From Kyoto via Moscow to nowhere?

Abstract

Since the World Climate Change Conference held in the autumn of 2003 in Moscow, Russian Federation, the fate of international climate policy architecture designed around the Kyoto Protocol hangs in the balance. After the withdrawal of the USA from the Kyoto Protocol, the condition of its ratification cannot be met without the Russian Federation. There has been a considerable uncertainty as to Russia's intentions regarding ratification of Kyoto. In this contribution, an attempt is made to identify the Russian motives and concerns, and explain their attitudes regarding the Kyoto Protocol. Pressures against and for ratification are discussed. Finally, a few comments are made about the future of the efforts to solve the global environmental problem of protecting the Earth's climate.     

Reflections on the current state of global climate response

What is the significance of the 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali? The formal outcomes, especially the ‘Bali Action Plan’, are described and commented on, along with the challenges for negotiating a post-2012 agreement in Copenhagen during 2008 and 2009. The article concludes that the outcome of the Bali meeting is insufficient when compared to the nature of the challenge posed by climate change. However, it can nevertheless be considered a success in terms of ‘Realpolitik’ in paving the way for the negotiations ahead, because some real changes have been discerned in the political landscape. The challenges for the road towards Copenhagen are manifold: the sheer volume and complexity of the issues and the far-reaching nature of decisions such as differentiation between non- Annex I countries pose significant challenges in themselves, while the dependency on the electoral process in the USA introduces a high element of risk into the whole process. The emergence of social justice as an issue turns climate policy into an endeavour to improve the world at large—thereby adding to the complexity. And, finally, the biggest challenge is the recognition that the climate problem requires a global solution, that Annex I and non-Annex I countries are mutually dependent on each other and that only cooperation regarding technology in combination with significant financial support will provide the chance to successfully tackle climate change.     

CDM potential in the power-generation and energy-intensive industries of China

Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) has emerged as an important carbon governance mechanism. However, forest governance is weak in most REDD+ countries, which undermines efforts to establish REDD+. This study analyses the factors that enable national REDD+ processes in the context of weak governance using a two-step ‘qualitative comparative analysis’ (QCA) of 12 REDD+ countries. Assuming that actor-related factors can be effective only if certain institutional preconditions are met, six factors were divided into two categories that were analysed separately: institutional setting (pressure from forest-resource shortage; forest legislation, policy, and governance; already initiated policy change) and the policy arena (national ownership; transformational coalitions; inclusiveness of the policy process). The factors were analysed to determine their role in efforts to establish comprehensive REDD+ policies that target transformational change. The results reveal path dependencies and institutional stickiness in all the study countries. Only countries already undertaking institutional change have been able to establish REDD+ policies in a relatively short period – but only in the presence of either high pressure from forest-resource shortages or key features of effective forest legislation, policy, and governance. Furthermore, where an enabling institutional setting is in place, the policy arena conditions of national ownership and transformational coalitions are crucial.Policy relevance Although the aim of REDD+ is to provide performance-based payments for emissions reductions, the outcomes in terms of actual emission reductions or co-benefits are not yet observable. Most REDD+ countries are still at the design and implementation stage for policies and measures. Indicators and criteria to measure progress in this phase are required to identify which factors enable or hinder countries' performance in delivering necessary policy change to provide targeted financial incentives to support countries' efforts. This study analyses the factors that shape national REDD+ processes in the context of weak governance using a two-step QCA of 12 REDD+ countries. The results show a set of enabling conditions and characteristics of the policy process under which REDD+ policies can be established. These findings may help guide other countries seeking to formulate REDD+ policies that are likely to deliver efficient, effective, and equitable outcomes.     

Does the framing of climate policies make a difference to public support? Evidence from UK marginal constituencies

Public support for climate policies is essential to underpin their credibility, but evidence suggests that an environmental basis for that support is not strong. It has been suggested that framing climate policies in other terms, such as energy security or job creation, will build a more sustainable political basis for bold climate policies. This approach is explored using data from a survey in 157 UK marginal constituencies. Framing does make a difference to support for the expansion of renewable energy, but not to support for policies on energy efficiency and financial assistance to developing countries. The data also show key differences in levels of support for policies between different socio-demographic and voter groups.     

