Forging alliance with Russia: the example of a Green Investment Scheme

Abstract

Russian Kyoto related interests are economic and after the US withdrawal the mission of Russian actors has been to find new demand for Russian credits and allowances. Kyoto related benefits to Russia will be significantly smaller than earlier expected, however, the revenues are now more likely to be focused on climate change mitigation purposes. Competition in the Kyoto market has established buyers’ market and Russia has to accommodate the interests of investors in order to gain benefits. The Russian initiative ‘Green Investment Scheme’ to recycle revenues from International Emissions Trading (IET) to further environmental activities would convene demand for Russian AAUs but experience the same problems than the previous initiatives: inadequate institutional arrangement, unclear division of responsibilities between domestic actors, prolonged ratification process and lack of eligibility strategy. These problems have prevented implementation of GIS so far. Therefore, these problems have to be addressed by high-level Russian policy-makers if serious benefits from Kyoto are sought. Actors building alliances with Russia should focus on assisting with solving these problems.     

Russian ratification process: Why is the rest of the world waiting?

Russia has a crucial veto on the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. The preparation of the ratification and institutional reform have begun in April 2002. The ratification process is based on the activities by high-level policy makers who have other priorities, federal level institutional actors which may be unclear about their roles and the few overloaded expert civil servants. After the US withdrawal from Kyoto, arguments against ratification have appeared in the Russian debate, mostly based on the lack of clarity of the economic benefits available. Ratification would require Russia to establish an eligibility strategy under Kyoto and divide responsibilities and rights between the government, regional and private sector actors. The legal procedure of ratification is simple but internal political complexities may delay the process.     

Russian ratification process Why is the rest of the world waiting?

Abstract

Russia has a crucial veto on the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. The preparation of the ratification and institutional reform have begun in April 2002. The ratification process is based on the activities by high-level policy makers who have other priorities, federal level institutional actors which may be unclear about their roles and the few overloaded expert civil servants. After the US withdrawal from Kyoto, arguments against ratification have appeared in the Russian debate, mostly based on the lack of clarity of the economic benefits available. Ratification would require Russia to establish an eligibility strategy under Kyoto and divide responsibilities and rights between the government, regional and private sector actors. The legal procedure of ratification is simple but internal political complexities may delay the process.     

Russian behaviour in the market for permits under the Kyoto Protocol

After the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the extension of national quotas in the Bonn and Marrakesh agreements, meagre environmental effects and a low price of emission permits are likely to be the outcome of implementation. This paper attempts to analyze this scenario, mainly in relation to the Russian case. I discuss on the basis of certain key assumptions the strategic options open to the supply side of the permit market and Russia’s potentially incompatible interests as a producer of oil and gas on the one hand and a dominating seller of emission permits under the Kyoto Protocol on the other. The analysis shows that Russian oil and gas interests are likely to boost Russia’s inclination to sell permits, ultimately resulting in lower permit prices.     

Russia at GHG Market

In the first Kyoto commitment period Russia could be the major supplier for the greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions market. Potential Russian supply depends on the ability of Russia to keep GHG emissions lower than the Kyoto target. In the literature there is no common understanding of the total trading potential of Russia at the international carbon market. In this paper we focus on CO₂ emission, which constituted nearly 80%of Russian GHG emission. We compare different projections of Russian CO₂emission and analyze the most important factors, which predetermine the CO₂emission growth. In a transition economy these factors are: Gross Domestic Product(GDP) dynamic, changes of GDP structure, innovation activity, transformation of export-import flows and response to the market signals. The input-output macroeconomic model with the two different input-output tables representing old and new production technologies has been applied for the analysis to simulate technological innovations and structural changes in the Russian economy during transition period. The Russian supply at the international GHG market without forest sector may be up to 3 billion metric ton of CO₂ equivalent. Earlier actions to reduce CO₂ emission are critical to insure theRussiansupply at the international carbon market. With regard to the current status of the Russian capital market, the forward trading with OECD countries is only the possibility to raise initial investments to roll no-regret and low-cost GHG reduction. This paper discusses uncertainties of RussianCO₂emission dynamics and analyzes the different incentives to lower the emission pathway.     

