‘Great Powers’ in climate politics

The concept of ‘Great Powers’ extends well beyond its nineteenth century origins to current business in, for example, the EU, the UN Security Council, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Such core groups can be crucial to finding agreement in complex and fractured negotiations. Climate change was not initially seen as an issue for the Great Power-type architecture. The problem was of universal concern, requiring universal involvement. Moreover, climate's natural great powers (the EU, the US, China, Japan, Russia, Brazil, India, and Canada) split into three antagonistic camps: the EU pressing for sharp emissions reductions; the US, with the other developed powers, much more cautious; and China, India, and Brazil determined that action should be confined to the developed world. These divisions contributed hugely to the ineffectiveness of both the 1992 Rio convention and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. In addition, as non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; particularly Chinese) emissions fast outgrew OECD emissions, their exclusion from any constraint became visibly untenable. So, from 2005 on, the Great Powers began to meet more closely in what became the Major Economies Forum. That cooperation contributed significantly to the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. The climate problem is of course far from being solved, but maintaining Great Power cooperation will be crucial to further progress.     

Mapping the narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC

Since the mid-1990s, the aim of keeping climate change within 2?°C has become firmly entrenched in policy discourses. In the past few years, the likelihood of achieving it has been increasingly called into question. The debate around what to do with a target that seems less and less achievable is, however, only just beginning. As the UN commences a two-year review of the 2?°C target, this article moves beyond the somewhat binary debates about whether or not it should or will be met, in order to analyse more fully some of the alternative options that have been identified but not fully explored in the existing literature. For the first time, uncertainties, risks, and opportunities associated with four such options are identified and synthesized from the literature. The analysis finds that the significant risks and uncertainties associated with some options may encourage decision makers to recommit to the 2?°C target as the least unattractive course of action.     

Post-2012 climate policy dilemmas: a review of proposals

This article assesses a wide range of alternative proposals for post-2012 international climate policy regimes. We believe that these proposals will serve as a basis for debates about how to configure post-2012 climate policy. The article characterizes and assesses the policy proposals along the lines of five key policy dilemmas. We argue that (1) many proposals have ideas on how to reduce emissions, but fewer have a solution on how to stimulate technical innovation; (2) many proposals formulate climate policy in isolation, while there are fewer proposals that try to mainstream climate policies in other policy areas; (3) many proposals advocate market-based solutions, while fewer realize that there are certain drawbacks to this solution especially at the international level; (4) most proposals have a preference for a UN-based regime, while a more fragmented regime, based on regional and sectoral arrangements may be emerging; and (5) most proposals have ideas about mitigation, but not many have creative ideas on how to integrate mitigation with adaptation.     

Who picks up the remainder? Mitigation in developed and developing countries

A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive climate regime beyond 2012 will need several political balances. Mitigation and funding will be at the heart of the agreement. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report indicates that absolute reductions will be needed in Annex I (AI) countries and substantial deviation from baseline in some non-Annex I (NAI) regions by 2020. Although the latter was not explicitly quantified by the IPCC, the EU subsequently proposed a range for developing countries. Sharing the burden for mitigation is essentially zero-sum: if one does less, the other has to do more. We critically examine the implicit assumption that NAI countries would pick up the remainder of the required global effort minus the AI contribution. We suggest that greater levels of ambition can be achieved by turning the formula around politically, starting from the achievable ‘deviation below baseline’ given NAI's national programmes and appropriate international support. AI countries may have to exceed the IPCC ranges or pay for the remainder. For notional levels of NAI mitigation action, Annex I has to reduce by between ?52% and ?69% below 1990 by 2020, only dropping to a domestic ?35% with commitments to offset payments through the carbon market. Given the large mitigation gap, a political agreement on the question of ‘who pays’ is fundamental. The carbon market will provide some investment, but it mainly serves to reduce costs, particularly in developed countries, rather than adding to the overall effort. Market-linked levies and Annex I public funding will therefore be crucial to bridge the gap.     

