Sectoral approaches for a post-2012 climate regime: a taxonomy

Sectoral approaches have been gaining currency in the international climate debate as a possible remedy to the shortfalls of the Kyoto Protocol. Proponents argue that a sector-based architecture can more easily invite the participation of developing countries, address competitiveness issues, and enable immediate emissions reductions. However, given the numerous proposals, much confusion remains as to what sectoral approaches actually are. This article provides a simple, yet comprehensive, taxonomy of the various proposals for sectoral approaches. Based on the dual criteria of content and actors, three such types are identified and described: government targets and timetables; industry targets and timetables; and transnational technology cooperation. For each of these types, existing proposals and ongoing initiatives are discussed. In a second step, the article analyses the political landscape in which sectoral approaches are being debated, identifying the interests of their key advocates as well as the concerns of their critics. The Japanese government and energy-intensive manufacturing industries represent the main proponents of sectoral approaches to address the problems of carbon leakage and economic competitiveness. Developing countries, on the other hand, are wary of attempts to impose emissions reduction targets on their economies through sectoral target-setting. They, therefore, interpret sectoral approaches as sector-based forms of technology cooperation and technology transfer.     

Common but differentiated convergence (CDC): a new conceptual approach to long-term climate policy

Abstract

This article describes a new concept for an international climate regime for differentiation of future commitments: the ‘common but differentiated convergence’ approach (CDC). Under CDC, Annex-I countries' per-capita emission allowances converge within a convergence period to a low level. Individual non-Annex-I countries' allowances converge to the same level also within the same period (‘common convergence’), but starting when their per-capita emissions are a certain percentage above global average (‘differentiated’). Until then they may voluntarily take on ‘positively binding’ targets. This approach eliminates two concerns often voiced in relation to gradually converging per-capita emissions: (i) advanced developing countries have their commitment to reduce emissions delayed and their targets are not the same as Annex-I countries with equal per-capita emissions; (ii) CDC does not provide excess emission allowances to the least developing countries. Under CDC, stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at 550 and 650 ppm CO₂-equivalent can be reached with participation at roughly 0% and 50% above global average and convergence to around 3 and 4.5 tCO₂-eq/cap within 40 years. Even if the CDC approach is not implemented in its entirety, it is possible that the step-by-step decisions on the international climate regime can be guided by the principles provided in the CDC approach.     

Meeting the EU 2°C climate target: global and regional emission implications

Abstract

This article presents a set of multi-gas emission pathways for different CO₂-equivalent concentration stabilization levels, i.e. 400, 450, 500 and 550 ppm CO₂-equivalent, along with an analysis of their global and regional reduction implications and implied probability of achieving the EU climate target of 2°C. For achieving the 2°C target with a probability of more than 60%, greenhouse gas concentrations need to be stabilized at 450 ppm CO₂-equivalent or below, if the 90% uncertainty range for climate sensitivity is believed to be 1.5–4.5°C. A stabilization at 450 ppm CO₂-equivalent or below (400 ppm) requires global emissions to peak around 2015, followed by substantial overall reductions of as much as 25% (45% for 400 ppm) compared to 1990 levels in 2050. In 2020, Annex I emissions need to be approximately 15% (30%) below 1990 levels, and non-Annex I emissions also need to be reduced by 15–20% compared to their baseline emissions. A further delay in peaking of global emissions by 10 years doubles maximum reduction rates to about 5% per year, and very probably leads to high costs. In order to keep the option open of stabilizing at 400 and 450 ppm CO₂-equivalent, the USA and major advanced non-Annex I countries will have to participate in the reductions within the next 10–15 years.     

Building bridges to 2020 and beyond: the road from Bali

What would the shape of a realistic, yet ambitious, package for the climate regime after 2012 look like? How do we obtain a package deal starting in Bali but building bridges to a post-2020 climate regime? A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive package deal has to strike a core balance between development and climate imperatives (mitigation, adaptation, dealing with the impacts of response measures, technology transfer, investment and finance) to create bargaining space and establish a conceptual contract zone. Within a continuum of possible packages, two packages in the contract zone are identified: ‘multi-stage’ and ‘ambitious transitional’. The latter is ambitious, combining domestic cap-and-trade for the USA, deeper cuts for Annex B countries, and quantifiable mitigation actions by developing countries. It is transitional as a possible bridge to a more inclusive regime beyond 2020. Multi-stage is defined around mechanisms by which countries move through increasingly stringent levels of participation, and must be based upon agreed triggers. Our assessment of political dynamics is that multi-stage is not yet in the political contract zone. Key to this is the absence of a ‘trigger from the North’, in that the largest historical emitter must act earlier and most decisively. But progress will also depend on continued leadership from Annex B countries, as well as more proactive, incentivized leadership in the South. Agreeing on the transitional stage is the critical next step in the evolution of the climate regime. Negotiating any package will require an institutional space for bargaining, political leadership and trust, and a clear time-frame.     