Lessons from JI and GIS for post-2012 carbon finance mechanisms in Russia and Ukraine

The main incentives for Russia's and Ukraine's participation in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol were its mechanisms. The opportunities that the anticipated post-2012 mechanisms will offer Russia and Ukraine are explored in light of the lessons from Joint Implementation (JI) and the Green Investment Scheme (GIS) during this first period. Four key factors that explain the success of these mechanisms are identified: the design of the mechanisms, the role of the private sector in their implementation, the coordination required, and the political will gained. Even though a weak rule of law, problems with policy implementation, and the ambiguous role of private-sector actors are not ‘make or break’ issues, they are likely to defer future mechanisms. Success and failure will, rather, hinge on the priority these factors are accorded by the top leadership. It is likely that simple mechanisms that only involve a few actors will be less complicated to set up and run than, for instance, emissions trading schemes (which require domestic burden sharing). Project-based options in which domestic actors have gained experience may be better suited. However, any lessons prior to the new mechanisms taking a clearer shape must be considered as preliminary.

Policy relevance

The Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, despite their problems, provided Russia and Ukraine with their main incentives for participation in the Protocol's first commitment period. As the chances that these countries will participate in the second commitment period seem slim, the opportunities that the anticipated post-2012 mechanisms will offer Russia and Ukraine are explored in light of the lessons from JI and GIS. The key factors that have determined the success and failure of these mechanisms are likely to be of relevance to future mechanisms. It is argued that – of the post-2012 options available – simple mechanisms with few actors involved should be chosen. Project-based options rather than emissions trading schemes may be more likely to succeed due to experience gained by domestic actors.     

Economics of the Kyoto Protocol for Russia

Abstract

In this article we propose a careful analysis of the economic consequences of the Kyoto Protocol for Russia, taking into account the most recently available data and the latest developments in the trends regarding Russian economic recovery. We present a review of different GHG forecasts for Russia and develop a new forecast for uncertain GDP growth and changing elasticity of GHG emission per GDP. Since the rate of growth remains uncertain, elasticity could change over time, as well as the fuel mix. We apply the Monte-Carlo method to simulate these uncertainties and to produce a reasonable interval for CO₂ emissions in 2010. The probability of Russia exceeding its Kyoto emissions budget is essentially zero. Further, we discuss the benefits for Russia from the Kyoto Protocol, and more generally from implementation of GHG mitigation policy. Ancillary benefits from Kyoto Protocol implementation will bring essential reductions in risk to human health. On the other hand, potential negative changes in the fuel mix and GDP structure, as well as a slowing of the innovation process, could exacerbate existing health problems. Alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol may bring much tougher commitments to Russia. We conclude that the Kyoto Protocol is the best possible deal for Russia. Therefore, Russia most will ratify it.     

Economic consequences of the US withdrawal from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol

The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties have important implications for both the effectiveness and the efficiency of future climate policies. Among these implications, those related with technical change and with the functioning of the international market for carbon emissions are particularly relevant, because these variables have the largest impact on the overall abatement cost to be borne by Annex B countries in the short and in the long run. This paper analyses the consequences of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol both on technological innovation and on the price of emission permits (and, as a consequence, on abatement costs). In particular, the analysis highlights mechanisms and feedbacks related to technological innovation, technological spillovers and R&D which could be relevant and which modify some policy relevant conclusions. First, we identify two feedback effects which explain why our results lead to a less significant fall in the price of permits than in most empirical analyses recently circulated. We show that the US defection from the Kyoto Protocol, by inducing a decline in the demand and price of emission permits, lowers the incentives to undertake energy-saving R&D. As a consequence, emissions increase and feed back on the demand and supply of permits, thus implying a lower decline in the price of permits than previously estimated. At the same time, as a result of the reduced R&D investments and the augmented emissions, climate change damages intensify and require an increase in investments that are again coupled with a growth of emissions. By thus again increasing the demand for permits and reducing their supply, this effect enhances the previous mechanism. Notwithstanding the lower decline in the price of permits, the paper still identifies a smaller price than would occur with a US participation. Therefore, we emphasise in a second step the crucial role of Russia in climate negotiations due to a large increase in Russia’s bargaining power.     

