高温高压下Mg2SiO4-MgAlO4体系相变的实验研究

采用多顶砧高压实验装置研究了Mg2SiO4-MgAl2O4体系在压力为22 GPa,温度为1550～1750℃条件下的相变,并考查了Al2O3在γ相中的固溶度.结果表明,随着体系中MgAl2O4组分含量的增加,相组合发生了变化,依次为γ相+镁铝硅酸盐固溶体+方镁石→镁铝硅酸盐固溶体+方镁石→镁铝硅酸盐固溶体+方镁石+刚玉固溶体;镁铝硅酸盐固溶体具有石榴子石结构,其化学成分随着体系中共存相的改变而有所变化;Al2O3在γ相中的固溶度很低(其重量百分比＜0.8%),因此,在Mg2SiO4-MgAl2O4体系中Al2O3可能对γ相超尖晶石分解转变的压力不会有很大的影响.     

班怒成矿带中段雄梅地区碰撞后含铜岩浆岩类型、时代及成因

雄梅地区位于西藏班公湖-怒江成矿带中段申扎县,区内分布有舍索矽卡岩型铜多金属矿,雄梅斑岩型铜钼矿,以及桑日、苦嘎矽卡岩铜矿点,相应地发育多套含铜岩浆岩。本文通过系统的锆石U-Pb年龄、全岩Pb同位素及岩石地球化学分析,厘定了这些含铜岩浆岩的时代和成因类型。初步查明它们先后形成于约110Ma(舍索,雄梅,苦嘎)和80Ma(桑日)两个岩浆活动阶段。雄梅地区岩浆活动的时代及源区具有明显的后碰撞阶段特征,其中雄梅矿区的含矿花岗闪长斑岩具高铝、钙碱性特征,为由泥砂质沉积岩生成的S型花岗岩。舍索、桑日、苦嘎矿区的含矿岩体均为I型,显示原岩为火成岩。岩石地球化学表明这些含矿岩体富集大离子亲石元素(Rb、Sr、Th、Pb),亏损高场强元素(Nb、Ta、Ti),显示出俯冲沉积物组分对岩浆形成产生过重要影响。在早白垩世时期,俯冲板片断离,大量的软流圈物质上涌并参与岩浆活动,促使上地壳组分熔融,携带大量成矿元素形成含矿岩浆岩,在近地表形成雄梅、舍索及桑日矿床;晚白垩世时期,加厚的岩石圈在重力作用下拆沉,减薄的岩石圈在上涌地幔的底侵作用下发生熔融,形成桑日矿床。     

柴北缘双口山金-银-铅矿床赋矿围岩及含金石英脉热液锆石U-Pb定年对成矿时代的限定及其成因启示

双口山金-银-铅矿床地处柴北缘西段,赋存在滩间山变基性-超基性变火山岩中。矿体由金矿体和银铅矿体组成,成矿作用与热液活动密切相关。本文通过对双口山含金矿体赋矿围岩及含金石英脉进行LA-ICP-MS锆石U-Pb年代学分析和研究。结果表明,赋矿围岩形成时代为443±2.9Ma,与区域滩间山群火山岩形成年代一致(440～490Ma)。含金石英脉热液锆石U-Pb年代为402.8±4.2Ma,与区域金矿床成矿年龄以及韧性剪切带年龄相接近(～400Ma),代表了金矿体热液作用及成矿时代。结合地质特征及前人研究,表明双口山金银铅矿床是柴北缘造山带在不同造山带演化阶段,由不同成矿作用,在不同时期,相互叠加形成的复合型多金属矿床。金矿体具有典型造山型金矿床特征的变质热液型金矿,其成因主要与造山运动过程中的变质和变形作用有关,成矿物质和流体来源于绿片岩相的滩间山群变基性-超基性变火山岩。银铅矿体为岩浆热液型,成矿与后碰撞造山作用伸展-构造转换有关的岩浆作用有关,成矿物质和流体来源于晚泥盆世深部含矿岩浆作用。     

甘肃北山南带沙枣园复式岩体年代学、地球化学特征及其构造意义

北山南带沙枣园复式岩体由中细粒黑云母花岗闪长岩、细粒黑云母石英闪长岩、中粒黑云母二长花岗岩和中粗粒黑云母正长花岗岩4个岩相单元组成。LA-ICP-MS锆石U-Pb定年结果表明,中细粒黑云母花岗闪长岩、细粒黑云母石英闪长岩和中粒黑云母二长花岗岩侵位于晚二叠世(252.1±1.9Ma、252.2±2.1Ma和248.8±3.5Ma),为海西晚期的产物;而中粗粒黑云母正长花岗岩侵位于早三叠世(246.4±2.0Ma),为印支早期的产物。该花岗质岩石均具有稀土元素的球粒陨石标准化配分曲线呈右倾型,轻重稀土分馏大,轻稀土富集且分异明显,而重稀土亏损且分异不显著特征。中细粒黑云母花岗闪长岩和细粒黑云母石英闪长岩具有较高的SiO₂、Al₂O₃和Na₂O含量,以及较低的MgO含量,强烈富集Sr而亏损Yb和Y,具轻微的铕异常(δEu=0.75～1.16),表现出典型的埃达克岩特征;中粒黑云母二长花岗岩和中粗粒黑云母正长花岗岩总体富硅(SiO₂)、富钾(K₂O)、富碱(K     

