“可测量、可报告、可核实”方法的框架及在中国的适用性分析

《联合国气候变化框架公约》第13次缔约方会议通过的《巴厘行动计划》中,提出了"可测量、可报告、可核实(MRV)"的国家行动的概念,包括在下一个国际协议中。但目前对哪些内容要进行MRV,范围是什么,发达国家和发展中国家都要如何进行MRV还不是很清晰,也存在不少争议。本文提供了作者的研究认识,就MRV的框架进行描述,并结合一些政策制定中的核心问题进行了分析。同时在中国背景下分析了如何进行已有国家行动和政策的MRV,以及未来的方向。     

我国部门减排行动可测量、可报告、可核实现状分析

通过一系列的部门政策和措施的论述,证明了我国各部门减缓政策和措施已经通过国内系统得到了报告和核证,显示了“可测量,可报告和可核实”（MRV）的实际部门应用,同时指出部门方案具有不同的度量、报告制度和核证程序,以及不同的减排效果。这些部门减缓行动的MRV特点为国际MRV的构建提供了案例基础。     

国际气候投融资监测、报告与核证制度及启示

实现中国2030年前碳达峰、2060年前碳中和需要大量的资金支持,亟需构建与之匹配的气候投融资体系.气候投融资监测、报告与核证(M RV)是气候投融资体系的重要组成部分,一方面能够有效地监督报告资金来源、使用及效果,另一方面能够统筹利用现有资金充分发挥对应对气候变化的积极作用,并撬动更多资金流向气候变化领域.本文通过广...     

《巴黎协定》与国际减缓气候变化合作模式的变迁

由于温室气体排放的全球外部性属性,减缓气候变化必须通过国际合作实现,必须体现一定程度的中央集权,考虑参与主体广泛性、减缓行动的范围和行动力度三大要素。《联合国气候变化框架公约》《京都议定书》及其“多哈修正案”“坎昆协议”等方案,对中央集权程度和三大要素各有取舍,构建了不同的国际减缓气候变化合作模式,但从实践看都未能解决国际减缓合作的问题。《巴黎协定》构建了“承诺+审评”的新模式,有望实现参与主体和行动范围的全覆盖,并通过透明度、遵约和全球盘点机制鼓励各参与方提高行动力度。然而要实现公约目标和科学应对气候变化的要求,《巴黎协定》下的国际减缓合作必须通过强化资金、技术、能力建设机制来保障,并通过进一步明确中长期量化目标来促进各方提高行动力度。     

Operationalizing the Adaptation Fund: challenges in allocating funds to the vulnerable

The Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto Protocol marks a change in the international climate change financing architecture due to its independence from official development assistance, direct access and the majority of developing countries in governance. A major goal of the Adaptation Fund is to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The presented analysis considers the results of operationalization of the fund between 2008 and 2010, and the role vulnerability had in the allocation of funds. The definition of ‘vulnerability’ remains broad and currently does not allow for a prioritization in the allocation of funds. Criteria like ‘level of vulnerability’ or ‘adaptive capacity’ still need to be specified. The possibilities for the Adaptation Fund Board to implement a vulnerability-oriented funding approach are limited by the legal basis of the Kyoto Protocol and the principle of a country-driven approach. The effective support of vulnerable communities primarily depends on the institutional capacities and the institutional arrangement at the national level and the quality of analysis the adaptation projects and programmes are based on.     

Obtaining public support for North-South climate funding: Evidence from conjoint experiments in donor countries

The adoption of the Warsaw mechanism on loss and damage has again highlighted the North-South divide in those parts of UNFCCC negotiations dealing with international climate finance. Current estimates put required funding from rich countries at 50–100 billion Euros per year to induce non-Annex I countries to take on greenhouse gas limitation commitments and to assist highly vulnerable countries. Results from survey-embedded conjoint experiments can help policy-makers anticipate opportunities and pitfalls in designing large-scale climate funding schemes. We implemented such experiments in the United States and Germany to better understand what institutional design characteristics are likely to garner more public support for climate funding among citizens in key developed countries. We find that climate funding receives more public support if it flows to efficient governments, funding decisions are made jointly by donor and recipient countries, funding is used both for mitigation and adaptation, and other donor countries contribute a large share. Contrary to what one might expect, climate change damage levels, income, and emissions in/of potential recipient countries have no significant effect on public support. These findings suggest that finance mechanisms that focus purely on compensating developing countries, without contributing to the global public good of mitigation, will find it hard to garner public support.     