小岛国联盟在国际气候行动格局中的地位分析

温室气体减排与配额已经成为各国、各政治实体谈判与争论的焦点。小岛国联盟(AOSIS)由于地理位置因素,对气候变化有较高的脆弱性,在气候谈判中往往以最大受害者的身份出现,对国际气候谈判进程有着特别的影响。首先对小岛国联盟的地理位置、经济、人口、面积等基本情况进行了分析,并采用CDIAC 1950～2009年各国的碳排放数据以及Word Bank提供的人口和GDP数据,对小岛国联盟的排放总量、人均排放量、历史累计人均排放量、排放强度以及碳排放密度等指标进行了评估,并与全球以及美国、法国、日本、中国、印度和南非六国的排放情况进行了比较,在此基础上对小岛国联盟在气候变化行动格局中的地位进行了分析。     

Management of spatially extensive natural resources in postwar contexts: working with the peace process

While extensively occurring natural resources play a fundamental role in the survival and recovery of postwar populations, their management is not presently part of the operational priorities in a peace process. Dependence on naturally occurring food, fuel, water, secure locations, and products that can be obtained and sold quickly for dislocated, war-weary populations is a primary approach to postwar livelihoods. The peace process, however, focuses on the logistical and institutional aspects of security, demobilization, reintegration and humanitarian efforts. The result is profound degradation of the spatially extensive resources necessary for longer-term recovery. The primary reason for the inattention to resource degradation in a peace process is that conventional conservation approaches do not fit with the priorities of a peace process or attend to the immediate needs of a postwar population; designed as they are for stable, peaceful settings. This article focuses on the need to derive postwar natural resource management approaches which can work with the in-place priorities of a peace process. Four such approaches are suggested, with successful examples from specific countries.

附件一国家温室气体排放趋势及其履约进展

 对《联合国气候变化框架公约》秘书处最新公布的温室气体排放数据进行统计分析,结果显示：相对于基准年（1990年）,附件一国家温室气体排放总量整体呈下降趋势。其中,经济转型期国家温室气体排放总量总体上呈逐年下降趋势,非经济转型期国家的温室气体排放总量有逐年增长的趋势。美国和加拿大能源部门的温室气体排放量增长最为显著,相对于1990年,2005年其增幅分别为19.2%和28.6%;英国和德国能源部门温室气体减排量最为显著,其减幅分别为7.8%和17.4%。在2005年,有超过一半的附件一国家的实际排放量低于其目标排放量,履约进展状况良好。     

边界谈判划界决策支持系统的设计与应用

边界谈判划界是一个重要而又复杂问题,结合了谈判划界业务流程;探讨了在GIS空间技术支持下,谈判划界系统各功能模块设计以及系统的数据设计,实现对谈判划界数据的有效管理,提供了划界辅助工具和资源评价分析工具,为谈判划界提供了决策支持.     

辅助边界谈判划界子系统设计及关键技术

边界谈判划界是一个重要而又复杂的问题,本文结合谈判划界业务流程,探讨了在GIS空间技术支持下,谈判划界系统各功能模块设计以及系统的数据设计,实现对谈判划界数据的有效管理,提供划界辅助工具和资源评价分析工具,为谈判划界提供决策支持.     

Triggering the low-carbon transition in the aftermath of the global financial crisis

An assessment of the post-Kyoto climate change negotiations, and the altered role of climate finance post-financial crisis, is presented. First, the paradigm shift of the Cancun Agreements is examined from an historical perspective and it is shown that the impasse in the negotiations, caused by the underlying over-emphasis on burden sharing reductions in emissions, can be overcome. Second, using information from two modelling exercises, it is demonstrated how climate finance can encourage the decoupling of carbon emissions from economic growth and thereby help align the development pattern with global climate goals. Third, a framework to place carbon finance within current discussions is sketched regarding both the reformation of the world financial systems and the facilitation of a sustainable economic recovery that is beneficial for North and South while addressing the low-carbon transition. It is concluded that upgrading climate finance is the key to triggering the shift to a low-carbon society and a system is proposed in which an agreed social cost of carbon is used to support the establishment of carbon emissions certificates to reorient a significant portion of global savings towards low-carbon investments.

Policy relevance

Investments that align development and climate objectives are shown to substantially lower the social cost of carbon and deliver long-term carbon emissions reductions. These reductions are greater than those contributed by the sole carbon price signal generated by a world cap-and-trade system. Carbon finance, as a part of the broader reform of financial systems and overseas aid, can help overcome the dual adversity of climate and financial crisis contexts. The carbon certificate, with an upfront agreed social cost of carbon, can be used as its instrument. The portion of the banking system that intends to reorient a significant part of world savings towards low-carbon investments could thus issue such carbon certificates. By giving carbon assets the status of a reserve currency, the system could even respond to the need of emerging countries to diversify their foreign exchange reserves and trigger a wave of worldwide sustainable growth through infrastructure markets.