Scepticism and uncertainty about climate change: Dimensions, determinants and change over time

While scientific consensus and political and media messages appear to be increasingly certain, public attitudes and action towards the issue do not appear to be following suit. Popular and academic debate often assumes this is due to ignorance or misunderstanding on the part of the public, but some studies have suggested political beliefs and values may play a more important role in determining belief versus scepticism about climate change. The current research used two representative postal surveys of the UK public to: measure scepticism and uncertainty about climate change; determine how scepticism varies according to individual characteristics, knowledge and values; and examine how scepticism has changed over time. Findings show denial of climate change is less common than the perception that the issue has been exaggerated. Scepticism was found to be strongly determined by individuals’ environmental and political values (and indirectly by age, gender, location and lifestyle) rather than by education or knowledge. Between 2003 and 2008, public uncertainty about climate change has remained remarkably constant, although belief that claims about the issue are exaggerated has doubled over that period. These results are interpreted with reference to psychological concepts of motivated reasoning, confirmation bias and ‘finite pool of worry’. Implications for communication and policy are discussed.     

Considering attitudinal uncertainty in the climate change skepticism continuum

In this paper we present an empirically driven language to discuss climate change skepticism. We conceptualize skeptic/skepticism as an umbrella term that includes those who actively reject climate science and those who are uncertain about climate change. We propose four categories for better empirical analysis of climate skepticism: epistemic deniers, epistemic doubters (borrowing from Capstick and Pidgeon 2014), attribution deniers, and attribution doubters (borrowing from Rahmstorf 2004). Using a unique dataset of surveys (n = 1000) and interviews (n = 33) with residents of the U.S. Pacific Northwest who are skeptical about climate change, we compare those four groups across several predictors and demographic variables (age, race, gender, political ideology, religiosity, income, education, and level of trust in science) and outcome variables (environmental concern, policy support, and conspiracy ideation (adherence to the belief that climate change is a “hoax”). We demonstrate the importance of considering attitudinal uncertainty in the analysis of climate skepticism by providing evidence for the presence of a continuum of thought wherein epistemic deniers and attribution doubters make up the two ends of a continuum with more complicated distinctions between epistemic doubters and attribution deniers.     

Politics eclipses climate extremes for climate change perceptions

Whether or not actual shifts in climate influence public perceptions of climate change remains an open question, one with important implications for societal response to climate change. We use the most comprehensive public opinion survey data on climate change available for the US to examine effects of annual and seasonal climate variation. Our results show that political orientation has the most important effect in shaping public perceptions about the timing and seriousness of climate change. Objective climatic conditions do not influence Americans’ perceptions of the timing of climate change and only have a negligible effect on perceptions about the seriousness of climate change. These results suggest that further changes in climatic conditions are unlikely to produce noticeable shifts in Americans’ climate change perceptions.     

Learning and climate change

Abstract

Learning—i.e. the acquisition of new information that leads to changes in our assessment of uncertainty—plays a prominent role in the international climate policy debate. For example, the view that we should postpone actions until we know more continues to be influential. The latest work on learning and climate change includes new theoretical models, better informed simulations of how learning affects the optimal timing of emissions reductions, analyses of how new information could affect the prospects for reaching and maintaining political agreements and for adapting to climate change, and explorations of how learning could lead us astray rather than closer to the truth. Despite the diversity of this new work, a clear consensus on a central point is that the prospect of learning does not support the postponement of emissions reductions today.     

下垫面改变导致局地气候变化的理论分析

运用气柱内辐射，相变，对流间的平衡及地表能量平衡条件研究了由于地表状况改变，即植被退化所造成的局地气候变化，结果表明地表反射率的加大及地面热通量的变化造成中国北方降水量的减少和温度的增加。粗糙度的减少也能造成降水量减少和温度增加，这些结果与数值模拟一致。考虑平流作用以后，上述特征不变，但降水及温度改变量发生变化。在全球增暖背景下，降水减少和温度增加要更剧烈些。     

Racing climate change: Collaboration and conflict in California's global climate change policy arena

