Participatory methodology used for sea urchin co-management in Barbados

This project aimed to develop co-management of exploited marine fishery resources in Barbados using the sea urchin fishery as a test case. The approach was to work with stakeholders, primarily the fishers, to establish a co-management mechanism that could be operated by the fishers themselves with technical and advisory support from the Fisheries Division. The project used Technology of Participation (ToP) methodology, developed by the Institute of Cultural Affairs (ICA). ToP methods used included Focused Conversation and Participatory Strategic Planning. To our knowledge, this methodology has not previously been applied in small-scale fisheries co-management. Fishers involvement was developed in stages: identification of groups of fishers in communities and a contact person for the group; dialogue with individuals and the small groups; discussion in larger groups to derive approaches to management; and full group participation to reach consensus regarding the most appropriate approach to management. Key persons identified in communities helped organize meetings to discuss the sea urchin fishery. From these community meetings, individuals were selected to take part in the strategic planning. Two vision meetings with separate groups of fishers, produced similar results. These groups were combined at a planning meeting, where fishers examined the blocks to achieving the vision, developed strategies to overcome the blocks, and an action plan to implement the strategies. Fishers and government officials concluded that the methodology had successfully facilitated the input of both parties and produced a workable, consensual approach.     

Can co-management emerge spontaneously? Collaborative management in Sri Lankan shrimp aquaculture

Shrimp aquaculture in northwestern Sri Lanka shows co-management like features. To understand the reasons behind co-management and to identify the mechanisms by which co-management is carried out, the paper examines shrimp aquaculture operations in three coastal communities using a case study approach. Water from an interconnected lagoon system is the key input for shrimp ponds, but it is also the potential source of shrimp disease outbreaks that threaten all shrimp farms. Farmers try to prevent the spread of disease by co-operating to adjust the timing of water intake and wastewater release. This is done through a zonal crop calendar system which is developed and implemented by a vertically integrated institutional structure with three levels: sub-zonal/community, zonal, and national. Partnerships, overall sharing of power and authority, and learning-by-doing are key features of this collaborative management system. The case shows that adaptive co-management can develop through collaborative problem-solving over time, even in the absence of legal arrangements.     

Property relations and the co-management of small-scale fisheries in Costa Rica: Lessons from Marine Areas for Responsible Fishing in the Gulf of Nicoya

Marine fisheries in Costa Rica have become characterized by overexploitation, ineffective centralized management and increased conflict among fishing sectors. Despite high economic and socio-cultural importance of small-scale fisheries, no formal mechanisms existed until recently to facilitate the participation of fishers in management. Marine Areas for Responsible Fishing (Áreas Marinas para la Pesca Responsable, AMPR) were legally recognized in 2009 as a co-management approach, enabling the designation of spatial management areas to be implemented collaboratively by artisanal fishers and government agencies. In this paper, we examine property and access relations shaping this emerging participatory management model using case studies primarily from the Gulf of Nicoya region. The policy demonstrably improves upon some aspects of management, for instance, by allowing artisanal fishers to determine gear restrictions within designated areas. However, the model lacks other attributes of more successful co-management scenarios, particularly exclusive access. The fugitive nature of resources further complicates property relations over these fisheries. The cases explored also illustrate broader institutional and systemic issues that preclude effective participatory management. Lessons from the region are used to propose significant shifts to the management of small-scale fisheries in Costa Rica.     

Current issues in fisheries governance in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

In this paper we identify the critical issues which Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries must address in defining their approach to fisheries governance. We suggest practical measures which should be taken in order to deal with these issues. Emphasis is placed on institutional reform which builds a broader institutional base for resource management than has been common in the past. Fisheries administrations need to develop partnerships with nongovernmental organizations, particularly fisherfolk organizations. This includes strengthening the capacity of those organizations to participate in the management process. There is also the need to strengthen regional organizations within the Caribbean, in order that they may better manage shared resources within the region as well as participate in international management initiatives.     

Conditions affecting the success of fisheries co-management: lessons from Asia

The purpose of this paper is to present results from the first five-year phase of a large fisheries co-management research project implemented by the International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM) and the Institute of Fisheries Management (IFM), with national partners in Asia and Africa. More specifically, the paper will present results of conditions which affect the success of co-management as identified through the project's research activities in Asia. The 18 conditions identified as being of high importance for success are grouped into three categories: supra-community level, community level, and individual and household level.     

