共查询到12条相似文献，搜索用时 60 毫秒
1.
张小全 《气候变化研究进展》2011,7(5):369-377
根据主要附件I缔约方2011年向《联合国气候变化框架公约》递交的1990—2009年国家温室气体（GHG）排放清单数据,包括报告的《京都议定书》土地利用、土地利用变化和林业（LULUCF）活动数据,对其LULUCF GHG源/汇趋势、《京都议定书》缔约方LULUCF相关活动在履约中的作用进行系统的对比分析,对缔约方会议确定的森林管理活动汇清除的限额进行评估。分析表明,1990—2009年,附件I缔约方LULUCF总体表现为净GHG汇清除,且总体上呈波浪式增加趋势,20年增加了65.9%,但年际波动较大。1990年LULUCF汇清除相当于GHG排放总量的7.41%, 2009年上升到13.68%。《京都议定书》第一承诺期的最初两年（2008—2009年）,各缔约方每年可从合格的LULUCF活动中获得2.38亿t CO2当量的汇清除,相当于这些缔约方基准年源排放的1.91%,可抵消其减限排额的45%。汇清除主要来自森林管理活动,而其他活动的汇清除所占份额很小。LULUCF活动使《京都议定书》的实施效果大打折扣,为一些缔约方过多地使用森林管理活动的汇清除来完成其减限排指标提供了机会,特别是俄罗斯、日本和意大利等国。这为目前正在谈判的第二承诺期LULUCF规则,特别是如何利用森林管理汇清除的规则敲响警钟。 相似文献
2.
本文搜集了2014年4月最新提交的附件B 35个主要缔约方报告的2008—2012年土地利用、土地利用变化与林业(LULUCF),能源,工业过程,溶剂使用,农业及废弃物6个领域的温室气体(GHG)排放与吸收的数据,估算了第一承诺期各领域的相对减排贡献及各缔约方在各领域做出的减排努力。结果表明,各领域减排量占所有领域总减排量比例由大到小依次为:能源62.6%、工业过程13.9%、农业13.4%、LULUCF 7.4%、废弃物2.6%和溶剂使用0.1%;各缔约方在各领域的减排量相当于其基准年总排放量的平均值由大到小分别为:能源8.7%、农业3.0%、LULUCF 2.5%、工业过程1.3%、废弃物0.5%和溶剂使用0.1%。总体而言,能源领域是GHG减排的主导领域,农业和LULUCF起到辅助减排的作用;多数缔约方选择的LULUCF活动产生的核算结果表现为弱GHG吸收汇,其利用LULUCF活动履约的减排贡献相对较小,仅相当于能源领域减排量的12%,但对于新西兰和冰岛的贡献较大,其LULUCF活动产生的汇清除抵消了两国在其他5个领域GHG排放量的50%以上。 相似文献
3.
2005年12月在蒙特利尔举行的《京都议定书》第一次缔约方会议决定按议定书第三条第九款的规定启动附件一缔约方(发达国家和经济转轨国家)2012年后温室气体减排指标的谈判,即第二承诺期谈判,并成立了“不限名额特设工作组”(以下简称工作组)。第二承诺期谈 相似文献
4.
欧盟第二承诺期减排目标初步分析 总被引：1，自引：1，他引：1
朱松丽 《气候变化研究进展》2009,5(2):103-109
欧盟提出了到2020年将温室气体排放在1990年水平上降低20%的目标,并提出了相应的政策措施。文章首先分析了1990-2005年欧盟减排成果,认为欧盟老成员国很难在第一承诺期内实现其在《京都议定书》之下的承诺。在这样的基础上提出进一步减排目标,必须有更严格的政策措施作保障,但现在的行动计划缺乏足够力量和信心。中东欧新成员国的加入有助于欧盟实现其第一承诺期目标,但随着经济发展的逐步恢复,这将给欧盟第二承诺期的减排目标带来挑战。 相似文献
5.
