资源依赖、权力与利益博弈：村寨型景区开发企业与社区关系研究——以西双版纳勐景来景区为例

以西双版纳勐景来景区为案例地，通过访谈、观察等方法，在构建村寨型景区开发企业与社区之间资源相互依赖关系分析框架的基础上，探讨村寨型景区开发企业与社区关系动态演变背后的逻辑。研究发现，村寨型景区开发企业与社区关系的动态演变是二者资源相互依赖程度变化作用的结果。在景区发展初期，开发企业对社区的依赖程度小于社区对开发企业的依赖程度，即在两者的利益博弈中，开发企业的权力比社区大，社区得到的利益从零开始不断增大，二者矛盾较少。在景区发展成熟期，开发企业对社区的依赖程度大于社区对开发企业的依赖程度，即在两者的利益博弈中，社区的权力比开发企业大，此时在已有的利益分配机制不变的情况下，会因利益分配导致社区与开发企业冲突。此外，还推论出在政府干预和协调下，村寨型景区开发企业在与社区的利益冲突中会让步于社区这一结论，可为企业投资村寨型景区开发提供现实指导。

Resource Dependence,Power and Interests Game:Research on The Relation-ship Between Village Scenic Development Enterprise and Community with Mengjinglai Scenic Spot in Xishuangbanna as an Example

The conflicts between village scenic development enterprises and communities have always been a common concern in academic research and industry practice. As an effective theory for understanding the relationship between organizations, the resource dependence theory provides a new perspective to analyze the relationship between village scenic development enterprises and communities. This article integrates the 4 dimensions of the relationship among village scenic development enterprises and the communities, interests, power, and the degree of resource dependence into the resource interdependence analysis framework, using the Mengjinglai scenic area in Xishuangbanna as a case study. The primary data are collected through interviews and observation. This article analyzes the dynamic evolution and the logic behind the evolution of the relationship between village scenic development enterprises and the communities. The study demonstrates that the dynamic evolution of the relationship between village scenic development enterprises and communities is the result of the change in the degree of resource interdependence between the two. In the initial stage of scenic area development, the dependence of village scenic development enterprises on the communities is less than that of the communities on the enterprises. In the game of interests between the two, the power of village scenic development enterprises is larger than that of communities, but the benefits obtained by the communities are continuously increased from zero. There is less contradiction between the two. In the mature stage of scenic area development, the dependence of village scenic development enterprises on communities is larger than that of the communities on the enterprises. In the game of interests between the two, the communities have more power than the enterprises. At this point, if the existing benefit distribution mechanism remains unchanged, it will have conflicts in interest distribution. This paper also inferred that with interventions and coordination from the government, the village scenic development enterprises will give way to communities when there is conflict of interests. This study provides a practical guiding significance for the scenic development enterprises which invest a village scenic area.