湖北碳交易试点价格稳定机制、评估及启示

碳排放交易体系存在诸多影响配额供需两端的因素,为避免配额供需严重失衡和碳价格剧烈波动,湖北碳交易试点建立了一套系统的碳价格稳定机制。这套机制包括配额分类管理及注销机制、企业配额事后调节机制、配额投放和回购机制、碳价格涨跌幅限制机制,对湖北碳交易试点的平稳运行发挥了积极作用。本文对上述机制进行了分析评估,并据此提出了全国碳交易体系建设中建立碳价格稳定机制的政策建议。     

实现国家自主贡献目标背景下我国碳交易机制研究

以实现国家自主贡献目标为背景,运用电力行业细分的递推动态可计算一般均衡（CGE）模型,模拟我国统一碳市场下不同碳交易机制的实施效果及其经济影响。研究表明,全国统一碳市场有助于我国实现国家自主贡献目标,并且可以缓解碳减排对经济增长造成的负面影响;相比基于碳排放量免费分配初始碳配额的“祖父法则”,基于碳强度基准免费分配初始碳配额的“标杆法则”可以降低碳交易价格、增加碳配额交易量并扩大碳市场规模;采取拍卖方式有偿分配初始碳配额时碳市场中各行业面临更大的减排成本,但有利于增加政府收入;对碳市场未覆盖的行业和居民户征收碳税能有效控制其碳排放、增加政府财政收入、降低碳交易价格并促进我国国家自主贡献目标的实现;全国统一碳市场在抑制火电行业发展的同时将不同程度地促进清洁能源发电部门的发展。     

碳交易试点地区电力部门配额分配比较研究及对全国的借鉴

全国碳市场将在电力行业启动交易,配额分配方法是其核心。通过试点经验对比分析,将对全国起到借鉴作用。研究结果表明,八试点共纳入电力企业202家,在覆盖范围、信息披露、分配方法、抵消机制等方面存在共性和差异,但普遍存在基准线法基础薄弱、间接排放处理不科学、热电联产供电和供热分摊困难等问题。建议在制定全国碳市场电力部门配额分配方案时应考虑循序渐进、协调推进、稳定性、科学与实用、激励和灵活、公开透明等基本原则。     

碳排放配额分配规则对煤电收益的影响研究

依据中国煤电现状及碳电市场发展趋势,在6种碳价及3种传导率组合的碳配额分配规则下,利用经济调度模型对1000 MW、600 MW和300 MW燃煤机组发电收益影响进行模拟研究。结果表明,300 MW机组对配额基准线与拍卖比例的变化较为敏感。在碳价为50.0元/t、79.9元/t及碳价传导率为20%的碳电市场耦合初期阶段下,配额基准线下降至0.74 t CO₂/(MW·h)或拍卖比例升高至50%,300 MW和600 MW机组存在负收益情况。若碳价及其传导率增加,配额基准线与拍卖比例改变对煤电机组造成的负效应更可控;核证减排量比例扩大对提高机组收益影响甚微,可以作为碳市场的一种有益补充并加以监管。因此,在充分考虑煤电承受力和竞争力前提下,制定碳配额分配规则应适应碳电市场发展阶段,积极推动碳电市场耦合传导碳成本,配合抵销机制来加速碳减排。     

碳成本传递原理、影响因素及对中国碳市场的启示——以电力部门为例

以欧盟碳市场的实践以及中国碳市场的发展现状为背景,调研分析了碳成本传递原理,重点以电力行业为例分析碳成本传递率的主要影响因素。结果显示影响电力行业碳成本传递率的主要因素包括碳排放权交易的配额分配方式以及电力市场结构。分配方式对传递率的影响主要包括配额是否免费发放、是否实时更新免费配额的发放额度、关闭的发电设备是否获得免费配额和新进入者是否发放免费配额等因素。电力市场结构对传递率的影响主要体现在市场竞争程度、市场需求与供给条件。最后,基于当前国内碳市场试点的碳配额分配方式,给出了循序渐进地改变碳排放额初始分配的方法、减少一次性发放未来相对长时期的免费配额、选择基于发电量发放免费配额而非装机容量发放免费配额等相关政策建议。     

