The polarization of public concern about climate change in Norway

This article contributes to the existing literature by investigating the importance of value orientations for the Norwegian public's climate change concern, by analysing data from a national Gallup Poll from 2003 to 2011. Logistic regressions were conducted to investigate the importance of individualistic and egalitarian values for climate concern, and whether the groups of different value orientations have polarized in their climate concern over time. Respondents who hold less individualistic values and those holding egalitarian values are found more likely to be concerned about climate change than are those holding individualistic and less egalitarian values. Furthermore, the analyses find polarization in climate concern in the period for both value orientations. Increased focus on policy instruments in the political debate may be one explanation for values being increasingly salient. Future research should focus on studying ways to formulate policies given variations in values. One way would be to develop solutions that have co-benefits across groups of different value orientations. However, not all mitigation policies have immediate co-benefits for everyone. Research on how changes in the institutional setting may enhance the logic of social responsibility seems crucial.

Policy relevance

It is an important social science contribution to increase our understanding of public positions on climate change for developing effective responses to this vexing problem. This study identifies polarization over time between subgroups of different value orientations in their climate change concern. This may have implications for policies, as political solutions may be increasingly dependent on the composition of political leadership. Society and politicians should look for mitigation policies that have co-benefits across groups of different value orientations when possible. However, not all mitigation policies have immediate co-benefits for everyone. One option then is to change the institutional settings from enhancing the logic of individual benefits to enhancing the logic of social benefits for behaviour crucial for mitigating climate change. Finally, narratives about a low-emitting society that are attractive for all groups of value orientations should be emphasized.     

Education,politics and opinions about climate change evidence for interaction effects

U.S. public opinion regarding climate change has become increasingly polarized in recent years, as partisan think tanks and others worked to recast an originally scientific topic into a political wedge issue. Nominally “scientific” arguments against taking anthropogenic climate change seriously have been publicized to reach informed but ideologically receptive audiences. Reflecting the success of such arguments, polls have noted that concern about climate change increased with education among Democrats, but decreased with education among Republicans. These observations lead to the hypothesis that there exist interaction (non-additive) effects between education or knowledge and political orientation, net of other background factors, in predicting public concern about climate change. Two regional telephone surveys, conducted in New Hampshire (n = 541) and Michigan (n = 1, 008) in 2008, included identical climate-change questions that provide opportunities to test this hypothesis. Multivariate analysis of both surveys finds significant interactions. These empirical results fit with theoretical interpretations and several other recent studies. They suggest that the classically identified social bases of concern about the environment in general, and climate in particular, have shifted in recent years. Narrowcast media, including the many Web sites devoted to discrediting climate-change concerns, provide ideal conduits for channeling contrarian arguments to an audience predisposed to believe and electronically spread them further. Active-response Web sites by climate scientists could prove critical to counterbalancing contrarian arguments.     

Declining public concern about climate change: Can we blame the great recession?

Social surveys suggest that the American public's concern about climate change has declined dramatically since 2008. This has led to a search for explanations for this decline, and great deal of speculation that there has been a fundamental shift in public trust in climate science. We evaluate over thirty years of public opinion data about global warming and the environment, and suggest that the decline in belief about climate change is most likely driven by the economic insecurity caused by the Great Recession. Evidence from European nations further supports an economic explanation for changing public opinion. The pattern is consistent with more than forty years of public opinion about environmental policy. Popular alternative explanations for declining support – partisan politicization, biased media coverage, fluctuations in short-term weather conditions – are unable to explain the suddenness and timing of opinion trends. The implication of these findings is that the “crisis of confidence” in climate change will likely rebound after labor market conditions improve, but not until then.     

Not a panacea: private-sector engagement in adaptation and adaptation finance in developing countries

The role of the private sector in climate finance is increasingly emphasized in international political debates. Knowledge of private engagement in mitigating climate change and in more advanced economies is growing, but the evidence base for private-sector engagement in climate change adaptation in developing countries remains weak. Starting from the premise that the private sector's role in adaptation is often inevitable and potentially significant, this article first analyses the potential of private-sector engagement in adaptation and adaptation financing in developing countries by conceptualizing the private sector's roles and motivation therein. For further inquiry, and for a discussion based on a developing-country context, interviews were conducted with key stakeholders for adaptation of Zambia's agricultural sector, including on ways in which the government can incentivize private-sector engagement in adaptation.

How much private-sector adaptation and adaptation finance can be identified depends on the interpretation of the concept of adaptation. Under a broad interpretation, the domestic private sector in particular can contribute substantially to adaptation, both directly and indirectly, through its investments and activities. However, the international private sector's role in financing adaptation should be analysed under a strict interpretation of adaptation and appears limited.