Artisanal fishers' perceptions regarding coastal co-management policies in Chile and their potentials to scale-up marine biodiversity conservation

No-take Marine Protected Areas (Nt-MPAs) constitute an indispensable tool for biodiversity conservation. Nevertheless, there are other instruments such as marine coastal co-management policy frameworks which may be also considered as tools for conservation or as ancillary conservation instruments. Using focus groups, semi-structured interviews and survey questionnaires we analysed small-scale artisanal fishers' perceptions towards a coastal co-management regime in Chile and the potential to generate capacities and a social setting to scale-up marine conservation. Empirical evidence from the study shows artisanal fishers have indeed been empowered through the coastal co-management experience; however, there exist heterogeneity in their willingness to participate in the creation of Nt-MPAs, mainly determined by occupational mobility. Chilean artisanal fishers strongly support a bottom-up process in the conservation of marine biodiversity, though the need for top-down steering and guidance is also stressed, especially regarding enforcement.     

Co-management of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) fisheries

The countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have a relatively poor record of fisheries management and the need to reform fisheries governance is urgent. There is now increasing interest in getting fishers and other stakeholders more involved in management through co-management and community-based management approaches. The purpose of this paper is to examine the potentials of co-management as an alternative fisheries management strategy for the countries in the CARICOM region. Co-management is found to have potential but there will need to be capacity-building and institutional strengthening of fisheries departments, fishers and NGOs to participate in co-management. Pilot projects should be initiated to gain practical experience in co-management.     

Hana Pa'a: Challenges and lessons for early phases of co-management

This case study provides in depth analysis of an early phase of natural resources co-management, rule making. Co-management involves shared management responsibility between resource users or community groups and governmental agencies, and is recommended as a key management approach for nearshore marine resources. This article explores collaborative rulemaking based on traditional management practices for a small, rural nearshore Hawaiian fishery important for local subsistence. Legislation mandated the state of Hawai‘i's natural resource management agency work with community residents to co-create and enforce rules for the fishery. By selecting a model case in which rule making has taken seven years longer than predicted, despite the presence of many established enabling conditions, this study elucidates new factors for consideration in early phases of co-management. These include legal uncertainty regarding statutory mandates, the role of bridging organizations in capacity building, cross-generational leadership development, and connection of the co-management rule-making process to the target geography. Through in depth analysis of a model collaborative rule making effort and the delays it faced, this research reveals new critical challenges while also offering suggestions to address them to build lasting collaborative capacity in other fledgling co-management efforts.     

Cooperatives,concessions, and co-management on the Pacific coast of Mexico

Ten fishery cooperatives of the Pacific coast of Mexico were studied to examine reasons for successful community-based management of the fishery commons. The cooperatives hold exclusive rights to ‘concession’ territories for major fisheries and are linked by geographic adjacency and through a federation. The case study underscores the role of factors such as smallness of scale; the productivity, visibility and legibility of the resources and fisheries involved; clarity of social and territorial boundaries; adjacency and linkages among territorial units; a strong sense of community. The cooperatives also made considerable investments in attaining high levels of knowledge, leadership, transparent and democratic decision-making, and “vigilance,” or enforcement of the rules and the running of the organization. The study also shows the workings of windows of opportunity and experience with environmental change in the development of strong and adaptive capacities for co-management between local organizations and government agencies. Although particular histories and larger legal, political, and cultural contexts matter, the Mexican case supports arguments for greater community-level engagement in “catch share” and territorial management throughout the Pacific.     

Co-management of sea turtle fisheries: Biogeography versus geopolitics

Co-management between local communities and government agencies is promoted as a strategy to improve fisheries management. This paper considers the potential for co-management of sea turtle fisheries within four UK Overseas Territories (OTs) in the Caribbean, and for co-ordinated management among those territories. We focus on fisher incentives for engaging in co-management and on the potential to scale up co-management to a regional level. This paper presents data from Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands, where 110 turtle fishers participated in a socio-economic survey undertaken as part of the ‘Turtles in the UK Overseas Territories in the Caribbean’ project. Based on three established criteria for co-management (perceived crisis in stock, willingness to participate and community cohesion), results suggest that fisher support for co-management exists within each OT, but the extent of support for and views of specific management interventions varies among OTs. The implications of results for co-management in each territory, and for establishing co-ordinated management regimes in the region, are discussed in the context of current debates about the nature of resources and scalar (mis)matches between resource and management regimes.     

