Rising powers: the evolving role of BASIC countries

The exponential growth in global populations, economic activity and resource utilization means it is becoming increasingly difficult to satisfy global demand for a number of fundamental resources, while some key ecosystems services are under stress. The likelihood of future resource scarcities have begun to influence the positions taken within international climate change negotiations by fast-growing developing countries. When Brazil, South Africa, India, and China formed the BASIC group it took many by surprise. The coordination needed to align this heterogeneous group of countries cannot simply be understood in terms of a set of shared interests around climate policy. How the BASIC group emerged and the nature of its cooperation on climate change are examined within the broader context in which these increasingly powerful countries came to join forces. Although traditionally aligned with the G77 group of developing countries, recent strategising as a group of emerging economies reflects their realization that there are insufficient global resources available to follow the same development pathway as industrialized countries. Hence, they must seek alternative growth pathways, which requires establishing common ground while also keeping track of each others' positions on important global issues like climate change.     

Greenhouse gas emissions caused by the international climate negotiations

Abstract

One and a half decades of climate negotiations have directly caused greenhouse gas emissions of about 150,000 t CO₂. At prevailing market prices, making the full negotiation process greenhouse-gas-neutral ex post would cost about US$0.5 million, which is a fraction of the cost of the conferences.     

The role of non-nation-state actors and side events in the international climate negotiations

United Nations climate change conferences have attracted an increasing number and range of observer participants, often outnumbering national delegates. The interactions between the formal and informal spaces of climate governance at the Conference of the Parties (COP) are explored by investigating why non-nation state actors (NNSAs) attend them and by measuring to what extent official UN Side Events provide relevant information for the formal negotiations. Based on primary empirical research at recent COPs, it is found that 60–75% of Side Events have related directly to items under negotiation in the post-2012 climate negotiations. In this regard, Side Events that facilitate informal exchange between stakeholders not only provide input into the negotiations but also allow issues beyond the realm of the negotiations to be discussed, reflecting the scope of climate change. Although Side Events are an effective forum to exchange ideas and network, their current format and purpose as being events ‘on the side’ does not offer a sufficient framework for coordination between the work of NNSAs and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process.     

Agreement,significance, and understandings of historical responsibility in climate change negotiations

For over 20 years, Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change have struggled with the normative significance of history for the differentiation of responsibilities. Negotiations on ‘historical responsibility’ have been marked by considerable conflict between developed and developing countries. However, in 2010, the Parties acknowledged the concept in a consensus decision. This article analyses UN Climate Change Conference delegates' agreement with the decision, whether it reconciled conflict between interpretations of historical responsibility, and the significance that delegates ascribe to the decision for future agreements. The decision has not eliminated conflict between different interpretations. Delegates who understand historical responsibility as linking countries' historical contributions to climate change to their responsibilities to act agree more with the decision and foresee it having a stronger influence on future agreements than do those viewing the concept in more conceptual terms. The decision marks the start of negotiations concerning how rather than whether historical responsibility should guide operative text. This article demonstrates that (1) the divergent interpretations pose clear challenges for a necessary but demanding agreement on operationalization, and (2) focusing on an ambiguous version of proportionality between contribution to change and responsibility can become a first step for convergence between divergent positions.     

Measurable,reportable and verifiable: the keys to mitigation in the Copenhagen deal

The climate negotiations up to Copenhagen will need to elaborate on measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) mitigation commitments and actions as part of the future of the climate regime. The conceptual, political, scientific, financial and institutional principles for MRV are explored for (1) mitigation commitments in developed countries, (2) mitigation actions in developing countries, supported by (3) means of implementation. For developed countries, the procedures in Articles 5, 7, 8 and 18 of the Kyoto Protocol will be critical in order to ensure comparability of commitments, both in effort and compliance. Outcomes should be reportable and verifiable through Annex I national communications and in-depth review. Existing procedures could be enhanced and need to apply across Protocol and Convention. MRV mitigation actions by developing countries should result in measurable deviations below baseline. Inventories will be important to measure, and enhanced national communications for reporting. The challenge will be to make mitigation actions verifiable, and options include verification by domestic institutions working to internationally agreed guidelines. A critical distinction is to be made between unilateral mitigation actions and those with international support. MRV applies to the provision of the means of implementation, including technology and finance. Investment in technology can be measured, so that institutional arrangements for technology and finance should be aligned. Verification of funds raised at international level would be simpler than raising funds nationally.     

Does leadership promote cooperation in climate change mitigation policy?