秦巴山区村域稳定脱贫测度及返贫防控风险识别——以重庆市城口县为例

深度贫困地区农村实现稳定脱贫、建立返贫防控机制是后2020时代的现实要求,更是精准扶贫与乡村振兴承上启下的紧密衔接。以强度生态脆弱与集中连片特困复合地区重庆市城口县为研究区域,基于脱贫稳定性测度模型、障碍度模型和最小方差模型等方法对城口县60个行政村、1950个农户进行多维脱贫稳定性空间分异特征和返贫风险模式探究。研究发现：① 样本村脱贫稳定性等级分布总体呈现前端窄小、中部突出的“葫芦状”结构,各地区多维脱贫稳定性总体不高且存在空间异质性;② 城口县返贫风险可识别为双风险模式、三风险模式、四风险模式和五风险模式4种模式及各阻力因素多元整合主导的11种返贫风险类型,人力资本、发展机会等涉及农户可持续增收、动态抗风险能力及内生动力的要素逐渐成为现阶段返贫防控及减贫路径依赖的重点;③ 立足区域特征,把继续攻坚和稳定脱贫、防止返贫摆在同等重要位置上,因村施策提高群众抗风险能力,精准织密防止脱贫群体的返贫网。     

Mapping the narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC

Since the mid-1990s, the aim of keeping climate change within 2?°C has become firmly entrenched in policy discourses. In the past few years, the likelihood of achieving it has been increasingly called into question. The debate around what to do with a target that seems less and less achievable is, however, only just beginning. As the UN commences a two-year review of the 2?°C target, this article moves beyond the somewhat binary debates about whether or not it should or will be met, in order to analyse more fully some of the alternative options that have been identified but not fully explored in the existing literature. For the first time, uncertainties, risks, and opportunities associated with four such options are identified and synthesized from the literature. The analysis finds that the significant risks and uncertainties associated with some options may encourage decision makers to recommit to the 2?°C target as the least unattractive course of action.     

Climate change technology transfer: a new paradigm and policy agenda

This article proposes a shift to a paradigm that is more extensive than the current narrow focus on North—South climate change technology transfers, towards a more inclusive ‘global’ paradigm. An implication of the paradigm shift is that there should be a concomitant expansion of the policy agendas of the international climate and trade regimes. The traditional North—South paradigm of technology transfer ignores the increasing importance of developing countries as sources of advanced climate-friendly technologies, and therefore ignores South—North and South—South transfers. Further, whereas the North—South paradigm has emphasized developing countries' intellectual property rights policies as barriers to technology transfers, the ‘global’ paradigm focuses attention on trade and investment policy barriers, including developed countries' policies that inhibit technology transfer from developing countries. The analysis is relevant to international negotiations in the post-2012 climate regime, and is also relevant to the future development of the trade regime—not only at the multilateral level in the WTO, but also at the regional and bilateral levels.     

Post-2012 climate policy dilemmas: a review of proposals

This article assesses a wide range of alternative proposals for post-2012 international climate policy regimes. We believe that these proposals will serve as a basis for debates about how to configure post-2012 climate policy. The article characterizes and assesses the policy proposals along the lines of five key policy dilemmas. We argue that (1) many proposals have ideas on how to reduce emissions, but fewer have a solution on how to stimulate technical innovation; (2) many proposals formulate climate policy in isolation, while there are fewer proposals that try to mainstream climate policies in other policy areas; (3) many proposals advocate market-based solutions, while fewer realize that there are certain drawbacks to this solution especially at the international level; (4) most proposals have a preference for a UN-based regime, while a more fragmented regime, based on regional and sectoral arrangements may be emerging; and (5) most proposals have ideas about mitigation, but not many have creative ideas on how to integrate mitigation with adaptation.     

Creating incentives for avoiding further deforestation: the nested approach

Since 2005, Parties to the UNFCCC have been negotiating policy options for incentivizing reductions of (greenhouse gas) emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) in a future climate regime. Proposals on how to operationalize REDD range from market-based to pure fund-based approaches. Most of the current proposals suggest accounting for REDD at the national level. Accounting for emission reductions and implementing policy reform for curbing deforestation will take time and imply high levels of technical and institutional capacity. Therefore it is essential that developing countries receive sufficient support to implement national REDD programmes. To save time and ensure prompt action in reducing deforestation, a REDD approach is proposed that integrates project-level and subnational REDD schemes into national-level accounting. This ‘nested approach’ can achieve meaningful reductions in GHG emissions from improved forest governance and management, while allowing for an immediate and broad participation by developing countries, civil society and the private sector.     

Who picks up the remainder? Mitigation in developed and developing countries

A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive climate regime beyond 2012 will need several political balances. Mitigation and funding will be at the heart of the agreement. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report indicates that absolute reductions will be needed in Annex I (AI) countries and substantial deviation from baseline in some non-Annex I (NAI) regions by 2020. Although the latter was not explicitly quantified by the IPCC, the EU subsequently proposed a range for developing countries. Sharing the burden for mitigation is essentially zero-sum: if one does less, the other has to do more. We critically examine the implicit assumption that NAI countries would pick up the remainder of the required global effort minus the AI contribution. We suggest that greater levels of ambition can be achieved by turning the formula around politically, starting from the achievable ‘deviation below baseline’ given NAI's national programmes and appropriate international support. AI countries may have to exceed the IPCC ranges or pay for the remainder. For notional levels of NAI mitigation action, Annex I has to reduce by between ?52% and ?69% below 1990 by 2020, only dropping to a domestic ?35% with commitments to offset payments through the carbon market. Given the large mitigation gap, a political agreement on the question of ‘who pays’ is fundamental. The carbon market will provide some investment, but it mainly serves to reduce costs, particularly in developed countries, rather than adding to the overall effort. Market-linked levies and Annex I public funding will therefore be crucial to bridge the gap.