Funding low-carbon investments in the absence of a carbon tax

Introducing a carbon tax is difficult, partly because it suggests that current generations have to make sacrifices for the benefit of future generations. However, the climate change externality could be corrected without such a sacrifice. It is possible to set a carbon value, and use it to create ‘carbon certificates’ that can be accepted as part of commercial banks’ legal reserves. These certificates can be distributed to low-carbon projects, and be exchanged by investors against concessional loans, reducing capital costs for low-carbon projects. As the issuance of carbon certificates would increase the quantity of money, it will either lead to accelerated inflation or induce the Central Bank to raise interest rates. Low-carbon projects will thus have access to cheaper loans at the expense of either ‘regular’ investors (in case of higher interest rates) or of lenders and depositors (in case of accelerated inflation). Within this scheme, mitigation expenditures are compensated by a reduction in regular investments, so that immediate consumption is maintained. It uses future generation wealth to pay for a hedge against climate change. This framework is not as efficient as a carbon tax but is politically easier to implement and represents an interesting step in the trajectory towards a low-carbon economy.     

Alternative climate policy pathways in the US

Although it is likely that the political–economic coalition required for implementing a federal cap-and-trade programme for GHGs in the US is now sufficiently strong, the structural impediments that have prevented its legislative passage remain impressively durable and can be expected to continue to lay waste to congressional proposals for the foreseeable future. Indeed, given the complex history of environmental policy gridlock in Washington since the early 1980s, any expectations that a cap-and-trade programme could have been realistically achieved through the traditional legislative passage in Congress are fundamentally misplaced. Building on previous research, it is argued that – as with most other forms of environmental policy in the US over the past three decades – a national carbon market is more plausible given alternative policy pathways, which if taken are capable of circumventing the Federal Congress altogether. In particular, the interaction between litigation against the federal government and the ‘rulemaking’ authority possessed by the Executive Branch provides the potential space for the current administration to unilaterally establish a model rule for a national carbon-trading programme.

Policy relevance

This article aims to contribute to American climate policy debates by re-thinking the policy mechanisms most capable of establishing a national carbon market in the US. By taking into account the array of structural factors that have prevented the legislative passage of such a programme in federal Congress, a range of alternative policy ‘pathways’ is considered that have historically allowed progressive environmental policies to endure in Washington (despite increased Congressional gridlock over the past few decades). Two specific alternative strategies and the relationship between them are assessed: the use of litigation to impose legal obligations on federal agencies to regulate effluents, and the use of executive authority to define the nature and scope of environmental regulation. The administration's current potential to unilaterally develop a model-rule for a cap-and-trade programme under the Clean Air Act is emphasized, and the political implications of such a strategy are considered.     

Living with limits: growth,resources, and climate change

Is it possible for all of humanity to enjoy the standards of living of today's high-income countries? What would happen if these limits were reached, perhaps because of climate change or a shortage of natural resources essential to production? How would society manage – or fail to manage – such limits? Notwithstanding the current financial and economic crises, these are perhaps the biggest questions confronting our species (and of a host of other species, who are the victims of our decisions). The article begins by considering the biggest economic event of our lifetimes – the ‘great convergence’ and its implications for the demand for resources. The discussion then turns to a specific limit on our development, climate change, which is different from most other limits, because it involves a global public good: the atmosphere. What such limits might mean for our civilization is discussed. One can persuade people to tackle climate change only if those concerned with the dangers persuade ordinary people that action will not come at the expense of their prosperity.     

Profitability of fossil-fuel production under different instruments in international climate policies

This article discusses how different climate policy instruments such as CO₂ taxes and renewable energy subsidies affect the profitability of fossil-fuel production, given that a fixed global climate target shall be achieved in the long term. Within an intertemporal framework, the model analyses show that CO₂ taxes reduce the short-term profitability to a greater extent than technology subsidies, since the competition from CO₂-free energy sources does not become particularly noticeable until decades later. Due to, for example, the discounting of future revenues, most fossil-fuel producers prefer subsidies to their competitors rather than CO₂ taxes. However, this conclusion does not apply to all producers. Oil producers outside OPEC lose the most on the subsidizing of CO₂-free energy, while CO₂ taxes only slightly reduce their profits. This is connected to OPEC's role in the oil market, as the cartel chooses to reduce its extraction significantly in the tax scenario. The results seem to be consistent with the observed behaviour of important players in the climate negotiations.     

