The economics of ending Canada's commercial harp seal hunt

The roots of the Canadian harp seal hunt can be traced to the 16th Century. But in the mid-20th century, opposition to the commercial hunt became widespread after television images of seal pups being killed with clubs on the pack ice off the coast of Newfoundland were broadcast around the world. International conservation groups, animal welfare groups, animal rights groups, and foreign governments have been calling for the Canadian government to end the commercial seal hunt on the grounds that it is inhumane and that harvest levels are unsustainable. The Canadian government defends the traditional practices of hunting harp seals, argues that seal pelts are an important source of income for sealers, and insists that the killing methods are humane and that harvest levels are sustainable. Emotions run high on both sides of the debate. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether or not there is a purely economic argument for ending Canada's commercial seal hunt. The paper finds that the benefits of ending the commercial hunt exceed the costs, but not unequivocally. However, the paper argues there should be a higher criterion—the Pareto criterion—for ending the commercial hunt; that is the hunt should end only if winners compensate the losers. The paper goes on to argue that an effective way to satisfy this criterion is to introduce a system of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and let the market reveal the value of the commercial seal hunt. In addition to many other advantages such as improving the safety and efficiency of the hunt, the ITQ market could provide a mechanism by which those willing to pay to end the hunt could do so directly to sealers thereby ensuring that the hunt is scaled back or ultimately ended only when it is economically efficient and unambiguously welfare-improving.     

Economic gains from introducing international ITQs—The case of the mackerel and herring fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic

Achieving a balance between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities is one of the major challenges in European fisheries. One way to achieve this is to introduce individual tradable quotas or similar management measures. In several mackerel and herring fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic, such systems have already been introduced on a national basis and the long term economic gains of this have been acknowledged. This paper takes this a step further and investigates the potential economic gains from introducing individual tradable quotas between countries. Overall, the results show that the gross cash flow can be improved by 21% by allowing the mackerel and herring quotas to be traded internationally in the Northeast Atlantic. This rent gain arises mainly from increased productivity by allowing tradability between areas and fleets. The analysis also shows that the Danish pelagic fleet will gain from increasing its share of mackerel and herring quotas, whereas the Irish fleets are incentivised to sell quota, if individual quotas are allowed to be traded among countries. This result is in line with the qualitative analyses that show that Irish fishermen targeting herring in the Celtic Sea are negatively oriented towards international individual tradable quotas, whereas the Danish pelagic fishermen have strong preferences for international individual tradable quotas.     

Perceptions and preferences of commercial fishers for dedicated access privilege framework in a multispecies fishery

The decline of the world's fisheries and the inability of traditional management frameworks to maintain them, has led managers to adopt alternative management frameworks. The use of dedicated access privileges have often been shown to have varying popularity among factions within the commercial fishing industry and managers. Here, we examine commercial fishers' preference for alternative management frameworks in the context of a unique multispecies fisheries of the Florida Keys. By surveying commercial fishers, we find that that the size of operation plays no role in affecting fisher perception regarding dedicated access privileges. Furthermore, fishers who are organized are less likely to support dedicated access privilege frameworks. Overall, we do not find enough support in the fishing industry for the implementation of dedicated access privileges in the Florida Keys. These findings can provide inputs in developing effective management plans in the region.     

Using individual transferable quotas (ITQs) to achieve social policy objectives: A proposed intervention

ITQs offer environmental and economic benefits, including better conservation of a fish stock and greater profitability for fishers. With some limitations, they achieve fairly good alignment between the profit incentive and stewardship objectives. Nevertheless, critics have objected to ITQ schemes because of such factors as the “armchair fishing” phenomenon, unfairness to the public (the owner of the fish), economic and social damage to remote communities, and increased concentration within the fishery. Economists generally dismiss these as distributional issues rather than matters of efficiency or economics, but economic principles are clearly not the only factors that may require attention or action from a government or regulator. This paper proposes an intervention that addresses these concerns within the context of an ITQ scheme. The intervention does not reduce the permanence or values of ITQs, and therefore retains the benefits that ITQs are designed to deliver. Nevertheless, the intervention addresses the criticisms identified above. Modifications of the intervention may enable additional goals and benefits to be achieved as well.     

