公众为何对气候变化的科学结论信任不充分

通过系统分析世界各国气候传播领域近年来的进展,以解释为何公众对气候变化的科学结论缺乏信任这一复杂问题.文中首先概述了各国公众对气候变化的态度以及影响公众态度的社会、政治与经济因素,再分析了各国媒体对气候变化的报道及其媒体效果,并重点探究了社会心理因素如何影响人们对气候变化的认知与态度.此外国际气候传播研究对我国气候传播...     

中国土壤有机碳库及其演变与应对气候变化

 通过综述和评价中国土壤,特别是农田土壤有机碳库（以下简称碳库）的现状与演变态势, 讨论其对我国应对气候变化的意义, 提出了我国土壤碳库及其演变与应对气候变化的基本国情是：1) 我国土壤背景碳储量较低且区域分布不均衡;2) 我国土壤固碳效应明显,未来固碳减排潜力显著;3) 技术和政策是实现和提高我国土壤碳汇、促进我国应对气候变化能力建设的重要途径。建议进一步加强对我国农田土壤固碳减排的研发投入, 完善农业应对气候变化的相关政策和鼓励措施体系,研究构建气候友好的新型农业,以期在提高和稳定农业生产力与应对气候变化能力上获得双赢。     

中国土壤有机碳库及其演变与应对气候变化

通过综述和评价中国土壤,特别是农田土壤有机碳库（以下简称碳库）的现状与演变态势, 讨论其对我国应对气候变化的意义, 提出了我国土壤碳库及其演变与应对气候变化的基本国情是：1) 我国土壤背景碳储量较低且区域分布不均衡;2) 我国土壤固碳效应明显,未来固碳减排潜力显著;3) 技术和政策是实现和提高我国土壤碳汇、促进我国应对气候变化能力建设的重要途径。建议进一步加强对我国农田土壤固碳减排的研发投入, 完善农业应对气候变化的相关政策和鼓励措施体系,研究构建气候友好的新型农业,以期在提高和稳定农业生产力与应对气候变化能力上获得双赢。     

气候变化与松嫩流域黑土退化

松嫩流域是世界三大黑土带中国境内主要部分,黑土的开发利用和保护越来越受到关注.本文通过利用气候要素计算土壤有机碳含量的方法分析了松嫩流域黑土地有机碳含量的分布状况和近 50a来气候变化可能引起碳含量的减少.认为松嫩流域土壤有机碳含量的分布有很好的规律,呈自西南向东、向北减少的梯度变化.这种分布与松嫩流域长期以来形成的气候状况有关,即湿润地区优越于亚干旱地区;由于近 50a来的气候变化导致了土壤中有机碳的含量下降,西南部亚干旱地区减少的最多.因此可以得出近 50a的气候变化也是松嫩流域黑土退化的原因之一.     

绿色气候基金在全球气候治理体系中的作用和展望

作为《联合国气候变化框架公约》(简称公约）和《巴黎协定》资金机制最大运营实体,绿色气候基金(GCF)不仅是发达国家兑现1000亿美元长期资金承诺的重要平台,亦是公约和《巴黎协定》目标达成的关键因素。文中系统总结了GCF在推进气候变化国际合作进程、为发展中国家应对气候变化提供资金支持、推动私营部门参与应对气候变化行动等方面的积极作用。提出在当前多边合作面临挑战的复杂背景下,GCF亦面临美国退群、缺乏有效决策机制、项目质量及秘书处能力有待提高等系列问题。文章认为,一个持续有效运营的GCF是国际社会落实《巴黎协定》实施细则的重要保障,各方应尽快凝聚政治共识,推动GCF在全球气候治理体系中继续发挥积极作用。首先,应通过引入投票权决策机制、完善政策缺口、创新业务模式等措施提升基金治理和运营效率;其次,通过尽快完成正式增资进程、拓宽资金渠道、加强剩余资金管理等方式确保充足及可持续的资金来源;最后,还应通过强化与现有气候基金的协调互补、加大与多边发展银行的合作等途径与各方资金形成合力,推动资金流向低碳和气候韧性发展领域。文章还提出,中国应在有效发挥发达国家和发展中国家桥梁作用的基础上,引导GCF投票权改革以消除政治因素对GCF长远发展的负面影响,同时通过积极争取获得下届董事席位,推进与GCF全方位合作、参与GCF正式增资进程等举措,服务生态文明建设及全球应对气候变化目标。     