Policy relevance

International political debates increasingly stress the importance of private climate finance, yet are constrained by vagueness around the private sector's role in adaptation finance. This article conceptualizes and scrutinizes private-sector engagement in adaptation and adaptation finance in developing countries. It concludes that the domestic private sector in particular can contribute substantially to adaptation in direct and indirect ways, and that domestic policies incentivize such contributions. However, international private financing of adaptation is more limited and its analysis requires a stricter interpretation of adaptation. Private-sector engagement in adaptation and adaptation finance can supplement, but not substitute for, public investments in adaptation. These limitations are particularly important when discussing private adaptation finance as part of the developed countries' pledge to mobilize US$100 billion of climate finance per annum from 2020 onwards.     

Characterising climate change discourse on social media during extreme weather events

When extreme weather events occur, people often turn to social media platforms to share information, opinions and experiences. One of the topics commonly discussed is the role climate change may or may not have played in influencing an event. Here, we examine Twitter posts that mentioned climate change in the context of three high-magnitude extreme weather events – Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy and Snowstorm Jonas – in order to assess how the framing of the topic and the attention paid to it can vary between events. We also examine the role that contextual factors can play in shaping climate change coverage on the platform. We find that criticism of climate change denial dominated during Irene, while political and ideological struggle frames dominated during Sandy. Discourse during Jonas was, in contrast, more divided between posts about the scientific links between climate change and the events, and posts contesting climate science in general. The focus on political and ideological struggle frames during Sandy reflects the event’s occurrence at a time when the Occupy movement was active and the 2012 US Presidential Election was nearing. These factors, we suggest, could also contribute to climate change being a more prominent discussion point during Sandy than during Irene or Jonas. The Jonas frames, meanwhile, hint at lesser public understanding of how climate change may influence cold weather events when compared with tropical storms. Overall, our findings demonstrate how event characteristics and short-term socio-political context can play a critical role in determining the lenses through which climate change is viewed.     

Barriers perceived to engaging with climate change among the UK public and their policy implications

This paper reports on the barriers that members of the UK public perceive to engaging with climate change. It draws upon three mixed-method studies, with an emphasis on the qualitative data which offer an in-depth insight into how people make sense of climate change. The paper defines engagement as an individual's state, comprising three elements: cognitive, affective and behavioural. A number of common barriers emerge from the three studies, which operate broadly at ‘individual’ and ‘social’ levels. These major constraints to individual engagement with climate change have implications for achieving significant reductions in greenhouse gases in the UK. We argue that targeted and tailored information provision should be supported by wider structural change to enable citizens and communities to reduce their carbon dependency. Policy implications for effective engagement are discussed.     

Applying personal carbon trading: a proposed ‘Carbon,Health and Savings System’ for British Columbia,Canada

Addressing climate change requires the synergy of technological, behavioural and market mechanisms. This article proposes a policy framework that integrates the three, deploying personal carbon trading as a key element within a policy portfolio to reduce personal carbon footprints. It draws on policy and human motivation literatures that address the behavioural changes that may be needed in the context of a long-term threat such as climate change. This proposal builds on an analysis of the British Columbia carbon tax, international examples of carbon pricing instruments and strategies for behavioural change such as social networks, loyalty management, mobile apps and gamification. Interviews were conducted with experts in financial services, energy conservation and clean technology, as well as with specialists in climate, health and taxation policy. Their input, together with a review of the theoretical literature and practical case studies, informed the proposed design of a Carbon, Health and Saving System for promoting individual engagement and collective action by linking long-term climate mitigation measures with short-term personal and social goals, including health, recreation and social reinforcement.

Policy Relevance

This article identifies areas for climate policy innovation and recommends policies that can support, promote and enable personal carbon budgeting and collective action. Although this study is focused on British Columbia, both the input provided by key opinion leaders and the proposed framework are applicable to other jurisdictions.

This policy proposal shows how personal carbon trading could work in the context of a Canadian province with an existing climate mitigation policy. It also specifies a minimum viable product approach to establishing the economic, social and technological foundations for personal carbon trading.

The Carbon, Health and Saving System identifies the technologies and stakeholders needed to implement personal carbon trading, and offers the possibility of motivating a widespread conscious human response in the event that carbon taxation proves insufficient to generate economic adaptation in a changing climate.     

