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Amy Ross 《Geoforum》2006,37(1):69-81
As in other Latin American nations, Guatemala established a truth commission as a part of a negotiated transition from war to peace. The establishment of a particular truth commission arises out of the unique circumstances of that nation’s conflict and its negotiated resolution. As with other examples of truth commissions, the Guatemalan experience demonstrates the dilemmas of answering the demands for accountability, within the precarious context of a negotiated transition. Once established, a truth commission is subjected to the struggles within sectors of society striving to control the truth commission, and make it respond to certain interests. These struggles influence the practices, powers, and potential of the truth commissions.This article analyses the context in which the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification emerged, the conditions in which it operated, and the potential consequences of the truth-seeking process. I argue that the Guatemalan truth commission became a site of struggle in which battles concerning impunity versus accountability occurred. This article first traces the phenomenon of truth commissions in Latin America, and locates the Guatemalan case within this regional context. Next, the negotiations that led to the formation of the truth commission are examined, in order to highlight the particular powers and interests at stake. Finally, I describe the operations of the Guatemalan truth commission in practice (1997-1999), and discuss the ways in which the commission developed a life of its own, despite the politics of its birth. 相似文献
52.
《Geoforum》2017
This article analyzes changing forms of transnational security governance and security expertise in Guatemala. It is argued that the dynamics of transnational security governance in Guatemala are directly related to the local appropriation of knowledge promoted by external security experts. As an expertise-based form of “intervention by invitation,” local political and economic elites engage in securitization strategies in order to invite external experts to intervene. In turn, through their intervention these experts provide resources that are “captured” and exploited by local actors to pursue their own interests. As a consequence, transnational security governance fails as it deviates from the original plans and programs experts try to implement. The analysis of these processes sheds light on how and why failure in the context of transnational security governance is productive. Failure, we argue, triggers a self-reinforcing interventionary feedback loop that aims at “fixing” the shortcomings of previous interventions by mobilizing new forms of external security expertise. In tracing the dynamics of this interventionary feedback loop over time, this article contributes to understanding of the role of experts and policy failure in the (re)making of transnational security governance. 相似文献
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