Deemed value arbitrage in the New Zealand annual catch entitlement market

New Zealand's Quota Management System (QMS) consists of a two tier operational structure: Quota shares in a fishstock provide an Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) of the total allowable commercial catch (TACC) of the specific fishstock. Fishers operating in a multispecies fishery need a portfolio of ACE that matches the mix of their annual catch. Fishers may own quota shares, and thereby receive the needed ACE allocations or they may operate without quota shares and rely on acquiring ACE in the ACE market. Whatever the fisher's situation, it is common for fishers to both buy and sell ACE during a fishing year as they seek to balance their actual catch against ACE. The incentive to achieve a balance is strong because at year-end fishers whose catch exceeds ACE are required to pay a fee called ‘deemed value’. For many fishstocks the deemed value fee increases sharply as the percentage by which a fisher's catch exceeds their ACE increases. When no ‘unbalanced’ ACE is available for purchase, an overfished fisher may attempt to mitigate their deemed value liability by engaging in arbitrage trading in ACE whereby they buy ACE from other overfished fishers. This study examines the nature and extent of ACE arbitrage behaviour in the New Zealand quota managed fishery. The study finds that the number of fishstocks where arbitrage trading occurs is relatively small and is declining. However, sizeable deemed value mitigation transactions are still evident.     

Changes in fishing behaviour of two fleets under fully documented catch quota management: Same rules,different outcomes

A Dutch pilot study of fully documented fisheries provided the opportunity to observe actual changes in fishing behaviour under catch quota management (CQM). Interviews with fishers in the pilot study aided in interpreting the results and giving insight in the decision making process and reasoning of fishers. The CQM pilot study entailed a fleet of small and large demersal vessels. For these vessels, all cod catches were counted against quota, including catches of individuals below minimum landings size. To obtain reliable catch data all vessels were equipped with electronic monitoring (EM) systems. These systems recorded videos of all fishing and processing activities on board. In return, fishers received a 30% quota bonus for cod and were compensated with more flexibility on effort regulations. It was hypothesized that vessels in the CQM will (i) increase their landings by 30% according to their quota bonus, (ii) increase the use of gear with large mesh size, and (iii) change effort towards fishing locations with high catch rates of large cod and avoid areas with high catch rates of undersized cod. The results showed that CQM had no effect on fishing behaviour of the small vessels. In contrast, large vessels significantly increased their cod landings (216%) and avoided undersized cod. This difference in response of different fleets suggested that implementation of CQM, for instance in the context of the European Common Fisheries Policy, should consider fleet characteristics. It seemed that larger vessels in this study more easily adapted their behaviour to new management regimes and that the quota bonus opened up new fishing strategies, that were not envisaged during the implementation.     

War,fish, and foreign fleets: The marine fisheries catches of Sierra Leone 1950–2015

In countries like Sierra Leone, where stock assessments based on fisheries-independent data and complex population models are financially and technically challenging, catch statistics may be used to infer fluctuations in fish stocks where more precise data are not available. However, FAO FishStat, the most widely-used time-series data on global fisheries ‘catches’ (actually ‘landings’), does not account for Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) catches and relies on statistics provided by the national agencies of each member country. As such, reported FishStat data is vulnerable to changes in monitoring capacity, governmental transitions, and budgetary constraints, and may substantially underestimate the measure of extracted marine resources. In this report, Sierra Leone's total catches by all marine fishing sectors were estimated for the period 1950–2015, using a catch reconstruction approach incorporating national data, expert knowledge, and both peer-reviewed and grey literature. Results demonstrate that a substantial amount of marine resource exploitation is not represented in official statistics, and reconstructed catches represent more than 2.25 times the recorded FAO Fishstat values. Notably, foreign fleets take the vast majority of industrial catch in Sierra Leone's EEZ, indicating that most of the resource catch and revenue is diverted to foreign companies and export markets. While foreign actors dominate the industrial sector, the small-scale sector represents the majority of domestic catch. Illegal fishing is also a substantial challenge in Sierra Leone, and extracts a large amount of the country's marine fish resources. Reconstructing catches in Sierra Leone also highlights the impacts of various historical events such as Sierra Leone's civil war and post-war reconstruction on the development of the fisheries sector. The results found in the reconstruction present a large discrepancy from FishStat data, with considerable implications for assessment of stocks and management of Sierra Leone's marine resources.     

Lipstick and catch shares in the Western Pacific: Beyond evangelism in fisheries policy?

The push for catch shares is on in the United States, nationwide generally, and in the western Pacific specifically. The prevailing understanding of catch shares emphasizes individual private property rights and changes in fisher behavior are understood to result from changes in rights in accordance with a long-established canon in fisheries economics. It is argued that this orthodoxy misses the causal factor in catch shares and thus constricts the range of policy options for catch shares. Moreover, this standard understanding of catch shares fosters opposition. Opposition to catch shares in the western Pacific can be understood as a specific variant of a generic pattern of opposition that is often centered on concerns for distributional impacts. Blind to the fact that their own misunderstanding fuels opposition, proponents of privatization resort to explaining opposition in terms of a simple, but inaccurate, for-or-against-catch-shares dichotomy. Perpetuation of this dichotomy has become a tool in the promotion of one particular ideological conception of catch shares and is a disservice to the public policy process. A possible path forward in the context of the western Pacific is presented that is based on diminishing the role of outside policy experts while encouraging local design of programs to meet local goals. Such an approach is consistent with the nature of development as local people adopt and adapt outside influences on their own terms.     