Sustainable development policies and measures: institutional issues and electrical efficiency in South Africa

An innovative approach is introduced for helping developing countries to make their development more sustainable, and also to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a co-benefit. Such an approach is proposed as part of the multilateral framework on climate change. The concept of sustainable development policies and measures (SD-PAMs) is outlined, making clear that it is distinct from many other approaches in starting from development rather than explicit climate targets. The potential of SD-PAMs is illustrated with a case-study of energy efficiency in South Africa, drawing on energy modelling for the use of electricity in industry. The results show multiple benefits both for local sustainable development and for mitigating global climate change. The benefits of industrial energy efficiency in South Africa include significant reductions in local air pollutants; improved environmental health; creation of additional jobs; reduced electricity demand; and delays in new investments in electricity generation. The co-benefit of reducing GHG emissions could result in a reduction of as much as 5% of SA's total projected energy CO₂ emissions by 2020. Institutional support and policy guidance is needed at both the international and national level to realize the potential of SD-PAMs. This analysis demonstrates that if countries begin to act early to move towards greater sustainability, they will also start to bend the curve of their emissions path.     

The special climate change fund: origins and prioritisation assessment

Abstract

A central issue in tackling climate change is to understand to what extent different short-term mitigation strategies are consistent with long-term stabilization targets. The present article aims at cross-comparing emission paths derived by plausible short-term policies against those implied by long-term climate targets, comparing, for example, differences in peak periods. Short-term policies considered are, for instance, Kyoto-type targets with or without participation by the USA and/or by developing countries. Long-term targets focus instead on stabilization of CO₂ concentrations, radiative forcing and the increase in atmospheric temperature relative to pre-industrial levels. In order to account for the uncertainty surrounding the climate cycle, for each long-term goal multiple paths of emission—the most probable, the optimistic and the pessimistic projections—are considered in the comparison exercise. Comparative analysis is performed using the FEEM-RICE model, a regional economy—climate model. The results suggest that some early policy action should take place for short-term emissions to be compatible with long-term targets. In particular, the Kyoto-type regimes appear to be on a compatible emission path, at least up to the second commitment period. However, this is no longer the case when assuming a pessimistic realization of the uncertain climate parameters.     

Achieving a low-carbon society

Climate change is perhaps the central challenge that faces humanity. If the concept of green growth is to be anything more than a mere rebranding of the concept of sustainability, then it must elucidate the relationship between economic activity and pollution and provide a more detailed economic account of it. The articles in this Special Issue focus on ways in which GHG emissions may be reduced while satisfying the increasing demand for energy: from global, technological or economic solutions, to sub-national, financial or regulatory ones. Although the wide disparity in income between the least and most wealthy makes it difficult to reach a consensus on the best way to achieve a low-carbon society, the scale and potential effects of climate change make it imperative that one is reached.     

Sectoral targets for developing countries: combining ‘common but differentiated re-sponsibilities’ with ‘meaningful participation’

Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the governments of developing countries refuse to enter into such a system in the short term. Many scholars and stakeholders, including the European Commission, have thus proposed various types of commitments for developing countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral approaches. A macroeconomic assessment of such a sectoral approach is provided for developing countries. Two policy scenarios in particular are assessed, in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type absolute commitments, while developing countries adopt an emissions trading system limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-trade systems. In the first scenario, CO₂ allowances are auctioned by the government, which distributes its revenues as a lump sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction revenues are used to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation. The quantitative analysis, conducted with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such options provide almost as much emissions reduction as a global cap-and-trade system. Moreover, in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much lower than with a global cap-and-trade system, as is also the effect on the electricity price.     

The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements

The negotiation strategy of the European Union was analysed with respect to the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. Game theory was employed to explore the incentives for key players in the climate policy arena to join future climate agreements. A ?20% unilateral commitment strategy by the EU was compared with a multilateral ?30% emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate—economy simulation model, we found that leakage, in the sense of strategic policy reactions on emissions, was negligible. The EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared with 1990 levels) by 2020, if other Annex-B countries follow suit, does not induce the participation of the USA with a comparable reduction commitment. However, we argue that the original EU proposal can be reshaped so as to stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.     

Economics of climate change: risk and responsibility by world region

The impacts of predicted climate change will not be distributed evenly around the world. As post-Kyoto negotiations unfold, relating the geographical distribution of projected impacts to responsibility for emissions among world regions is essential for achieving an equitable path forward. This article surveys the current knowledge of regional climate consequences, and delves into the regional predictions of economic assessment models to date, examining how the uncertainties, assumptions and ethical dimensions influence the portrayal of risk at this scale. The few studies that quantitatively compared regional risk and responsibility are reviewed, and the analytical framework from one such study is applied to the 2006 Stern Review's projections to give the first regional comparison to take purchasing power and welfare considerations into account. Synthesizing burden and blame in this way is informative for policy makers; the world's most vulnerable communities—in Africa, the Indian subcontinent, Latin America, and small island states—accounted for less than 33% of global greenhouse gas emissions over the period 1961–2000, but may experience more than 75% of the ensuing climate damages this century. This analysis reinforces the call for industrialized nations to lead mitigation efforts, and to do so decisively and swiftly.