发达国家2020年前应对气候变化行动和支持力度盘点

在应对气候变化问题上,发达国家有率先减排和为发展中国家提供气候资金支持的义务。根据《联合国气候变化框架公约》相关成果,发达国家做出了到2020年减排温室气体和每年动员1000亿美元气候资金的承诺,综合相关数据信息盘点了上述承诺的实施进展,结果显示发达国家2020年减排目标力度不足,核算规则不清晰,部分国家缺乏减排进展,气候资金的概念和范围尚有争议,现有气候资金规模与承诺仍有较大差距,《联合国气候变化框架公约》下资金机制作用仍待加强,并且发展中国家需要更大规模的气候资金支持。发达国家2020年承诺兑现不力不利于巩固多边进程各方互信,且有向发展中国家转嫁责任之嫌。为此,建议中国在国际气候谈判进程中,依托谈判联盟,进一步敦促发达国家履行2020年承诺并提高力度。     

隐形碳关税:概念辨析与国际治理

碳关税是各国高度关注的贸易问题,因涉及各国经贸利益,南北国家在碳关税问题上分歧很大。任何有关碳关税的政策措施,都会引起发展中国家的强烈反对。因此,部分发达国家试图另辟蹊径,在国际贸易中通过增加生产标准、碳标签等技术要求,以比较隐蔽的方式实现执行碳关税的目的。文中将这些隐蔽的但能起到碳关税执行效果的政策措施归纳为隐形碳关税,并定义隐形碳关税是指那些虽然没有在边境环节征收碳关税,但与征收碳关税起到相同贸易壁垒作用的,对发展中国家出口产品和服务构成限制的政策和措施。隐形碳关税比较典型的表现形式包括生产标准、碳标签等措施。这些措施本身是政策中性的,并不构成隐形碳关税,但如果叠加了转移应对气候变化成本、限制发展中国家产业发展等目的,这些措施的性质便不再中性,而成为现实中的贸易壁垒。隐形碳关税的治理应该是国际气候治理进程的一个部分,《联合国气候变化框架公约》则应是隐形碳关税治理的主要国际平台。无论是在气候公约内还是气候公约外的治理机制,隐形碳关税的国际治理都应遵循气候公约的相关原则,尤其是共同但有区别责任原则,区别对待发达和发展中国家的责任和义务,充分发挥生产标准、碳标签等措施的积极环境效用,同时约束其不当使用,建立公平、互信、务实的国际合作模式,实现气候治理与经济发展的协同。     

南京信息工程大学气候与气候变化研究进展回顾

简要回顾了南京信息工程大学建校60 a来在气候与气候变化方向的研究历程,总结了南京信息工程大学（简称南信大）气候学科在辐射气候、山地气候、应用气候、气候诊断与预测、统计气候、气候变化与区域响应及其未来预估等方面的重要研究成果。     

对斯特恩新报告的要点评述和解读

 2006年10月,英国推出的由著名经济学家斯特恩爵士领导编写的《斯特恩回顾：气候变化经济学》,从经济学的角度着重论述了全球应对气候变化的紧迫性,强调只有尽快大幅度减少温室气体排放,才能避免全球升温超过2℃可能造成的巨大经济损失,且减排成本并不高。2008年4月,斯特恩爵士再次推出一份报告,提出为实现上述目标构建2012年后国际气候制度的基本要素,这对后续国际谈判可能会产生一定的影响。通过比较分析两份报告的关系和不同特点,对新报告中国际气候制度设计和评价的基本原则,全球减排的长期目标和减排义务的分担,通过资金、技术、市场、适应等国际政策措施吸引发展中国家参与,减少毁林排放,以及政策执行和制度建设等问题进行了评述和解读,其中内涵对深入开展国际气候制度的研究和我国参与国际气候谈判有重要启发。     

