All adrift: aviation,shipping, and climate change policy

All sectors face decarbonization for a 2 °C temperature increase to be avoided. Nevertheless, meaningful policy measures that address rising CO₂ from international aviation and shipping remain woefully inadequate. Treated with a similar approach within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), they are often debated as if facing comparable challenges, and even influence each others’ mitigation policies. Yet their strengths and weaknesses have important distinctions. This article sheds light on these differences so that they can be built upon to improve the quality of debate and ensuing policy development. The article quantifies ‘2 °C’ pathways for these sectors, highlighting the need for mitigation measures to be urgently accelerated. It reviews recent developments, drawing attention to one example where a change in aviation mitigation policy had a direct impact on measures to cut CO₂ from shipping. Finally, the article contrasts opportunities and barriers towards mitigation. The article concludes that there is a portfolio of opportunities for short- to medium-term decarbonization for shipping, but its complexity is its greatest barrier to change. In contrast, the more simply structured aviation sector is pinning too much hope on emissions trading to deliver CO₂ cuts in line with 2 °C. Instead, the solution remains controversial and unpopular – avoiding 2 °C requires demand management.

Policy relevance

The governance arrangements around the CO₂ produced by international aviation and shipping are different from other sectors because their emissions are released in international airspace and waters. Instead, through the Kyoto Protocol, the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) were charged with developing policies towards mitigating their emissions. Slow progress to date, coupled with strong connections with rapidly growing economies, has led to the CO₂ from international transport growing at a higher rate than the average rate from all other sectors. This article considers this rapid growth, and the potential for future CO₂ growth in the context of avoiding a 2 °C temperature rise above pre-industrial levels. It explores similarities and differences between these two sectors, highlighting that a reliance on global market-based measures to deliver required CO₂ cuts will likely leave both at odds with the overarching climate goal.     

Potential impact of albedo incorporation in boreal forest sector climate change policy effectiveness

Forests have an important role to play in climate change mitigation through carbon sequestration and wood supply. However, the lower albedo of mature forests compared to bare land implies that focusing only on GHG accounting may lead to biased estimates of forestry's total climatic impacts. An economic model with a high degree of detail of the Norwegian forestry and forest industries is used to simulate GHG fluxes and albedo impacts for the next decades. Albedo is incorporated in a carbon tax/subsidy scheme in the Norwegian forest sector using a partial, spatial equilibrium model. While a price of EU€100/tCO₂e that targets GHG fluxes only results in reduced harvests, the same price including albedo leads to harvest levels that are five times higher in the first five years, with 39% of the national productive forest land base being cleared. The results suggest that policies that only consider GHG fluxes and ignore changes in albedo will not lead to an optimal use of the forest sector for climate change mitigation.

Policy relevance

Bare land reflects a larger share of incoming solar energy than dense forest and thus has higher albedo. Earlier research has suggested that changes in albedo caused by management of boreal forest may be as important as carbon fluxes for the forest's overall global warming impacts. The presented analysis is the first attempt to link albedo to national-scale forest climate policies. A policy with subsidies to forest owners that generate carbon sequestration and taxes levied on carbon emissions leads to a reduced forest harvest. However, including albedo in the policy alongside carbon fluxes yields very different results, causing initial harvest levels to increase substantially. The inclusion of albedo impacts will make harvests more beneficial for climate change mitigation as compared to a carbon-only policy. Hence, it is likely that carbon policies that ignore albedo will not lead to optimal forest management for climate change mitigation.     

