This article illustrates the main difficulties encountered in the preparation of GHG emission projections and climate change mitigation policies and measures (P&M) for Kazakhstan. Difficulties in representing the system with an economic model have been overcome by representing the energy system with a technical-economic growth model (MARKAL-TIMES) based on the stock of existing plants, transformation processes, and end-use devices. GHG emission scenarios depend mainly on the pace of transition in Kazakhstan from a planned economy to a market economy. Three scenarios are portrayed: an incomplete transition, a fast and successful one, and even more advanced participation in global climate change mitigation, including participation in some emission trading schemes. If the transition to a market economy is completed by 2020, P&M already adopted may reduce emissions of CO2 from combustion by about 85 MtCO2 by 2030 – 17% of the emissions in the baseline (WOM) scenario. One-third of these reductions are likely to be obtained from the demand sectors, and two-thirds from the supply sectors. If every tonne of CO2 not emitted is valued up to US$10 in 2020 and $20 in 2030, additional P&M may further reduce emissions by 110 MtCO2 by 2030. 相似文献
Four policies might close the gap between the global GHG emissions expected for 2020 on the basis of current (2013) policies and the reduced emissions that will be needed if the long-term global temperature increase can be kept below the 2 °C internationally agreed limit. The four policies are (1) specific energy efficiency measures, (2) closure of the least-efficient coal-fired power plants, (3) minimizing methane emissions from upstream oil and gas production, and (4) accelerating the (partial) phase-out of subsidies to fossil-fuel consumption. In this article we test the hypothesis of the International Energy Agency (IEA) that these policies will not result in a loss of gross domestic product (GDP) and we estimate their employment effects using the E3MG global macro-econometric model. Using a set of scenarios we assess each policy individually and then consider the outcomes if all four policies were implemented simultaneously. We find that the policies are insufficient to close the emissions gap, with an overall emission reduction that is 30% less than that found by the IEA. World GDP is 0.5% higher in 2020, with about 6 million net jobs created by 2020 and unemployment reduced.
Policy relevance
The gap between GHG emissions expected under the Copenhagen and Cancun Agreements and that needed for emissions trajectories to have a reasonable chance of reaching the 2 °C target requires additional policies if it is to be closed. This article uses a global simulation model E3MG to analyse a set of policies proposed by the IEA to close the gap and assesses their macroeconomic effects as well as their feasibility in closing the gap. It complements the IEA assessment by estimating the GDP and employment implications separately by the different policies year by year to 2020, by major industries, and by 21 world regions. 相似文献
This article assesses Japan's carbon budgets up to 2100 in the global efforts to achieve the 2?°C target under different effort-sharing approaches based on long-term GHG mitigation scenarios published in 13 studies. The article also presents exemplary emission trajectories for Japan to stay within the calculated budget.The literature data allow for an in-depth analysis of four effort-sharing categories. For a 450?ppm CO2e stabilization level, the remaining carbon budgets for 2014–2100 were negative for the effort-sharing category that emphasizes historical responsibility and capability. For the other three, including the reference ‘Cost-effectiveness’ category, which showed the highest budget range among all categories, the calculated remaining budgets (20th and 80th percentile ranges) would run out in 21–29 years if the current emission levels were to continue. A 550?ppm CO2e stabilization level increases the budgets by 6–17 years-equivalent of the current emissions, depending on the effort-sharing category. Exemplary emissions trajectories staying within the calculated budgets were also analysed for ‘Equality’, ‘Staged’ and ‘Cost-effectiveness’ categories. For a 450?ppm CO2e stabilization level, Japan's GHG emissions would need to phase out sometime between 2045 and 2080, and the emission reductions in 2030 would be at least 16–29% below 1990 levels even for the most lenient ‘Cost-effectiveness’ category, and 29–36% for the ‘Equality’ category. The start year for accelerated emissions reductions and the emissions convergence level in the long term have major impact on the emissions reduction rates that need to be achieved, particularly in the case of smaller budgets.Policy relevanceIn previous climate mitigation target formulation processes for 2020 and 2030 in Japan, neither equity principles nor long-term management of cumulative GHG emissions was at the centre of discussion. This article quantitatively assesses how much more GHGs Japan can emit by 2100 to achieve the 2?°C target in light of different effort-sharing approaches, and how Japan's GHG emissions can be managed up to 2100. The long-term implications of recent energy policy developments following the Fukushima nuclear disaster for the calculated carbon budgets are also discussed. 相似文献
As the two large developing and populous countries, China and India face the dual challenges of economic development and climate change. Both of them are active in carbon emissions reduction, while India also bears the pressure of being “benchmarked” against China. With taking China and India as the sample of a comparative analysis, and the statistical value of a long sequence as the basic analysis data, based on the detailed analysis and comparison of carbon emissions history, the carbon emissions situation of the two countries from various dimensions including economic development, energy reserves and consumption, etc. were comparatively analyzed. The carbon intensity and energy structure after achieving the objectives were measured and compared by focusing on the carbon emissions reduction targets in China and India. The comparative results show that: China’s total carbon emissions are greater than India’s, but the growth rate of emissions, per capita emissions are significantly lower than India’s, while the carbon intensity decreases significantly faster than that of India. China has taken more efforts to make commitments to carbon reduction than India. With India’s energy structure adjustment, the situation will be gradually better than that in China. 相似文献
The majority of emissions of nitrous oxide – a potent greenhouse gas (GHG) – are from agricultural sources, particularly nitrogen fertilizer applications. A growing focus on these emission sources has led to the development in the United States of GHG offset protocols that could enable payment to farmers for reducing fertilizer use or implementing other nitrogen management strategies. Despite the development of several protocols, the current regional scope is narrow, adoption by farmers is low, and policy implementation of protocols has a significant time lag. Here we utilize existing research and policy structures to propose an ‘umbrella’ approach for nitrogen management GHG emissions protocols that has the potential to streamline the policy implementation and acceptance of such protocols. We suggest that the umbrella protocol could set forth standard definitions common across multiple protocol options, and then modules could be further developed as scientific evidence advances. Modules could be developed for specific crops, regions, and practices. We identify a policy process that could facilitate this development in concert with emerging scientific research and conclude by acknowledging potential benefits and limitations of the approach.