Media accounts routinely refer to California's Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32), the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, as “landmark” climate change legislation. On its surface, this label is an accurate reflection of the state's forward-thinking stance across many environmental issues including pesticides, toxic substances, solid waste, and air quality. For all its promise, however, AB 32 can also be considered a low point in the landscape of conflict between state environmental regulators and California's environmental justice movement. While the legislation included several provisions to address the procedural and distributive dimensions of environmental justice, the implementation of AB 32 has been marked by heated conflict. The most intense conflicts over AB 32 revolve around the primacy of market mechanisms such as “cap and trade.” This article examines the drivers and the manifestations of these dynamics of collaboration and conflict between environmental justice advocates and state regulators, and pays particular attention to the scalar and racialized quality of the neoliberal discourse. The contentiousness of climate change politics in California offers scholars and practitioners around the world a cautionary tale of how the best intentions for integrating environmental justice principles into climate change policy do not necessarily translate into implementation and how underlying racialized fractures can upend collaboration between state and social movement actors.     

Mechanisms for the land/sea warming contrast exhibited by simulations of climate change

The land/sea warming contrast is a phenomenon of both equilibrium and transient simulations of climate change: large areas of the land surface at most latitudes undergo temperature changes whose amplitude is more than those of the surrounding oceans. Using idealised GCM experiments with perturbed SSTs, we show that the land/sea contrast in equilibrium simulations is associated with local feedbacks and the hydrological cycle over land, rather than with externally imposed radiative forcing. This mechanism also explains a large component of the land/sea contrast in transient simulations as well. We propose a conceptual model with three elements: (1) there is a spatially variable level in the lower troposphere at which temperature change is the same over land and sea; (2) the dependence of lapse rate on moisture and temperature causes different changes in lapse rate upon warming over land and sea, and hence a surface land/sea temperature contrast; (3) moisture convergence over land predominantly takes place at levels significantly colder than the surface; wherever moisture supply over land is limited, the increase of evaporation over land upon warming is limited, reducing the relative humidity in the boundary layer over land, and hence also enhancing the land/sea contrast. The non-linearity of the Clausius–Clapeyron relationship of saturation specific humidity to temperature is critical in (2) and (3). We examine the sensitivity of the land/sea contrast to model representations of different physical processes using a large ensemble of climate model integrations with perturbed parameters, and find that it is most sensitive to representation of large-scale cloud and stomatal closure. We discuss our results in the context of high-resolution and Earth-system modelling of climate change.     

Climate change perceptions and their individual-level determinants: A cross-European analysis

There is now an extensive literature on the question of how individual-level factors affect climate change perceptions, showing that socio-political variables, notably values, worldviews and political orientation, are key factors alongside demographic variables. Yet little is known about cross-national differences in these effects, as most studies have been conducted in a single or small number of countries and cross-study comparisons are difficult due to different conceptualisations of key climate change dimensions. Using data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (n = 44,387), we examine how key socio-political and demographic factors are associated with climate change perception across 22 European countries and Israel. We show that human values and political orientation are important predictors of climate change beliefs and concern, as are the demographics of gender, age, and education. Certain associations with climate change perceptions, such as the ones for the self-transcendence versus self-enhancement value dimension, political orientation, and education, are more consistent across countries than for gender and age. However, even if the direction of the associations are to a large extent consistent, the sizes of the effects are not. We demonstrate that the sizes of the effects are generally smaller in Central and Eastern European countries, and that some demographic effects are larger in Northern European as compared to Western European countries. This suggests that findings from one country do not always generalize to other national contexts.     

Perceptions and responses to climate policy risks among California farmers

This paper considers how farmers perceive and respond to climate change policy risks, and suggests that understanding these risk responses is as important as understanding responses to biophysical climate change impacts. Based on a survey of 162 farmers in California, we test three hypotheses regarding climate policy risk: (1) that perceived climate change risks will have a direct impact on farmer's responses to climate policy risks, (2) that previous climate change experiences will influence farmer's climate change perceptions and climate policy risk responses, and (3) that past experiences with environmental policies will more strongly affect a farmer's climate change beliefs, risks, and climate policy risk responses. Using a structural equation model we find support for all three hypotheses and furthermore show that farmers’ negative past policy experiences do not make them less likely to respond to climate policy risks through participation in a government incentive program. We discuss how future research and climate policies can be structured to garner greater agricultural participation. This work highlights that understanding climate policy risk responses and other social, economic and policy perspectives is a vital component of understanding climate change beliefs, risks and behaviors and should be more thoroughly considered in future work.     

