Beyond fisheries management: The Phronetic dimension

This paper has two main sources of inspiration. Firstly, building on Flyvbjerg's “Making Social Science Matter”[Flyvbjerg B. Making social science matter: why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2003], I argue that the contribution of the social sciences to fisheries resource management must essentially be “phronetic” (after Aristotle's phronesis, i.e. practical wisdom), in contrast to the “scientific” (Aristotle: episteme) contribution of the natural sciences. Secondly, inspired by the recent publication “Fish for Life: Interactive Governance for Fisheries” [Kooiman J, Jentoft S, Pullin R, Bavinck M, editors. Fish for life: interactive governance for fisheries. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; 2005], I hold that phronesis is basically what the notion of governance adds to management. Governance is the broader concept, inviting a more reflexive, deliberative and value-rational methodology than the instrumental, means-end oriented management concept. I claim that for interdisciplinarity to work in fisheries it is essential to recognize the fundamental methodological differences that exist between the social and natural sciences.     

Painting the floor with a hammer: Technical fixes in fisheries management

Fisheries management benefits from the contribution of several academic disciplines, each with their own perspectives, concerns and solutions. In this essay we argue that the contribution of biology, economics, sociology and other relevant disciplines to fisheries would be improved if they originated from broader, more integrated analytical perspectives that are attuned to the empirical realities of fisheries management. Today, disciplinary boundaries narrow the perspectives of fisheries management, creating tunnel vision and standardized technical fixes to complex and diverse management problems. Having worked separately and together for a number of years in fisheries research and consultancy in many parts of the world we, as a group of biologists, economists and sociologists, feel that the time to rid ourselves from disciplinary dogmatism is long overdue. We claim that improvements in fisheries management will be realized not through the promotion of technical fixes but instead by embracing and responding to the complexity of the management problem.     

Why comply? Attitudes towards harvest regulations among Swedish fishers

Why do fishers break rules? And why do they follow them? The answers to these pertinent questions could contribute to reducing overfishing, stock decimation, environmental degradation, economic losses and community failures. This explorative paper presents findings from a nationwide survey among Swedish fishers, who were asked what, in their opinion, would justify non-compliance, why fisheries management regulations are not being respected, and what might help improve the situation. The survey was conducted to test four inducements often suggested in the literature: Fishers’ compliance/non-compliance is based on (a) their own benefit, (b) whether they feel morally compelled to do one way or another, (c) whether compliance is believed to create a negative impression among peers and (d) whether they accept the justification given for introducing the rules. Among other things, the study finds that the moral motives of law-abidingness and peer group solidarity rank the highest among the reasons for compliance, that large-scale fishers are more concerned about deterrence than small- and medium-scale fishers and also that co-management experience makes fishers less inclined to accept non-compliance by fishers who seek to boost their income.     

What are MPAs for: On goal formation and displacement

Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are established for various purposes. Some are aimed at protection, some are intended as resource management tools, while others imply both of these objectives, as well as others. Regardless of the stated goals, the same MPA can mean different things to different people, and these meanings may be inconsistent. In practice, MPA goals are not always stated clearly, and even if they are, they do not necessary align well with what the different actors have in mind. Moreover, the stated goals are not always those that govern the actual operation of MPAs. The priorities of goals may also change over time for stakeholders and for MPAs. In this paper we argue that the goals of MPAs should not be assumed a priori but should be researched empirically. Thus, before we can answer why MPAs succeed or fail in reaching their goals, we must ask what these goals are in the first place and how they came into existence. How are they, for instance, established, negotiated and agreed upon among stakeholders? How do they reflect particular interests, perspectives and power differentials of those involved? Here, we provide a framework for how to analyze the formation, complexity, and displacement of goals in MPAs, presenting three case studies as illustration.     

Fisheries and coastal governance as a wicked problem

Inspired by Rittel and Webber [Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sciences 1973;4:155–69], it is argued that fisheries and coastal governance is confronted with problems that are inherently “wicked.” Problems are wicked (as opposed to “tame”) when they are difficult to define and delineate from other and bigger problems and when they are not solved once and for all but tend to reappear. Wicked problems have no technical solution, it is not clear when they are solved, and they have no right or wrong solution that can be determined scientifically. Instead, for wicked problems governance must rely on the collective judgment of stakeholders involved in a process that is experiential, interactive and deliberative. In this paper, the wicked problem is identified as a governability issue, recognizing that there are limitations to how rational and effective fisheries and coastal governance can possibly be. The paper offers a framework which could help us locate the wicked problems within the fisheries and coastal governance system, as well as examine their governability.     

