Co-productive governance: A relational framework for adaptive governance

Adaptive governance focuses our attention on the relationships between science and management, whereby the so-called ‘gaps’ between these groups are seen to hinder effective adaptive responses to biophysical change. Yet the relationships between science and governance, knowledge and action, remain under theorized in discussions of adaptive governance, which largely focuses on abstract design principles or preferred institutional arrangements. In contrast, the metaphor of co-production highlights the social and political processes through which science, policy, and practice co-evolve. Co-production is invoked as a normative goal (Mitchell et al., 2004) and analytical lens (Jasanoff, 2004a, Jasanoff, 2004b), both of which provide useful insight into the processes underpinning adaptive governance. This paper builds on and integrates these disparate views to reconceptualize adaptive governance as a process of co-production. I outline an alternative conceptual framing, ‘co-productive governance’, that articulates the context, knowledge, process, and vision of governance. I explore these ideas through two cases of connectivity conservation, which draws on conservation science to promote collaborative cross-scale governance. This analysis highlights the ways in which the different contexts of these cases produced very different framings and responses to the same propositions of science and governance. Drawing on theoretical and empirical material, co-productive governance moves beyond long standing debates that institutions can be rationally crafted or must emerge from context resituate adaptive governance in a more critical and contextualized space. This reframing focuses on the process of governance through an explicit consideration of how normative considerations shape the interactions between knowledge and power, science and governance.     

Unravelling the United Kingdom’s climate policy consensus: The power of ideas,discourse and institutions

As climate change policies and governance initiatives struggle to produce the transformational social changes required, the search for stand out case studies continues. Many have pointed to the period between 2005 and 2008 in the United Kingdom as a promising example of national level innovation. With strong cross-party consensus and a first-of-its-kind legislation the UK established itself as a climate policy leader. However, early warning signs suggest that this institutionalised position is far from secure. Through a novel application of discursive institutionalism this article presents a detailed analysis of the role of ideas in unravelling this ambition under the Conservative-Liberal coalition administration (2010–2015). Discursive interactions among policymakers and other political actors were dominated by ideas about governmental responsibility and economic austerity, establishing an atmosphere of climate policy scepticism and restraint. By situating this conspicuous and influential process of bricolage within its institutional context the importance of how policymakers think and communicate about climate change is made apparent. The power of ideas to influence policy is further demonstrated through their cognitive and normative persuasiveness, by imposing over and excluding alternatives and in their institutional positioning. It can be concluded that despite innovative legislation, institution building and strategic coordination of different types of governance actors the ideational foundations of ambitious climate change politics in the UK have been undermined.     

Comparative assessment of Japan's long-term carbon budget under different effort-sharing principles

This article assesses Japan's carbon budgets up to 2100 in the global efforts to achieve the 2?°C target under different effort-sharing approaches based on long-term GHG mitigation scenarios published in 13 studies. The article also presents exemplary emission trajectories for Japan to stay within the calculated budget.

The literature data allow for an in-depth analysis of four effort-sharing categories. For a 450?ppm CO₂e stabilization level, the remaining carbon budgets for 2014–2100 were negative for the effort-sharing category that emphasizes historical responsibility and capability. For the other three, including the reference ‘Cost-effectiveness’ category, which showed the highest budget range among all categories, the calculated remaining budgets (20th and 80th percentile ranges) would run out in 21–29 years if the current emission levels were to continue. A 550?ppm CO₂e stabilization level increases the budgets by 6–17 years-equivalent of the current emissions, depending on the effort-sharing category. Exemplary emissions trajectories staying within the calculated budgets were also analysed for ‘Equality’, ‘Staged’ and ‘Cost-effectiveness’ categories. For a 450?ppm CO₂e stabilization level, Japan's GHG emissions would need to phase out sometime between 2045 and 2080, and the emission reductions in 2030 would be at least 16–29% below 1990 levels even for the most lenient ‘Cost-effectiveness’ category, and 29–36% for the ‘Equality’ category. The start year for accelerated emissions reductions and the emissions convergence level in the long term have major impact on the emissions reduction rates that need to be achieved, particularly in the case of smaller budgets.

Policy relevance

In previous climate mitigation target formulation processes for 2020 and 2030 in Japan, neither equity principles nor long-term management of cumulative GHG emissions was at the centre of discussion. This article quantitatively assesses how much more GHGs Japan can emit by 2100 to achieve the 2?°C target in light of different effort-sharing approaches, and how Japan's GHG emissions can be managed up to 2100. The long-term implications of recent energy policy developments following the Fukushima nuclear disaster for the calculated carbon budgets are also discussed.     

