Peace Parks and jaguar trails: transboundary conservation in a globalizing world

An increasingly utilized strategy for expanding conservation in the developing world has been the promotion of protected areas that supersede national borders. Alternatively known as transfrontier biosphere reserves, transfrontier or transboundary conservation areas, or Peace Parks, these protected areas are aggressively advanced by conservation agencies for their purported ecological and economic benefits. This article provides a comparative assessment of two case studies to understand the various impacts of transboundary conservation. The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, which unites protected areas in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, is contrasted with efforts to protect jaguars along the United States–Mexico border. We argue that while these cases are promising for the purposes of biodiversity protection, they demonstrate that transboundary conservation can minimize political context, contributes to the hegemony of international conservation agendas, and remains closely linked to economic neoliberalism and decentralization in the developing world.

宗教教义中的环保思想评析

古人对于环保问题十分重视，这在宗教方面表现为，宗教教义及宗教思想中有不少相关的论述：《圣经》中有着朦胧的环境保护意识；道教经典《太平经》中有具有拟人化特征的环保思想；佛教对于人与自然的关系也具有一定深度的认识。宗教环保思想的历史渊源可以上溯至宗教的起始阶段——原始宗教时期，早在原始宗教中就已经存在自然崇拜、动植物崇拜。通过对于宗教的四要素中的核心要素——宗教教义要素所赖以产生的现实基础的剖析可以看出，这些环保思想和崇拜行为是与当时的社会生产力发展水平、科学发展水平、人类的认识能力，尤其是人类生存和发展对于自然物的依赖等因素有密切关系。     

The economics of boldness: equity,action, and hope

Equity is usually interpreted in terms of the concept of justice, such that an equitable share of the atmospheric space is understood in terms of past emissions. This emphasizes the collective nature of sharing the burden of mitigation and the duty to act for those who have emitted the most. An alternative is considered: the aggregate costs and benefits to all Parties that could result from both increasing the level of collective ambition and implementing a climate regime that supports bold actions across all Parties. The regional impacts and carbon flow costs across differentiated scenarios are assessed and it is argued that the majority of developing-country Parties would be better off if a high ambition outcome to which all contributed, but some more than others. Moreover, those with middle or low emissions would have proportionally more to gain (or lose) relative to the level of ambition compared to those that have had higher emissions. The climate regime should be built on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities (CBDR&RC), in which all act early even if some do much more; one that accounts for justice but does not forget hope.

Policy relevance

Differing interpretations of equity and the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are discussed, with a focus on how these can enhance or hinder collective action. Whilst the climate change negotiations are usually taken as games in which one party gains and another loses, and interactions are dogged by continuous conflict, it is explored instead how negotiation responses can be framed in terms of cooperation. This would emphasize the gains that could be achieved by common but differentiated collective action, which could result in a collective avoidance of impacts. The possibilities that this shift of perspective could bring are explored by comparing costs under global cooperation (or lack of it). It is found that cooperation reduces the total costs for these regions. Thus, thinking in terms of cooperation focuses the options for negotiation on the means and interpretations of the UNFCCC principles that spur action and avoid climate impacts through collective action.     

Constructed peer groups and path dependence in international organizations: The case of the international climate change negotiations

International organizations sometimes institutionalize country groupings by specifying differentiated commitments that may, in turn, affect negotiation dynamics. Drawing on incentive-based and socialization arguments, we develop a “constructed peer group” hypothesis suggesting that by creating these groups those organizations may actually construct new lines of confrontation over and above the substance-based disagreements existing between countries. This generates a particular type of path dependence, rendering broad-based international agreements more difficult in the future.We analyze this question at the example of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's increasingly politicized split between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Using a self-coded dataset of country oral statements during the negotiations between December 2007 and December 2009 we assess whether Annex I membership influences a country's stance toward other countries’ arguments, while controlling for country characteristics that may drive their preferences and the affiliation to Annex I. We find that the split between Annex I and non-Annex I has indeed influenced negotiation behavior and amplified the divide between developing and industrialized countries in the climate negotiations.     

An Review of International Climate Change Conference and Analysis on Recent Hot Issues

The international climate change negotiation has been carried out over 20 years. The issue of climate change has shifted from a scientific question into a complex political matter which is related to the sustainable development of mankind. Based on the overview of major processes and stages of international climate conferences, this paper analyzed the key measures that major countries have taken to address climate change, as well as the primary tasks of Paris climate conference and recent international actions. The recent international climate policy issues were also analyzed in order to provide suggestions for China’s activel participation in the development of a new round of international climate change system.     

Reflections on the current state of global climate response

What is the significance of the 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali? The formal outcomes, especially the ‘Bali Action Plan’, are described and commented on, along with the challenges for negotiating a post-2012 agreement in Copenhagen during 2008 and 2009. The article concludes that the outcome of the Bali meeting is insufficient when compared to the nature of the challenge posed by climate change. However, it can nevertheless be considered a success in terms of ‘Realpolitik’ in paving the way for the negotiations ahead, because some real changes have been discerned in the political landscape. The challenges for the road towards Copenhagen are manifold: the sheer volume and complexity of the issues and the far-reaching nature of decisions such as differentiation between non- Annex I countries pose significant challenges in themselves, while the dependency on the electoral process in the USA introduces a high element of risk into the whole process. The emergence of social justice as an issue turns climate policy into an endeavour to improve the world at large—thereby adding to the complexity. And, finally, the biggest challenge is the recognition that the climate problem requires a global solution, that Annex I and non-Annex I countries are mutually dependent on each other and that only cooperation regarding technology in combination with significant financial support will provide the chance to successfully tackle climate change.     