Pyramids and roses: Alternative images for the governance of fisheries systems

Governors always have some image of what they are governing and why, and of what their role is. These images are often implicit. They are not reflected upon or discussed in the governance process, yet they have real consequences because they are acted upon. Interactive governance theory argues that image formation is an integral part of governance and that images are made as explicit as possible to avoid self-fulfilment. Such a process needs to be interactive and flexible to allow exploration of alternatives to existing governing images for the purpose of enhancing the governability of fisheries systems. In this paper, we contrast the classical image of the governing system (top down decision-making pyramid) and of the human-in-nature system (top down trophic pyramid) with alternative images (roses and inverted pyramid, respectively) and discuss the implication that these different images have on fisheries governance.     

Participatory practices in fisheries across Europe: Making stakeholders more responsible

Drawing on an EU-funded project titled “Sharing responsibilities in fisheries management” this paper assesses the institutional landscape of fisheries management in a number of European countries, with a particular emphasis on stakeholder involvement in regulatory decision-making. What are their roles and responsibilities in the chain of governance? What are the specific characteristics of each country, and what is similar and what is different as compared with other sectors? Although there is a move towards devolvement and decentralisation in some European countries, there is quite an ambivalence regarding such reforms in other countries. These differences in stakeholder involvement are partly a result of institutional traditions within each country, but also a reflection of how management authorities struggle with the dilemmas pertaining to such reforms of participatory practices. Thus, we argue that even within a reformed fisheries management system that allows greater participation of stakeholder groups, there can hardly be one European model that fits all.     

Leaning on user-groups: The role of civil society in fisheries governance

Fisheries have long been managed through public–private partnerships based on collaboration between government and user-groups. The alleged benefits of involving the latter—as representatives of civil society—are a management system that is more flexible and legitimate than one based exclusively on top–down command and control. A question that is rarely addressed is whether civil society is up to the task. Are voluntary associations fit—‘technically’ and ‘democratically’—to take on management responsibilities? Assessing the pros and cons of involving civil society in fisheries governance requires a closer look at the role of user-groups in public policy-making. This paper attempts to do that by examining certain aspects of the Norwegian system of fisheries management, focusing—in particular—on the role of its most prominent civil society player: the Norwegian Fishers’ Association. The association has long been a privileged partner, virtually monopolizing the attention and goodwill of government. How has this been justified, and does it still serve its original purpose? As the fishery has changed, so—we contend—has the association: from something akin to a public interest group into what is essentially a ‘trade union’ pursuing the economic interests of its most powerful members. How and why did this change—in goals and priorities—come about, and is it tenable that this particular partnership continues? What lessons, if any, can be drawn from the Norwegian case about the pros and cons of user involvement, interactive governance and the role of civil society in fisheries management?     

Limits of governability: Institutional implications for fisheries and coastal governance

Drawing on some recent developments in so-called “interactive governance theory”, it is argued that fisheries and coastal governance is basically a relationship between two systems, which could be termed a “governing system” and a “system-to-be-governed.” The former system is social: it is made up of institutions and steering mechanisms. The latter system is partly natural, partly social: it consists of an ecosystem and the resources that it harbors, as well as a system of users and stakeholders who form political coalitions and institutions among themselves. Obviously, we need to be concerned with the relationship and interaction between the governing system and the system-to-be-governed, which forms a system in its own right. According to governance theory, these systems share similar structural attributes: they are diverse, complex, dynamic and vulnerable. In order for governance to work they must somehow be compatible, in order to be mutually responsive. This is not a matter of natural mechanism but of institutional design by societal actors such as legislative bodies, planning agencies and civic organizations—alone, or in concert. What conditions, mechanisms and institutions are conducive to creating a better rapport between the governing system and the system-to-be-governed? Before we can start this discussion, we need to rethink our basic assumptions of what governance is, what governors do, and what we can expect from governance. How do we get from where we are now to where we want to be? In order to accomplish this we need something other than an instrumental, rational model. We need “a technology of foolishness” that emphasizes institutional experimentation and learning by doing.