Harvesting in boreal forests and the biofuel carbon debt

Owing to the extensive critique of food-crop-based biofuels, attention has turned toward second-generation wood-based biofuels. A question is therefore whether timber taken from the vast boreal forests on an increasing scale should serve as a source of wood-based biofuels and whether this will be effective climate policy. In a typical boreal forest, it takes 70–120 years before a stand of trees is mature. When this time lag and the dynamics of boreal forests more generally are taken into account, it follows that a high level of harvest means that the carbon stock in the forest stabilizes at a lower level. Therefore, wood harvesting is not a carbon-neutral activity. Through model simulations, it is estimated that an increased harvest of a boreal forest will create a biofuel carbon debt that takes 190–340 years to repay. The length of the payback time is sensitive to the type of fossil fuels that wood energy replaces     

Russian behaviour in the market for permits under the Kyoto Protocol

After the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the extension of national quotas in the Bonn and Marrakesh agreements, meagre environmental effects and a low price of emission permits are likely to be the outcome of implementation. This paper attempts to analyze this scenario, mainly in relation to the Russian case. I discuss on the basis of certain key assumptions the strategic options open to the supply side of the permit market and Russia's potentially incompatible interests as a producer of oil and gas on the one hand and a dominating seller of emission permits under the Kyoto Protocol on the other. The analysis shows that Russian oil and gas interests are likely to boost Russia's inclination to sell permits, ultimately resulting in lower permit prices.     

A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime

The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, there is no second-order punishment for those countries that fail to implement them. Thus, a Party can simply refuse to comply without consequence. The alternative compliance enforcement systems that have been proposed in the literature also face substantial problems. A simple, flexible, potent, and credible compliance enforcement system for a post-Kyoto climate agreement, based on deposits, is proposed here: at ratification, each country deposits a significant amount of money, and continues to do so in the preparation stage each year until the start of the commitment period. At the end of this period, those countries that meet their emissions limitation targets receive a full refund of their deposit, while those that fail to do so forfeit part or all of it. A simplified two-country model of the deposit system and a numerical example of an agreement involving the US, Japan, Russia, and Europe is also provided. If each country's deposit is no less than its abatement costs, there is a strong incentive for participating countries to avoid non-compliance.     

PPP Correction of the IPCC Emission Scenarios – Does it Matter?

Ian Castles and David Henderson have criticized IPCC’s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC: 2000, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 595 pp. http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/index.htm) for using market exchange rates (MER) instead of purchasing power parities (PPP), when converting regional GDP into a common denominator. The consequence is that poor countries generally appear to be poorer than they actually are. An overstated income gap between the rich and poor countries in the base year gives rise to projections of too high economic growth in the poor countries, because the scenarios are constructed with the aim of reducing the income gap. Castles and Henderson claim that overstated economic growth means that greenhouse gas emissions are overstated as well. However, because closure of the emission-intensity gap between the rich and the poor parts of the world is another important driving force in the scenarios, we argue that the use of MER in the SRES scenarios has not caused an overestimation of the global emission growth because, as far as global emissions are concerned, the overstated income gap is effectively neutralized by the overstated emission-intensity gap.     

Russian behaviour in the market for permits under the Kyoto Protocol

After the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the extension of national quotas in the Bonn and Marrakesh agreements, meagre environmental effects and a low price of emission permits are likely to be the outcome of implementation. This paper attempts to analyze this scenario, mainly in relation to the Russian case. I discuss on the basis of certain key assumptions the strategic options open to the supply side of the permit market and Russia’s potentially incompatible interests as a producer of oil and gas on the one hand and a dominating seller of emission permits under the Kyoto Protocol on the other. The analysis shows that Russian oil and gas interests are likely to boost Russia’s inclination to sell permits, ultimately resulting in lower permit prices.     

The use of PPP or MER in the construction of emission scenarios is more than a question of ‘metrics’

Abstract

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)'s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES, IPCC, 2000) has been a matter of debate since Ian Castles and David Henderson claimed that the scenarios were based on unsound economics, giving rise to improbably high emission growth. A main point in their critique was that the scenario-makers converted national gross domestic product (GDP) data to a common measure using market exchange rates (MER) rather than purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. The IPCC responded to the critique by claiming that the use of PPP- or MER-based measures is just a question of ‘metrics’, as important as the ‘switch from degrees Celsius to Fahrenheit’. This paper addresses both the critique from Castles and Henderson and the response from the IPCC. It builds on our earlier argument that the use of MER-based measures, although misleading in some respects, probably has not given rise to seriously exaggerated emission forecasts because comparing regional income levels by the use of MER has two types of implications that draw in different directions and effectively neutralize one another. Nevertheless, we argue that the choice between MER and PPP in the construction of emission scenarios is far more than just a question of metrics. Finally, we discuss whether the SRES scenario with the lowest cumulative emissions is a reasonable lower limit with respect to global emission growth.