为IPCC第五次评估报告提供的全球气候模式预估

IPCC自1990年到2007年的4次评估报告都进行了未来气候变化预估,唱主角的一直是全球气候模式.从对未来气候变化的预估,到气候变化影响和对策评估研究,全球模式起了主导作用.因此,关注全球气候模式预估动态对第五次评估报告是非常重要的一个环节.     

Implementing climate change adaptation: lessons from India’s national adaptation fund on climate change (NAFCC)

With poverty alleviation and sustainable development as key imperatives for a developing economy like India, what drives the resource-constrained state governments to prioritize actions that address climate change impacts? We examine this question and argue that without access to additional earmarked financial resources, climate action would get overshadowed by developmental priorities and effective mainstreaming might not be possible. A systematic literature review was carried out to draw insights from the current state of implementation of adaptation projects, programmes and schemes at the subnational levels, along with barriers to mainstreaming climate change adaptation. The findings from a literature review were supplemented with lessons emerging from the implementation of India’s National Adaptation Fund on Climate Change (NAFCC). The results of this study underscore the scheme’s relevance.

Key policy insights

• Experience with NAFCC implementation reveals that states require sustained ‘handholding’ in terms of financial, technical and capacity support until climate change issues are fully understood and embedded in the policy landscape.

• Domestic sources of finance are critically important in the absence of predictable and adequate adaptation finance from international sources.

• The dedicated window for climate finance fosters a spirit of competitive federalism among states and encourages enhanced climate action.

• Enhanced budgetary allocation to NAFCC to strengthen the state-level adaptation response and create capacity to mainstream climate change concerns in state planning frames, is urgently needed.

     

The changing geopolitics of climate change finance

Funding for climate change efforts in developing countries is firmly established in the Articles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Since the early days of the climate change negotiations, finance has been a key focus of attention and, often, a principal source of tension between developed and developing countries. Understandably, these tensions have led to numerous efforts to reform the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC. The history of reforms of the Global Environment Facility – for some time the only operating entity of the financial mechanism – and the recent establishment of the Green Climate Fund are good examples of such efforts. It is asked here whether these efforts have been sufficient to keep pace with a rapidly changing, more complex and radically different world from that of 1992 when the UNFCCC was signed by most countries in Rio de Janeiro. On the 21st anniversary of the signing of the UNFCCC, the effects that global transformations have had on climate change finance are here explored, and some of the new challenges, as well as emerging opportunities, resulting from the new landscape of climate finance that has emerged as a result are described.

Policy relevance

The climate change negotiations are entering a critical period. The issue of finance is one of the key pillars on which the success of a new deal on a binding agreement depends. A better understanding of the increasing complexity of the climate finance landscape is essential. The world of climate finance and the geopolitics in which it operates have been significantly transformed since the signing of the UNFCCC. A better understanding of this transformation would help policy makers and negotiators find more effective and realistic ways to help unleash the immense amount of financial resources that could potentially be made available for the great challenge that many countries face to address climate change. The need for up-front and significantly scaled-up investments requires effective mechanisms that can leverage and encourage investments into areas where they are most needed to face the challenge of climate change. The role of the Green Climate Fund will be critical in this regard.     