全国碳交易下中国钢铁行业的基准线法研究

自2011年来,中国碳排放权交易机制不断健全完善,其中基准线法被确定为全国碳交易初始配额分配的主要方法。钢铁行业作为仅次于电力行业的第二大碳排放部门,加快对其开展基准线法碳交易的测算、设计和评价,对纵深推进全国碳交易市场建设具有重要意义。文中基于2018年钢铁企业直报的温室气体排放数据和单位产品碳强度这一关键指标,确定了中国钢铁行业开展全国碳交易的基准线方案。结果显示,钢铁行业碳交易基准线应包括炼钢及之前的6个工序,基准值宜采用效率较高的前70%至80%范围内的企业碳强度均值,在配额确定时无需考虑行业区域差异,但针对企业间碳强度差异较大的工序应设立从历史法到基准线法的过渡期。     

碳市场价格稳定机制探索及对中国碳市场建设的建议北大核心CSCD

通过总结欧盟碳排放权交易市场(EU ETS)的实践经验,提出了碳市场运行过程中潜在的碳排放权价格过度波动的问题,深入剖析了碳市场过度波动性的根源及其负面影响,在此基础上提出了引入碳市场价格稳定机制的必要性。文章系统分析了几种主要的碳市场价格稳定机制、相应的实施手段及可能存在的问题。根据EU ETS等国际碳市场的经验,建议中国在碳市场建立之初,应该考虑设计一套系统灵活、简单易行且实施成本较低的碳市场价格稳定方案,包括整个试点期内价格暴涨预防机制、价格暴跌预防机制以及试点期内各年份之间的价格波动平抑机制,使得碳市场充分发挥作用,以较低成本达成既定减排目标。     

EU ETS试验阶段微观交易大数据分析及其对中国的启示

通过对欧盟独立交易登记系统（CITL）的抓取、识别、清洗与融合构建了全样本的交易大数据集合,完整地重现了欧盟碳排放权交易体系（EU ETS）在试验阶段的市场微观结构。进而从市场内部微观视角出发,对EU ETS的市场微观体系、排放企业的微观交易行为,以及市场供需微观演化等予以分析,结果表明在市场建立初期：排放企业的交易大多是以配额履约为目的;交易行为呈现活跃度低、季节性和同向性的特点;市场上少量的高排放企业凭借其在配额总量、资金和信息上的优势在交易中占据了主导地位。此外,微观行为数据还反映了金融部门在碳配额交易中的作用：配额在前期流向金融部门使得供过于求的状况有所缓解,但当配额流出金融部门时,市场供需失调的情况被迅速放大。在碳市场建立初期,理解EU ETS市场参与者微观行为特点以及潜在的风险,对中国即将启动的全国统一碳排放权交易体系的机制设计有重要的启示意义。     

碳市场、行业竞争力与碳泄漏：以钢铁行业为例

全国碳市场的建设已启动。钢铁行业是被纳入碳市场的主要行业之一,碳市场政策势必对其竞争力带来一定的影响。文中通过构建局部均衡模型,从价格、产量、贸易和碳泄漏等方面定量研究分析碳市场对我国钢铁行业竞争力的影响,并对影响模型结果的关键参数做敏感性分析,包括减排成本曲线、配额分配方式和贸易弹性。研究结果表明,碳市场对于钢铁行业的竞争力影响不太大,但是需要高度关注碳泄漏问题。     

The economic impacts of introducing CCER trading and offset mechanism into the national carbon market of China北大核心CSCD