Key policy insights
Agricultural greenhouse gas market options are growing, but are still underutilized
Streamlining protocol development through an umbrella process could enable quicker development of protocols across new crops, regions, and practices
Effective protocol development must not compromise best available science and should follow a rigorous pathway to ensure appropriate implementation
Energy-intensive industries play an important role in low-carbon development, being particularly exposed to climate policies. Concern over possible carbon leakage in this sector poses a major challenge for designing effective carbon pricing instruments (CPI). Different methodologies for assessing carbon leakage exposure are currently used by different jurisdictions, each of them based on different approaches and indicators. This paper aims to analyse the extent to which the use of different methodologies leads to different results in terms of exposure to the risk of carbon leakage, using the Brazilian industry sector as a case study. Results indicate that carbon leakage exposure is an expected outcome of eventual CPI implementation in Brazilian industry. However, results vary according to the chosen methodology, so the definition of the criteria is paramount for assessing sectoral exposure to the risk of carbon leakage.
Key policy insights
Despite increasing discussion about the implementation of carbon pricing on the Brazilian industrial sector, the evaluation of carbon leakage risks is still neglected.
Assessments of the risk of carbon leakage are directly related to the indicators and criteria used by each methodology. Thus, a given subsector may present different levels of exposure to carbon leakage depending on the methodological choice.
More than a purely technical discussion, the methodological definition of carbon leakage risk is a political discussion – it can be well-conducted, leading to the success of a CPI, or even sabotaged, by implicitly subsidizing energy-intensive industries.
Aviation constitutes about 2.5% of all energy-related CO2 emissions and in addition there are non-CO2 effects. In 2016, the ICAO decided to implement a Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and in 2017 the EU decided on faster emission reductions in its Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which since 2012 includes the aviation sector. The effects of these policies on the expected development of air travel emissions from 2017 to 2030 have been analyzed. For the sample country Sweden, the analysis shows that when emissions reductions in other sectors are attributed to the aviation sector as a result of the EU ETS and CORSIA, carbon emissions are expected to reduce by ?0.8% per year (however if non-CO2 emissions are included in the analysis, then emissions will increase). This is much less than what is needed to achieve the 2°C target. Our analysis of potential national aviation policy instruments shows that there are legally feasible options that could mitigate emissions in addition to the EU ETS and CORSIA. Distance-based air passenger taxes are common among EU Member States and through increased ticket prices these taxes can reduce demand for air travel and thus reduce emissions. Tax on jet fuel is an option for domestic aviation and for international aviation if bilateral agreements are concluded. A quota obligation for biofuels is a third option.Key policy insights
Existing international climate policies for aviation will not deliver any major emission reductions.
Policymakers who want to significantly push the aviation sector to contribute to meeting the 2°C target need to work towards putting in place tougher international policy instruments in the long term, and simultaneously implement temporary national policy instruments in the near-term.
Distance-based air passenger taxes, carbon taxes on jet fuel and quota obligations for biofuels are available national policy options; if they are gradually increased, and harmonized with other countries, they can help to significantly reduce emissions.
In principle, many climate policymakers have accepted that large-scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement’s mitigation targets, but they have avoided proposing by whom CDR might be delivered. Given its role in international climate policy, the European Union (EU) might be expected to lead the way. But among EU climate policymakers so far there is little talk on CDR, let alone action. Here we assess how best to ‘target’ CDR to motivate EU policymakers exploring which CDR target strategy may work best to start dealing with CDR on a meaningful scale. A comprehensive CDR approach would focus on delivering the CDR volumes required from the EU by 2100, approximately at least 50 Gigatonnes (Gt) CO2, according to global model simulations aiming to keep warming below 2°C. A limited CDR approach would focus on an intermediate target to deliver the CDR needed to reach ‘net zero emissions’ (i.e. the gross negative emissions needed to offset residual positive emissions that are too expensive or even impossible to mitigate). We argue that a comprehensive CDR approach may be too intimidating for EU policymakers. A limited CDR approach that only addresses the necessary steps to reach the (intermediate) target of ‘net zero emissions’ is arguably more achievable, since it is a better match to the existing policy paradigm and would allow for a pragmatic phase-in of CDR while avoiding outright resistance by environmental NGOs and the broader public.
Key policy insights
Making CDR an integral part of EU climate policy has the potential to significantly reshape the policy landscape.
Burden sharing considerations would probably play a major role, with comprehensive CDR prolonging the disparity and tensions between progressives and laggards.
Introducing limited CDR in the context of ‘net zero’ pathways would retain a visible primary focus on decarbonization but acknowledge the need for a significant enhancement of removals via ‘natural’ and/or ‘engineered’ sinks.
A decarbonization approach that intends to lead to a low level of ‘residual emissions’ (to be tackled by a pragmatic phase-in of CDR) should be the priority of EU climate policy.