未来联合国气候变化谈判的核心内容及前景展望——“巴厘路线图”解读

详细介绍了《联合国气候变化框架公约》缔约方会议第13次会议通过的"巴厘路线图"的具体内容。"巴厘路线图"规划了未来两年将要谈判的重要议题,包括发达国家在2012年后减排温室气体义务;发展中国家未来温室气体减排行动;适应气候变化;发达国家未来向发展中国家提供技术转让、资金支持和能力建设等。这些议题谈判的成败,将对未来保护气候的国际努力、对未来全球的气候环境产生决定性影响,从而对谈判前景做了分析     

未来联合国气候变化谈判的核心内容及前景展望——“巴厘路线图”解读

 详细介绍了《联合国气候变化框架公约》缔约方会议第13次会议通过的"巴厘路线图"的具体内容。"巴厘路线图"规划了未来两年将要谈判的重要议题,包括发达国家在2012年后减排温室气体义务;发展中国家未来温室气体减排行动;适应气候变化;发达国家未来向发展中国家提供技术转让、资金支持和能力建设等。这些议题谈判的成败,将对未来保护气候的国际努力、对未来全球的气候环境产生决定性影响,从而对谈判前景做了分析     

Future mitigation commitments: differentiating among non-Annex I countries

Abstract

In the long term, any definition of adequacy consistent with UNFCCC Article 2 will require increased mitigation efforts from almost all countries. Therefore, an expansion of emission limitation commitments will form a central element of any future architecture of the climate regime. This expansion has two elements: deepening of quantitative commitments for Annex B countries and the adoption of commitments for those countries outside of the current limitation regime. This article seeks to provide a more analytical basis for further differentiation among non-Annex I countries. To be both fair and reflective of national circumstances, it is based on the criteria of responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate. Altogether, non-Annex I countries were differentiated in four groups, each including countries with similar national circumstances: newly industrialized countries (NICs), rapidly industrializing countries (RIDCs), ‘other developing countries’, and least developed countries (LDCs). Based on the same criteria that were used for differentiating among non-Annex I countries, a set of decision rules was developed to assign mitigation and financial transfer commitments to each group of countries (including Annex I countries). Applying these decision rules results in (strict) reduction commitments for Annex I countries, but also implies quantifiable mitigation obligations for NICs and RIDCs, assisted by financial transfers from the North. Other developing countries are obliged to take qualitative commitments, but quantifiable mitigation commitments for these countries and the LDC group would be not justifiable. As national circumstances in countries evolve over time, the composition of the groups will change according to agreed triggers.     

Building bridges to 2020 and beyond: the road from Bali

What would the shape of a realistic, yet ambitious, package for the climate regime after 2012 look like? How do we obtain a package deal starting in Bali but building bridges to a post-2020 climate regime? A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive package deal has to strike a core balance between development and climate imperatives (mitigation, adaptation, dealing with the impacts of response measures, technology transfer, investment and finance) to create bargaining space and establish a conceptual contract zone. Within a continuum of possible packages, two packages in the contract zone are identified: ‘multi-stage’ and ‘ambitious transitional’. The latter is ambitious, combining domestic cap-and-trade for the USA, deeper cuts for Annex B countries, and quantifiable mitigation actions by developing countries. It is transitional as a possible bridge to a more inclusive regime beyond 2020. Multi-stage is defined around mechanisms by which countries move through increasingly stringent levels of participation, and must be based upon agreed triggers. Our assessment of political dynamics is that multi-stage is not yet in the political contract zone. Key to this is the absence of a ‘trigger from the North’, in that the largest historical emitter must act earlier and most decisively. But progress will also depend on continued leadership from Annex B countries, as well as more proactive, incentivized leadership in the South. Agreeing on the transitional stage is the critical next step in the evolution of the climate regime. Negotiating any package will require an institutional space for bargaining, political leadership and trust, and a clear time-frame.     

