Vessel buybacks in fisheries: The role of auction and financing structures |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics and IRPS, University of California, San Diego & NBER, 9500 Gilman Drive, MC 0519, La Jolla, CA 92014, USA;2. Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, MC 0508, La Jolla, CA 92014, USA;1. Abess Center for Ecosystem Science and Policy, University of Miami, 1365 Memorial Drive, Miami, FL 33146, USA;2. RJ Dunlap Marine Conservation Program, University of Miami, 4600 Rickenbacker Causeway, Miami, FL 33149, USA;3. Upwell, 110 Capp St. Suite 300, San Francisco, CA 94110, USA;4. Fish Ecology and Conservation Physiology Laboratory, Department of Biology, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ont., Canada K4P045;1. Department of Accounting and Finance, Unitec Institute of Technology, Private Bag 92025, Mt Albert, Auckland, New Zealand;2. Department of Civil Engineering, Unitec Institute of Technology, Private Bag 92025, Mt Albert, Auckland, New Zealand;1. Université Nice Sophia Antipolis, Lab. ECOMERS, Parc Valrose, 06034 Nice Cedex 2, France;2. Aix Marseille Université, CNRS, Université de Toulon, IRD, Mediterranean Institute of Oceanography, (MIO), UM 110, 13288 Marseille, France |
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Abstract: | Vessel buyback programs intended to address overcapacity and excess capitalization in fisheries can lead to dramatically different levels of decapitalization depending on program structure and availability of vessel-specific information. This paper develops a simple theoretical model of self-financing vessel buybacks to examine equilibrium outcomes using sequential versus take-it-or-leave-it auctions, and financing schemes which allocate costs either homogeneously or according to rents captured through the buyback. This model demonstrates that programs which spread costs evenly among remaining vessels limit the possible extent of buybacks, as do programs which buy vessels one at a time in sequence rather than all at once. In addition to the theoretical modeling, a stylized case study inspired by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Fishery is also provided. This analysis suggests that a wide range of auction structures could roughly half the size of the existing fleet, and starkly demonstrates how information poor settings can entirely derail a buyback. |
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Keywords: | Fisheries policy Common pool Buyback programs Self-financing Capacity reduction Decommissioning schemes |
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