Producers'' organizations and devolved fisheries management in the United Kingdom: Collective and individual quota systems

In the United Kingdom responsibility for the management of national catch quotas has since 1984 been extensively devolved to producers' organizations, Institutions created by the European Community in order to implement the common organization of the Community market for fish. The paper describes the development of the UK quota management system and the approaches adopted by different producers' organizations to the internal management of their quota allocations. Because of changes in the UK fishing vessel licensing rules as well as developments in the quota allocation system, there is an emerging market in quotas at both individual and collective levels. The implications of these developments are discussed, including the possible evolution, largely through industry-led innovation, of some sort of individual transferable quota (ITQ) system for the UK.     

Transferability of fishing rights: The Spanish case

Some authors defend the implementation of regulation mechanisms such as individual transferable quotas, that is, the capacity to assign every fisherman an individual right so that he can fish a certain quantity of a specific species during a concrete period of time, as the most efficient way to reach a greater resource assessment and to guarantee biological sustainability. Nevertheless, much attention has been brought to the fact that, since these rights can be sold, negotiated, exchanged or transferred by the owners, it can bring about a concentration process, which would not favour social equity.     

深教、疏导、严管、服务——渔政管理工作的探讨

本文深入细致地对做好国家渔业法规宣传教育重要性、必要性，对渔区经济结构因地制宜进行调整和疏导，严格渔政执法，寓管理于服务之中等方面进行阐述。     

Food and habitat resource partitioning between three estuarine fish species on the Swedish west coast

In 1978 the food and habitat resource partitioning of three small and common fish species, viz. Pomatoschistus microps (Krøyer), Gasterosteus aculeatus (L.) and Pungitius pungitius (L.) were studied in river Broälven estuary on the Swedish west coast (58°22′N, 11°29′E). The area was divided into three habitats, based on environmental features. In July, September, and October stomach contents and size distribution of each species present were analysed.In July there was high food and habitat overlap between the species. Interference interactions probably occurred between some size classes of P. microps and the other two species. P. pungitius was exposed to both intra- and interspecific interactions. In September the food and habitat overlaps between G. aculeatus and P. pungitius were high, while both had low food and habitat overlaps in relation to P. microps. Interactions between G. aculeatus and P. pungitius were probably influenced by more severe abiotic conditions in one habitat, which caused lower abundances there, and higher abundances in the other two habitats. In October no interactions were observed. These results indicate that competition for food at least temporarily determines the species distribution in a temperate estuary, and that estuarine fish populations are sometimes food limited.     

Rethinking the principle of abstention: the North Pacific and beyond

While the principle of abstention was established as part of the International North Pacific Fishery Convention in 1952, it was generally overlooked for several decades afterwards. The 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement says that states parties to the Agreement enjoy a right to access to high seas fishery resources, but on the condition that they respect existing regional conservation and management measures. This Agreement also introduces the concept of a precautionary approach. The end result is that the 1995 Agreement fulfilled the same intent of the original 1952 principle of abstention—that is, it places some kinds of restrictions on high seas fishing. The degree of restrictions depends on the activities and policies of new regional fishery organizations like WCPFC and so on. Even if the new version of the principle of abstention succeeds in excluding distant fishing states from high seas, it will do little to solve the larger problems facing today's ocean fishery resources.