Russian behaviour in the market for permits under the Kyoto Protocol

After the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the extension of national quotas in the Bonn and Marrakesh agreements, meagre environmental effects and a low price of emission permits are likely to be the outcome of implementation. This paper attempts to analyze this scenario, mainly in relation to the Russian case. I discuss on the basis of certain key assumptions the strategic options open to the supply side of the permit market and Russia's potentially incompatible interests as a producer of oil and gas on the one hand and a dominating seller of emission permits under the Kyoto Protocol on the other. The analysis shows that Russian oil and gas interests are likely to boost Russia's inclination to sell permits, ultimately resulting in lower permit prices.     

Economic consequences of the US withdrawal from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol

Abstract

The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties have important implications for both the effectiveness and the efficiency of future climate policies. Among these implications, those related with technical change and with the functioning of the international market for carbon emissions are particularly relevant, because these variables have the largest impact on the overall abatement cost to be borne by Annex B countries in the short and in the long run. This paper analyses the consequences of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol both on technological innovation and on the price of emission permits (and, as a consequence, on abatement costs). In particular, the analysis highlights mechanisms and feedbacks related to technological innovation, technological spillovers and R&D which could be relevant and which modify some policy relevant conclusions. First, we identify two feedback effects which explain why our results lead to a less significant fall in the price of permits than in most empirical analyses recently circulated. We show that the US defection from the Kyoto Protocol, by inducing a decline in the demand and price of emission permits, lowers the incentives to undertake energy-saving R&D. As a consequence, emissions increase and feed back on the demand and supply of permits, thus implying a lower decline in the price of permits than previously estimated. At the same time, as a result of the reduced R&D investments and the augmented emissions, climate change damages intensify and require an increase in investments that are again coupled with a growth of emissions. By thus again increasing the demand for permits and reducing their supply, this effect enhances the previous mechanism. Notwithstanding the lower decline in the price of permits, the paper still identifies a smaller price than would occur with a US participation. Therefore, we emphasise in a second step the crucial role of Russia in climate negotiations due to a large increase in Russia's bargaining power.     

Russia: climate policy formation and implementation during the 1990s

Russian climate policy initially developed slowly, mostly in response to the emerging international regime in the early 1990s. Developments accelerated by the end of the decade, under the influence of the UNFCCC, and especially, its Kyoto Protocol. Developments included creation of institutional framework for domestic implementation of its reporting and other UNFCCC commitments, formulation of mitigation and adaptation strategies and measures, GHG inventory compilation and reporting, crystallizing its major national positions towards international mechanisms, initiation of vertical subsidiarity of government authority in climate policy implementation, and channeling interactions between the government and business community. The Kyoto Protocol and its international mechanisms (particularly IET and JI), mark a turning point, with opportunities for Russia to benefit if the Kyoto Protocol enters into force; the apparent US withdrawal from Kyoto puts Russia in a central position. Besides external influences, national climate policy has been strongly influenced by the domestic reforms towards market economy and democracy: combining new opportunities with constraints characteristic of the transition period. The gap between climate policy goals and putting them in practice has been considerable, but is narrowing.     

Estimating the CDM market under the Marrakech Accords

Abstract

The agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol achieved at COP7 in Marrakech has important implications for investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The required actual emission reductions for participating Annex B countries overall will be relatively small, as the United States do not intend to ratify the protocol and significant amounts of carbon sequestered in domestic sinks can be credited. In addition, the potential supply of surplus emission permits (hot air) from Russia and other economies in transition may be as high as total demand in the first commitment period. Thus, even under restraint of hot air sellers, CDM demand will be limited, and a low demand, low price carbon market scenario appears likely.

The magnitude of the CDM will be influenced by a host of factors both on the demand and the supply-side. We analyse these using a quantitative model of the global carbon market, based on marginal abatement cost curves. Implementation and transaction costs, as well as baseline and additionality rules affect the CDM's share in the carbon market. Demand for the CDM is sensitive to changes in business-as-usual emissions growth in participating Annex B countries, and also to crediting for additional sinks. Permit supply from Russia and other economies in transition is possibly the most crucial factor in the carbon market.     

