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A method to measure enforcement effort in shipping with incomplete information |
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| Institution: | 1. Gibbs Quantitative Research & Consulting, Westersingel 6, 3014 GM Rotterdam, The Netherlands;2. Econometric Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands;1. National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 15013 Denver West Parkway Golden, CO 80401, USA;2. Hukseflux Thermal Sensors B.V., Delftechpark 31, 2628 XJ Delft, The Netherlands;1. Saint Mary’s University, Department of Finance Information Systems and Management Science & School of the Environment, Halifax, NS, Canada B3H 3C3;2. Marine Research Institute, Department of Biological Sciences, University of Cape Town, Private Bag X3, Rondebosch, Cape Town 7701, Western Cape, South Africa;1. Management Studies Group, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands;2. Knowledge, Technology and Innovation Group, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands |
| Abstract: | Current methods in the shipping industry to evaluate performance do not account for differences in fleet profiles of registries such as age, size or ship type and not for bad luck. This can lead to unfair evaluation of enforcement efforts of the international standards. Furthermore, incentives to improve performance are concentrated on decreasing detentions rather than incidents. This article proposes a new method to a longstanding problem to evaluate performance that rectifies shortcomings of the method currently used. The proposed method measures the enforcement effort by means of proxy variables and introduces incentives for improvement that go beyond the currently used 'detention'. The aim is to provide a fair and transparent way. The proposed method is applied and results are compared with methods currently used to demonstrate how the rankings change. The method can be adapted to other areas of the shipping industry such as classification societies or ship management companies. |
| Keywords: | Performance measurement Small sample sizes Inspections Detentions Incidents Measuring effort under incomplete information Accounting for bad luck Incentives |
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