不同监管强度下碳排放权交易违约行为的实验研究

2017年底中国全国碳市场启动,全球正式运行的碳排放权交易体系达到21个。伴随碳排放权交易的广泛开展,加之产品市场不确定性的冲击,控排企业的违约行为也日益多样化和复杂化。基于此,根据中国碳市场试点地区的通行交易规则,通过在产品市场中引入随机冲击,分析在具有储蓄机制且存在不确定性需求的碳交易体系中,企业违约行为的方式以及监管强度对企业违约行为的影响。研究结果表明:抽查比例较高的强监管设置下被试不会产生系统动机来排放违约,弱监管设置下明显的报告违约会导致排放总量上升。即使面临不确定性冲击,储蓄机制依然能促进控排企业以一个相对有效的方式跨期分配生产量。因此给出如下建议:违约处罚应该分级,报告违约处罚力度应大于排放违约;为提高实际履约率,各地应提高排放报告抽查比例;完善配额储蓄机制。

Experimental study on the default behavior of the carbon emission trading under different supervision intensity

With the launch of China’s national carbon market at the end of 2017, 21 carbon emission trading systems have been put into operation worldwide. With the extensive development of carbon emission trading and the impact of the uncertainty of the product market, the default behavior of emission control firms is also increasingly diversified and complicated. Based on this, according to the prevailing business rules in the pilot areas of China’s carbon markets, this paper analyzes the ways of default behavior of the firms and the influence of supervision intensity on a carbon trading system with a savings mechanism and uncertain demand by introducing stochastic shocks into the product market. When the audit probability is high, the subjects will not generate systematic motivation to default on emissions, and obvious default on report under weak supervision settings will lead to an increase in total emissions. Faced with the impact of uncertainty, the savings mechanism can still promote the pollution sources of controlled emissions enterprises to distribute production in a relatively effective way. Therefore, this study gives the following suggestions: penalties for default should be graded, and penalties for reporting default should be greater than penalties for emission default; in order to improve the actual compliance rate, all localities should increase the proportion of spot checks on emission reports; the quota savings mechanism should be improved.