The influence of national temperature fluctuations on opinions about climate change in the U.S. since 1990

Public opinion in the United States about human-caused climate change has varied over the past 20 years, despite an increasing consensus about the issue in the expert community. Attitudes about climate change have been attributed to a number of factors including personal values, political ideology, the media environment and personal experience. Recent studies have found evidence that the temperature can influence one’s opinion about climate change and willingness to change behaviour and/or support climate policy. Although there is some evidence that individual cool or warm years have influenced large-scale opinion about climate change, the extent to which temperature can explain the past variability in public opinion and public discourse about climate change at the national level is not known. Here we isolate the relationship between opinion about climate change and temperature at the national scale, using data from opinion polls, a discourse analysis of opinion articles from five major daily newspapers, and a national air temperature database. The fraction of respondents to national polls who express “belief in” or “worry about” climate change is found to be significantly correlated to U.S. mean temperature anomalies over the previous 3–12 months. In addition, the fraction of editorial and opinion articles which “agree” with the expert consensus on climate change is also found to be significantly correlated to U.S. mean temperature anomalies at seasonal and annual scales. These results suggest that a fraction of the past variance in American views about climate change could potentially be explained by climate variability.     

Extreme weather events and climate change concern

This paper examines whether experience of extreme weather events—such as excessive heat, droughts, flooding, and hurricanes—increases an individual’s level concern about climate change. We bring together micro-level geospatial data on extreme weather events from NOAA’s Storm Events Database with public opinion data from multiple years of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study to study this question. We find evidence of a modest, but discernible positive relationship between experiencing extreme weather activity and expressions of concern about climate change. However, the effect only materializes for recent extreme weather activity; activity that occurred over longer periods of time does not affect public opinion. These results are generally robust to various measurement strategies and model specifications. Our findings contribute to the public opinion literature on the importance of local environmental conditions on attitude formation.     

Attribution matters: Revisiting the link between extreme weather experience and climate change mitigation responses

The literature suggests that extreme weather experiences have potential to increase climate change engagement by influencing the way people perceive the proximity and implications of climate change. Yet, limited attention has been directed at investigating how individual differences in the subjective interpretation of extreme weather events as indications of climate change moderate the link between extreme weather experiences and climate change attitudes. This article contends that subjective attribution of extreme weather events to climate change is a necessary condition for extreme weather experiences to be translated into climate change mitigation responses, and that subjective attribution of extreme weather to climate change is influenced by the psychological and social contexts in which individuals appraise their experiences with extreme weather. Using survey data gathered in the aftermath of severe flooding across the UK in winter 2013/2014, personal experience of this flooding event is shown to only directly predict perceived threat from climate change, and indirectly predict climate change mitigation responses, among individuals who subjectively attributed the floods to climate change. Additionally, subjective attribution of the floods to climate change is significantly predicted by pre-existing climate change belief, political affiliation and perceived normative cues. Attempts to harness extreme weather experiences as a route to engaging the public must be attentive to the heterogeneity of opinion on the attributability of extreme weather events to climate change.     

What is climate change scepticism? Examination of the concept using a mixed methods study of the UK public

The holding of doubts about climate change is often referred to as ‘scepticism’. However, there has been a lack of clarity in previous work as to what exactly this scepticism comprises. We integrate data obtained from discussion groups and a nationally representative survey, to interrogate and refine the concept of climate change scepticism with respect to the views of members of the public. We argue that two main types should be distinguished: epistemic scepticism, relating to doubts about the status of climate change as a scientific and physical phenomenon; and response scepticism, relating to doubts about the efficacy of action taken to address climate change. Whilst each type is independently associated by people themselves with climate change scepticism, we find that the latter is more strongly associated with a lack of concern about climate change. As such, additional effort should be directed towards addressing and engaging with people's doubts concerning attempts to address climate change.     

Socioeconomic geography of climate change views in Europe

Climate change views have their socioeconomic foundations but also specific geographies. In merging these perspectives, this analysis uses ESS Round 8 data from 23 European countries to examine whether climate change scepticism and concern, pro-environmental personal norm and a willingness to engage in energy-saving behaviour exhibit, first, urban–rural and/or regional differences, and second, if these attitudes can be explained at individual level by socioeconomic position and wellbeing resources. We find that climate change scepticism and concern do exhibit urban–rural differences, where living in a country village is associated with greater climate scepticism and lower concern compared to living in a big city. Also, higher climate change concern and pro-environmental norms are associated with living in a region with constant population growth. These geographical differences are independent of individual-level socioeconomic attributes as well as one’s political orientation. Additionally, the results show that both climate change attitudes and reporting energy-saving behaviour are strongly stratified by level of education and reveal that those in lower income deciles feel less pro-environmental norm but nonetheless report greater engagement with energy-saving behaviour. In sum, the results highlight that climate change mitigation is not a uniform project either spatially or within certain socioeconomic strata. Hence, our results suggest that socioeconomic disadvantage (belonging to the lowest education and income levels) and spatial marginalisation (living in more rural surroundings and declining regions) should be better acknowledged when reworking climate change and environmental policies in the EU.     