The need for national deep decarbonization pathways for effective climate policy

Constraining global average temperatures to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels will probably require global energy system emissions to be halved by 2050 and complete decarbonization by 2100. In the nationally orientated climate policy framework codified under the Paris Agreement, each nation must decide the scale and method of their emissions reduction contribution while remaining consistent with the global carbon budget. This policy process will require engagement amongst a wide range of stakeholders who have very different visions for the physical implementation of deep decarbonization. The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP) has developed a methodology, building on the energy, climate and economics literature, to structure these debates based on the following principles: country-scale analysis to capture specific physical, economic and political circumstances to maximize policy relevance, a long-term perspective to harmonize short-term decisions with the long-term objective and detailed sectoral analysis with transparent representation of emissions drivers through a common accounting framework or ‘dashboard’. These principles are operationalized in the creation of deep decarbonization pathways (DDPs), which involve technically detailed, sector-by-sector maps of each country’s decarbonization transition, backcasting feasible pathways from 2050 end points. This article shows how the sixteen DDPP country teams, covering 74% of global energy system emissions, used this method to collectively restrain emissions to a level consistent with the 2 °C target while maintaining development aspirations and reflecting national circumstances, mainly through efficiency, decarbonization of energy carriers (e.g. electricity, hydrogen, biofuels and synthetic gas) and switching to these carriers. The cross-cutting analysis of country scenarios reveals important enabling conditions for the transformation, pertaining to technology research and development, investment, trade and global and national policies.

Policy relevance

In the nation-focused global climate policy framework codified in the Paris Agreement, the purpose of the DDPP and DDPs is to provide a common method by which global and national governments, business, civil society and researchers in each country can communicate, compare and debate differing concrete visions for deep decarbonization in order to underpin the necessary societal and political consensus to design and implement short-term policy packages that are consistent with long-term global decarbonization.     

Including animal to plant protein shifts in climate change mitigation policy: a proposed three-step strategy

Strong and rapid greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions, far beyond those currently committed to, are required to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. This allows no sector to maintain business as usual practices, while application of the precautionary principle requires avoiding a reliance on negative emission technologies. Animal to plant-sourced protein shifts offer substantial potential for GHG emission reductions. Unabated, the livestock sector could take between 37% and 49% of the GHG budget allowable under the 2°C and 1.5°C targets, respectively, by 2030. Inaction in the livestock sector would require substantial GHG reductions, far beyond what are planned or realistic, from other sectors. This outlook article outlines why animal to plant-sourced protein shifts should be taken up by the Conference of the Parties (COP), and how they could feature as part of countries’ mitigation commitments under their updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to be adopted from 2020 onwards. The proposed framework includes an acknowledgment of ‘peak livestock’, followed by targets for large and rapid reductions in livestock numbers based on a combined ‘worst first’ and ‘best available food’ approach. Adequate support, including climate finance, is needed to facilitate countries in implementing animal to plant-sourced protein shifts.

Key policy insights

• Given the livestock sector’s significant contribution to global GHG emissions and methane dominance, animal to plant protein shifts make a necessary contribution to meeting the Paris temperature goals and reducing warming in the short term, while providing a suite of co-benefits.

• Without action, the livestock sector could take between 37% and 49% of the GHG budget allowable under the 2°C and 1.5°C targets, respectively, by 2030.

• Failure to implement animal to plant protein shifts increases the risk of exceeding temperate goals; requires additional GHG reductions from other sectors; and increases reliance on negative emissions technologies.

• COP 24 is an opportunity to bring animal to plant protein shifts to the climate mitigation table.

• Revised NDCs from 2020 should include animal to plant protein shifts, starting with a declaration of ‘peak livestock’, followed by a ‘worst first’ replacement approach, guided by ‘best available food’.

     

Targeting carbon dioxide removal in the European Union

In principle, many climate policymakers have accepted that large-scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement’s mitigation targets, but they have avoided proposing by whom CDR might be delivered. Given its role in international climate policy, the European Union (EU) might be expected to lead the way. But among EU climate policymakers so far there is little talk on CDR, let alone action. Here we assess how best to ‘target’ CDR to motivate EU policymakers exploring which CDR target strategy may work best to start dealing with CDR on a meaningful scale. A comprehensive CDR approach would focus on delivering the CDR volumes required from the EU by 2100, approximately at least 50 Gigatonnes (Gt) CO₂, according to global model simulations aiming to keep warming below 2°C. A limited CDR approach would focus on an intermediate target to deliver the CDR needed to reach ‘net zero emissions’ (i.e. the gross negative emissions needed to offset residual positive emissions that are too expensive or even impossible to mitigate). We argue that a comprehensive CDR approach may be too intimidating for EU policymakers. A limited CDR approach that only addresses the necessary steps to reach the (intermediate) target of ‘net zero emissions’ is arguably more achievable, since it is a better match to the existing policy paradigm and would allow for a pragmatic phase-in of CDR while avoiding outright resistance by environmental NGOs and the broader public.

Key policy insights

• Making CDR an integral part of EU climate policy has the potential to significantly reshape the policy landscape.

• Burden sharing considerations would probably play a major role, with comprehensive CDR prolonging the disparity and tensions between progressives and laggards.