Estimating the CDM market under the Marrakech Accords

The agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol achieved at COP7 in Marrakech has important implications for investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The required actual emission reductions for participating Annex B countries overall will be relatively small, as the United States do not intend to ratify the protocol and significant amounts of carbon sequestered in domestic sinks can be credited. In addition, the potential supply of surplus emission permits (hot air) from Russia and other economies in transition may be as high as total demand in the first commitment period. Thus, even under restraint of hot air sellers, CDM demand will be limited, and a low demand, low price carbon market scenario appears likely.The magnitude of the CDM will be influenced by a host of factors both on the demand and the supply-side. We analyse these using a quantitative model of the global carbon market, based on marginal abatement cost curves. Implementation and transaction costs, as well as baseline and additionality rules affect the CDM’s share in the carbon market. Demand for the CDM is sensitive to changes in business-as-usual emissions growth in participating Annex B countries, and also to crediting for additional sinks. Permit supply from Russia and other economies in transition is possibly the most crucial factor in the carbon market.     

Institutional change and the political economy of water megaprojects: China’s south-north water transfer

This paper analyses the relationship between megaproject construction and change in water management institutions. Due to the wide geographical distribution of their costs and benefits, which often spans national and provincial borders, water supply megaprojects frequently prompt intentional or evolutionary institutional change. China’s South-North Water Transfer Project (Middle Route), the world’s largest interbasin transfer project, was completed in December 2014 and is now in operation. Based on extensive fieldwork and analysis of Chinese documents, this paper introduces the government actors involved in, and impacted by, the planning and construction of the project. By detailing the interests of these actors, and the way those interests have been affected by the political, economic and environmental changes wrought by the megaproject, it shows that the Middle Route project has already contributed to change in one major financial institution – water pricing – and is exerting pressure on at least two others—infrastructure financing and compensation. Despite the regulatory efforts of the Chinese central government, incomplete institutional change processes threaten the long-term viability of the megaproject. Megaprojects demand institutional change and this must be factored into policymaking processes; business as usual will not suffice if the real benefits of the South-North Water Transfer are to be fairly distributed and its negative social, economic and environmental effects mitigated and appropriately compensated.     

Experiences of host communities with carbon market projects: towards multi-level climate justice

The literature on equity and justice in climate change mitigation has largely focused on North–South relations and equity between states. However, some initiatives (e.g. the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation programme (REDD), and voluntary carbon markets (VCMs)) are already establishing multi-level governance structures that involve communities from developing countries in global mitigation efforts. This poses new equity and justice dilemmas: how the burdens and benefits of mitigation are shared across various levels and how host communities are positioned in multi-level governance structures. A review of the existing literature is used to distill a framework for distinguishing between four axes of climate justice from the perspective of communities. Empirical evidence from African and Asian carbon market projects is used to assess the distributive and procedural justice implications for host communities. The evidence suggests that host communities often benefit little from carbon market projects and find it difficult to protect their interests. Capacity building, attention to local power relations, supervision of business practices, promotion of projects with primarily development aims and an active involvement of non-state actors as bridges between local communities and the national/international levels could potentially contribute towards addressing some of the key justice concerns.Policy relevance International negotiations on the institutional frameworks that are envisaged to govern carbon markets are proceeding at a rather slow pace. As a consequence, host countries and private-sector actors are making their own arrangements to safeguard the interests of local communities. While several standards have emerged to guide carbon market activity on the ground, distributive as well as procedural justice concerns nevertheless remain salient. Four empirical case studies across Asia and Africa show that within the multi-scale and multi-actor carbon market governance, local-level actors often lack sufficient agency to advance their claims and protect their interests. This evidence suggests that ameliorating policy reforms are needed to enhance the positioning of local communities. Doing so is important to ensure future acceptability of carbon market activity in potential host communities as well as for ensuring their broader legitimacy.     

The impact of private investor’s transaction costs on the cost effectiveness of project-based Kyoto mechanisms

From a private investor’s point of view transaction costs of project-based Kyoto mechanisms relate mainly to project management and interaction with government representatives. However, when analysing the cost effectiveness of project-based Kyoto mechanisms these transaction costs are often underestimated or completely ignored¹ due to limited data availability. This paper presents an analysis of transaction costs of project-based Kyoto mechanisms by applying cost estimates from comparable activities, for example, activities implemented jointly (AIJ). The findings show that transaction costs of AIJ projects range between 7% and more than 100% of production costs with 80% of projects lying between 14 and 89%. Furthermore the data clearly illustrate that “bigger” projects have lower specific project costs indicating the existence of economies of scale. Due to the fact that high transaction costs will push many promising projects out of the market, efforts should be undertaken to reduce transaction costs by improving procedures and business environments, for example, by standardisation.     

