Four policies might close the gap between the global GHG emissions expected for 2020 on the basis of current (2013) policies and the reduced emissions that will be needed if the long-term global temperature increase can be kept below the 2 °C internationally agreed limit. The four policies are (1) specific energy efficiency measures, (2) closure of the least-efficient coal-fired power plants, (3) minimizing methane emissions from upstream oil and gas production, and (4) accelerating the (partial) phase-out of subsidies to fossil-fuel consumption. In this article we test the hypothesis of the International Energy Agency (IEA) that these policies will not result in a loss of gross domestic product (GDP) and we estimate their employment effects using the E3MG global macro-econometric model. Using a set of scenarios we assess each policy individually and then consider the outcomes if all four policies were implemented simultaneously. We find that the policies are insufficient to close the emissions gap, with an overall emission reduction that is 30% less than that found by the IEA. World GDP is 0.5% higher in 2020, with about 6 million net jobs created by 2020 and unemployment reduced.
Policy relevance
The gap between GHG emissions expected under the Copenhagen and Cancun Agreements and that needed for emissions trajectories to have a reasonable chance of reaching the 2 °C target requires additional policies if it is to be closed. This article uses a global simulation model E3MG to analyse a set of policies proposed by the IEA to close the gap and assesses their macroeconomic effects as well as their feasibility in closing the gap. It complements the IEA assessment by estimating the GDP and employment implications separately by the different policies year by year to 2020, by major industries, and by 21 world regions. 相似文献
This article assesses Japan's carbon budgets up to 2100 in the global efforts to achieve the 2?°C target under different effort-sharing approaches based on long-term GHG mitigation scenarios published in 13 studies. The article also presents exemplary emission trajectories for Japan to stay within the calculated budget.The literature data allow for an in-depth analysis of four effort-sharing categories. For a 450?ppm CO2e stabilization level, the remaining carbon budgets for 2014–2100 were negative for the effort-sharing category that emphasizes historical responsibility and capability. For the other three, including the reference ‘Cost-effectiveness’ category, which showed the highest budget range among all categories, the calculated remaining budgets (20th and 80th percentile ranges) would run out in 21–29 years if the current emission levels were to continue. A 550?ppm CO2e stabilization level increases the budgets by 6–17 years-equivalent of the current emissions, depending on the effort-sharing category. Exemplary emissions trajectories staying within the calculated budgets were also analysed for ‘Equality’, ‘Staged’ and ‘Cost-effectiveness’ categories. For a 450?ppm CO2e stabilization level, Japan's GHG emissions would need to phase out sometime between 2045 and 2080, and the emission reductions in 2030 would be at least 16–29% below 1990 levels even for the most lenient ‘Cost-effectiveness’ category, and 29–36% for the ‘Equality’ category. The start year for accelerated emissions reductions and the emissions convergence level in the long term have major impact on the emissions reduction rates that need to be achieved, particularly in the case of smaller budgets.Policy relevanceIn previous climate mitigation target formulation processes for 2020 and 2030 in Japan, neither equity principles nor long-term management of cumulative GHG emissions was at the centre of discussion. This article quantitatively assesses how much more GHGs Japan can emit by 2100 to achieve the 2?°C target in light of different effort-sharing approaches, and how Japan's GHG emissions can be managed up to 2100. The long-term implications of recent energy policy developments following the Fukushima nuclear disaster for the calculated carbon budgets are also discussed. 相似文献
Achieving long-term climate mitigation goals in Japan faces several challenges, starting with the uncertain nuclear power policy after the 2011 earthquake, the uncertain availability and progress of energy technologies, as well as energy security concerns in light of a high dependency on fuel imports. The combined weight of these challenges needs to be clarified in terms of the energy system and macroeconomic impacts. We applied a general equilibrium energy economic model to assess these impacts on an 80% emission reduction target by 2050 considering several alternative scenarios for nuclear power deployment, technology availability, end use energy efficiency, and the price of fossil fuels. We found that achieving the mitigation target was feasible for all scenarios, with considerable reductions in total energy consumption (39%–50%), higher shares of low-carbon sources (43%–72% compared to 15%), and larger shares of electricity in the final energy supply (51%–58% compared to 42%). The economic impacts of limiting nuclear power by 2050 (3.5% GDP loss) were small compared to the lack of carbon capture and storage (CCS) (6.4% GDP loss). Mitigation scenarios led to an improvement in energy security indicators (trade dependency and diversity of primary energy sources) even in the absence of nuclear power. Moreover, preliminary analysis indicates that expanding the range of renewable energy resources can lower the macroeconomic impacts of the long term target considerably, and thus further in depth analysis is needed on this aspect.
Key policy insights
For Japan, an emissions reduction target of 80% by 2050 is feasible without nuclear power or CCS.
The macroeconomic impact of such a 2050 target was largest without CCS, and smallest without nuclear power.
Energy security indicators improved in mitigation scenarios compared to the baseline.
Strong and rapid greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions, far beyond those currently committed to, are required to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. This allows no sector to maintain business as usual practices, while application of the precautionary principle requires avoiding a reliance on negative emission technologies. Animal to plant-sourced protein shifts offer substantial potential for GHG emission reductions. Unabated, the livestock sector could take between 37% and 49% of the GHG budget allowable under the 2°C and 1.5°C targets, respectively, by 2030. Inaction in the livestock sector would require substantial GHG reductions, far beyond what are planned or realistic, from other sectors. This outlook article outlines why animal to plant-sourced protein shifts should be taken up by the Conference of the Parties (COP), and how they could feature as part of countries’ mitigation commitments under their updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to be adopted from 2020 onwards. The proposed framework includes an acknowledgment of ‘peak livestock’, followed by targets for large and rapid reductions in livestock numbers based on a combined ‘worst first’ and ‘best available food’ approach. Adequate support, including climate finance, is needed to facilitate countries in implementing animal to plant-sourced protein shifts.
Key policy insights
Given the livestock sector’s significant contribution to global GHG emissions and methane dominance, animal to plant protein shifts make a necessary contribution to meeting the Paris temperature goals and reducing warming in the short term, while providing a suite of co-benefits.
Without action, the livestock sector could take between 37% and 49% of the GHG budget allowable under the 2°C and 1.5°C targets, respectively, by 2030.
Failure to implement animal to plant protein shifts increases the risk of exceeding temperate goals; requires additional GHG reductions from other sectors; and increases reliance on negative emissions technologies.
COP 24 is an opportunity to bring animal to plant protein shifts to the climate mitigation table.
Revised NDCs from 2020 should include animal to plant protein shifts, starting with a declaration of ‘peak livestock’, followed by a ‘worst first’ replacement approach, guided by ‘best available food’.