The psychology of denial concerning climate mitigation measures: evidence from Swiss focus groups

Various studies of public opinion regarding the causes and consequences of climate change reveal both a deep reservoir of concern, yet also a muddle over causes, consequences and appropriate policy measures for mitigation. The technique adopted here, namely integrated assessment (IA) focus groups, in which groups of randomly selected individuals in Switzerland looked at models of possible consequences of climate change and questioned specialists as to their accuracy and meaning, revealed a rich assembly of reactions. Respondents were alarmed about the consequences of high-energy futures, and mollified by images of low-energy futures. Yet they also erected a series of psychological barriers to justify why they should not act either individually or through collective institutions to mitigate climate change. From the viewpoint of changing their lifestyles of material comfort and high-energy dependence, they regarded the consequences of possible behavioural shift arising from the need to meet mitigation measures as more daunting. To overcome the dissonance created in their minds they created a number of socio-psychological denial mechanisms. Such mechanisms heightened the costs of shifting away from comfortable lifestyles, set blame on the inaction of others, including governments, and emphasised doubts regarding the immediacy of personal action when the effects of climate change seemed uncertain and far away. These findings suggest that more attention needs to be given to the social and psychological motivations as to why individuals erect barriers to their personal commitment to climate change mitigation, even when professing anxiety over climate futures. Prolonged and progressive packages of information tailored to cultural models or organised belief patterns, coupled to greater community based policy incentives may help to widen the basis of personal and moral responsibility.     

Uncertainty, scepticism and attitudes towards climate change: biased assimilation and attitude polarisation

‘Scepticism’ in public attitudes towards climate change is seen as a significant barrier to public engagement. In an experimental study, we measured participants’ scepticism about climate change before and after reading two newspaper editorials that made opposing claims about the reality and seriousness of climate change (designed to generate uncertainty). A well-established social psychological finding is that people with opposing attitudes often assimilate evidence in a way that is biased towards their existing attitudinal position, which may lead to attitude polarisation. We found that people who were less sceptical about climate change evaluated the convincingness and reliability of the editorials in a markedly different way to people who were more sceptical about climate change, demonstrating biased assimilation of the information. In both groups, attitudes towards climate change became significantly more sceptical after reading the editorials, but we observed no evidence of attitude polarisation—that is, the attitudes of these two groups did not diverge. The results are the first application of the well-established assimilation and polarisation paradigm to attitudes about climate change, with important implications for anticipating how uncertainty—in the form of conflicting information—may impact on public engagement with climate change.     

Voluntary citizen participation in carbon allowance markets: the role of norm-based motivation

The results from a semi-experimental study of Swedish students’ stated willingness to purchase emission allowances for carbon dioxide are presented. Drawing heavily on recent developments in the literature on integrating norm-motivated behaviour into neoclassical consumer theory, it is assumed that individuals have a preference for maintaining a self-image as a responsible (and thus norm-compliant) person. The results indicate that students’ willingness to purchase carbon allowances is determined by both price and the presence of norms: those who feel personally responsible for contributing to reducing climate damages also appear more inclined to buy allowances. The empirical findings are consistent with the notion that a person's beliefs about others’ stated willingness to purchase carbon allowances imply improvements in their own self-image and ultimately behavioural change. This suggests that information campaigns that attempt to influence beliefs about others’ intentions could promote ‘green’ consumer behaviour in the carbon allowance market. Such (stated) behaviour also appears to be influenced by a person's awareness of the problem of climate change and their beliefs about their own ability to contribute to solving it.

Policy relevance

Although there is a concern that public goods such as reduced climate change may be under-provided in the free market, individual concern for the environment occasionally has profound impacts on consumer choice and voluntary action. This research suggests that information campaigns that attempt to influence beliefs about others’ intentions could promote ‘green’ consumer behaviour in carbon allowance markets. Publicly-provided information about the impacts of climate change and the ways in which these damages stem from individual choices could also induce this type of behaviour.     

Political orientation and climate concern shape visual attention to climate change

Despite the scientific consensus, there is widespread public controversy about climate change. Previous explanations focused on interpretations hampered by political bias or insufficient knowledge of climate facts. We propose that public views of climate change may also be related to an attentional bias at a more basic level of cognitive processing. We hypothesized that selective visual attention towards or away from climate-related information would be associated with climate concern. To test prioritization of climate-related stimuli under conditions of limited attention, we asked participants to identify climate-related and neutral words within a rapid stream of stimuli. Undergraduate students attended to climate-related words more readily than neutral words. This attentional prioritization correlated with self-rated climate concern. We then examined this relationship in a more diverse community sample. Principal component analysis of survey data in the community sample revealed a component indexing a relationship between climate concern and political orientation. That component was correlated with the degree of selective inattention to climate-related words. Our findings suggest that climate-related communications may be most effective if tailored in a manner accounting for how attentional priorities differ between audiences—particularly those with different political orientations.     