Debt-for-climate swaps: Killing two birds with one stone?

The COVID-19 pandemic has further fuelled problems of debt sustainability in developing countries and has sapped the fiscal resources needed to finance climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. We examine whether “debt-for-climate” swaps, instruments whereby debtor countries are relieved from their contractual debt obligations in return for local climate-related spending commitments, may be helpful in tackling worrying debt levels and climate concerns simultaneously. We point out that debt swaps do not have a great historical track record but that common flaws such as their piecemeal nature, lack of additionality and creation of parallel implementation structures, could be overcome by scaling up and careful design. To realize swaps’ full potential, a distinction needs to be made between situations where debt is clearly unsustainable and where it is high but sustainable. In the former case, deep and comprehensive debt restructuring should be the primary focus, rather than closely matching debt service savings with increased climate spending; in the latter case, stand-alone debt swaps may be used to transfer resources from creditors to debtor countries that are committed to climate investments but lack fiscal space. Another helpful differentiation is that between middle-income debtor countries, where debt swaps could finance climate mitigation interventions, and low-income debtors, where investments in adaption deserve prioritization. Finally, debt swap proposals need to be mindful of creditor incentives, including positive reputational payoffs, achieving greater scale using a multi-creditor set-up, at the same time as carefully considering governance credentials in each country context.     

Does funds-based adaptation finance reach the most vulnerable countries?

The evolving architecture of global climate change adaptation finance is shifting towards fund mechanisms with competitive application and allocation principles. At the same time, prioritization of the most vulnerable countries is a key goal within this emerging architecture. The paper analyses whether the Green Climate Fund (GCF), by far the largest climate change fund, has so far delivered on its promise to prioritize the most vulnerable countries. For our analysis, we consider the USD 2.5 billion GCF funding allocated until the end of the first mobilization phase and disaggregate it project-by-project into its mitigation and adaptation related amounts. We then analyze the adaptation flows in terms of the recipient country’s level of vulnerability and institutional capacity. We further analyze whether funds are being accessed through independent national entities or international intermediaries and whether recipient countries have developing country priority status. The results show that funds-based adaptation finance creates an ambiguous picture: On the one hand, the GCF is on track in allocating its funds largely to country groups which its statutes aim to prioritize, particularly LDCs, African countries and SIDS. At the same time, the proposal process results in the fact that many countries with the highest climate vulnerability but weak government institutions and fragile state-bureaucracies have missed out and not been able to access project funding, mostly LDCs in Africa and conflict-ridden countries. Further, most countries have not yet been able to access project funds independently through their national entities, limiting direct access and country ownership – the strengthening of which is a major goal of the fund. The findings suggest that simplified approval tracks need to be strengthened in the emerging climate finance architecture so that populations in countries with the lowest institutional capacity but highest vulnerability are not being left behind in the long-run.     

Technological capability and transfer for achieving South Africa's development goals

Technological capability and technology transfer both play important roles in achieving low-carbon development targets and the concepts of both have appeared in national development and climate policy debates. Yet, they differ. Improving capabilities and transfer mechanisms are two differing approaches to technological development. Technology transfer is associated with a key political dynamic within international climate policy, in that developing countries request support from industrialised countries. Whereas technological capability focuses on building internal capabilities and is often framed in the context of national industrial policy plans rather than relying on external support. We argue that technology development, a combination of these approaches, can contribute to South Africa's low-carbon development through innovation and technology-based mitigation actions that increase domestic technological capabilities. Technological capability needs to become a determinant of mitigation action to effectively contribute to achieving South Africa's low-carbon development goals. International technology transfer and cooperation should contribute to boosting domestic capabilities to advance technological development. Technology transfer based on pure sales will not contribute to achieving long-term low-carbon development goals.     