Commitments through financial options: an alternative for delivering climate change obligations

Governments willing to commit themselves to maintain carbon prices at or above a certain level face the challenge that their commitments need to be credible both for investors in low-carbon technology and for foreign governments. This article argues that governments can make such commitments by issuing long-term put option contracts on the price of CO₂ allowances. This mechanism gives investors the right, but not the obligation, to sell allowances to the government at the strike price. From the investors' point of view, a government is therefore fully committed to a price floor for allowances in the future. This proposed approach alters the incentives that a government faces when considering noncompliance and serves to prevent non-compliance. The proposal fares well when assessed against criteria to determine its suitability in legitimacy, enforcement, proportionality, lack of interference from other contracting States, and transparency. It also allows for fine-tuning through the number and duration of issued options and the strike price. A robust contract structure is proposed to protect against government interference that might threaten the credibility of commitments.     

Assessing the designs and effectiveness of Japan's emissions trading scheme

After years of discussions and trials, Japan's domestic emissions trading scheme remains purely voluntary. The newly elected Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has taken a firmer stance on climate change, initially intending to establish a nationwide mandatory cap-and-trade as early as 2011. This has promoted several questions regarding the possible designs and feasibility of such a scheme. This article describes the key features of the two trial schemes implemented, thus far, assesses the effectiveness of their implementation and discusses what will be the likely areas of contention should the Japanese government introduce a mandatory cap-and-trade in the future. The analyses indicate that the initial years of ‘Japan's Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme’ (JVETS) implementation have shown positive performance, although its scale has remained limited. The ‘Trial Implementation of an Integrated Domestic Market for Emissions Trading’ emerged as a hybrid scheme, one that incorporated varying interests. Significant institutional developments have taken place in recent years, however the effectiveness of the present trial scheme also seems restricted.     

Slovenia's climate policy efforts: CO2 tax and implementation of EU ETS

Slovenia is required to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to an average of 8% below the base year 1986 in the period 2008–2012, due to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. It was the first of the transition countries to implement a CO₂ tax in 1997. At the beginning of 2005, Slovenia joined other EU Member States by implementing the Emissions Trading Scheme. In contrast with other new EU Member States, Slovenia will be a net buyer of allowances. Therefore future movements on the emissions market will play an important role in the compliance costs of achieving the Kyoto target. The main purpose of this article is to present the establishment and characteristics of the first national allocation plan (NAP1) and to describe the main elements of the second national allocation plan (NAP2) for Slovenia within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the expected movements on the emissions allowances market in Slovenia, the expected compliance cost of achieving the Kyoto target and to present the main characteristics and efficiency of the CO₂ tax in Slovenia.     

The threat to climate change mitigation posed by the abundance of fossil fuels

This article analyses the trends in primary demand for fossil fuels and renewables, comparing regions with large and small domestic fossil fuel reserves. We focus on countries that hold 80% of global fossil fuel reserves and compare them with key countries that have meagre fossil fuel reserves. We show that those countries with large domestic fossil fuel reserves have experienced a large increase in primary energy demand from fossil fuels, but only a moderate or no increase in primary energy from renewables, and in particular from non-hydro renewable energy sources (NHRES), which are assumed to represent the cornerstone of the future transformation of the global energy system. This implies a tremendous threat to climate change mitigation, with only two principal mitigation options for fossil-fuel-rich economies if there is to be compliance with the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement: (1) leave the fossil fuels in the ground; and (2) apply carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. Combinations of these two options to exploit their respective possibilities synergistically will require strong initiatives and incentives to transform a certain amount of the domestic fossil fuel reserves (including the associated infrastructure) into stranded assets and to create an extensive CCS infrastructure. Our conclusion is that immediate and disruptive changes to the use of fossil fuels and investments in non-carbon-emitting technologies are required if global warming is to be limited to well below 2°C. Collective actions along value chains in business to divert from fossil fuels may be a feasible strategy.

Key policy insights

• The main obstacle to compliance with any reasonable warming target is the abundance of fossil fuels, which has maintained and increased momentum towards new fossil-fuelled processes.

• So far, there has been no increase in the share of NHRES in total global primary energy demand, with a clear decline in the NHRES share in India and China.

• There is an immediate need for the global community to develop fossil fuel strategies and policies.

