不同监管强度下碳排放权交易违约行为的实验研究

2017年底中国全国碳市场启动,全球正式运行的碳排放权交易体系达到21个。伴随碳排放权交易的广泛开展,加之产品市场不确定性的冲击,控排企业的违约行为也日益多样化和复杂化。基于此,根据中国碳市场试点地区的通行交易规则,通过在产品市场中引入随机冲击,分析在具有储蓄机制且存在不确定性需求的碳交易体系中,企业违约行为的方式以及监管强度对企业违约行为的影响。研究结果表明:抽查比例较高的强监管设置下被试不会产生系统动机来排放违约,弱监管设置下明显的报告违约会导致排放总量上升。即使面临不确定性冲击,储蓄机制依然能促进控排企业以一个相对有效的方式跨期分配生产量。因此给出如下建议:违约处罚应该分级,报告违约处罚力度应大于排放违约;为提高实际履约率,各地应提高排放报告抽查比例;完善配额储蓄机制。     

EU ETS对欧洲电力行业的影响及对我国的建议

简要介绍欧盟排放交易体系（EU ETS）的发展情况,调研EU ETS对欧洲电力行业影响的研究现状,认为EU ETS将增加发电企业的生产成本,迅速提高电力市场价格,大幅增加发电企业利润,刺激能源技术投资和创新。同时简要评述EU ETS引发的争议问题,包括当前EU ETS对发电企业和电力市场的实际影响、发电企业巨额利润问题的产生原因等。在此基础上,对比中国和欧盟之间的差异,初步分析建设国内碳交易市场将对我国电力行业产生的影响,最后对我国建设碳交易市场提出建议。     

碳市场建设路径研究：国际经验及对中国的启示

基于国际碳市场建设的初始决策环境,从政治诉求、决策环境、经济基础、市场根基等4个维度的32个子指标构建了碳市场建立背景与条件指标体系,据此深入挖掘了欧盟碳排放权交易体系(EU ETS)、美国区域温室气体减排行动(RGGI)、美国西部行动倡议(WCI)等国际典型碳市场建立的背景与基础条件,并归纳出各国建立不同类型碳市场的必要条件,进而判断中国建立各类碳市场所具备的条件和不足之处。研究发现：跨界联盟型碳市场建立通常具备经济联系紧密、单个地区减排成本过高和地理位置临近等3个要点;国家型碳市场建立通常考虑到了国家强制减排责任、能源结构转型需求强烈和稳固的国家立法保障等方面;地区型碳市场的建立需满足地区减排诉求强烈与国家层面排放权立法缺失等条件;行业型碳市场建立的基础条件则包括温室气体排放集中度高、行业竞争力保护、重点行业排放需求增长和行业排放数据基础稳固等4个特征。当前,中国碳市场应重点考虑行业型与跨界联盟型碳市场并行的建设模式,进一步完善碳市场监管法律体系,加快各省市排放数据清单制作,加强地方碳市场能力建设培训,尽快完善国家型碳市场建立的基本条件,进而实现温室气体减排与产业结构升级的双重目标。     

碳市场价格稳定机制探索及对中国碳市场建设的建议北大核心CSCD

通过总结欧盟碳排放权交易市场(EU ETS)的实践经验,提出了碳市场运行过程中潜在的碳排放权价格过度波动的问题,深入剖析了碳市场过度波动性的根源及其负面影响,在此基础上提出了引入碳市场价格稳定机制的必要性。文章系统分析了几种主要的碳市场价格稳定机制、相应的实施手段及可能存在的问题。根据EU ETS等国际碳市场的经验,建议中国在碳市场建立之初,应该考虑设计一套系统灵活、简单易行且实施成本较低的碳市场价格稳定方案,包括整个试点期内价格暴涨预防机制、价格暴跌预防机制以及试点期内各年份之间的价格波动平抑机制,使得碳市场充分发挥作用,以较低成本达成既定减排目标。     

