The inclusion of Programmes of Activities (PoAs) within the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has been limited by the fact that third-party project validators, who determine the eligibility of a CDM Project Activity (CPA), are currently held liable for any certificates that are erroneously issued. As such, validators must replace any credits issued for the relevant CPA. Moreover, the risk associated with the validation of small-scale CPAs is considerably higher than that associated with traditional CDM projects. Using a simple game-theory model to model the interactions between project validators and coordinators, it is shown that shifting liability for certificates that are erroneously included – from the former to the latter – is never optimal, does not provide a strong enough incentive to enforce first-best levels of due care in CPA selection and inclusion, and can induce overprovision in validation efforts. The main problem with such a simple proportionate liability regime is that an increase in incentives for one player automatically leads to a decrease in incentives for the other. Two additional instruments are also considered that would both rectify this problem and improve the environmental integrity of the CDM mechanism. 相似文献
Abstract The Ninth Conference of the Parties (COP-9) decided to adopt an accounting system based on expiring carbon credits to address the problem of non-permanent carbon storage in forests established under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This article reviews and discusses carbon accounting methods that were under consideration before COP-9 and presents a model which calculates the minimum area that forest plantation projects should reach to be able to compensate CDM transaction costs with the revenues from carbon credits. The model compares different accounting methods under various sets of parameters on project management, transaction costs, and carbon prices. Model results show that under current carbon price and average transaction costs, projects with an area of less than 500 ha are excluded from the CDM, whatever accounting method is used. Temporary crediting appears to be the most favorable approach to account for non-permanent carbon removal in forests and also for the feasibility of smaller projects. However, lower prices for credits with finite lifetimes may prevent the establishment of CDM forestry projects. Also, plantation projects with low risk of unexpected carbon loss and sufficient capacity for insuring or buffering the risk of carbon re-emission would benefit from equivalence-adjusted average carbon storage accounting rather than from temporary crediting. 相似文献
Many gentle dip translational rock slides have taken place in the Three Gorges Reservoir, China. In order to study the mechanism of these translational rock slides, the authors use the Anlesi landslide as a typical case study to investigate in detail. Field investigations show that the slip zones of the Anlesi landslide were formed from a white mudstone in Jurassic red strata. X-ray diffraction and infrared ray analysis showed that the main mineral components of the slip zones are montmorillonite, illite, feldspar and quartz. Laboratory tests indicate that the slip zone soils are silty clay, of medium-swelling potential, the shear strength decreasing significantly as the slip zone attracts water and saturates.The main factors contributing to the Anlesi landslide are recent tectonic activity, incompetent beds, and intensive rainfall. Recent tectonic activity had caused shear failure along the incompetent beds, and joints within the sandstone. With the effect of intensive rainfall, water percolates to the incompetent beds along tectonic fissures, resulting in swelling of the soil material and high groundwater pressures within fissures in the strata. As a consequence, the Anlesi slope is prone to slide along these incompetent beds.Flac3D software was used to simulate the mechanism of the Anlesi landslide considering the rheological properties of soil and rock. The simulation results demonstrate that the stress, displacement and failure area changes with simulated creep time. The maximum displacement in the X direction reaches 7.59 m after 200-year simulated creep. Therefore, the mechanism of the Anlesi landslide can be illustrated considering the rheological properties of Jurassic red strata. 相似文献
The Paris Agreement (PA) emphasizes the intrinsic relationship between climate change and sustainable development (SD) and welcomes the 2030 agenda for the global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Yet, there is a lack of assessment approaches to ensure that climate and development goals are achieved in an integrated fashion and trade-offs avoided. Article 6.4 of the PA introduces a new Sustainable Mitigation Mechanism (SMM) with the dual aim to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and foster SD. The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has a similar objective and in 2014, the CDM SD tool was launched by the Executive Board of the CDM to highlight the SD benefits of CDM activities. This article analyses the usefulness of the CDM SD tool for stakeholders and compares the SD tool’s SD reporting requirements against other flexible mechanisms and multilateral standards to provide recommendations for improvement. A key conclusion is that the Paris Agreement’s SMM has a stronger political mandate than the CDM to measure that SD impacts are ‘real, measurable and long-term’. Recommendations for an improved CDM SD tool are a relevant starting point to develop rules, modalities, and procedures for SD assessment in Article 6.4 as well as for other cooperative mitigation approaches.
POLICY RELEVANCE
Research findings are relevant for developing the rulebook of modalities and procedures for Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement, which introduces a new mechanism for mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and sustainable development. Lessons learnt from the CDM SD tool and recommendations for enhanced SD assessment are discussed in context of Article 6 cooperative approaches, and make a timely contribution to inform negotiations on the rulebook agreed by the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement. 相似文献
After decades of pressure from vulnerable developing countries, the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (the WIM) was established at the nineteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 19) in 2013 to address costly damages from climate change. However, little progress has been made towards establishing a mechanism to fund loss and damage. The WIM's Executive Committee issued its first two-year workplan the following year at COP 20 which offered, among other things, a range of approaches to financing loss and damage programmes, which we review here. We provide brief overviews of each mechanism proposed by the WIM ExCom, describe their current applications, their statuses under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), some of their advantages and disadvantages, and their current or potential application to loss and damage. We find that several of these mechanisms may be useful in supporting loss and damage programmes, but identify some key gaps. First, most of the mechanisms identified by the WIM ExCom are insurance schemes subsidized with voluntary contributions, which may not be adequate or reliable over time. Second, none were devised to apply to slow-onset events, or to non-economic losses and damages. That is, if harms are inflicted on parts of a society or its ecosystems that have no price, or if they occur gradually, they would probably not be covered by these mechanisms. Finally, the lack of a dedicated and adequate flow of finance to address the real loss and damage being experienced by vulnerable nations will require the use of innovative financial tools beyond those mentioned in the WIM ExCom workplan.
Key policy insights
Despite a full article of the 2015 Paris Agreement devoted to loss and damage, there is little international agreement on the scope of loss and damage programmes, and especially how they would be funded and by whom.
Most of the loss and damage funding mechanisms identified by the WIM ExCom are insurance schemes subsidized with voluntary contributions, which may burden the most vulnerable countries and may not be reliable over time.
None of the mechanisms were devised to apply to slow-onset events, or to non-economic losses and damages.