• Policies must account for the global trade flow of products that typically occurs from the newly industrialized fossil fuel-rich countries to the developed countries.

     

Alternative climate policy pathways in the US

Although it is likely that the political–economic coalition required for implementing a federal cap-and-trade programme for GHGs in the US is now sufficiently strong, the structural impediments that have prevented its legislative passage remain impressively durable and can be expected to continue to lay waste to congressional proposals for the foreseeable future. Indeed, given the complex history of environmental policy gridlock in Washington since the early 1980s, any expectations that a cap-and-trade programme could have been realistically achieved through the traditional legislative passage in Congress are fundamentally misplaced. Building on previous research, it is argued that – as with most other forms of environmental policy in the US over the past three decades – a national carbon market is more plausible given alternative policy pathways, which if taken are capable of circumventing the Federal Congress altogether. In particular, the interaction between litigation against the federal government and the ‘rulemaking’ authority possessed by the Executive Branch provides the potential space for the current administration to unilaterally establish a model rule for a national carbon-trading programme.

Policy relevance

This article aims to contribute to American climate policy debates by re-thinking the policy mechanisms most capable of establishing a national carbon market in the US. By taking into account the array of structural factors that have prevented the legislative passage of such a programme in federal Congress, a range of alternative policy ‘pathways’ is considered that have historically allowed progressive environmental policies to endure in Washington (despite increased Congressional gridlock over the past few decades). Two specific alternative strategies and the relationship between them are assessed: the use of litigation to impose legal obligations on federal agencies to regulate effluents, and the use of executive authority to define the nature and scope of environmental regulation. The administration's current potential to unilaterally develop a model-rule for a cap-and-trade programme under the Clean Air Act is emphasized, and the political implications of such a strategy are considered.     

The impact of the Tokyo Metropolitan Emissions Trading Scheme on reducing greenhouse gas emissions: findings from a facility-based study

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the Tokyo Metropolitan Emissions Trading Scheme (Tokyo ETS), Japan’s first emissions trading scheme with mandatory cap initiated by the government of Tokyo. Unlike trading schemes in other countries, the Tokyo ETS covers indirect emissions from the commercial sector. It is well known that a variety of market barriers impede full realization of energy efficiency opportunities, especially in the commercial sector. Experiences with the Tokyo ETS should therefore provide important lessons for the design of climate change mitigation policies, especially when targeting the commercial sector. The emissions from covered entities have been drastically reduced from those at the scheme’s outset, with an average 14% reduction as of the end of the first commitment period of five years (2010–2014) compared with 2009 levels. This paper shows that the Tokyo ETS alone did not cause these reductions; there were other drivers. Among them, the energy savings triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 were crucial. The contribution of credit trading, in contrast, was limited since most of the covered entities reduced emissions by themselves. Through an investigation of official reports, an assessment of the emissions data from the covered entities compared to those of uncovered entities and in-depth interviews with firms covered by the scheme, this paper confirms that the main drivers of emissions reductions by covered entities were separate from the ETS. In fact, the advisory aspect of the scheme seems to be much more important in encouraging energy-saving actions.

Key policy insights

• Most of the observed emission reductions were not caused by the Tokyo ETS alone.

• An advisory instrument was crucial to the effectiveness of the Tokyo ETS.

• The experience of the Tokyo ETS suggests that making full use of the advantages of emissions trading is difficult in the case of the commercial sector.

• Price signals have not provided a stimulus to climate change mitigation actions, which implies that establishing a cap to yield effective carbon prices poses a challenge.