美国碳排放权交易体系评析

通过评析当前美国最主要的两类碳排放交易体系--自愿减排和总量控制与交易体系的发展现状与前景得到,自愿减排终因需求不足而难以维系,只有建立碳排放的总量控制与交易体系,才能进行持续的碳交易,完成减碳目标。借鉴美国区域温室气体行动、西部气候倡议和加州总量控制与交易体系的经验,建议中国选择具有一定基础的省份或行业试行总量控制与交易体系,初期排放配额的分配以免费发放为主,拍卖为辅,并严格控制碳抵消的数量和范围等,然后再逐步过渡到拍卖方式。     

中国试点ETS的碳减排效果评估——基于分省高耗能工业子行业数据的分析

评估中国试点碳排放权交易体系(ETS)碳减排效果的现有研究普遍存在处理组样本选取范围明显大于试点ETS实际覆盖范围的问题。因此,文中对研究样本进行了更为严格的甄别：将2005—2017年各省的六大高耗能工业子行业中纳入试点企业的体量占相应子行业体量60%及以上的工业子行业作为处理组,将非试点地区的工业子行业作为对照组。基于双重差分法的分析表明,相较于对照组,试点ETS在启动后不仅促进了处理组工业子行业碳排放绝对量的下降,还促进了其碳排放强度的下降,说明试点ETS具有明显的碳减排效果。工业子行业的总产值和人均总产值分别与其碳排放量和碳排放强度呈现出一定的库兹涅茨曲线效应,工业子行业资产的流动性越强、盈利能力越强、面临的环境规制强度越大,越有利于碳减排。建议主管部门坚定依靠市场手段来控制温室气体排放,尽快将更多行业纳入全国ETS;另外,应提高体系运行相关数据的公开力度,定期对体系进行分析评估,并及时公布评估结果。     

碳成本传递原理、影响因素及对中国碳市场的启示——以电力部门为例

以欧盟碳市场的实践以及中国碳市场的发展现状为背景,调研分析了碳成本传递原理,重点以电力行业为例分析碳成本传递率的主要影响因素。结果显示影响电力行业碳成本传递率的主要因素包括碳排放权交易的配额分配方式以及电力市场结构。分配方式对传递率的影响主要包括配额是否免费发放、是否实时更新免费配额的发放额度、关闭的发电设备是否获得免费配额和新进入者是否发放免费配额等因素。电力市场结构对传递率的影响主要体现在市场竞争程度、市场需求与供给条件。最后,基于当前国内碳市场试点的碳配额分配方式,给出了循序渐进地改变碳排放额初始分配的方法、减少一次性发放未来相对长时期的免费配额、选择基于发电量发放免费配额而非装机容量发放免费配额等相关政策建议。     

欧盟将民航运输纳入欧盟排放交易体系问题探析

按照欧盟法律,自2012年1月1日起在欧盟境内起降的航班排放将被纳入欧盟排放交易系统。通过详细解读欧盟这一法律,指出欧盟排放交易体系是典型的"上限-交易"系统,即通过规定排放上限与进行配额交易实现减排目标。欧盟此举本质目的是强化气候变化主导权,最终为经济谋利,加快完善欧盟碳交易市场以建设欧元货币权力体系。其结果可能引发其与《联合国气候变化框架公约》及《京都议定书》等国际法之间的法律冲突,购买配额将对民航运输发展造成制约,"可测量、可报告和可核实"将对发展中国家能力建设提出挑战,并将一定程度影响《联合国气候变化框架公约》下的行业减排谈判走向。     

全国碳排放权交易市场下电解铝行业基准线法研究

2011年以来,我国碳排放权交易市场建设不断加快,碳排放权交易机制不断健全完善,其中基准线法被确定为全国碳交易初始配额分配的主要方法。电解铝行业是我国能源消耗和碳排放的重点部门,尽早将该行业纳入碳市场对于行业减排、纵深推进全国碳市场交易以及应对国际碳边境调节机制政策均有重要意义。基于2018年电解铝行业直报的碳排放相关数据,确定了我国电解铝行业开展全国碳交易的基准线方案。结果显示,电解铝行业宜选取8.12~8.15 t CO₂/t铝作为基准线取值,不需设置区域差异调整系数。同时为保证电解铝行业碳交易的顺利开展,还需尽快确定行业配额方案,进一步完善企业排放量的监测、报告和核查以提高核查填报数据质量,以及进一步研究电解铝行业碳排放核算的范围。     

