Past as prologue: an innovation-diffusion approach to additionality

The ‘additionality’ criterion for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (which is key to ensuring that CDM projects lead to real and additional emission reductions) has been a topic of much analysis and discussion. A number of different approaches, including those based on financial, barrier and market-penetration criteria, have been suggested as a test for additionality. A simple test for additionality is proposed that draws on the framework of the diffusion of innovations, especially the risk profile of adopters of new technologies or innovations. This approach has the potential to streamline the assessment for additionality, although it will require data on the rate of implementation of specific technologies or innovations.     

The impact of private investor’s transaction costs on the cost effectiveness of project-based Kyoto mechanisms

From a private investor’s point of view transaction costs of project-based Kyoto mechanisms relate mainly to project management and interaction with government representatives. However, when analysing the cost effectiveness of project-based Kyoto mechanisms these transaction costs are often underestimated or completely ignored¹ due to limited data availability. This paper presents an analysis of transaction costs of project-based Kyoto mechanisms by applying cost estimates from comparable activities, for example, activities implemented jointly (AIJ). The findings show that transaction costs of AIJ projects range between 7% and more than 100% of production costs with 80% of projects lying between 14 and 89%. Furthermore the data clearly illustrate that “bigger” projects have lower specific project costs indicating the existence of economies of scale. Due to the fact that high transaction costs will push many promising projects out of the market, efforts should be undertaken to reduce transaction costs by improving procedures and business environments, for example, by standardisation.     

Transaction costs of the Kyoto Mechanisms

Transaction costs will reduce the attractiveness of the Kyoto Mechanisms compared to domestic abatement options. Especially the project-based mechanisms Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) are likely to entail considerable costs of baseline development, verification and certification. The Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) pilot phase and the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) programme give indications about the level of these costs. Under current estimates of world market prices for greenhouse gas emission permits, projects with annual emission reductions of less than 50,000 t CO₂ equivalent are unlikely to be viable; for micro projects transaction costs can reach several hundred € per t CO₂ equivalent. Thus, the Marrakech Accord rule to have special rules for small scale CDM projects makes sense, even if the thresholds chosen advantage certain project types; projects below 1000 t CO₂ equivalent per year should get further exemptions. An alternative solution with no risk for the environmental credibility of the projects would be to subsidise baseline setting and charge lower, subsidised fees for small projects for the different steps of the CDM/second track JI project cycle.     

Carbon accounting for sinks in the CDM after CoP-9

Abstract

The role of sinks in the clean development mechanism (CDM) has been a subject of controversy for several reasons; one being that temporary carbon storage in forests appeared to prevent any opportunity to use them as an option to reduce permanent greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In Milan (December 2003), the Conference of the Parties (CoP) decided to address this problem by introducing two types of expiring units: temporary CERs (tCERs) and long-term CERs (lCERs). Countries committed to emission reductions may acquire these units to temporarily offset their emissions and thus to postpone permanent emission reductions. As further decided by the CoP, baseline emissions of GHGs and the enhancement of sinks outside the project boundary will not be accounted for in the calculation of tCERs or lCERs. The contribution of CDM-sink projects to GHG emissions abatement will therefore be greater than what will be credited to them. On the other hand, permanent GHG emissions that may result as a consequence of the implementation of sink project activities are treated as non-permanent. If these emissions are above avoided baseline emissions, CDM-sinks will result in net increases of GHG emissions into the atmosphere. After briefly reassessing the non-permanence problem, this article explains how tCERs and lCERs should be quantified according to Decision 19/CP.9 of CoP-9 and how calculations are implemented in the forthcoming software CO₂ Land. Using a simple numerical example, it illustrates how the GHG accounting rule adopted at CoP-9 may result in net increases of GHG emissions. In the conclusion, a possible solution to this problem is proposed.     

Can the EU emission trading scheme support CDM forestry?

Abstract

The European Commission is mandated to consider the inclusion of credits from land-use projects under the clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI), beginning with the second period of the European Union's emission trading scheme (ETS) in its report due in July 2006. Temporary credits from afforestation and reforestation under the CDM are seen by many as posing a technical problem for their use under the ETS. This article summarizes three feasible, efficient and environmentally sound alternatives for achieving the integration of such temporary credits in the European emissions trading market starting in 2008. The first proposal integrates tCERs and lCERs (temporary credits) into the EU ETS by allowing for their direct use for compliance purposes. The second proposal builds on the idea of swapping temporary credits for EU allowances (EUAs) by Member States. The third proposal would not require a political decision at the EU level. Instead supportive Member States or private carbon fund operators would agree to swap temporary credits for the CERs or ERUs they hold in their accounts. All three solutions would be linked to a risk-mitigation strategy based on levying a fee or fixing an exchange rate, which would allow governments to hedge the risk of losing temporary credits.     