     

Managing carbon-intensive materials in a decarbonizing world without a global price on carbon

Emissions from the production of iron and steel could constitute a significant share of a 2°C global emissions budget (around 19% under the IEA 2DS scenario). They need to be reduced, and this could be difficult under nationally based climate policy approaches. We compare a new set of nationally based modelling (the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project) with best practice and technical limit benchmarks for iron and steel and cement emissions. We find that 2050 emissions from iron and steel and cement production represent an average 0.28?tCO₂ per capita in nationally based modelling results, very close to the technical limit benchmark of 0.21?tCO₂ per capita, and over 2.5 times lower than the best practice benchmark of 0.72?tCO₂ per capita. This suggests that national projections may be overly optimistic about achievable emissions reductions in the absence of global carbon pricing and an international research and development effort to develop low emissions technologies for emissions-intensive products. We also find that equal per capita emissions targets, often the basis of proposals for how global emissions budgets should be allocated, would be inadequate without global emissions trading. These results show that a nationally based global climate policy framework, as has been confirmed in the Paris Agreement, could lead to risks of overshooting global emissions targets for some countries and carbon leakage. Tailored approaches such as border taxes, sectoral emissions trading or carbon taxes, and consumption-based carbon pricing can help, but each faces difficulties. Ultimately, global efforts are needed to improve technology and material efficiency in emissions-intensive commodities manufacturing and use. Those efforts could be supported by technology standards and a globally coordinated R&D effort, and strengthened by the adoption of global emissions budgets for emissions-intensive traded goods.

Policy relevance

This article presents new empirical findings on global iron and steel and cement production in a low-carbon world economy, demonstrates the risks associated with a nationally based global climate policy framework as has been confirmed in the Paris Agreement, and analyses policy options to deal with those risks.     

Carbon taxes,cap-and-trade administration,and US legislation

An upstream cap-and-trade system that rations allowances for the carbon content of fuel inputs could achieve wider coverage than existing CO₂ emission programmes or most of those proposed in draft US legislation, but would risk shortages and price spikes. Allowance price volatility could be avoided with a CO₂-price corridor established through auctions, similar in some respects to how central banks manage short-term interest rates with open market operations. Building on the central bank analogy, a Greenhouse Gas Board could be established with the ‘instrument independence’ to set annual CO₂-price corridors in line with broadly-framed, long-term climate goals laid out in legislation. National and regional Boards of this nature might also help facilitate the international coordination of climate policies.     

The (ir)relevance of transaction costs in climate policy instrument choice: an analysis of the EU and the US

This article assesses the relevance of ex post transaction costs in the choice of climate policy instruments in the EU (focusing mainly on the example of Germany) and the US. It reviews all publicly available empirical ex post transaction cost studies of climate policy instruments broken down by the main private and public sector cost factors and offers hypotheses on how these factors may scale depending on instrument design and other contextual factors. The key finding from the evaluated schemes is that it is possible to reject the hypothesis that asymmetries in ex post transaction costs across instruments are large and, thus, play a pivotal role in climate policy instrument choice. Both total and relative ex post transaction costs can be considered low. This conjecture differs from the experience in other areas of environmental policy instruments where high total transaction costs are considered to be important factors in the overall assessment of optimal environmental policy choice. Against this background, the main claim of this article is that in climate policy instrument choice, ex post transaction cost considerations play a minor role in large countries that feature similar institutional characteristics as the EU and the US. Rather, the focus should be on the efficiency properties of instruments for incentivizing abatement, as well as equity and political economy considerations (and other societally relevant objectives). In order to inform transaction cost considerations in climate policy instrument choice in countries that adopt new climate policies, more data would be desirable in order to enable more robust estimates of design- and context-specific transaction-cost scaling factors.

Policy relevance

The findings of this study can help inform policy makers who plan to set up novel climate policy instruments. The results indicate that ex post transaction costs play a minor role for large countries that feature similar institutional characteristics as the EU and the US. For instrument design the focus should rather be on efficiency properties of instruments in incentivizing abatement, as well as equity and political economy considerations (and other societally relevant objectives).     