Developing country perspectives on ‘mitigation actions’, ‘NAMAs’, and ‘LCDS’

The MAPS programme, which seeks to deepen mitigation ambition in developing countries, is engaged in exploring the concepts of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and Low Carbon Development Strategies (LCDS) from a developing country perspective. Here, climate mitigation practitioners in six developing countries were surveyed for their understanding of these concepts (anonymous, personal communications with climate mitigation practitioners in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, and South Africa). It is found that there is much scope for clarity and conceptual elaboration in this policy space. NAMAs are largely interpreted as mitigation activities packaged for submission to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) registry, but are not held to constitute the full set of mitigation activity in a developing country. New terminology may be needed to describe this broader set. A tighter interpretation of LCDS to distinguish between a strategic or coordinating policy action may be useful. Other themes arising include the way ‘national appropriateness’ is reflected in the concepts, and the role of international policy in deepening mitigation action in developing countries.     

A shale gas revolution for China?

The question of whether China is on the verge of a ‘shale gas revolution’ is examined. This has potentially significant consequences for energy policy and climate change mitigation. Contrary to the optimistic reading of some commentators, it argues that various technological, environmental, political, regulatory and institutional factors will constrain the growth of China's shale gas market and that such a revolution might in any event have consequences that are at best mixed, at worst antithetical to climate change mitigation.Policy relevanceChina's reserves of unconventional gas have the potential to transform energy policy, as has occurred in the US, resulting in the substitution of shale gas for coal in the energy mix. Because gas emits only approximately half the GHG per unit as coal, such a move would have important implications for climate policy. However, substantial obstacles stand in the way of the ‘energy revolution’ that some policy analysts see China as embarking upon. The need to acknowledge these obstacles, particularly those relating to regulation and governance (and whether or to what extent they can be overcome), is an issue of profound importance to the future of climate and energy policy.     

Global climate policy and deep decarbonization of energy-intensive industries

If we are to limit global warming to 2 °C, all sectors in all countries must reduce their emissions of GHGs to zero not later than 2060–2080. Zero-emission options have been less explored and are less developed in the energy-intensive basic materials industries than in other sectors. Current climate policies have not yet motivated major efforts to decarbonize this sector, and it has been largely protected from climate policy due to the perceived risks of carbon leakage and a focus on short-term reduction targets to 2020. We argue that the future global climate policy regime must develop along three interlinked and strategic lines to facilitate a deep decarbonization of energy-intensive industries. First, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility must be reinterpreted to allow for a dialogue on fairness and the right to development in relation to industry. Second, a greater focus on the development, deployment and transfer of technology in this sector is called for. Third, the potential conflicts between current free trade regimes and motivated industrial policies for deep decarbonization must be resolved. One way forward is to revisit the idea of sectoral approaches with a broader scope, including not only emission reductions, but recognizing the full complexity of low-carbon transitions in energy-intensive industries. A new approach could engage industrial stakeholders, support technology research, development and demonstration and facilitate deployment through reducing the risk for investors. The Paris Agreement allows the idea of sectoral approaches to be revisited in the interests of reaching our common climate goals.

Policy relevance

Deep decarbonization of energy-intensive industries will be necessary to meet the 2 °C target. This requires major innovation efforts over a long period. Energy-intensive industries face unique challenges from both innovation and technical perspectives due to the large scale of facilities, the character of their global markets and the potentially high mitigation costs. This article addresses these challenges and discusses ways in which the global climate policy framework should be developed after the Paris Agreement to better support transformative change in the energy-intensive industries.     

Landscape for change? International climate policy and energy transitions: evidence from sub-Saharan Africa

What is the role of the climate regime in facilitating rapid decarbonization of the world’s energy systems? We examine how core assumptions concerning the roles of the nation state, carbon markets and finance and technology in international climate policy are being challenged by the realities of how transitions in the energy systems are unfolding. Drawing on the critical region of sub-Saharan Africa, we examine the potential for international climate policy to foster new trajectories towards decarbonization.