In the run-up to the Copenhagen negotiations, commentators, politicians and the public had great expectations of some state taking the lead towards a new global climate deal. Is there something in such a call for leadership? In two steps, this article provides an empirically informed answer to that question. The first part develops a theoretical account of the relation between leadership and cooperation in international climate change mitigation policy (ICCMP). Starting from a five-dimensional leadership account and a simple game-theoretical analysis of the impediments to cooperation, it is predicted that (1) increased leadership facilitates cooperation in ICCMP and (2) different leadership modes contribute to cooperation in varying degrees. The second part tests these hypotheses: a new leadership index measures the extent to which the EU exhibited leadership at the negotiations of the Conference of the Parties (COP) between 1995 and 2008. This positively correlates with the level of cooperation arrived at. The result also holds for four out of five leadership modes.     

Building bridges to 2020 and beyond: the road from Bali

What would the shape of a realistic, yet ambitious, package for the climate regime after 2012 look like? How do we obtain a package deal starting in Bali but building bridges to a post-2020 climate regime? A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive package deal has to strike a core balance between development and climate imperatives (mitigation, adaptation, dealing with the impacts of response measures, technology transfer, investment and finance) to create bargaining space and establish a conceptual contract zone. Within a continuum of possible packages, two packages in the contract zone are identified: ‘multi-stage’ and ‘ambitious transitional’. The latter is ambitious, combining domestic cap-and-trade for the USA, deeper cuts for Annex B countries, and quantifiable mitigation actions by developing countries. It is transitional as a possible bridge to a more inclusive regime beyond 2020. Multi-stage is defined around mechanisms by which countries move through increasingly stringent levels of participation, and must be based upon agreed triggers. Our assessment of political dynamics is that multi-stage is not yet in the political contract zone. Key to this is the absence of a ‘trigger from the North’, in that the largest historical emitter must act earlier and most decisively. But progress will also depend on continued leadership from Annex B countries, as well as more proactive, incentivized leadership in the South. Agreeing on the transitional stage is the critical next step in the evolution of the climate regime. Negotiating any package will require an institutional space for bargaining, political leadership and trust, and a clear time-frame.     

Why has China not embraced a global cap-and-trade regime?

Although many economic studies suggest that China would reap significant benefits from participating in a global cap-and-trade regime, China has consistently refused to participate in international negotiations on this issue. Understanding China's underlying concerns is a key to explaining why China has not embraced an international greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme. This is explored as a potential basis for including China in future negotiations and schemes. This issue is considered from the following perspectives that impact upon China: (a) fairness: how do developing countries perceive emissions caps? (b) why have China and India been sceptical about international emissions trading? (c) what would China's political perceptions be of an inflow of CDM investment in comparison with the exports of emissions permits to the USA? (d) what are the implications of ‘lock in’ to an emissions cap, particularly when no rules and principles exist for setting emissions targets for post-2012? (e) the complex question of establishing future emissions caps for developing countries.     

附件一国家温室气体排放趋势及其履约进展

对《联合国气候变化框架公约》秘书处最新公布的温室气体排放数据进行统计分析,结果显示：相对于基准年（1990年）,附件一国家温室气体排放总量整体呈下降趋势。其中,经济转型期国家温室气体排放总量总体上呈逐年下降趋势,非经济转型期国家的温室气体排放总量有逐年增长的趋势。美国和加拿大能源部门的温室气体排放量增长最为显著,相对于1990年,2005年其增幅分别为19.2%和28.6%;英国和德国能源部门温室气体减排量最为显著,其减幅分别为7.8%和17.4%。在2005年,有超过一半的附件一国家的实际排放量低于其目标排放量,履约进展状况良好。     

Great-power politics,order transition,and climate governance: insights from international relations theory

The complex politics of climate change cannot be properly understood without reference to deeper geopolitical trends in the wider international system. Chief among these is the growing resurgence of ‘great-power politics’ between China and the US, along with failures of socialization and enmeshment into global governance structures in relation to these two powers. Traditional theoretical frameworks have failed to adequately account for these developments. Nonetheless, this current great-power contestation is at the core of an order transition that has prevented the large-scale institutional redesign required to remove deadlocks in existing global governance structures, including climate governance. Examples from the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference provide ample evidence for these claims. The slow progress of the climate change negotiations are due not just to the politics of the issue itself, but to the absence of a new political bargain on material power structures, normative beliefs, and the management of the order amongst the great powers. Without such a grand political bargain, which could be promoted through a forum of major economies whose wide-ranging remit would go beyond single issues, the climate change regime is only ever likely to progress in a piecemeal fashion.

Policy relevance

Despite the achievements of the 2012 Doha Climate Change Conference, the climate negotiations are not on course to limit warming to 2 °C, and thereby avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change. Several factors have been invoked to account for such slow progress: notably, the nature of the climate change problem itself, the institutional structure of the climate regime, and lack of political will among key players. An alternative explanation is proposed such that the failure to seriously address climate change – as well as other global problems – reflects a resurgent meta-struggle between the ‘great powers’ of China and the US over the nature of the global order. Without such a broader understanding of the deeper dynamics underlying the stalemates of the climate change negotiations, there is little chance of turning those negotiations around.