The impact of compensatory measures on public support for carbon taxation: an experimental study in Sweden

This study aims at better understanding how, and to what extent, perceptions of a policy instrument’s distributional effects impact on policy support, focusing on the case of CO₂ taxes on petrol in Sweden. Through a large-scale (N?=?5000) randomized survey experiment with a 2?×?3 factorial design, the extent to which perceptions of fairness determine attitudes to a suggested increase of the Swedish CO₂ tax is explored. Furthermore, the study considers whether these effects change with the level of the suggested tax increase, as well as whether negative sentiments can be alleviated by combining it with a compensatory measure in the shape of a simultaneous income tax cut financed by the revenues from the tax increase. The results show that a higher tax increase is both viewed as more unfair and enjoys weaker support. Furthermore, compensatory measures can be a powerful policy design tool to increase perceptions of the policy as fair, but the effect of compensation on policy support is conditioned by the individual’s left–right ideological position. Whereas people self-identifying to the right react favourably to compensatory measures, people self-identifying to the left become less supportive of a tax increase when combined with a simultaneous cut in income taxes.

Key policy insights

• Perceptions of fairness are highly important for explaining public support for climate policy tools, specifically CO₂ taxes.

• Compensatory measures can be a powerful policy design tool to increase perceptions of the policy as less unfair.

• However, the effect of compensatory measures on policy support is conditioned by ideological position, and only successful among people to the ideological right.

• In contexts dominated by right-wing ideals, a combination of a tax and a compensatory scheme may be a successful route forward towards increased climate policy support.

• In left-oriented contexts the results imply that a CO₂ tax without compensation seems more likely to increase support.

     

How to reach an elusive INDC target: macro-economic implications of carbon taxation and emissions trading in Turkey

This paper employs a computable general equilibrium model (CGE) to analyse how a carbon tax and/or a national Emissions Trading System (ETS) would affect macroeconomic parameters in Turkey. The modelling work is based on three main policy options for the government by 2030, in the context of Turkey’s mitigation target under its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), that is, reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by up to 21% from its Business as Usual (BAU) scenario in 2030: (i) improving the productivity of renewable energy by 1% per annum, a target already included in the INDC, (ii) introducing a new flat rate tax of 15% per ton of CO₂ (of a reference carbon price in world markets) imposed on emissions originating from carbon-intensive sectors, and (iii) introducing a new ETS with caps on emission permits. Our base path scenario projects that GHG emissions in 2030 will be much lower than Turkey’s BAU trajectory of growth from 430 Mt CO₂-eq in 2013 to 1.175 Mt CO₂-eq by 2030, implying that the government’s commitment is largely redundant. On the other hand, if the official target is assumed to be only a simple reduction percentage in 2030 (by 21%), but based on our more realistic base path, the government’s current renewable energy plans will not be sufficient to reach it.

• Turkey’s official INDC is based on over-optimistic assumptions of GDP growth and a highly carbon-intensive development pathway;

• A carbon tax and/or an ETS would be required to reach the 21% reduction target over a realistic base path scenario for 2030;

• The policy options considered in this paper have some effects on major sectors’ shares in total value-added. Yet the reduction in the shares of agriculture, industry, and transportation does not go beyond 1%, while the service sector seems to benefit from most of the policy options;

• Overall employment would be affected positively by the renewable energy target, carbon tax, and ETS through the creation of new jobs;

• Unemployment rates are lower, economic growth is stronger, and households become better off to a larger extent under an ETS than carbon taxation.

     

Challenges to the development of carbon markets in China

China has introduced several pilot emission trading schemes to build the basis for a national scheme. The potential scale of this initiative raises prospects for a regional carbon trading network as a way to further engage other major Asian economies. However, the Chinese carbon markets rest upon a unique political-economic context and institutional environment that are likely to limit their development and viability. This article offers an overview of such structural economic and political constraints. Four main challenges are identified, namely, inadequate domestic demand, limited financial involvement, incomplete regulatory infrastructure, and excessive government intervention. The first two challenges concern economic dimensions and may be partially addressed by the incentives created by the newly introduced emission trading schemes. The other two are more deeply entrenched in the dominant political system and governing practice. They require fundamental changes to the ways in which the state and the market interact. The success of China's carbon market reform depends crucially on the ability of the ongoing efforts to transform the distorted state–market relationship.