应对气候变化与保护生物多样性协同：全球实践与启示

气候变化与生物多样性丧失是当前全球面临的两大热点和难点环境问题,二者协同推进的必要性和重要性也在全球范围内形成广泛共识。文中在总结我国“双碳”目标下应对气候变化与保护生物多样性协同的现状与挑战的基础上,对近年来各国应对气候变化和保护生物多样性协同方面的政策实践进行了系统梳理与总结,各主要国家近年来在战略规划、生态空间、绿色金融、科技创新等方面进行了大量实践探索以推动二者协同,在这些实践推动下,全球已逐渐将“碳中和”和“生物多样性”融入生态环境治理新格局、将基于自然的解决方案（NbS）作为二者协同领域最有效的新路径、将绿色金融和科技创新作为推动二者协同发展的新动力。鉴于此,我国在二者协同推进中亟需将生物多样性保护纳入双碳“1+N”政策体系,注重将基于自然的解决方案融入城镇化、乡村振兴等重大国家发展战略,鼓励引导绿色金融、数字科技支持二者协同的重点领域,提高公众认知和社会参与,以推进二者协同并助力我国成为全球生态治理的重要参与者、贡献者和引领者。     

Triggering the low-carbon transition in the aftermath of the global financial crisis

An assessment of the post-Kyoto climate change negotiations, and the altered role of climate finance post-financial crisis, is presented. First, the paradigm shift of the Cancun Agreements is examined from an historical perspective and it is shown that the impasse in the negotiations, caused by the underlying over-emphasis on burden sharing reductions in emissions, can be overcome. Second, using information from two modelling exercises, it is demonstrated how climate finance can encourage the decoupling of carbon emissions from economic growth and thereby help align the development pattern with global climate goals. Third, a framework to place carbon finance within current discussions is sketched regarding both the reformation of the world financial systems and the facilitation of a sustainable economic recovery that is beneficial for North and South while addressing the low-carbon transition. It is concluded that upgrading climate finance is the key to triggering the shift to a low-carbon society and a system is proposed in which an agreed social cost of carbon is used to support the establishment of carbon emissions certificates to reorient a significant portion of global savings towards low-carbon investments.

Policy relevance

Investments that align development and climate objectives are shown to substantially lower the social cost of carbon and deliver long-term carbon emissions reductions. These reductions are greater than those contributed by the sole carbon price signal generated by a world cap-and-trade system. Carbon finance, as a part of the broader reform of financial systems and overseas aid, can help overcome the dual adversity of climate and financial crisis contexts. The carbon certificate, with an upfront agreed social cost of carbon, can be used as its instrument. The portion of the banking system that intends to reorient a significant part of world savings towards low-carbon investments could thus issue such carbon certificates. By giving carbon assets the status of a reserve currency, the system could even respond to the need of emerging countries to diversify their foreign exchange reserves and trigger a wave of worldwide sustainable growth through infrastructure markets.     

Climate finance: A transaction cost perspective on the structure of state-to-state transfers

Direct transfers of climate finance from governments of developed countries to governments of developing countries are often perceived as risky due to information asymmetries, the infeasibility of perfect contract enforcement at the international level, and uncertain recipient capacities and respective outcomes. Donor governments usually try to minimize such risks by delegating the provision of climate finance to bilateral and multilateral organizations that implement and monitor projects in recipient countries. Such direct interventions generate an alternative set of transaction costs through the fragmentation of finance flows and proliferation of funding organizations that can put an additional burden on recipient institutions. Moreover, long delegation chains between initial donors and targeted beneficiaries trigger a cascade of principal-agent problems. The benefits of channelling climate finance through the international development cooperation system hence need to be weighed against the opportunity cost of this approach. The potential for such scrutiny is however constrained by a broken feedback loop between donor and recipient constituencies. Only if the extent to which transaction costs accrue and the reasons they do so become better understood, policy makers might be able to address them and chose the most cost-effective channel in each particular case.     