气候变化适应行动实施框架

气候变化适应对脆弱地区和贫困群体更为重要。尽管我国急需采取适应行动,但由于缺乏可操作性的模式和评估方法,目前实际的适应行动还略显滞后。本文建立了一个适应行动实施框架,主要包含六个核心步骤,从气候风险、适应目标、适应措施、技术优化、实施示范到监测评估,基本涵盖了适应行动的关键内容。框架的构建具有一定的通用性和借鉴性,可以帮助适应实施者开发综合和战略性的适应措施。适应行动框架是一个开放和可更新的体系,可根据实践过程中新的认识,对适应行动做一定的再设计和调整,实施过程中还可提炼适应的基本信息和确定适应的优化技术。     

OK Boomer: A decade of generational differences in feelings about climate change

The emergence of concern about and evidence of climate change has been argued to create a cultural milieu unique to the Millennial generation (born between 1981 and 1996) and iGeneration (aka iGens or Generation Z born after 1997). The present research tested a) claims of unique angst about climate change among younger versus older generations, b) growing generational discrepancies over time in emotions about climate change, c) generational differences for several emotions about climate change, and d) the implications of these emotions for motivating people to discuss climate change with others, potentially aiding coping with climate change and facilitating action to address climate change. Survey data gathered from 2010 to 2019 of a representative sample of United States residents (N = 22,468) document greater increases in worry about climate change and, to a lesser degree, anger and guilt about climate change, within the two youngest generations relative to changes among Generation X, Baby Boomers, and the Silent and Greatest Generations. Although generational differences were small and suggest overstatements of unique effects for younger generations, increases in younger generations’ emotions transform into the two youngest generations reporting the strongest emotions in 2019. Over ten years, these differential shifts in emotions explain more substantial increases in the frequency of discussing climate in the youngest generations.     

企业气候变化意识及应对措施调查研究

基于2012—2015年在华北、珠三角和湖南湖北地区对企业管理人员进行的气候变化意识的问卷调查,构建了气候变化意识和企业应对气候变化措施两个一级指数。通过对调查结果交叉列联表分析,得出以下结论：企业管理人员的气候变化意识指数处于一般水平,并且受年龄、产业类型、企业类型的影响显著;企业应对气候变化措施指数也处于一般水平且不同企业水平差距较大,企业管理人员气候变化意识水平、未来预期和自主知识产权拥有量对其影响显著。     

从全球到区域气候变化

尽管气候变化是全球性的现象,但其表现和结果随区域不同而不同,因此区域气候信息对于气候变化的作用和风险评估很重要.基于此,IPCC第六次评估报告(AR6)第一工作组(WGI)报告第十章对如何从全球链接到区域气候变化方面进行了评估.区域气候变化是对自然强迫和人类活动的区域响应、对大尺度气候系统内部变率的响应和区域气候本身反...     

Contesting climate justice in the city: Examining politics and practice in urban climate change experiments

Debates about climate justice have mainly occurred at the international scale, and have focussed on the rights and responsibilities of nation-states to either be protected from the effects of climate change, or to take action to reduce emissions or support adaptation. In this paper, we argue that it is both productive and necessary to examine how climate justice is being pursued at the urban scale, which brings into focus the need for attention to issues of recognition as well as rights and responsibilities. Building on work from environmental justice, which has conceptualized justice as trivalent, we propose that climate justice can be understood as a pyramid, the faces of which are distributions, procedures, rights, responsibilities and recognition. We then apply this conceptual framework to examine climate change interventions in five cities; Bangalore, Monterrey, Hong Kong, Philadelphia and Berlin. Arguing that the politics and practices of urban climate change interventions are constantly engaging with and refracting the idea of justice, we examine how justice was articulated, practiced and contested across our cases. The perspective of recognition emerges as a particularly useful entry point through which to explore the types of rights, responsibilities, distributions and procedures required to respond justly to climate change. We conclude by reflecting on our framework, arguing that it is useful both as an analytical device to interrogate climate justice and to shape the design of climate change interventions which seek to ensure climate justice.     