从哥本哈根气候变化大会看气候变化谈判的焦点问题及IPCC第五次评估报告的可能作用

从哥本哈根气候变化大会的谈判焦点可以预期,后续国际气候变化谈判的重点将是谈判的基础案文、发达国家在《京都议定书》第二承诺期进一步的量化减排承诺以及长期目标的表述等问题。IPCC第五次评估报告将对以往报告已阐述的科学问题和基本结论加以巩固并提供更有说服力的证据和论据,更加侧重区域问题,增加适应和减缓经济学成本、气候变化与可持续发展等内容的分析。关于气候变化检测和归因、气候变化影响和关键脆弱性、大气温室气体浓度稳定水平、适应的选择及其成本效益、减缓措施的选择和社会经济成本、责任分担机制及公平性等问题的评估结论,将对谈判进程的推进发挥重要作用。     

Russia: climate policy formation and implementation during the 1990s

Russian climate policy initially developed slowly, mostly in response to the emerging international regime in the early 1990s. Developments accelerated by the end of the decade, under the influence of the UNFCCC, and especially, its Kyoto Protocol. Developments included creation of institutional framework for domestic implementation of its reporting and other UNFCCC commitments, formulation of mitigation and adaptation strategies and measures, GHG inventory compilation and reporting, crystallizing its major national positions towards international mechanisms, initiation of vertical subsidiarity of government authority in climate policy implementation, and channeling interactions between the government and business community. The Kyoto Protocol and its international mechanisms (particularly IET and JI), mark a turning point, with opportunities for Russia to benefit if the Kyoto Protocol enters into force; the apparent US withdrawal from Kyoto puts Russia in a central position. Besides external influences, national climate policy has been strongly influenced by the domestic reforms towards market economy and democracy: combining new opportunities with constraints characteristic of the transition period. The gap between climate policy goals and putting them in practice has been considerable, but is narrowing.     

Natural gas and climate finance

Should energy projects to extend the use of natural gas be considered for funding under public climate finance commitments? This article provides an overview of evidence for and against climate finance for natural gas projects. The argument focuses on a case study, the UK’s International Climate Fund (ICF). This synthesis concludes that gas-related projects will rarely be eligible for funding under public climate finance, save a few exceptions in which they provide energy access to households directly. Although gas power plants have generally lower emissions than those which use other fossil fuels such as coal, their impact will depend on the material constraints to calculate emissions reductions, the context of implementation, and the political economy of the target country. Three case studies demonstrate that energy access projects need to be understood as providing a whole range of sustainable benefits, from improving local health to reducing emissions. Overall, gas-related projects are complex interventions that require context-specific knowledge of both the effects of technology and the possible business models that can work in context.

POLICY RELEVANCE

This article investigates whether projects related to natural gas constitute an appropriate use of public climate finance, with a particular focus on the UK’s International Climate Fund. Policy makers in developed countries will decide in the coming years how to use public climate finance; that is, the fraction of overseas development assistance (ODA) for climate change mitigation and adaptation. In the UK, for example, the ICF is the most important instrument to provide climate finance for developing countries. In 2013, the UK set out a clear position ‘to end support for public financing of new coal-fired power plants overseas, except in rare circumstances.’ This ban has fostered debate about whether similar positions should follow for other fossil fuels such as natural gas, specifically in the context of ICF funding. Similar debates are taking place in other countries such as Germany and Norway, and are informing the implementation of international facilities such as the Green Climate Fund.     

Assessing progress in MRV capacity development: experience with a scorecard approach

This article reports experiences gathered in 12 developing countries in Latin America and Africa with capacity development for national GHG inventory systems. The national systems and their ability to deliver on measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) requirements is assessed using a scorecard that covers the transparency, accuracy, completeness, consistency, and comparability of the GHG inventory as well as its institutional set-up and management aspects. The analysis shows that a quantitative assessment of GHG inventory systems with a scorecard is feasible and useful, and could commonly be used for tracking progress in MRV capacity development.