Policy relevance

The burgeoning carbon markets offer opportunities for emissions mitigation at lower costs and enable circulation of a new form of capital, i.e. carbon credits, across borders. China accounts for a gigantic share of global GHG emissions and has the potential to significantly scale up these opportunities. There are clear implications for market developers and participants worldwide, including climate policy makers who attempt to link their emission trading schemes to other schemes, firms who seek to take advantage of the inexpensive carbon offsets generated in developing countries, international financial institutions who endeavour to establish their business in an emerging major carbon market, etc. This article can inform their decisions by identifying key issues that may undermine their ability to achieve these goals. Policy makers and stakeholders will benefit from this analysis, which shows how the Chinese carbon markets operate in ways that may be different from their experience elsewhere.     

Magnitude,distribution and causes of terrestrial carbon sinks and some implications for policy

Abstract

Recent analyses continue to modify our understanding of terrestrial carbon sinks. The sinks are large and variable enough to account for much of the variability in the growth rate of atmospheric CO₂. They are distributed throughout both northern mid-latitudes and the tropics. Identification of the factors influencing an observed sink is extremely difficult; methods for attribution are reviewed. Although various ecological mechanisms (e.g. CO₂ fertilization, nitrogen deposition, climatic variability) have been shown experimentally to have short-term effects on physiological processes controlling the amount of carbon in terrestrial ecosystems, it is unclear which of these mechanisms has been most important in the past 10–100 years and which will be most important in the future. The decades-long supposition that CO₂ fertilization has been a major driver of terrestrial carbon uptake is being challenged. A major portion of the sink in the northern mid-latitudes (although probably not in the tropics) is a result of recovery from past changes in land use and management. To the extent that these direct human actions explain most of the current (and future) sink, attribution and thus accounting become more tractable, but the continued functioning of the sink is limited and largely dependent on deliberate actions (e.g. afforestation, sustainable forest management and preservation).     

Cumulative CO2 emissions: shifting international responsibilities for climate debt

In contrast to many discussions based on annual emissions, this article presents calculations and projections of cumulative contributions to the stock of atmospheric CO₂ by the major players, China, Europe, India, Japan and the USA, for the period 1900–2080. Although relative contributions to the climate problem are changing dramatically, notably due to the rapid industrialization of China, long-term responsibilities for enhanced global warming have not been transparently quantified in the literature. The analysis shows that if current trends continue, by the middle of this century China will overtake the USA as the major cumulative contributor to atmospheric concentrations of CO₂. This has enormous implications for the debate on the ethical responsibilities of the major greenhouse gas emitters. Effective climate policy will require both the recognition of shared responsibility and an unprecedented degree of cooperation.     

Post-Kyoto energy strategy of the Russian Federation,outlooks and prerequisites of the Kyoto mechanisms implementation in the country

Abstract

Energy sector emissions from Russia have declined by about 33% from 1990 levels. We estimate that some 60–70% of the reduction is due to economic decline, and about 8–12% of it is due to reforms in the energy sector; the remainder being due to the wider use of natural gas and structural changes in the economy. Vigorous institutional and technological measures to promote energy efficiency could lead to savings of over 100 million t.c.e. per year by 2010, and keep CO₂ emissions fairly close to current levels over the decade. In our view, international emissions trading should not lead to global emissions growth, but should facilitate the best energy saving and efficiency. Consequently, we propose that the available assigned amount should be divided into two components. That part arising from ‘type 1’ reductions, produced by special projects and measures relating to GHG reduction taken since 1990, should be freely traded; whereas the remaining ‘type 2’ surplus, without a clear link to real emission reduction activity, should only be traded if the revenues are recycled into special projects resulting in emissions reduction equal to or more than the amount of emissions sold.     

