ITQs under illegal fishing: An application to the red shrimp fishery in Chile |
| |
Authors: | Carlos Ch vez, Nuria Gonz lez,Hugo Salgado |
| |
Affiliation: | aDepartamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción, Casilla 1987, Concepción, Chile;bPrograma Magíster en Economía de Recursos Naturales y del Medio Ambiente, Universidad de Conceptión, Chile |
| |
Abstract: | We study an individual transferable quota system with imperfect enforcement. We apply a model of individual fisherman behavior to the red shrimp (Pleuroncodes monodon) fishery in central-southern Chile. Simulation results suggest that illegal fishing could generate a 21% increase in fishing effort, resulting in a 13% increase in catch and a 2% lower quota price in comparison with the results of a system that operates under perfect compliance. The results are sensitive to changes in the level of fish abundance, total allowable catch, and the design of enforcement to induce compliance. |
| |
Keywords: | Individual transferable quotas Illegal fishing Enforcement Quota market |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|