Aligning climate action with the self-interest and short-term dominated priorities of decision-makers

The global and long-term nature of climate change conflicts with the self-interest and short-term dominated priorities of decision-makers. Climate change mitigation makes sense at the global level, but not at the level of the individual decision-maker. This conflict has been and remains the main obstacle to effective global cooperation and mitigation. This paper proposes a framework that aligns climate action with short-term self-interest through results-based payments to governments. Its key components are: determining an emission benchmark for each country as well as a price for carbon saving; paying countries annually for reducing emissions below their respective benchmark; a new international fund to finance these annual payments by borrowing capital from private investors; and repaying borrowings in the long-term through payments made by countries to the fund based on a pre-determined allocation mechanism. This framework would offer important benefits over an approach focused on allocating climate action or a carbon budget among countries. These include the improved prospect of reaching an effective climate agreement and delivering fast and dramatic mitigation thanks to stronger political commitment, the transformation of short-term self-interest from an obstacle into a driver of climate action, and the additional financing created. The paper also proposes a pilot scheme focusing on hydrofluorocarbon emissions with a considerably lower financing requirement. This offers the possibility of an alternative financing mechanism, and thus a faster and more straightforward implementation path. Short-term financial incentives offered to governments could turn policy action from a burden into an opportunity from their perspective unlocking a huge potential for timely mitigation.

Key policy insights

• A new international framework that offers short-term, results-based payments to governments to promote mitigation action could lead to much more effective global mitigation and international cooperation.

• The financing of such an approach could be solved through a novel financing structure, backed by the long-term commitments of participating countries and thus aligning the timeframe of the financial costs of mitigation with its climate benefits.

• The effectiveness of results-based payments and the concept behind this new approach could be proven through a pilot scheme focusing on hydrofluorocarbon emissions.

     

Difficulties in accounting for private finance in international climate policy

It is widely acknowledged that private finance has a key role to play in achieving low-carbon development and resilience to climate change. However, while there have been several studies that have closely examined the data on public climate finance, there have been few such studies of the private climate-related finance data. There is a political dimension to accounting for ‘private finance’ given the commitment of industrialized countries – enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements – to mobilize US$100 billion of public and private finance for developing countries by 2020, on an annual basis. The availability and quality of data for different types of private climate finance flows with climate benefits (investments, carbon market payments, and voluntary funding) are analysed, and these flows are assessed according to various criteria for inclusion in the $100 billion figure. While existing data suggest that private climate finance invested in developing countries and mobilized by industrialized countries might currently be in the range of $27–123 billion per year, this number is a questionable point of reference. Existing data are limited and of very poor quality: definitions of ‘private climate finance’ are missing and data are hardly verified. Therefore, policy makers will first have to clearly define ‘private climate finance’ and develop systems for measuring, reporting, and verifying it, before using private finance numbers in international climate agreements.     

Local level climate justice? Adaptation finance and vulnerability reduction

Climate change creates a double inequality through the inverse distribution of risk and responsibility. Developed states are responsible, but are forecast to confront only moderate adverse effects; least developed states are not culpable and yet experience significant threats to livelihoods, assets and security. Adaptation finance addresses inequity by developed states facilitating/funding behaviour adjustments necessary for exposed communities to lessen climate risk. This article investigates the ground-level effectiveness of adaptation finance in climate vulnerable villages across Malawi, while controlling for disparities in vulnerability. Malawi and selected districts are both climate vulnerable and significant recipients of adaptation finance. This concludes a larger top–down multi-scalar analysis of climate justice, which applies the distribution and effectiveness of adaptation finance as a proxy. The study avails of participatory assessments to compare actions of villages receiving adaptation finance with those engaging in autonomous and informal adaptations. Adaptation finance villages: (a) address more climate related risks; and (b) enhance agency, security and sustainably lessen climate vulnerability. Conversely, informal practice villages attend to a lower proportion of climate risks and often develop short-term strategies with less enduring vulnerability reduction. Vulnerable communities receiving adaptation finance do change behaviours to reduce climate risk and thus secure local level climate justice.