2012年6月24日宁蒗—盐源5.7级地震的发震构造浅析

本文在分析2012年6月24日宁蒗—盐源5.7级地震的震源机制解、 余震特征、 震害分布基础上, 结合区域第四纪地层分布成因特征、 区域地质构造特征以及对三维卫星遥感影像进行断层地貌解译分析, 认为此次5.7级地震是北西向永宁断裂正断为主活动的结果。 该断裂在影像上线性延伸, 断层崖发育, 其晚第四纪活动性对建立区域新构造变形模式的意义有待进一步研究。     

The EU's failed attempt to innovate with Regulation 1026/2012

Cooperation is one of the cornerstones of the international fisheries regime. It requires States to work together for the conservation and management of the fisheries resources. This applies even stronger with respect to shared fisheries resources. However, negotiating a cooperative solution is not always easily achievable for the parties involved and the international regime does not provide for consequences in such cases. Faced with such a problem and seeking a new solution to it, the EU adopted Regulation 1026/2012, equipping itself with a framework for adopting measures against third countries. This innovative solution challenges certain aspects of the international duty to cooperate and its negotiations aspect. The EU's innovation has so far failed because it lacks clear international support and basis in the international regime. This failure exemplifies one of the limits of unilateralism for generating developments in international fisheries law.     

预报异常极端高影响天气的 “集合异常预报法”：以北京2012年7月21日特大暴雨为例

对罕见极端高影响天气,既使一个模式有能力预报它,其数值预报也至少有以下难点:一是有多大把握确定所预报的天气是极端事件？二是其具体的定时、定量、定点预报可靠吗？本文介绍了集合预报和气候资料相结合的 “集合异常预报法”,并通过北京2012年7月21日（7.21）特大暴雨事件揭示出“集合异常预报法”和集合预报可以提供比单一模式预报更可靠和更准确的信息,从而可有效地缓解上述两大难点。作者建议中央气象台和其他有条件的台站可采用这种办法提高重大灾害性天气的预报能力。文中具体讨论了如下三方面:（1）标准化异常度（SA）的定义以及它同集合预报相结合提高对罕见极端高影响天气预报的可靠性,并由此可导出一个“社会影响矩阵”来定量地表达一个预报对社会的潜在影响;（2）利用集合预报,特别是多模式集合预报可以克服单一模式前后预报的跳跃性或不连续性问题,由此可延长实际可预报时效,如北京7.21事件超过100 mm大暴雨的实际可预报时效提前了2天;（3）SA还有助于认识异常天气发生的原因:从SA的分布看,造成北京7.21 大暴雨事件的短期天气尺度背景因素是从西北方向移来的冷锋和台风倒槽的相遇;从SA的演变看,该事件的中期大背景因素是在北京东北方向有阻塞高压发展并导致北京以西地区的低槽加强和发展（地面强冷空气堆积）,在高纬度形成了一个高、低压系统相间的波列,发展并维持,同时诱导热带系统北进。     

Mapping the narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC

Since the mid-1990s, the aim of keeping climate change within 2?°C has become firmly entrenched in policy discourses. In the past few years, the likelihood of achieving it has been increasingly called into question. The debate around what to do with a target that seems less and less achievable is, however, only just beginning. As the UN commences a two-year review of the 2?°C target, this article moves beyond the somewhat binary debates about whether or not it should or will be met, in order to analyse more fully some of the alternative options that have been identified but not fully explored in the existing literature. For the first time, uncertainties, risks, and opportunities associated with four such options are identified and synthesized from the literature. The analysis finds that the significant risks and uncertainties associated with some options may encourage decision makers to recommit to the 2?°C target as the least unattractive course of action.     

Climate change technology transfer: a new paradigm and policy agenda

This article proposes a shift to a paradigm that is more extensive than the current narrow focus on North—South climate change technology transfers, towards a more inclusive ‘global’ paradigm. An implication of the paradigm shift is that there should be a concomitant expansion of the policy agendas of the international climate and trade regimes. The traditional North—South paradigm of technology transfer ignores the increasing importance of developing countries as sources of advanced climate-friendly technologies, and therefore ignores South—North and South—South transfers. Further, whereas the North—South paradigm has emphasized developing countries' intellectual property rights policies as barriers to technology transfers, the ‘global’ paradigm focuses attention on trade and investment policy barriers, including developed countries' policies that inhibit technology transfer from developing countries. The analysis is relevant to international negotiations in the post-2012 climate regime, and is also relevant to the future development of the trade regime—not only at the multilateral level in the WTO, but also at the regional and bilateral levels.     

Post-2012 climate policy dilemmas: a review of proposals

This article assesses a wide range of alternative proposals for post-2012 international climate policy regimes. We believe that these proposals will serve as a basis for debates about how to configure post-2012 climate policy. The article characterizes and assesses the policy proposals along the lines of five key policy dilemmas. We argue that (1) many proposals have ideas on how to reduce emissions, but fewer have a solution on how to stimulate technical innovation; (2) many proposals formulate climate policy in isolation, while there are fewer proposals that try to mainstream climate policies in other policy areas; (3) many proposals advocate market-based solutions, while fewer realize that there are certain drawbacks to this solution especially at the international level; (4) most proposals have a preference for a UN-based regime, while a more fragmented regime, based on regional and sectoral arrangements may be emerging; and (5) most proposals have ideas about mitigation, but not many have creative ideas on how to integrate mitigation with adaptation.