This article provides an ex post analysis of the compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol during the first commitment period (2008–2012) based on the final data for national GHG emissions and exchanges in carbon units that became available at the end of 2015. On the domestic level, among the 36 countries that fully participated in the Kyoto Protocol, only nine countries emitted higher levels of GHGs than committed and therefore had to resort to flexibility mechanisms. On the international level – i.e. after the use of flexibility mechanisms – all Annex B Parties are in compliance. Countries implemented different compliance strategies: purchasing carbon units abroad, stimulating the domestic use of carbon credits by the private sector and incentivizing domestic emission reductions through climate policies.
Overall, the countries party to the Protocol surpassed their aggregate commitment by an average 2.4 GtCO2e yr–1. Of the possible explanations for this overachievement, ‘hot-air’ was estimated at 2.2 GtCO2e yr–1, while accounting rules for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) further removed 0.4 GtCO2e yr–1 from the net result excluding LULUCF. The hypothetical participation of the US and Canada would have reduced this overachievement by a net 1 GtCO2e yr–1. None of these factors – some of which may be deemed illegitimate – would therefore on its own have led to global non-compliance, even without use of the 0.3 GtCO2e of annual emissions reductions generated by the Clean Development Mechanism. The impact of domestic policies and ‘carbon leakage’ – neither of which is quantitatively assessed here – should not be neglected either.
Policy relevance
Given the ongoing evolution of the international climate regime and the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, we believe that there is a need to evaluate the results of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. To our knowledge there has been no overarching quantitative ex post assessment of the Kyoto Protocol based on the final emissions data for 2008–2012, which became available in late 2015. This article attempts to fill this gap, focusing on the domestic and international compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period. 相似文献
6.
Considerable progress has been made in Europe towards cutting GHG emissions during the last decade, but this achievement is partly due to the delocalization of manufacturing industries to emerging countries. Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the current emission accounting method is production-based and cannot fully capture this effect. The use of such a method is clearly unfavourable for emerging countries and could lead to difficulties in engaging them in climate policy negotiations. The consumption-based approach represents the other extreme in apportioning emission responsibilities. This article proposes the beneficiary-based shared responsibility approach, which outperforms previous methods in terms of scientific justification and political acceptability. Consumer countries benefit from enjoying the product itself, while producing countries benefit from the production process, which provides them with employment, government income, and company profit. Thus, emissions related to the material throughput used to produce exported products should be allocated to the final place of consumption. The income of production activities benefits the producer country, so emissions associated with these values should be allocated to them. The main reason for taking this accounting approach is that the responsibility for emissions and the benefits of enjoying a product should not be decoupled. 相似文献
7.
YASUKO KAMEYAMA 《Climate Policy》2013,13(5):429-443
How do current processes in international climate-related institutions affect the architecture of a future climate regime, particularly various international negotiating processes related to climate change? A plausible image of future climate regime is developed to address this question. Three plausible scenarios are described for the next decade using the scenario-planning approach. Based on this, the scope for an internationally acceptable climate regime beyond 2012 is developed. The current processes under the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and those outside the UN arena are encapsulated into three scenarios. Each scenario has a set of relatively preferable types of commitments, which differ from each other. Each process is likely to result in the establishment of one particular institution. Linkages are developed between the three institutions so that the climate regime as a whole will be environmentally effective. The three institutions are likely to converge in the long run, as countries' views on both climate change and a future climate regime converge. 相似文献
8.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):51-70
Abstract To reduce the risk of overselling in the context of international greenhouse gas trading under the Kyoto Protocol, Parties have agreed to a commitment period reserve requirement. The commitment period reserve requires each Annex B Party to hold in its national registry quota equal to the lower of (a) X% of five times the Party's most recently reviewed emissions inventory; and (b) Y% of the Party's initial assigned amount. The agreement reached at the resumed sixth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) sets X = 100% and Y = 90%. This paper analyses different specifications (values of X and Y) of the commitment period reserve in terms of potential non-compliance due to overselling and restricted sales of quota surplus to compliance needs of the seller. To eliminate potential non-compliance due to overselling, Y must be equal to 100% and X must be greater than 105%. Specifications that limit potential non-compliance due to overselling, may temporarily restrict sales of quota surplus to the compliance of some countries. The Annex II Parties are less likely to face restrictions on sales of surplus quota than other Annex B countries. The risk of temporarily restricted sales is reduced to less than 10% for almost all countries for a value of X close to 90%. 相似文献
9.