Early-stage transformation of coastal marine governance in Vietnam?

This paper examines an apparent ‘early stage’ governance transformation in the Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam. In this context, the role of key policy windows for innovative governance practice is assessed (e.g., changes to Land and Fisheries Laws). Also examined is the emergence of recent initiatives to catalyze a wider shift in governance practice in the region, including the formation of co-management institutional networks that contribute to trust building and learning, and the allocation of collective territorial use rights for fisheries. While these changes are consistent with experiences in other coastal marine contexts, the paper shows that place-based and longitudinal research is necessary to explain and predict the conditions and incentives that catalyze governance shifts. Differences between a governance change and more fundamental transformation are difficult to discern using point-in-time analysis. Moreover, the results show that current declines in ecological conditions in the lagoon may not be reversed by changes to access rights or the emergence of co-management. Rather, these governance changes may simply help to stabilize the situation and buy time until other livelihood opportunities arise. Assessments of governance transformation thus need to be linked to ecological outcomes (i.e., reversing degradation of coastal marine systems, avoiding biophysical tipping points) which may not be easily identified in the short-term. Despite uncertainty, the emergence of policy windows, evidence of institutional innovation, and small-scale rights allocation experiments, all suggest important shifts in the trajectory of governance are underway in the Tam Giang Lagoon.     

Recommendations for the management of subsistence fisheries in South Africa

This paper summarizes recommendations for the management of previously marginalized and neglected subsistence fisheries in South Africa. The recommendations stem from the activities and analyses of a task group appointed by Government and mandated to provide advice about management of the new fishing sector. The following focus areas were identified for attention: planning for implementation; definitions of subsistence fishers and other sectors; assessment and categorization of resources; determination of types of fishing activities; zonation; management systems; training; communication mechanisms; application and allocation procedures; compliance processes; research and monitoring; development of institutional capacity. Subsistence fishers were defined as poor people who personally harvest marine resources as a source of food or to sell them to meet basic needs of food security; they operate on or near to the shore or in estuaries, live in close proximity to the resource, consume or sell the resources locally, use low-technology gear (often as part of a long-standing community-based or cultural practice), and the resources they harvest generate only sufficient returns to meet basic needs of food security. A second group of informal fishers was identified that fishes for profit but cannot be equated to large industrial fisheries, and a new sector was proposed to accommodate these artisanal "small-scale commercial" fishers. Resources were classified for use by these different sectors based on accessibility, fishing methods, cash value and sustainability. In all, 12 different categories of subsistence and small-scale commercial fisheries were identified, and a preliminary list of resource species suitable for different fishing sectors is presented. A multi-tiered institutional management structure is recommended, with the national agency (MCM) controlling issues of national concern, and supporting and coordinating the activities of provincial and local structures. The management agents required for effective implementation were identified and include a dedicated national Subsistence Fisheries Management Unit, provincial management agencies that have the capacity to be delegated authority, Regional Fieldworkers, an independent Advisory Group for Subsistence Fisheries Management, local co-management structures, and community monitors responsible for observing and recording fishing activities and catches. Co-management, involving both authorities and users in joint management, is advocated in preference to previous top-down approaches, because of its potential to improve communication and compliance.     

Expanding fisheries co-management to ecosystem-based management: A case in the Shiretoko World Natural Heritage area,Japan

Fisheries co-management in the Shiretoko World Natural Heritage area was expanded to ecosystem-based management, in which the fisheries sector plays an essential role in management. A marine management plan was drawn up to define the management objectives, strategies to maintain major species, and methods for ecosystem monitoring. A network of coordinating organizations from a wide range of sectors was established to integrate policy measures. Experience from this case could inform ecosystem-based management in other countries where large numbers of small-scale fishers take a wide range of species under a fisheries co-management regime.     

Reflections on integrating operation and maintenance activities of offshore wind farms and mariculture

Offshore waters are in a process of transition, revealing diverse and heterogenic interests in marine resources. This increasing complexity leads to limits in developing and managing the different and often spatially overlapping maritime activities independently of one another. On a showcase basis we discuss ways and manners as well as the preconditions of an offshore co-management approach for the fledgling actor groups offshore wind farmers and mariculturists. Both groups may benefit through the integration of operation and maintenance (O&M) activities. Their resources in terms of offers, needs and constraints characteristics and thereof deduced potentialities for interaction is a prerequisite for initiating a co-management process. This process is more likely to develop and succeed if an interface management that acts as a moderator, disclosing the interests of the actor groups and offering possibilities for concerted action, guides it. It is concluded that such an institutional arrangement may in the long term contribute to a sound methodological tool for a co-management approach between different offshore maritime sectors.     