• Introducing limited CDR in the context of ‘net zero’ pathways would retain a visible primary focus on decarbonization but acknowledge the need for a significant enhancement of removals via ‘natural’ and/or ‘engineered’ sinks.

• A decarbonization approach that intends to lead to a low level of ‘residual emissions’ (to be tackled by a pragmatic phase-in of CDR) should be the priority of EU climate policy.

     

International and national climate policies for aviation: a review

Aviation constitutes about 2.5% of all energy-related CO₂ emissions and in addition there are non-CO₂ effects. In 2016, the ICAO decided to implement a Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and in 2017 the EU decided on faster emission reductions in its Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which since 2012 includes the aviation sector. The effects of these policies on the expected development of air travel emissions from 2017 to 2030 have been analyzed. For the sample country Sweden, the analysis shows that when emissions reductions in other sectors are attributed to the aviation sector as a result of the EU ETS and CORSIA, carbon emissions are expected to reduce by ?0.8% per year (however if non-CO₂ emissions are included in the analysis, then emissions will increase). This is much less than what is needed to achieve the 2°C target. Our analysis of potential national aviation policy instruments shows that there are legally feasible options that could mitigate emissions in addition to the EU ETS and CORSIA. Distance-based air passenger taxes are common among EU Member States and through increased ticket prices these taxes can reduce demand for air travel and thus reduce emissions. Tax on jet fuel is an option for domestic aviation and for international aviation if bilateral agreements are concluded. A quota obligation for biofuels is a third option.

Key policy insights

• Existing international climate policies for aviation will not deliver any major emission reductions.

• Policymakers who want to significantly push the aviation sector to contribute to meeting the 2°C target need to work towards putting in place tougher international policy instruments in the long term, and simultaneously implement temporary national policy instruments in the near-term.

• Distance-based air passenger taxes, carbon taxes on jet fuel and quota obligations for biofuels are available national policy options; if they are gradually increased, and harmonized with other countries, they can help to significantly reduce emissions.

     

Policy options to streamline the carbon market for agricultural nitrous oxide emissions

The majority of emissions of nitrous oxide – a potent greenhouse gas (GHG) – are from agricultural sources, particularly nitrogen fertilizer applications. A growing focus on these emission sources has led to the development in the United States of GHG offset protocols that could enable payment to farmers for reducing fertilizer use or implementing other nitrogen management strategies. Despite the development of several protocols, the current regional scope is narrow, adoption by farmers is low, and policy implementation of protocols has a significant time lag. Here we utilize existing research and policy structures to propose an ‘umbrella’ approach for nitrogen management GHG emissions protocols that has the potential to streamline the policy implementation and acceptance of such protocols. We suggest that the umbrella protocol could set forth standard definitions common across multiple protocol options, and then modules could be further developed as scientific evidence advances. Modules could be developed for specific crops, regions, and practices. We identify a policy process that could facilitate this development in concert with emerging scientific research and conclude by acknowledging potential benefits and limitations of the approach.

Key policy insights

• Agricultural greenhouse gas market options are growing, but are still underutilized

• Streamlining protocol development through an umbrella process could enable quicker development of protocols across new crops, regions, and practices

• Effective protocol development must not compromise best available science and should follow a rigorous pathway to ensure appropriate implementation

     

Perceived fairness and public acceptability of carbon pricing: a review of the literature

While carbon pricing is widely seen as a crucial element of climate policy and has been implemented in many countries, it also has met with strong resistance. We provide a comprehensive overview of public perceptions of the fairness of carbon pricing and how these affect policy acceptability. To this end, we review evidence from empirical studies on how individuals judge personal, distributional and procedural aspects of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade. In addition, we examine preferences for particular redistributive and other uses of revenues generated by carbon pricing and their role in instrument acceptability. Our results indicate a high concern over distributional effects, particularly in relation to policy impacts on poor people, in turn reducing policy acceptability. In addition, people show little trust in the capacities of governments to put the revenues of carbon pricing to good use. Somewhat surprisingly, most studies do not indicate clear public preferences for using revenues to ensure fairer policy outcomes, notably by reducing its regressive effects. Instead, many people prefer using revenues for ‘environmental projects’ of various kinds. We end by providing recommendations for improving public acceptability of carbon pricing. One suggestion to increase policy acceptability is combining the redistribution of revenue to vulnerable groups with the funding for environmental projects, such as on renewable energy.

Key policy insights

• If people perceive carbon pricing instruments as fair, this increases policy acceptability and support.

• People’s satisfaction with information provided by the government about the policy instrument increases acceptability.

• While people express high concern over uneven distribution of the policy burden, they often prefer using carbon pricing revenues for environmental projects instead of compensation for inequitable outcomes.

• Recent studies find that people’s preferences shift to using revenues for making policy fairer if they better understand the functioning of carbon pricing, notably that relatively high prices of CO₂-intensive goods and services reduce their consumption.

• Combining the redistribution of revenue to support both vulnerable groups and environmental projects, such as on renewable energy, seems to most increase policy acceptability.