退牧还草政策下农村住户的违约行为分析

为讨论农村住户在退牧还草政策下面对一系列约束条件时的违约行为及其影响因素，本研究尝试建立农户违约行为的概率函数模型，实证分析如何在不降低农户效用的同时，规范他们的违约行为，从而达到可持续发展的目的。研究发现农户的违约行为（偷牧）只取决于其养殖规模、从偷牧中所获得的利润以及因偷牧被抓而需要直接支付的罚款金额（不包括上期违约行为对当期补偿的影响）。因此，要调控农户的违约行为，从政策层面适当指导调节养殖规模，对草原进行合理管理与利用（而不是一刀切的禁牧模式），引导区域产业转型以及促进城镇化发展等将是切实可行的措施。

Default Behaviors of Rural Households under Chinese Returning Grazing Land to Grassland Program

This study is initiated to investigate the default behaviors of rural households and their impact factors under Chinese Returning Grazing Land to Grassland Program, by a theoretic economic model and a small size empirical analysis. The results show default behaviors of rural households are only depended on cultivation scale of livestock, the benefit and direct loss they can get from the default behaviors. As a result, to regulate default behaviors of rural households in China, measures which may work effectively include the modification of cultivation size of livestock, rational management and utilization of grassland, and a successful transformation of regional economy.