Systemic vulnerabilities of the global urban-industrial network to hazards

Cities in the USA engage in action on climate change, even as the federal government remains resistant to comprehensive climate policy. While experts generally agree that local level adaptation and mitigation policies are critical to avoiding the worst climate impacts, the degree to which cities communicate climate change issues to their constituents has yet to be fully explored. In this article, we evaluate how US cities communicate climate change-related issues, problems, and policies. We use a computer-assisted approach to evaluate climate change efforts by cities by examining the full text of press releases of 82 large cities in the USA. We first identify who discusses climate change, finding that many large cities in the USA address climate change in their public communication. Second, we examine the content of these discussions. Many cities discuss weather-related concerns in conjunction with broad collaborative efforts to address global warming, while city-based policy discussions focus more on energy and transportation efforts. Third, we evaluate the local factors associated with these discussions. We find that the city’s climate vulnerability is particularly influential in shaping the level and timing of climatic communication.     

Felt responsibility and climate engagement: Distinguishing adaptation from mitigation

Policy makers and citizens must choose from among a growing variety of strategic options as they try to cope optimally with climate change. As a means of more accurately predicting different types of climate change engagement, we empirically distinguish individuals’ felt responsibility for mitigation (FRm) from felt responsibility for adaptation (FRa), and assess support for different climate action strategies (mitigation and adaptation). We surveyed two U.S. samples two months apart, and the replication study confirmed Study 1′s findings of differing predictive powers for FRm vs. FRa. Each type of felt responsibility, controlling for the other, served as a mediator between belief in global warming (as well as belief in anthropogenic cause of climate change) and its corresponding climate action strategy (mitigation vs. adaptation). FRa predicted adaptation measures but not mitigation measures, while FRm predicted mitigation measures more strongly than it predicted adaptation but did predict both action strategies. We also found important individual differences: people’s disposition toward behaving proactively correlated positively with all types of climate engagement, and political orientation (liberal/conservative ideology) interacted with climate action strategy (mitigation vs. adaptation) in predicting all engagement variables. Comparing levels of support across the political spectrum, the mitigation measures were highly polarizing, while the adaptation measures were less divisive.     

“We don’t tell people what to do”: An examination of the factors influencing NGO decisions to campaign for reduced meat consumption in light of climate change

To date, efforts by non-governmental organizations to encourage reduced meat consumption in light of climate change have been quite limited, particularly among environmental non-governmental organizations. This study sought to examine the factors influencing non-governmental organization decisions to establish and sustain dedicated public education and/or policy advocacy campaigns on this issue. More specifically, a grounded theory approach was used to examine environmental, food-focused, and animal protection non-governmental organizations in the U.S., Sweden, and Canada. Results indicate that the relatively limited degree of engagement is primarily attributable to the fact that few non-governmental organization staffers felt that addressing meat consumption within a climate change context was a part of their core missions. Reduced meat consumption was also seen as an issue with limited social and political appeal. Further, many environmental non-governmental organizations appeared to be reluctant to mount campaigns explicitly encouraging personal behavior change of any type. Cross- non-governmental organization collaboration or the creation of additional non-governmental organizations with missions focused on this specific issue may be needed to increase the level of campaigning on this issue.     

An iconic approach for representing climate change

International and national greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals implicitly rely in part on individuals undertaking voluntary emissions reductions through lifestyle decisions. Whilst there is widespread public recognition of climate change as an issue, there are many barriers – cognitive, psychological and social – preventing individuals from enacting lifestyle decarbonisation. More effective climate change communication approaches are needed which allow individuals to engage meaningfully with climate change, thus opening new prospects for lifestyle decarbonisation. This study presents an iconic approach to engagement, tested in the UK context, which allows individuals to approach climate change through their own personal values and experiences. The iconic approach harnesses the emotive and visual power of climate icons with a rigorous scientific analysis of climate impacts under a different climate future. Although some climate icons already exist – for example the Thermohaline Circulation shutdown – these ‘expert-led’ icons fail to effectively engage ‘non-experts’. We demonstrate that the non-expert-led iconic approach helps overcome some of the cognitive and affective barriers that impede action towards lifestyle decarbonisation.