Not all fisheries will be collapsed in 2048

In a recently published paper, Worm et al. [Impacts of biodiversity loss on ocean ecosystem services. Science 2006;314:787–90.] project “the global collapse of all taxa currently fished” by 2048. Using their criteria and data, this paper shows that the number of not-collapsed fisheries actually increased over time to a plateau of about 5600 in 1985–2003. Furthermore, if trends are projected into the future, more than half of the world's fisheries would always be in a recovered state.     

莱州湾,黄河口水域春季近岸渔获生物多样性特征的调查研究

本文以1998年莱州湾与黄河口水域的定*置网具春季渔获为基础,记述了该海区出现的61种渔获名录,渔业资源分布与数量特征。表明了该水域资源量呈大幅度下降趋势。以此提出加强渔业生物多样性保护和资源合理利用的建议。     

Quota concentration in the New Zealand fishery: Annual catch entitlement and the small fisher

New Zealand's quota management system (QMS) was introduced in 1986 to enhance the sustainability of New Zealand's fishery. This paper examines trends in quota and catch share concentration across a range of important fish stocks. It demonstrates that continuing concentration is occurring in the ownership of quota for deepwater species. At the same time there has been an increase in participation by small scale fishers in the inshore fishery. This appears to be driven by the introduction of the Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) regime, allowing annual catch shares to be accessed at reduced transaction cost.     

Unreported fishing, hungry people and political turmoil: the recipe for a food security crisis in Madagascar?

Madagascar, the world's fourth largest island, is one of the world's poorest developing countries, and its people depend heavily on marine resources for subsistence and income. Exports of these resources and foreign fishing access agreements are also important, at least from a large-scale economic perspective. In recent years, concerns have been voiced amongst local fishers and industry groups regarding the growth of the country's fishing effort. Despite these concerns, existing knowledge of the scale, composition and trends of Malagasy fisheries remains poor, and there is negligible information regarding unreported catches and illegal fishing in Madagascar's waters. Small-scale fisheries, which are often substantial in developing countries such as Madagascar, are often unreported or underestimated. Unfortunately, fisheries legislations, management plans and foreign fishing access agreements are often influenced by these incomplete data, leading to serious over-estimations of resource availability. This also appears to be the situation in Madagascar, where the reconstruction of total catches by all Malagasy fisheries sectors conducted here showed that total catches between 1950 and 2008 were twice the volume reported by national fisheries agencies. Most importantly, much of the subsistence sector is missing from official statistics, and signs of decline have already been observed in several stocks, suggesting that current levels of catches are likely to be exceeding sustainable yields. This has profound implications for the economic and ecological sustainability of fisheries, as well as food security in a country where people rely heavily on the ocean for their daily protein needs and livelihoods.     

Actions speak louder than words: Tournament angling as an avenue to promote best practice for pelagic shark fishing

Social research can aid in understanding the behaviour of the general public or stakeholders towards natural resources. In the case of recreational fishing, social research aids in integrating anglers' knowledge and attitudes into management frameworks to increase the likelihood of the uptake of new management regulations. Tournament anglers were surveyed at game fishing competitions throughout New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia between February 2012 and May 2013 to investigate their general beliefs around sharks and their behaviours when targeting pelagic sharks. Over half (55%) of the anglers interviewed practised catch and release of pelagic sharks. Of those, almost all (98%) asserted that they attempt to release sharks in good condition, but a large percentage of anglers (48%) did not use circle hooks that have been shown to increase post-release survival. Results showing some concordance between angler's beliefs and behaviours when targeting pelagic sharks suggest that anglers are cognisant of the functional role of sharks in the ecosystem and would be open to recommendations ensuring the long-term sustainability of recreational fisheries targeting pelagic sharks.     

Fishing selectivity as an instrument to reach management objectives in an ecosystem approach to fisheries

With the development of the ecosystem approach to fisheries, improving fishing selectivity has increasingly been put forward as an objective for management. The aim of this paper is to clarify the limits of fishing selectivity and its use in fisheries management. Fishing selectivity would be better apprehended if restricted to the catching process only, not to the utilisation that is made of the catch once onboard, which falls under catch utilisation. Confusion would be further limited if fishing selectivity is restricted to the fishing operation scale, while exploitation pattern, i.e. the distribution of fishing mortality at the population or community level, applies to larger scales. Fishing selectively is minimizing bycatch – catching primarily the fishing trip targets. Since the ecological consequences of maximising the target catch relative to bycatch remain unknown at integrated scales, fishing selectivity cannot be used as an objective in itself. However, its small scale, high manageability and good understanding make it a convenient instrument to reach management objectives at large scales. Selectivity can serve to manage what is extracted from the ecosystem and thus what can be used, and/or to manage what is left in the ecosystem and how fishing impacts it. Different factors affect fishing selectivity, catch utilisation and exploitation patterns, some of them are manageable and thus can be used to move towards these objectives. Management tools are diverse, but need to be integrated to meet large-scale objectives. The complexity of dealing with large scales incurs a need to develop the available knowledge on exploitation patterns and catch utilisation to be able to adequately manage and monitor progress toward selectivity-related objectives.