Policy relevance

The international regime for climate policy has been in place for some twenty years. Despite significant changes in the landscape of energy systems and drivers of global GHG emissions over this time, the core principles and tools remain relatively stable – national governments, carbon markets, project-based climate finance and the transfer of technological hardware. Given the diversity of actors and drivers and the limited direct reach and influence of international climate policy, however, there is an urgent need to consider how the climate regime can best support the embryonic transitions that are slowly taking form around the world. To do this effectively requires a more nuanced understanding of the role of the state in governing these transitions beyond the notion of a cohesive state serving as rule-enforcer and transition manager. It also requires a broader view of technology, not just as hardware that is transferred, but as a set of practices and networks of expertise and enabling actors. Likewise, though markets have an important role to play as vehicles for achieving broader ends, they are not an end in themselves. Finally on finance, while acknowledging the important role of climate aid, often as a multiplier or facilitator of more ambitious private flows, it is critical to differentiate between the types of finance required for different transitions, many of which will not be counted under, or directed by, the climate regime. In sum, the (low-) carbon economy is being built in ways and in numerous sites that the climate regime needs to be cognizant of and engage with productively, and this may require fundamental reconsideration of the building blocks of the international climate regime.     

Cross-national patterns of governance mechanisms in nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement

ABSTRACT

The continuous submission and scaling-up of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) constitutes a key feature of the Paris Agreement. In their NDCs, states propose governance mechanisms for implementation of climate action, in turn distinguishing appropriate roles for the state in climate governance. Clarity on Parties’ suggested roles for the state makes explicit assumptions on the premise of climate policy, in turn contributing to enhanced transparency in negotiations on the scaling-up of NDCs. This also speaks to ongoing debates on roles for the state in climate governance literature. This article identifies the governance mechanisms proposed by states in their NDCs and the roles for the state envisioned by those governance mechanisms, and also examines how cross-national patterns of roles for the state break or converge with conventional patterns of international politics. The analysis shows that states propose a plurality of roles, which to different extents may be complementary or conflictual. We conclude that income, region, and the Annexes under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are important for understanding suggested roles for the state, but that there are nuances to be further explored. We argue that this paper has three key findings: i) a majority of states rely on market mechanisms to implement their NDCs while rules on implementation and assessment of market mechanisms are still an outstanding issue in the negotiations, meaning that resolving this issue will be essential; ii) the process for evaluating and assessing qualitative governance mechanisms needs to be specified; and iii) increased awareness of differing views on the state’s roles makes explicit different perspectives on what constitutes an ambitious and legitimate contribution to combating climate change.

Key policy insights

• A majority of states (> 75%) envision the state as regulator (creating and strengthening legislation), market facilitator (creating and maintaining market structures), or facilitator (creating more favourable material conditions for climate-friendly behaviour).

• Greater awareness of differing views on roles for the state can increase understanding of different perspectives on ambition and legitimacy of contributions, in turn facilitating trust in negotiations.

• A distinction between substantive and procedural qualitative governance mechanisms and their function and interaction would facilitate the stocktaking dialogues.

     

Delivering the two degree global climate change target using a flexible ratchet framework

Global climate negotiations have been characterized by a divide between developed and developing nations – a split which has served as a persistent barrier to international agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. Notable progress in bridging this division was achieved at the 21st Conference of the Parties meeting in Paris through the introduction of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). However, the collective ambition of submitted INDCs falls short of a global 2°C target, requiring an effective ratchet mechanism to review and increase national commitments. Inequitable distribution of additional responsibilities risks re-opening historic divisions between parties. This article presents a flexible ratchet framework which shares mitigation commitments on the basis of per capita equity in line with emerging requirements for a 2°C target. The framework has been designed through convergence between developed and developing nations; developed nation targets are based on an agreed standardized percentage reduction wherever emissions are above per capita equity; developing nations are required to peak emissions at or below per capita equity levels by an agreed convergence date. The proposed framework has the flexibility to be integrated with current INDCs and to evolve in line with shifting estimates of climate sensitivity.

Policy relevance

The outcome of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) negotiations in Paris offered mixed results in terms of level of ambition and submitted national commitments. A global agreement to keep average global temperature rise below two degrees was maintained; however, current pledged Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are projected to result in an average warming of close to three degrees. The implementation of a global ratchet mechanism to scale-up national commitments will remain key to closing this ambition gap to reach this two degree target. How this upscaling of responsibility is shared between parties will be a defining discussion point within future negotiations. This study presents a standardized, equity-based framework for how this ratchet mechanism can be implemented – a framework designed to be flexible for evolution in line with better understanding of climate sensitivity, and adaptable for integrations with current INDC proposals.