Policy relevance

A large number of capacity development initiatives are underway to advance national GHG inventory systems in developing countries, particularly in the land-use sector. These aim to promote the reliable MRV of GHG emissions and removals, which is expected to underpin developing countries’ contributions to global mitigation efforts, including through results-based payments. Although MRV is a cornerstone of climate change policy and despite widespread capacity gaps, there is little conclusive evidence about the effectiveness of such capacity development. This article relates the positive experience from one initiative, the Capacity Development for REDD+ project, which employed a novel, scorecard-based approach to results monitoring. Considerable progress is observed and provides reassurance regarding the soundness of development agencies’ significant investments in MRV. Disaggregating scores by countries and by underlying criteria also provides insights to prioritize further investments.     

Who picks up the remainder? Mitigation in developed and developing countries

A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive climate regime beyond 2012 will need several political balances. Mitigation and funding will be at the heart of the agreement. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report indicates that absolute reductions will be needed in Annex I (AI) countries and substantial deviation from baseline in some non-Annex I (NAI) regions by 2020. Although the latter was not explicitly quantified by the IPCC, the EU subsequently proposed a range for developing countries. Sharing the burden for mitigation is essentially zero-sum: if one does less, the other has to do more. We critically examine the implicit assumption that NAI countries would pick up the remainder of the required global effort minus the AI contribution. We suggest that greater levels of ambition can be achieved by turning the formula around politically, starting from the achievable ‘deviation below baseline’ given NAI's national programmes and appropriate international support. AI countries may have to exceed the IPCC ranges or pay for the remainder. For notional levels of NAI mitigation action, Annex I has to reduce by between ?52% and ?69% below 1990 by 2020, only dropping to a domestic ?35% with commitments to offset payments through the carbon market. Given the large mitigation gap, a political agreement on the question of ‘who pays’ is fundamental. The carbon market will provide some investment, but it mainly serves to reduce costs, particularly in developed countries, rather than adding to the overall effort. Market-linked levies and Annex I public funding will therefore be crucial to bridge the gap.     

发达国家2020年前应对气候变化行动和支持力度盘点

在应对气候变化问题上,发达国家有率先减排和为发展中国家提供气候资金支持的义务。根据《联合国气候变化框架公约》相关成果,发达国家做出了到2020年减排温室气体和每年动员1000亿美元气候资金的承诺,综合相关数据信息盘点了上述承诺的实施进展,结果显示发达国家2020年减排目标力度不足,核算规则不清晰,部分国家缺乏减排进展,气候资金的概念和范围尚有争议,现有气候资金规模与承诺仍有较大差距,《联合国气候变化框架公约》下资金机制作用仍待加强,并且发展中国家需要更大规模的气候资金支持。发达国家2020年承诺兑现不力不利于巩固多边进程各方互信,且有向发展中国家转嫁责任之嫌。为此,建议中国在国际气候谈判进程中,依托谈判联盟,进一步敦促发达国家履行2020年承诺并提高力度。     

A new look at climate equity in the UNFCCC

Equity has been at the core of the global climate debate since its inception over two decades ago, yet the current negotiations toward an international climate agreement in 2015 provide a new and critical opportunity to make forward progress on the difficult web of equity issues. These negotiations and the discussions about equity are taking place in a context that has shifted: all countries will be covered under a new agreement; growing climate impacts are being felt, especially by the most vulnerable; and there is an emergence of new institutions and increasing complexity in the international climate regime. Innovative thinking on equity, including which countries should take action and how, is therefore essential to finalizing an agreement by 2015. A broader, deeper, and more holistic view of equity is necessary, one that sees equity as a multi-dimensional challenge to be solved across all the facets of the international climate process.

Policy relevance

This article is relevant to policy makers following the development of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform as it prepares the way for a new agreement in 2015. The article focuses specifically on the issues most relevant to the debate around equity in the negotiations and how that debate is evolving with the expansion of the UNFCCC. It explains the current state of the negotiations and what issues are on the negotiating table, including the fact that negotiations on equity are now much broader than the mitigation commitments, to include the possible ‘equity reference framework’, concerns relating to adaptation and loss and damage, and the need for ambition in terms of mitigation and finance support.