基于中国风电及光伏国家核证自愿减排量(CCER)现状及发展趋势,针对CCER供给、抵销和价格形成等关键机制问题,运用电力部门细分的递推动态可计算一般均衡(CGE)模型,模拟了在取消电价补贴的背景下全国碳市场引入风电及光伏CCER交易及抵销机制的经济影响。研究发现:引入CCER交易及抵销机制会降低碳配额交易价格,并缓解取消电价补贴对风电和光伏电力的负面影响,但也会削弱全国碳市场的碳减排效果,且随着CCER供给总量增加这些作用更明显;全国碳市场引入CCER交易及抵销机制后,碳排放强度较高的控排行业将选择购买更多的CCER,其中火电行业是主要的CCER需求方;未来我国如果不放开CCER项目备案审批则风电行业将是主要受益方,而未来适度放开CCER项目备案审批则风电和光伏行业都将从中受益。因此,全国碳市场在引入CCER交易及抵销机制的同时需从紧设置初始碳配额发放量,并可考虑适时重启CCER项目备案审批工作以更好地促进风电和光伏电力的发展,但允许的CCER清缴比例上限应结合碳减排目标合理设定,以避免对全国碳市场产生较大冲击。     

不同监管强度下碳排放权交易违约行为的实验研究

2017年底中国全国碳市场启动,全球正式运行的碳排放权交易体系达到21个。伴随碳排放权交易的广泛开展,加之产品市场不确定性的冲击,控排企业的违约行为也日益多样化和复杂化。基于此,根据中国碳市场试点地区的通行交易规则,通过在产品市场中引入随机冲击,分析在具有储蓄机制且存在不确定性需求的碳交易体系中,企业违约行为的方式以及监管强度对企业违约行为的影响。研究结果表明:抽查比例较高的强监管设置下被试不会产生系统动机来排放违约,弱监管设置下明显的报告违约会导致排放总量上升。即使面临不确定性冲击,储蓄机制依然能促进控排企业以一个相对有效的方式跨期分配生产量。因此给出如下建议:违约处罚应该分级,报告违约处罚力度应大于排放违约;为提高实际履约率,各地应提高排放报告抽查比例;完善配额储蓄机制。     

碳市场顶层设计路线图

中国正面临着低碳减排和保持经济增速的双重挑战。为利用碳排放权交易机制以最低的社会成本实现减排目标,我国自2013年起开始建设碳排放权交易试点,并于2017年12月起宣布正式启动全国碳市场。然而碳市场的顶层设计不可一蹴而就,需要在我国宏观经济改革的大背景下分阶段逐步推进。短期（2020年前）碳市场建设重在强化产权制度建设,完善市场交易基础。中期（2021—2030年）碳市场建设要形成活跃的市场氛围,充分降低我国的温室气体达峰成本。长期（2031—2050年）碳市场建设要形成稳定上升的碳价趋势,为我国的低碳转型提供长期动力。     

碳市场建设路径研究：国际经验及对中国的启示

基于国际碳市场建设的初始决策环境,从政治诉求、决策环境、经济基础、市场根基等4个维度的32个子指标构建了碳市场建立背景与条件指标体系,据此深入挖掘了欧盟碳排放权交易体系(EU ETS)、美国区域温室气体减排行动(RGGI)、美国西部行动倡议(WCI)等国际典型碳市场建立的背景与基础条件,并归纳出各国建立不同类型碳市场的必要条件,进而判断中国建立各类碳市场所具备的条件和不足之处。研究发现：跨界联盟型碳市场建立通常具备经济联系紧密、单个地区减排成本过高和地理位置临近等3个要点;国家型碳市场建立通常考虑到了国家强制减排责任、能源结构转型需求强烈和稳固的国家立法保障等方面;地区型碳市场的建立需满足地区减排诉求强烈与国家层面排放权立法缺失等条件;行业型碳市场建立的基础条件则包括温室气体排放集中度高、行业竞争力保护、重点行业排放需求增长和行业排放数据基础稳固等4个特征。当前,中国碳市场应重点考虑行业型与跨界联盟型碳市场并行的建设模式,进一步完善碳市场监管法律体系,加快各省市排放数据清单制作,加强地方碳市场能力建设培训,尽快完善国家型碳市场建立的基本条件,进而实现温室气体减排与产业结构升级的双重目标。     

