The limits of ethicality in international markets: Imported second-hand clothing in India

Those of us living in the global north are increasingly urged to divert cast-off clothing from the local waste stream and donate it for reuse and recycling. It is argued that this is the right thing to do, since it is environmentally responsible behaviour, conserves resources, and supports charities via collection systems. Second-hand clothing is thereby culturally framed as waste, as a surplus, and as a morally-charged product that has a powerful redemptive capacity for donors, multiple recyclers and secondary consumers. Two-thirds of collected used clothing is commercially exported for reuse in developing countries, and it is as a freely-traded commodity that it is claimed to grow markets and support livelihoods in the global south, rather than a fairly-traded product. As policy-makers in Northern Europe seek to improve sustainable systems of textile reuse and recycling, ethical issues associated with distant destination markets in the global South are beginning to garner attention. Imported used clothing is ubiquitous in India despite highly restrictive tariff barriers, and the Indian market provides a thought-provoking example since in this case the trade is neither fair nor free. The paper evidences the complexity of the market as vertical hierarchies of dealers negotiate and expand the multiple spaces between legal and illegal commodity flows, and formal and informal economies, to build successful businesses. It reflects upon debates in India around democracy, development and neoliberal economics, and suggests that efforts to introduce ethical interventions in end markets will have to negotiate the nexus of power, politics and corruption.     

Subnational institutions and power of landholders drive illegal deforestation in a major commodity production frontier

Deforestation is a main threat to the biosphere due to its contribution to biodiversity loss, carbon emissions, and land degradation. Most deforestation is illegal and continues unabated, representing around half of the total deforestation in the tropics and subtropics. Quantifying illegal deforestation is challenging, let alone assessing the social and institutional processes underlying its occurrence. We tackle this challenge by quantifying the relative influence of individual (i.e., landholders’ power, landholding size) and contextual (i.e., subnational institutions, agricultural suitability) factors on the type and size of illegal deforestation in the Argentine Dry Chaco, a major commodity production frontier and global deforestation hotspot. We build a Bayesian network fed with data of 244 illegal deforestation events, obtained from journalistic articles, grey literature, key informant interviews, and geospatial analyses. The results reveal that more powerful landholders were associated with larger illegal deforestation events. Policy simulations suggest that higher concentration of land in the hands of powerful landholders and more flexible subnational forest regulations would escalate illegal deforestation. This points to the need for a smart policy mix that integrates across economic, agricultural, and environmental sectors to halt illegal deforestation at commodity production frontiers. A land tenure reform can facilitate forest protection, while incentives to land-use diversification and the criminal prosecution of illegal deforestation are critical to shift landholder behavior towards more balanced production and conservation outcomes.     

Democracy and the environment revisited: The case of African fisheries

This article develops and tests three hypotheses concerning the effects of levels of democracy on levels of overfishing in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results show that the more democratic a country is, the more successful it is in protecting marine environments. However, this effect disappears during turbulent times and periods of rapid political change. The analysis also shows that democracy has a stronger effect on environmental performance than do levels of corruption and government effectiveness.     

Managing fisheries and corruption in the Pacific Islands region

The Pacific Islands region includes some of the smallest countries in the world, some of which are in a precarious economic condition and heavily reliant on the region's tuna fisheries for revenue and food security. The ability of some of these countries to profit from their fisheries resources, and effectively conserve these resources for future generations, is undermined by a combination of economic, governance and institutional weaknesses that make these countries vulnerable to corruption in the fisheries sector.     

Corruption and regulatory compliance: Experimental findings from South African small-scale fisheries

Although corruption is often mentioned as an obstacle to fisheries management, its negative effects have seldom been investigated empirically in a systematic manner. This article examines the impact of corruption on regulatory compliance among South African small-scale fishermen. Results from scenario experiments with 181 participants confirm that perceived corruptibility of the enforcing authority corrodes the willingness to comply with regulations. Both grand and petty types of corruption have significant effects. Attitudes related to moral support of the regulations, perceived inclusion in the decision making leading to regulations and an individual record of law breaking all affect the willingness to comply. However, these effects are trumped by the relative size of the negative impact of corruption. These findings underline the importance of curbing corruption involving public officials in the small-scale fisheries sector.