中国试点ETS的碳减排效果评估——基于分省高耗能工业子行业数据的分析

评估中国试点碳排放权交易体系(ETS)碳减排效果的现有研究普遍存在处理组样本选取范围明显大于试点ETS实际覆盖范围的问题。因此,文中对研究样本进行了更为严格的甄别:将2005—2017年各省的六大高耗能工业子行业中纳入试点企业的体量占相应子行业体量60%及以上的工业子行业作为处理组,将非试点地区的工业子行业作为对照组。基于双重差分法的分析表明,相较于对照组,试点ETS在启动后不仅促进了处理组工业子行业碳排放绝对量的下降,还促进了其碳排放强度的下降,说明试点ETS具有明显的碳减排效果。工业子行业的总产值和人均总产值分别与其碳排放量和碳排放强度呈现出一定的库兹涅茨曲线效应,工业子行业资产的流动性越强、盈利能力越强、面临的环境规制强度越大,越有利于碳减排。建议主管部门坚定依靠市场手段来控制温室气体排放,尽快将更多行业纳入全国ETS;另外,应提高体系运行相关数据的公开力度,定期对体系进行分析评估,并及时公布评估结果。     

Understanding carbon trading: Effects of delegating CO2 responsibility on organizations’ trading behaviour

The establishment of a carbon market assumes that there is an effective means of transforming price information into technical carbon reduction measures. However, empirical evidence reveals that the links between price information and carbon management strategies are far from obvious. To understand how delegating CO₂ responsibility affects CO₂ trading behaviour, this article proposes a neo-institutionalist approach to answering the question of why companies became sellers, buyers or a combination of both during phase I of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Original data from a survey on companies that participated in this scheme were collected and analysed. It was assumed that the trading scheme offered two ways to delegate decisions regarding emissions trading: decoupling from technical knowledge and financialization (i.e. delegating to financial departments) or coupling using technicalization (i.e. delegating to manufacturing departments). The results support the hypothesis that a company that adopts a decoupling strategy is more likely to buy certificates to fulfil their emissions targets. Adopting a coupling strategy indicates that a company is more likely to become a seller, all else equal. Professional identity is the theoretical basis for this relationship. Delegating carbon management to different departments represents either a stronger coupling or a stronger decoupling from core technological processes.

Policy relevance

The transaction data from phase I of the EU ETS open new questions and possibilities regarding the reasons that drive selling and buying in companies. It is important to look not only at the traditional sources of transaction costs, but rather also at the reasons for these tensions. One important source is the professional education of the people in charge of the EU ETS. Tailored information that directly addresses the different professional backgrounds of managers working in both financial departments and more technical departments might help to lower these types of transaction costs. In today's context, important emitter countries, such as China and Korea, have launched their own emissions markets, copying many aspects of the EU ETS. For the positive development of these markets and as a way of establishing a global emissions market, these new schemes should learn from the EU ETS experience.     

Transfer patterns in Phase I of the EU Emissions Trading System: a first reality check based on cluster analysis

In 2005, the world's largest Emissions Trading System (ETS) was introduced in the EU. Economic theory assumes high efficiency of such market-based instruments since companies have the flexibility to trade allowances. However, to date there is a lack of understanding on how companies have participated in the allowance markets. This article uses data on transfers of allowances between 2005 and the end of 2007, published by the EU in the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) after a five-year delay. We use cluster analysis to detect patterns in the data and differentiate transfer behaviour. We find that the vast majority of participants (7212 accounts) are rather passive in terms of transfers. Of these, more than half are hardly participating in the market at all, whereas one-third are accounts managed by another account belonging to the parent company. Opposed to that, 143 accounts show more active, but relatively diverse transfer behaviour. We also identify differences in sectoral representations, account types, and primary allocation across the seven clusters. While the passive accounts mostly belong to installations regulated under the EU ETS, the most active accounts are classified as ‘non-regulated account type'.     

The effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

How effective is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in promoting emissions reduction for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol commitment? A theoretical benchmark is determined in order to assess the stringency of the ETS cap and to evaluate whether emissions allowances have been over-allocated. This analysis clarifies how the emissions reduction effort has been divided between ETS and non-ETS sectors, highlighting the extent to which Member States effectively rely on the ETS to comply with their Kyoto commitments. Finally, inefficiencies relating to the over-allocation of allowances are analysed; namely cross-subsidization from non-ETS to ETS sectors, national subsidies to the ETS sectors, and distortion of competition.     

The impact of administrative transaction costs in the EU emissions trading system

This article empirically investigates the impact of transaction costs for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions on companies regulated by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in Germany. Based on a unique panel dataset, we investigate if MRV costs are dependent on the amount of annual emissions of regulated companies and if there are differences in transaction costs between economic sectors. The results indicate that administrative costs are dependent on the amount of annual emissions for larger companies, which has implications for the economic efficiency of the EU ETS. The most important finding, however, is that there are significant differences in MRV transaction costs dependent on the type and size of companies. This implies the existence of considerable economies of scale. Overall, the EU ETS could benefit from reforms by means of a push towards upstream regulation as this would likely increase administrative efficiency.

Policy relevance statement

Transaction costs are, among other things, an important aspect of market-based climate policy design. A policy instrument with low transaction costs is preferred over instruments with larger transaction costs under equal conditions. This is occasionally referred to as administrative efficiency, and its importance was acknowledged in directive 2009/29/EC of the European Commission. Thoughtful empirical examination of transaction costs is essential in order to inform about the extent and impact of these costs. This article provides an analysis of transaction costs for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions in the EU ETS. It is shown that administrative costs will likely have negative effects on the cost efficiency of the EU ETS. However, the most relevant finding is that small companies (<250 employees) or firms emitting small amounts of carbon dioxide per year face far higher average transaction costs compared with larger firms or emitters. Thus, there is a tendency for the EU ETS to cause MRV transaction costs that are disadvantageous for small companies. A regulation that is more upstream-oriented could mitigate this negative effect to some extent. The EU ETS could initiate a reform that is targeted on putting a price on the carbon content of fossil fuels instead of directly regulating emissions in a so-called ‘end-of-the-pipe’ way at the installation level.     

Can the EU emission trading scheme support CDM forestry?

Abstract

The European Commission is mandated to consider the inclusion of credits from land-use projects under the clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI), beginning with the second period of the European Union's emission trading scheme (ETS) in its report due in July 2006. Temporary credits from afforestation and reforestation under the CDM are seen by many as posing a technical problem for their use under the ETS. This article summarizes three feasible, efficient and environmentally sound alternatives for achieving the integration of such temporary credits in the European emissions trading market starting in 2008. The first proposal integrates tCERs and lCERs (temporary credits) into the EU ETS by allowing for their direct use for compliance purposes. The second proposal builds on the idea of swapping temporary credits for EU allowances (EUAs) by Member States. The third proposal would not require a political decision at the EU level. Instead supportive Member States or private carbon fund operators would agree to swap temporary credits for the CERs or ERUs they hold in their accounts. All three solutions would be linked to a risk-mitigation strategy based on levying a fee or fixing an exchange rate, which would allow governments to hedge the risk of losing temporary credits.     