Catching air? Climate change policy in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan

Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have each participated actively in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conferences of the Parties, and each is developing domestic rules and institutions to address UN obligations under the treaties. Russia and Ukraine are each Annex I/Annex B countries. Kazakhstan will become Annex I upon ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, but has not yet established itself as Annex B. Each state has evolved a distinct set of policies and priorities in the domestic and the international arena. Drawing largely on interviews in each country, this article presents brief histories of the evolution of climate policy, focusing on each state’s behavior in the international arena, the sources of domestic policy leadership, and the forces that led to change in each national approach. Current policies and practices are evaluated with an eye towards learning from the successes and failures in each state.     

From Kyoto via Moscow to nowhere?

Abstract

Since the World Climate Change Conference held in the autumn of 2003 in Moscow, Russian Federation, the fate of international climate policy architecture designed around the Kyoto Protocol hangs in the balance. After the withdrawal of the USA from the Kyoto Protocol, the condition of its ratification cannot be met without the Russian Federation. There has been a considerable uncertainty as to Russia's intentions regarding ratification of Kyoto. In this contribution, an attempt is made to identify the Russian motives and concerns, and explain their attitudes regarding the Kyoto Protocol. Pressures against and for ratification are discussed. Finally, a few comments are made about the future of the efforts to solve the global environmental problem of protecting the Earth's climate.     

Participatory Water Basin Councils in Peru and Brazil: Expert discourses as means and barriers to inclusion

In the last twenty years, participatory forums have been increasingly used to manage water basins around the world. The implementation of participatory forums has sought to prevent and overcome conflicts by bringing together a multiplicity of stakeholders in joint efforts to deliberate, achieve mutually agreed upon decisions, and distribute limited water resources. Different literature streams have evaluated the benefits and challenges of participatory forums in practice, such as the difficulties some forums have had when confronting existing power structures. Separately, research on water governance has paid particular attention to the ways in which expert discourses are used by traditionally powerful actors to exclude less powerful others. This paper draws from the literatures on participation and discourses in environmental governance to empirically investigate how expert discourses may empower or disempower certain actors in four basin councils – two in Peru and two in Brazil. Through qualitative thematic analysis of 116 interviews and observation notes, we specifically investigate the extent to which expert discourses in these basin councils help empower previously excluded actors. Our findings indicate stakeholder interests that are not, or cannot, be expressed within the frame of expert discourses are often marginalized. This suggests participation has made it possible for some previously excluded actors to have a voice, yet their potential influence is seemingly confined to a restricted space beyond which their voices will have little effect.     

Russian industry responses to climate change: the case of the metals and mining sector

Globally, the metals and mining sector is a major contributor to GHG emissions. Climate change also poses significant challenges for the industry in a number of ways, including risks to infrastructure and equipment, transport routes and the cost of energy supplies. The sector is of particular importance to Russia, and yet very little is known about how the sector positions itself in relation to this key issue. This article conducts an in-depth look at the response of the Russian metals and mining sector to climate change. It looks at the key actors, their willingness to engage with the issue of climate change, preferred policy options and the strategies adopted to further their interests. The role of companies, prominent individuals and business associations is considered. The evidence suggests that, although there is widespread acceptance of climate change as a phenomenon, there is significant variation within the sector, with some companies proactive on climate policy, and others more reluctant. Different responses are attributed to reputational factors and the disproportionate influence of international and domestic policy developments on companies. Russian coal companies, directly threatened by any international attempts to reduce coal consumption, display the strongest opposition to efforts aimed at curbing emissions. The Russian government, far from thinking of transitioning to a low carbon future, is vigorously trying to expand the coal industry.

Key policy insights

• Understanding how Russia’s domestic position on climate policy is formed is fundamental for understanding the factors driving its international engagement on climate policy.

• The Russian government has no plans to phase out coal and is instead actively seeking to expand the coal industry. This highlights the obstacles to Russia’s commitment to climate policy at both the domestic and international levels.

• The socio-economic consequences of climate policy for the Russian coal industry are a key consideration for the government, with some regions heavily dependent on the industry for employment and electricity generation.