The effectiveness of communicative tools in addressing barriers to municipal climate change adaptation: lessons from the Netherlands

Little research has been done on the effectiveness of communicative tools for climate change adaptation. Filling this knowledge gap is relevant, as many national governments rely on communicative tools to raise the awareness and understanding of climate impacts, and to stimulate adaptation action by local governments. To address this knowledge gap, this study focuses on the effectiveness of communicative tools in addressing key municipal barriers to climate change adaptation, by conducting a large N-size empirical study in the Netherlands. This study explores the effectiveness of these tools in theory, by checking whether their goals match the perceived barriers to municipal climate change adaptation, and the effectiveness in practice by analysing whether they are used and perceived as useful. Document analyses have clarified the assumptions underlying the tools. By conducting semi-structured interviews with 84 municipalities the key barriers to climate change adaptation and the use and usefulness of the tools in practice were analysed. The research revealed that the key barriers experienced by municipalities are a lack of urgency, a lack of knowledge of risks and measures, and limited capacity, the first being the primary one. Communicative tools, while being effective in theory, are not sufficiently effective in practice in addressing the key barriers. Municipalities that are not experiencing a sense of urgency to take on adaptation planning are not likely to be activated by the tools. Advanced municipalities need more sophisticated tools. This article concludes with some suggestions to improve the effectiveness of communicative tools.

Key policy insights

• Although effective in theory in addressing key barriers to municipal adaptation planning, the effectiveness in practice of communicative tools is limited.

• To increase their effectiveness in practice, municipalities’ awareness of the existence of the communicative tools needs to be raised.

• Advanced municipalities need more sophisticated tools that are context-specific and address a wide range of climate risks.

• The effectiveness of communicative tools can be improved by embedding them in a wider mix of policy instruments.

     

Production of N2O,CH4, and CO2 from soils in the tropical savanna during the dry season

Emissions of N₂O, CH₄, and CO₂ from soils at two sites in the tropical savanna of central Venezuela were determined during the dry season in February 1987. Measured arithmetic mean fluxes of N₂O, CH₄, and CO₂ from undisturbed soil plots to the atmosphere were 2.5×10⁹, 4.3×10¹⁰, and 3.0×10¹³ molecules cm^-2 s^-1, respectively. These fluxes were not significantly affected by burning the grass layer. Emissions of N₂O increased fourfold after simulated rainfall, suggesting that production of N₂O in savanna soils during the rainy season may be an important source for atmospheric N₂O. The CH₄ flux measurements indicate that these savanna soils were not a sink, but a small source, for atmospheric methane. Fluxes of CO₂ from savanna soils increased ninefold two hours after simulated rainfall, and remained three times higher than normal after 16 hours. More research is needed to clarify the significance of savannas in the global cycles of N₂O, CH₄, CO₂, and other trace gases, especially during the rainy season.     

Designing policy for deployment of CCS in industry

Attaining deep greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions in industry in order to support a stringent climate change control target will be difficult without recourse to CO₂ capture and storage (CCS). Using the insights from a long-term bottom-up energy systems model, and undertaking a sectoral assessment, we investigated the importance of CCS in the industrial sector. Under climate policy aimed at limiting atmospheric concentration of GHGs to 650 ppm CO₂e, costs could increase fivefold when CCS is excluded from the portfolio of mitigation option measures in the industry sector as compared to when CCS is excluded in the power sector. This effect is driven largely by the lack of alternatives for deep emission reductions in industry. Our main policy conclusion is that a broader recognition of CCS in industrial applications in both current policy discussions and research, development, and demonstration funding programmes is justified. In recognition of the heterogeneity of the many types of industrial production processes, the size and location of industrial CO₂ sources, the specific need for CCS-retrofitting, and the exposure of most industrial sectors to international trade, policies aimed at supporting CCS must distinguish between the different challenges faced by the power and industrial sectors.