Socioeconomic geography of climate change views in Europe

Climate change views have their socioeconomic foundations but also specific geographies. In merging these perspectives, this analysis uses ESS Round 8 data from 23 European countries to examine whether climate change scepticism and concern, pro-environmental personal norm and a willingness to engage in energy-saving behaviour exhibit, first, urban–rural and/or regional differences, and second, if these attitudes can be explained at individual level by socioeconomic position and wellbeing resources. We find that climate change scepticism and concern do exhibit urban–rural differences, where living in a country village is associated with greater climate scepticism and lower concern compared to living in a big city. Also, higher climate change concern and pro-environmental norms are associated with living in a region with constant population growth. These geographical differences are independent of individual-level socioeconomic attributes as well as one’s political orientation. Additionally, the results show that both climate change attitudes and reporting energy-saving behaviour are strongly stratified by level of education and reveal that those in lower income deciles feel less pro-environmental norm but nonetheless report greater engagement with energy-saving behaviour. In sum, the results highlight that climate change mitigation is not a uniform project either spatially or within certain socioeconomic strata. Hence, our results suggest that socioeconomic disadvantage (belonging to the lowest education and income levels) and spatial marginalisation (living in more rural surroundings and declining regions) should be better acknowledged when reworking climate change and environmental policies in the EU.     

Drought and the future of rural communities: Opportunities and challenges for climate change adaptation in regional Victoria,Australia

Australia's vulnerability to climate variability and change has been highlighted by the recent drought (i.e. the Big Dry or Millennium Drought), and also recent flooding across much of eastern Australia during 2011 and 2012. There is also the possibility that the frequency, intensity and duration of droughts may increase due to anthropogenic climate change, stressing the need for robust drought adaptation strategies. This study investigates the socio-economic impacts of drought, past and present drought adaptation measures, and the future adaptation strategies required to deal with projected impacts of climate change. The qualitative analysis presented records the actual experiences of drought and other climatic extremes and helps advance knowledge of how best to respond and adapt to such conditions, and how this might vary between different locations, sectors and communities. It was found that more effort is needed to address the changing environment and climate, by shifting from notions of ‘drought-as-crisis’ towards acknowledging the variable availability of water and that multi-year droughts should not be unexpected, and may even become more frequent. Action should also be taken to revalue the farming enterprise as critical to our environmental, economic and cultural well-being and there was also strong consensus that the value of water should be recognised in a more meaningful way (i.e. not just in economic terms). Finally, across the diverse stakeholders involved in the research, one point was consistently reiterated: that ‘it's not just drought’. Exacerbating the issues of climate impacts on water security and supply is the complexity of the agriculture industry, global economics (in particular global markets and the recent/ongoing global financial crisis), and demographic changes (decreasing and ageing populations) which are currently occurring across most rural communities. The social and economic issues facing rural communities are not just a product of drought or climate change – to understand them as such would underestimate the extent of the problems and inhibit the ability to coordinate the holistic, cross-agency approach needed for successful climate change adaptation in rural communities.     

中国农田下垫面变化对气候影响的模拟研究

使用同期的美国国家环境预报中心/能源部(NCEP/DOE)再分析资料驱动区域气候耦合模式AVIM-RIEMS2.0,从遥感卫星图像资料中获取3期中国土地利用/覆盖数据中的农田植被类型,将其分别引入到AVIM-RIEMS2.0模式进行积分,研究中国农田下垫面变化对东亚区域气候的影响。结果表明:中国农田变化对气候影响具有冬季弱、夏季强的季节性变化,夏季气温和降水的差异在一些地区通过了95%的显著性检验;20世纪80年代农田扩张,林地、草地为主的植被类型转化为农田,植被变化区域的叶面积指数降低,反照率升高,且通过了95%的显著性检验,使得中国东部地区的气温由南到北呈现增加—减少—增加—减少的相间变化趋势,而降水的变化趋势大体相反;20世纪90年代农田面积减少,除东北地区外,农田变化引起的植被变化与80年代基本相反,叶面积指数变化、反照率以及由此导致的气候各要素也呈现大体相反的变化趋势;不同时期农田变化引起的植被类型转化的差异,使850 hPa风场变化趋势基本相反,可能是导致气温和降水变化趋势差异的主要原因之一。     