The UNFCCC as a negotiation forum: towards common but more differentiated responsibilities

The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRC) captures the idea that it is the common responsibility of states to protect and restore the environment but that the levels and forms of states’ individual responsibilities may be differentiated according to their own national circumstances. This principle has shaped the evolution of the climate regime and has played an important role in promoting compromise and agreement. It is argued that some twenty years after the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the principle of CBDRC remains as relevant as ever. The practice of Parties under the regime and, most recently, the concerted efforts to shape and flesh out the meaning of the principle, underscore the central role that it plays. At the same time, the binary understanding of CBDRC in the Kyoto Protocol is being replaced with a more nuanced, multifaceted understanding. The evolving interpretation of CBDRC is considered, and its continued relevance as the nucleus of a global burden-sharing regime for addressing climate change is demonstrated.

Policy relevance

The development of a common understanding of the principle of CBDRC is essential for the burden sharing and responsibilities under a future climate agreement. The CBDRC principle captures the idea that it is the common responsibility of states to protect and restore the environment, but that the levels and forms of states’ individual responsibilities may be differentiated according to their own national circumstances. This article informs the international climate change negotiations by considering the development of the principle of CBDRC under the UNFCCC over time. It is concluded that, although there has been a significant shift in how the principle is understood, it remains crucial to the integrity and stability of the climate regime.     

Delivering the two degree global climate change target using a flexible ratchet framework

Global climate negotiations have been characterized by a divide between developed and developing nations – a split which has served as a persistent barrier to international agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. Notable progress in bridging this division was achieved at the 21st Conference of the Parties meeting in Paris through the introduction of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). However, the collective ambition of submitted INDCs falls short of a global 2°C target, requiring an effective ratchet mechanism to review and increase national commitments. Inequitable distribution of additional responsibilities risks re-opening historic divisions between parties. This article presents a flexible ratchet framework which shares mitigation commitments on the basis of per capita equity in line with emerging requirements for a 2°C target. The framework has been designed through convergence between developed and developing nations; developed nation targets are based on an agreed standardized percentage reduction wherever emissions are above per capita equity; developing nations are required to peak emissions at or below per capita equity levels by an agreed convergence date. The proposed framework has the flexibility to be integrated with current INDCs and to evolve in line with shifting estimates of climate sensitivity.

Policy relevance

The outcome of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) negotiations in Paris offered mixed results in terms of level of ambition and submitted national commitments. A global agreement to keep average global temperature rise below two degrees was maintained; however, current pledged Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are projected to result in an average warming of close to three degrees. The implementation of a global ratchet mechanism to scale-up national commitments will remain key to closing this ambition gap to reach this two degree target. How this upscaling of responsibility is shared between parties will be a defining discussion point within future negotiations. This study presents a standardized, equity-based framework for how this ratchet mechanism can be implemented – a framework designed to be flexible for evolution in line with better understanding of climate sensitivity, and adaptable for integrations with current INDC proposals.     

A CER discounting scheme could save climate change regime after 2012

We can generate a net global GHG emission reduction from developing countries (in an UNFCCC term, non-Annex 1 Parties) without imposing targets on them, if we discount CERs generated from CDM projects. The CER discounting scheme means that a part or all of CDM credits, i.e., CERs, made by developing countries through unilateral CDM projects will be retired rather than sold to developed countries to increase their emissions. It is not feasible to impose certain forms of target (whether sectoral or intensity targets) on non-Annex 1 whose emission trend is hard to predict and whose industrial structure is undergoing a rapid change.

Instead of imposing targets (a command and control approach), we should apply market instruments in generating a net global emission reduction from non-Annex 1. Since April 2005 when the first unilateral CDM was approved by the CDM Executive Board, CDM has been functioning as a market mechanism to provide incentives for developing countries to initiate their own emission reduction projects. As CDM is the only market mechanism engaging developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol, we should try to re-design CDM so that it can generate net global emission reductions by introducing the idea of discounting CERs. But in order to produce meaningful GHG emission reductions by discounting CERs, the project scope of CDM has to be expanded by relaxing project additionality criteria while maintaining strict technical additionality criteria. Agreeing on the CERs Discounting Scheme will have a better political chance than agreeing on imposing emission reduction targets on developing countries.     

Climate negotiations beyond Kyoto: developing countries concerns and interests

Abstract

Five years down the road from Kyoto, the Protocol that bears that city's name still awaits enough qualifying ratifications to come into force. While attention has been understandably focussed on the ratification process, it is time to begin thinking about the next steps for the global climate regime, particularly in terms of a deeper inclusion of developing countries' concerns and interests. This paper begins doing so from the perspective of the developing countries. The principal argument is that we need to return to the basic principles outlined in the Framework Convention on Climate Change in searching for a north—south bargain on climate change. Such a bargain may be achievable if we can realign the policy architecture of the climate regime to its original stated goals of sustainable development.