Technology transfer in the CDM: the role of host-country characteristics

Technology transfer is not an explicit objective of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, it constitutes a potential co-benefit by helping to improve living conditions in developing countries. Understanding the drivers and barriers of technology transfer in CDM projects is therefore essential to direct investment flows in host countries and enhance the current CDM framework. In this respect, the contribution of this article is twofold. First, it identifies stepping stones and stumbling blocks to technology transfer in the CDM. Higher applied tariff rates on environmental goods and services as well as burdensome administrative procedures to start a new business are found to be negatively associated with the likelihood of a technology transfer. The results are robust to the exclusion of large host countries such as China and India from the sample. Second, as an extension, the article analyses the correspondence of these supporting factors and barriers with the likelihood of a transfer of the different types of technology (equipment, knowledge, or both). The article concludes with policy recommendations for non-Annex I governments, and suggestions for improvements to the CDM to better assess technology transfer in offsetting projects.     

Waste energy recovery CDM projects in China: status,challenges and suggestions

The recovery potential for waste energy from major Chinese industries is significant. For example, the estimated waste energy recovery potential is 40 million tons of coal equivalent in the iron and steel industry, accounting for ～10% of the total energy use in the industry. A detailed overview is presented of existing waste energy recovery Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in China. These projects have been developed predominantly in large enterprises and rarely in small or medium-sized companies. The chance of waste energy projects being reviewed or rejected by the Executive Board is slightly higher and delivery rates of certified emission reductions are generally lower than other types of CDM projects. Several major barriers that inhibit project development are identified, such as the lack of CDM awareness or development capacity among many small or medium enterprises, low internal rates of return of the projects, increasing review risk and long delays in the registration process, the varying quality of intermediary buyers, a lack of local Chinese Designated Operational Entities, and policy implementation inconsistency at different levels. Suggestions are put forward to address these problems and such critical issues as additionality are also discussed.     

Mitigation options for the Bangladesh forestry sector: implications of the CDM

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol has expedited various global warming mitigation opportunities that allow Bangladesh to receive investments from those Annex I countries wishing to offset their emissions of greenhouse gases. Bangladesh has a special interest in strategies for combating global warming because its large areas that need to be planted represent a potentially large carbon sink, and at the same time its high rate of deforestation represents a huge carbon source. To properly assign carbon credits within the forestry sector of Bangladesh, a number of important issues and uncertainties need to be examined and resolved. Afforestation and reforestation (A/R) offers opportunities for carbon credits, which is subject to the end-use of the forest products. A/R may be the best option, as well as conserving the existing carbon sink offered by Bangladesh for mitigating global warming. This article discusses the legal issues raised in combating global warming; the potential of the Bangladesh forestry sector to combat global warming; implications of the forestry options for different land uses; and issues to be settled regarding carbon credits. Future policy and governance issues are considered which will enable the Bangladesh forestry sector to mitigate global warming and to obtain carbon credits.     

Implementing CDM for the Indian dairy sector: prospects and issues

What is the potential for developing small-scale CDM projects in India to reduce enteric methane emissions from cattle and buffaloes? The issue of baseline setting for prospective CDM projects is a complex one in the Indian context. The baselines constructed on the basis of aggregate emission rates at the national level are unlikely to be precise as methane emission rates are influenced by the livestock and feed characteristics, which vary widely across regions in an agro-climatically diverse country like India. This calls for establishing a project specific baseline underpinned with regional methane emission rates. The various aspects of sustainable development that merit consideration in formulating a CDM project in the Indian dairy sector include; increasing the productivity of animals, increasing the net income of producers, decreasing the cost of milk production and the transfer of safe technologies. The projects in the sector would be able to meet the ‘additionality’ conditions of the CDM. However, there are a number of constraints in implementing the enteric methane mitigation strategies through a CDM project at the field level. The article discusses these technical, financial, socio-cultural and institutional barriers along with possible responses to these constraints.     

Review of the experience with monitoring uncertainty requirements in the Clean Development Mechanism

In order to ensure the environmental integrity of carbon offset projects, emission reductions certified under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have to be ‘real, measurable and additional’, which is ensured, inter alia, through the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) process. MRV, however, comes at a cost that ranges from several cents to €1.20 and above per tCO₂e depending on the project type. This article analyses monitoring uncertainty requirements for carbon offset projects with a particular focus on the trade-off between monitoring stringency and cost. To this end, existing literature is reviewed, overarching monitoring guidelines, as well as the ten most-used methodologies are scrutinized, and finally three case studies are analysed. It is shown that there is indeed a trade-off between the stringency and the cost of monitoring, which if not addressed properly may become a major barrier for the implementation of offset projects in some sectors. It is then demonstrated that this trade-off has not been systematically addressed in the overarching CDM guidelines and that there are only limited incentives to reduce monitoring uncertainty. Some methodologies and calculation tools as well as some other offset standards, however, do incorporate provisions for a trade-off between monitoring costs and stringency. These provisions may take the form of discounting emissions reductions based on the level of monitoring uncertainty – or more implicitly through allowing a project developer to choose between monitoring a given parameter and using a conservative default value.

Policy relevance

The CDM Executive Board acknowledged that monitoring uncertainty has not been treated in a consistent manner and the draft standard on uncertainty was subsequently presented in May 2013. This article supports the implementation of this standard for more comprehensive, yet cost-efficient accounting for monitoring uncertainty in carbon offset projects. Moreover, in the light of the ongoing discussions on the New Market Mechanisms as well as the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund and different national mitigation policies, the CDM experience provides valuable insights with regards to the treatment of monitoring uncertainty and constitutes a solid basis for designing uncertainty requirements for new mechanisms to mitigate climate change.