Network approach for understanding small-scale fisheries governance: The case of the Chilean coastal co-management system

Recent studies have focused on the study of social networks among local resource users, but few have attempted to study co-management networks. The objective of the research was to assess the Chilean shellfish co-management system from an organizational network perspective. Starting with one detailed case study, representatives of 38 small-scale fisher associations from two administrative regions were interviewed to investigate: (1) networks of actors in each co-management case, (2) the functions of these actors in co-management, and (3) fisher perceptions about Chile's co-management arrangement. Results indicate that decision-making is highly centralized and power is concentrated in government, with little horizontal exchange and cooperation among fisher associations. However, the network approach indicates the presence of a rich set of players, some seven sets of actors by function. Grassroots management innovations are hampered by the existing co-management structure, suggesting that the system may benefit from a modification of the policy to allow greater learning-by-doing and flexibility.     

Fisheries co-management as empowerment

Empowerment is both a condition and a goal of fisheries co-management. In this paper I attempt to explain what empowerment means, what it requires, and what can be expected from it. The concept emphasizes psychological as well as sociological factors. It works at an individual and a collective level. For fisheries co-management to become sustainable, empowerment must occur at both levels. Thus, co-management entails more than institutional design and participatory democracy. It also requires capacity enhancement. The good news is that these processes are mutually dependent and reinforcing. They should therefore proceed hand in hand, and it does not matter very much which of them is undertaken first.     

Trust relationships between fishers and government: New challenges for the co-management arrangements in the Dutch flatfish industry

Until the 1990s fisheries were largely managed by the state. Since then, Dutch government and the sector increasingly recognized that a fishing industry cannot be managed effectively without the cooperation and participation of fishers to formulate policy and to implement and enforce laws and regulations. As a result, in the nineties, the existing neo-corporatist arrangement was replaced by a co-management system in the Dutch flatfish fishery. Co-management is often seen as leading to greater procedural legitimacy and subsequently compliance. However, constructing an effective co-management arrangement is not only a matter of building institutions but also a matter of building trust relations between the government and industry. Institutional arrangements such as co-management can contribute to these trust building processes; however, a too strong reliance on institutional arrangements can lead to distrust when new challenges are being faced and institutional arrangements fail to adapt to these changes.     

Co-management from the top? The roles of policy entrepreneurs and distributive conflict in developing co-management arrangements

This research examines attempts to develop co-management arrangements in the Maine lobster and Chesapeake Bay blue crab fisheries. It finds that the attributes of user groups and resources as well as government support are important in facilitating the development of co-management, but are not sufficient. This study highlights that the process of developing institutions for co-management is lengthy and time consuming and that user groups do not necessarily embrace changes to the status quo. I argue that the nature of distributional conflict and the affiliation of policy entrepreneurs account for variation in the development of co-management regimes in these cases.     

User participation and institutional change in fisheries management: a viable alternative to the failures of ‘top-down’ driven control?

This article investigates the role and value of user participation in fisheries management. New empirical data on changes in the institutional structure of fisheries management systems is presented by examining the management structure of two Danish fisheries. The analysis focuses on how user participation functions are institutionalized as co-management between administrators and user groups. General lessons for successful user participation in management are deduced. The paper concludes that co-management is able to overcome some of the fundamental problems related to modern fisheries management and that co-management can work as an active and effective management tool rather than as an impediment to efficient management.     

Fish wars: Conflict and collaboration in fisheries management in Southeast Asia

As a result of declining and overfished small-scale nearshore fisheries in Southeast Asia, there are increasing conflicts and social tensions between and among different user groups, leading to coastal “fish wars”. A challenge facing fishers, resource managers and national decision makers in the region is to identify more appropriate governance and public policy mechanisms to manage conflicts over fishery resources and to resolve them productively in the interests of both long-term sustainability and short-term economic feasibility. A quantitative analysis undertaken in selected coastal communities in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam with and without co-management indicate that co-management does lead to reduced resource conflict levels. The analysis has also shown that when resource conflicts are reduced, food security improves.