Emissions trading and competitiveness: lessons from Germany

Germany's National Allocation Plans (NAP I and NAP II) for implementing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) are critically analysed. Emissions trading has created a new scarcity, and grandfathering constitutes a subsidy that is used to reach additional policy goals related to energy and distribution policy. With respect to energy policy, the objective was to protect the German coal industry; but in terms of distribution policy the hidden agenda was to allocate as many emissions allowances as possible to the industries involved. The whole discussion is based on the false premise that a generous, or at least ‘needs-based’, allocation of costless emissions allowances increases an industry's competitiveness. As a consequence, NAP I is overburdened with several complex special rules and exemptions which distort the incentive effect of emissions trading, thus making climate change mitigation in Germany more costly than necessary. The attempted continuation of this policy, in particular with regard to new installations and an over-generous cap, has led to the European Commission's rejection of these rules in the German NAP II in November 2006. Despite significant improvements since then, some important shortfalls remain. Unfortunately, the economic literature available on this topic refers to highly stylized models of allocation rules and neglects the concrete details of the German NAP II. This article tries to close this gap in the literature by analysing the most distorting rules as well as the most important and arguments of the misguided debate on competitiveness.     

Chinese business at the dawn of its domestic emissions trading scheme: incentives and barriers to participation in carbon trading

This article explores the incentives and challenges for Chinese business companies in participating in carbon emissions trading schemes (ETSs). Based on extensive interviews with the business managers and government officers who are currently involved in the ongoing policy experiments of pilot ETS programmes across China, the article identifies factors that either motivate or discourage companies in participating in carbon trading activities. It argues that different business groups, i.e. capped enterprises, uncapped enterprises, and carbon intermediaries, are affected by these factors to significantly different extents in terms of formulating their specific carbon strategies. It also illustrates some factors, such as a lack of stakeholder pressure and fragmented political interests, which have a distinctive Chinese character and are believed will have a fundamental impact on the quality and efficiency of Chinese ETSs in the future.

Policy relevance

At the outset, the successful implementation of any ETS depends critically on the active involvement of business actors across various industries. Hence, having an understanding of the business incentives and obstacles in participating in carbon trading is crucial, as these factors will ultimately determine the size and quality of the carbon market, and the total volume and integrity of the GHG emissions to be traded. This article also illustrates the common factors that affect business appetite for carbon trading throughout the world, as well as the factors that are unique to the Chinese political and economic context to constrain business in the market. Finally, a presentation of the business attitude towards the ETS experiment indicates the most worrying aspects of the policy design regarding carbon trading in China. As the construction and implementation of the ETS is a long-term undertaking, such investigation deserves attention from both policy makers and business leaders alike.     

Effectiveness of pilot carbon emissions trading systems in China

China is in the process of establishing a national emissions trading system (ETS). Evaluating the implementation effectiveness of the seven pilot ETSs in China is critical for designing this national system. This study administered a questionnaire survey to assess the behaviour of enterprises covered by the seven ETS pilots from the perspective of: the strictness of compliance measures; rules for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV); the mitigation pressure felt by enterprises; and actual mitigation and trading activities. The results show that the pilot MRV and compliance rules have not yet been fully implemented. The main factors involved are the lack of compulsory force of the regulations and the lack of policy awareness within the affected enterprises. Most enterprises have a shortage of free allowances and thus believe that the ETSs have increased their production costs. Most enterprises have already established mitigation targets. Some of the covered enterprises are aware of their own internal emission reduction costs and most of these have used this as an important reference in trading. Many enterprises have accounted for carbon prices in their long-term investment. The proportion of enterprises that have participated in trading is fairly high; however, reluctance to sell is quite pervasive in the market, and enterprises are mostly motivated to trade simply in order to achieve compliance. Few enterprises are willing to manage their allowances in a market-oriented manner. Different free allowance allocation methods directly affect the pathways enterprises take to control emissions.

Key policy insights

• In the national ETS, the compulsory force of ETS provisions should be strengthened.

• A reasonable level of free allowance shortage should be ensured to promote emission reduction by enterprises.

• Sufficient information should be provided to guide enterprises in their allowance management to activate the market.

• To promote the implementation of mitigation technologies by enterprises, actual output-based allocation methods should be used.

• The government should use market adjustment mechanisms, such as a price floor and ceiling, to ensure that carbon prices are reasonable and stable, so as to guide long-term low carbon investment.