China’s national carbon emissions trading scheme: lessons from the pilot emission trading schemes,academic literature,and known policy details

Upon completion, China’s national emissions trading scheme (C-ETS) will be the largest carbon market in the world. Recent research has evaluated China’s seven pilot ETSs launched from 2013 on, and academic literature on design aspects of the C-ETS abounds. Yet little is known about the specific details of the upcoming C-ETS. This article combines currently understood details of China’s national carbon market with lessons learned in the pilot schemes as well as from the academic literature. Our review follows the taxonomy of Emissions Trading in Practice: A Handbook on Design and Implementation (Partnership for Market Readiness & International Carbon Action Partnership. (2016). Retrieved from www.worldbank.org): The 10 categories are: scope, cap, distribution of allowances, use of offsets, temporal flexibility, price predictability, compliance and oversight, stakeholder engagement and capacity building, linking, implementation and improvements.

Key policy insights

• Accurate emissions data is paramount for both design and implementation, and its availability dictates the scope of the C-ETS.

• The stakeholder consultative process is critical for effective design, and China is able to build on its extensive experience through the pilot ETSs.

• Current policies and positions on intensity targets and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits constrain the market design of the C-ETS.

• Most critical is the nature of the cap. The currently discussed rate-based cap with ex post adjustment is risky. Instead, an absolute, mass-based emissions cap coupled with the conditional use of permits would allow China to maintain flexibility in the carbon market while ensuring a limit on CO₂ emissions.

     

Challenges to the development of carbon markets in China

China has introduced several pilot emission trading schemes to build the basis for a national scheme. The potential scale of this initiative raises prospects for a regional carbon trading network as a way to further engage other major Asian economies. However, the Chinese carbon markets rest upon a unique political-economic context and institutional environment that are likely to limit their development and viability. This article offers an overview of such structural economic and political constraints. Four main challenges are identified, namely, inadequate domestic demand, limited financial involvement, incomplete regulatory infrastructure, and excessive government intervention. The first two challenges concern economic dimensions and may be partially addressed by the incentives created by the newly introduced emission trading schemes. The other two are more deeply entrenched in the dominant political system and governing practice. They require fundamental changes to the ways in which the state and the market interact. The success of China's carbon market reform depends crucially on the ability of the ongoing efforts to transform the distorted state–market relationship.

Policy relevance

The burgeoning carbon markets offer opportunities for emissions mitigation at lower costs and enable circulation of a new form of capital, i.e. carbon credits, across borders. China accounts for a gigantic share of global GHG emissions and has the potential to significantly scale up these opportunities. There are clear implications for market developers and participants worldwide, including climate policy makers who attempt to link their emission trading schemes to other schemes, firms who seek to take advantage of the inexpensive carbon offsets generated in developing countries, international financial institutions who endeavour to establish their business in an emerging major carbon market, etc. This article can inform their decisions by identifying key issues that may undermine their ability to achieve these goals. Policy makers and stakeholders will benefit from this analysis, which shows how the Chinese carbon markets operate in ways that may be different from their experience elsewhere.     

Foreign policy ‘trilemmas’: understanding China's stance on international cap-and-trade

This article uses a policy analogy approach to explore China's attitude toward the possibility of global carbon market integration, including the development of a common cap-and-trade market for the global civil aviation industry. Like in other foreign policy domains, in international cap-and-trade, China faces a ‘trilemma’ between carbon market integration, state sovereignty and policy flexibility. By referring to how China has approached a comparable trilemma in foreign exchange policy making, we analyse China's possible stance on international cap-and-trade. We argue that China will prefer to gradually establish and strengthen, to a limited extent, intergovernmental governance mechanisms, which allow nation-states to prioritize sovereignty and policy flexibility in carbon trading policy making. In the conclusion we use this argument to explain China's responses to the carbon-trading initiatives of Australia, the EU, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the World Bank.