The discourses of climate change science: Scientific reporting,climate negotiations and the case of Papua New Guinea

This paper analyses climate science as a discourse to reveal how it enables and constrains climate change negotiations and action. Focusing on long-term outcomes projected in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report and the World Bank’s “Turn Down the Heat” reports, this paper examines processes of discourse structuration and institutionalization to identify the dominant discourses which frame climate action. We trace the dominant discourses identified in the scientific reports – Survivalism, Ecological Modernisation and Economic Rationalism – through the Paris Agreement and selected Leader Statements and Intended Nationally Determined Contributions from COP21. From the 24 states included in this analysis, Papua New Guinea (PNG) is developed as a case study to investigate the hybridity and institutionalization of discourses. Even though PNG’s rhetoric and commitments at COP21 express Survivalism, the state’s policy frameworks rarely move beyond solutions found in Economic Rationalism and Ecological Modernisation. This suggests that states strategically adopt hybrid discourses drawn from climate science in line with their positionality, political economy and interests. Understanding how discourses drawn from climate science manifest in national policies has significant implications not only for how science is communicated at the international level but also for understanding different state positions in the global climate governance regime.     

Linkages between climate change and sustainable development

Abstract

Climate change does not yet feature prominently within the environmental or economic policy agendas of developing countries. Yet evidence shows that some of the most adverse effects of climate change will be in developing countries, where populations are most vulnerable and least likely to easily adapt to climate change, and that climate change will affect the potential for development in these countries. Some synergies already exist between climate change policies and the sustainable development agenda in developing countries, such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, transport and sustainable land-use policies. Despite limited attention from policy-makers to date, climate change policies could have significant ancillary benefits for the local environment. The reverse is also true as local and national policies to address congestion, air quality, access to energy services and energy diversity may also limit GHG emissions. Nevertheless there could be significant trade-offs associated with deeper levels of mitigation in some countries, for example where developing countries are dependent on indigenous coal and may be required to switch to cleaner yet more expensive fuels to limit emissions. The distributional impacts of such policies are an important determinant of their feasibility and need to be considered up-front. It follows that future agreements on mitigation and adaptation under the convention will need to recognise the diverse situations of developing countries with respect to their level of economic development, their vulnerability to climate change and their ability to adapt or mitigate. Recognition of how climate change is likely to influence other development priorities may be a first step toward building cost-effective strategies and integrated, institutional capacity in developing countries to respond to climate change. Opportunities may also exist in developing countries to use regional economic organisations to assist in the design of integrated responses and to exploit synergies between climate change and other policies such as those designed to combat desertification and preserve biodiversity.

© 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.     

基于自然的气候变化解决方案

基于自然的解决方案(NbS)是近10年提出的人类社会应对一系列环境和社会挑战的成本有效的方式,但直到近期才在国际社会引起重视。针对气候变化,NbS指通过对生态系统的保护、恢复和可持续管理减缓气候变化,同时利用生态系统及其服务功能帮助人类和野生生物适应气候变化带来的影响和挑战。这些生态系统包括森林、农田、草地、湿地（海岸带）生态系统,人工的或天然的。NbS能够为实现《巴黎协定》目标贡献30%左右的减排潜力,同时带来巨大的环境和社会经济的协同效益。但是,在过去的气候变化政策和行动中,包括国家自主贡献（INDC）,NbS尚未得到充分的重视,流入NbS相关的气候资金明显不足。为充分发挥NbS的潜力,建议开展中国NbS减排潜力及其协同效应研究,识别成本有效的中国NbS优先领域,梳理国际国内NbS成功案例,制定推动NbS主流化相关激励政策,推动多领域NbS协同治理。