The problem of historicity in physical geography

Historicity forms for logic the direct antithesis of regularity. In recognition of this dialectical premise physical geography has attempted to remove the historical contingent element of its phenomena in order to emphasise the regularity, and by so doing legimitise its status as a scientific discipline. This has resulted in a schism between empirical knowledge and the accepted theoretical structures. The regularity of geodynamic processes is apparent only on the basis of contingent clusters that in their essential characteristics are subject to historical change. Analysis becomes therefore a question of attribution, reconstructing individual clusters of causal determinants, each cluster being described as an individual outcome rather than the embodiment of necessary laws. The concept of the historical within geography must be clearly separated from the pseudo-historical development concept, as employed in relation to the theory of deterministic chaos. The scientific methodological problem, present in geography because of the incongruence between the logical assessment and the empirical subject matter, is here considered as the basis for the application of the evolutionary epistomological theory which not only recognises this incongruence but also clarifies and makes explicable its origin.The authors gratefully acknowledge the translation of this paper rendered by Prof. Dr. E. M. Yates, King's College, London.