Incentivising selective fishing under a policy to ban discards; lessons from European and global fisheries

The reduction of discards in European fisheries has been identified as a specific objective of the reform of the EU Common Fisheries Policy. To reduce the uncertainty in catch data and the socially unacceptable waste of resources that results from the disposal of catch at sea, a policy to ban discards has been proposed. Discard bans are currently implemented in Alaska, British Columbia, New Zealand, the Faroe Islands, Norway and Iceland. Experience from these countries highlights that a policy of mandatory landings can result in a reduction in discards, but relies upon a high level of surveillance or economic incentives to encourage fishers to land more of their catch. Discard bans will also not result in long term benefits to stocks unless total removals are reduced, through the avoidance of undersized, non-commercial or over quota catch. Experience shows that additional management measures are required to incentivise such a move towards more selective fishing. Success has resulted from the use of area closures and bycatch limits, with potential applications in EU fisheries. However, selective fishing will not be a panacea for the current state of European fisheries; discard bans and accompanying measures must be embedded in a wider management system that constrains fishing mortality to reasonable levels before sustainable exploitation can occur.     

Development in fleet fishing capacity in rights based fisheries

Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) fisheries management systems are supposed to remedy the over-capacity problem associated with traditional command-and-control management systems. This paper provides some insight with respect to the impact of ITQs on vessel numbers in six different countries. The results indicate that the number of vessels was reduced by at least 30% within a few years of the implementation of individual vessel quotas. Thereafter a slow reduction in vessel numbers continued, indicating that it may take time period before over-capacity is fully removed. Moreover, the total effect on vessel numbers is surprisingly similar across countries and fisheries despite different degrees of transferability in the different cases analysed.     

Flexible management of fishing rights and a sustainable fisheries industry in Europe

Although overexploitation of commercial fish stocks in European waters has been in the public debate now for more than 20 years, the European Union has so far failed to implement sustainable fisheries management. Millions in subsidies paid to the fishing industry have led to significant excess capacity in the fishing fleet. Various feeble attempts to stop overexploitation of marine resources have failed. The cause is that fishing policy is highly dominated by short-term socioeconomic interests. There is an urgent need for a new fisheries management system in Europe that supports reductions in the fishing fleet, increases responsibility among fishers and guarantees long-term conservation of natural marine resources.Transferable rights to fish have proved a reliable and effective means of creating incentives to conserve marine resources. By strengthening individual fishing rights under flexible quota management systems, the EU Member States could, within the Common Fisheries Policy, make a significant contribution to conserving fish stocks, to reducing excess capacity and to raising the profitability of the fisheries industry. A closer look at existing reservations against a flexible management system shows most of the objections to be overstated or capable of resolution.     

Existing Territories and Formalization of Territorial Use Rights for Moored Fish Aggregating Devices: The Case of Small-Scale Fisheries in the La Désirade Island (France)

Moored fish aggregating devices (MFADs) are used by small-scale fishers to access fish species difficult to harvest in large numbers. In the case of Guadeloupe (Caribbean area), the use of MFADs has increased considerably and this is causing congestion in these fishing areas and creating conflict between fishers. The aim of this article is to understand how informal fishing territories around the La Desirade Island were established and examine these territories through the lens of economic defendability theory. Results of semistructured interviews show that MFAD fishers display territoriality along MFAD tract lines forming quasi-privatized areas. Territoriality in this article is based on the following factors: the type of targeted resources, the cost of harvesting, the defending of territories, and the acknowledgment of territories by the fishing community. Conflicts and utilization of MFADs (overcapacity) have raised an opportunity to create co-managed legalized territorial use rights for fisheries.