Policy relevance

The international community has reached a consensus on the use of market mechanisms for mitigating climate change. While opposing the EU's plan to include Chinese airlines in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, China has started to co-explore with Australia the possibility of linking their carbon markets, and has adopted a supportive attitude toward the carbon trading initiatives led by the ICAO and the World Bank. Considering China's status as the largest emitting country of GHGs and its interdependence with major developed and developing countries, China's substantial participation would be crucial to the success of the global market-based efforts to reduce GHG emissions. This article presents an initial attempt to develop a better understanding of China's stance on international cap-and-trade.     

Ex-post cap adjustment for China’s ETS: an applicable indexation rule,simulating the Hubei ETS,and implications for a national scheme

China plans to launch its nationwide Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in 2017. Uncertainty in China’s future economic growth rate and its effect on underlying emissions may need to be addressed to ensure stability of the scheme. This article investigates an ex-post cap adjustment mechanism for China’s ETS. An applicable rule for indexation of emissions targets to gross domestic product (GDP) adjustment is presented. Such an ex-post optimal emissions intensity target is estimated in an empirical simulation of the Hubei ETS, a large pilot scheme in a fast-growing Chinese province. And its implications for China’s planned national ETS have been discussed. The article finds that by correcting the emissions cap for the difference between expected and realized GDP, the ex-post adjustment can minimize the abatement costs. It can also limit the influence of uncertainties, as it minimizes the standard deviation of realized abatement, abatement cost, and allowance price for a given expected emissions reduction. In addition, with a limited number of parameters requiring estimation, the ex-post cap adjustment mechanism is feasible. It is consistent with the anticipated design of China’s planned national ETS and could be used alongside other design options such as price corridors.

POLICY RELEVANCE

It will be important for the stability of China’s planned national ETS to address uncertainty about future GDP growth which can significantly affect underlying emissions growth. This paper proposes a specific solution, namely an ex-post cap adjustment mechanism for the ETS cap. This method provides flexibility with transparent rules, would be consistent with China’s overall ETS policy design, and could be implemented in practice as the required parameters can be readily estimated.     

Electricity regulation in the Chinese national emissions trading scheme (ETS): lessons for carbon leakage and linkage with the EU ETS

Carbon leakage is central to the discussion on how to mitigate climate change. The current carbon leakage literature focuses largely on industrial production, and less attention has been given to carbon leakage from the electricity sector (the largest source of carbon emissions in China). Moreover, very few studies have examined in detail electricity regulation in the Chinese national emissions trading system (which leads, for example, to double counting) or addressed its implications for potential linkage between the EU and Chinese emissions trading systems (ETSs). This article seeks to fill this gap by analysing the problem of ‘carbon leakage’ from the electricity sector under the China ETS. Specifically, a Law & Economics approach is applied to scrutinize legal documents on electricity/carbon regulation and examine the economic incentive structures of stakeholders in the inter-/intra-regional electricity markets. Two forms of ‘electricity carbon leakage’ are identified and further supported by legal evidence and practical cases. Moreover, the article assesses the environmental and economic implications for the EU of potential linkage between the world’s two largest ETSs. In response, policy suggestions are proposed to address electricity carbon leakage, differentiating leakage according to its sources.

Key policy insights

• Electricity carbon leakage in China remains a serious issue that has yet to receive sufficient attention.

• Such leakage arises from the current electricity/carbon regulatory framework in China and jeopardizes mitigation efforts.

• With the US retreat on climate efforts, evidence suggests that EU officials are looking to China and expect an expanded carbon market to reinforce EU global climate leadership.

• Given that the Chinese ETS will be twice the size of the EU ETS, a small amount of carbon leakage in China could have significant repercussions. Electricity carbon leakage should thus be considered in any future EU–China linking negotiations.