Abstract Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have been established under the Kyoto Protocol as project-based instruments to mitigate greenhouse gases of the industrialized countries to the levels imposed by their Kyoto commitments. An unresolved issue associated with the implementation of these two flexibility mechanisms, concerns the choice of the appropriate baseline for calculating the emission reductions in JI or CDM projects. This article describes a computerized tool that constructs and compares different types of standardized baselines and benchmarks. The analysis focuses on the suitability of several different types of benchmarks for assessing the emission reductions of certain types of projects. The analysis is also expanded into a discussion of the extent to which benchmarks reduce the crediting of non-additional projects and limit the risk of missed additional investments. This tool has been applied to actual JI and CDM projects in the Russian Federation and Indonesia. 相似文献
10.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(2):169-184
Linking emissions trading schemes has attracted interest as a means of reducing costs and expanding market size and liquidity. A number of studies have explored the compatibility of schemes, although little attention has been devoted to the implementation of links. Most trading schemes provide for unilateral recognition of certified emission reductions (CERs) and occasionally other units. Restrictions on the types of units and the quantity that can be used are common. Unilateral links can be implemented through adoption of a schedule that lists the units accepted together with limits on, and adjustments to, imported units. Only a bilateral link yields the full benefits of linking trading schemes. No bilateral links have been established yet, but the number of schemes interested in such links is growing. Implementing such a link through a binding agreement affords participants considerable certainty. However, it entails cumbersome adoption procedures as well as legal and procedural constraints. Reciprocal unilateral links, possibly accompanied by an informal agreement, are easier to implement and offer more flexibility. Economic benefits will not differ significantly from a bilateral linking agreement. 相似文献
11.
第二承诺期LULUCF有关议题谈判进展与对策建议 总被引：1，自引：1，他引：1
自2005年作为《京都议定书》缔约方会议的《联合国气候变化框架公约》（以下简称《公约》）缔约方会议第一届会议（CMP.1）决定启动《京都议定书》第二承诺期进程以来,国际社会通过《京都议定书》缔约方特设工作组（AWG-KP）针对第二承诺期的谈判紧锣密鼓地进行。在第二承诺期如何利用LULUCF活动（包括与LULUCF活动有关的清洁发展机制项目）,也是谈判中的主要议题之一。通过调研,概述了AWG-KP的谈判进展,结合第一承诺期LULUCF有关规则的不足,对LULUCF有关的关键问题进行了综合分析,提出了关于第二承诺期LULUCF规则的建议。 相似文献
12.
《Climate Policy》2013,13(1):5-25
Abstract Deliberate land management actions that enhance the uptake of CO2 or reduce its emissions have the potential to remove a significant amount of CO2 from the atmosphere over the next three decades. The quantities involved are large enough to satisfy a substantial portion of the Kyoto Protocol commitments for many countries, but are not large enough to stabilise atmospheric concentrations without also implementing major reductions in fossil fuel emissions. ‘Sinks’ can be deployed relatively rapidly at moderate cost and thus could play a useful bridging role while new energy technologies are developed. There is no difference in climatological effect between CO2 taken up by the land and CO2 reductions due to other causes. There are potential regulatory differences, related to the security with which the CO2 is held and to the accuracy with which it can be measured and verified. A variety of policy approaches are available to address these differences. 相似文献