The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump

On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced that the US intends to leave the Paris Agreement if no alternative terms acceptable to his administration can be agreed upon. In this article, an agent-based model of bottom-up climate mitigation clubs is used to derive the impact that lack of US participation may have on the membership of such clubs and their emissions coverage. We systematically analyse the prospects for climate mitigation clubs, depending on which of three conceivable roles the US takes on: as a leader (for benchmarking), as a follower (i.e. willing to join climate mitigation clubs initiated by others if this is in its best interest) or as an outsider (i.e. staying outside of any climate mitigation club no matter what). We investigate these prospects for three types of incentives for becoming a member: club goods, conditional commitments and side-payments. Our results show that lack of US leadership significantly constrains climate clubs’ potential. Lack of US willingness to follow others’ lead is an additional, but smaller constraint. Only in a few cases will US withdrawal entail widespread departures by other countries. We conclude that climate mitigation clubs can function without the participation of an important GHG emitter, given that other major emitters show leadership, although these clubs will rarely cover more than 50% of global emissions.

Key policy insights

• The US switching from being a leader to being a follower substantially reduces the emissions coverage of climate mitigation clubs.

• The US switching from being a follower to being an outsider sometimes reduces coverage further, but has a smaller impact than the switch from leader to follower.

• The switch from follower to outsider only occasionally results in widespread departures by other countries; in a few instances it even entices others to join.

• Climate mitigation clubs can function even without the participation of the US, provided that other major emitters show leadership; however, such clubs will typically be unable to cover more than 50% of global emissions.

• Climate mitigation clubs may complement the Paris Agreement and can also serve as an alternative in case Paris fails.

     

Social safety nets and US climate policy costs

The debate surrounding US climate policy has been strongly influenced by concerns about the impact that placing a price on GHG emissions could have on potentially vulnerable populations, including senior citizens. This article shows that seniors would be one of the best protected groups under the climate policies recently debated in the US Congress. Moreover, low-income groups would also be protected generally under these proposals. This is due to a combination of existing government transfer programmes that automatically adjust benefit payments to account for inflation and provisions in the proposals.     

Alternative climate policy pathways in the US

Although it is likely that the political–economic coalition required for implementing a federal cap-and-trade programme for GHGs in the US is now sufficiently strong, the structural impediments that have prevented its legislative passage remain impressively durable and can be expected to continue to lay waste to congressional proposals for the foreseeable future. Indeed, given the complex history of environmental policy gridlock in Washington since the early 1980s, any expectations that a cap-and-trade programme could have been realistically achieved through the traditional legislative passage in Congress are fundamentally misplaced. Building on previous research, it is argued that – as with most other forms of environmental policy in the US over the past three decades – a national carbon market is more plausible given alternative policy pathways, which if taken are capable of circumventing the Federal Congress altogether. In particular, the interaction between litigation against the federal government and the ‘rulemaking’ authority possessed by the Executive Branch provides the potential space for the current administration to unilaterally establish a model rule for a national carbon-trading programme.

Policy relevance

This article aims to contribute to American climate policy debates by re-thinking the policy mechanisms most capable of establishing a national carbon market in the US. By taking into account the array of structural factors that have prevented the legislative passage of such a programme in federal Congress, a range of alternative policy ‘pathways’ is considered that have historically allowed progressive environmental policies to endure in Washington (despite increased Congressional gridlock over the past few decades). Two specific alternative strategies and the relationship between them are assessed: the use of litigation to impose legal obligations on federal agencies to regulate effluents, and the use of executive authority to define the nature and scope of environmental regulation. The administration's current potential to unilaterally develop a model-rule for a cap-and-trade programme under the Clean Air Act is emphasized, and the political implications of such a strategy are considered.     

The crucial role of policy surveillance in international climate policy

An extensive literature shows that information-creating mechanisms enhance the transparency of and can support participation and compliance in international agreements. This paper draws from game theory, international relations, and legal scholarship to make the case for how transparency through policy surveillance can facilitate more effective international climate change policy architecture. I draw lessons from policy surveillance in multilateral economic, environmental, and national security contexts to inform a critical evaluation of the historic practice of monitoring and reporting under the global climate regime. This assessment focuses on how surveillance produces evidence to inform policy design, enables comparisons of mitigation effort, and illustrates the adequacy of the global effort in climate agreements. I also describe how the institution of policy surveillance can facilitate a variety of climate policy architectures. This evaluation of policy surveillance suggests that transparency is necessary for global climate policy architecture.     

Building a regime for climate protection: Finland and international climate policy

The effective management of climate change on a national as well as an international level requires close co-operation between the scientific community and the political sector. Climate change first became a major subject of scientific inquiry in the early 1980s, and real political interest in the issue was awakened towards the end of that decade. In the last few years, the dialogue between the scientific community and the political sector has increased considerably. As a result, climate change is today one of the most significant areas in environmental research and international environmental policy alike.This paper examines the emergence and consolidation of international climate change regime. The theory of regime building is used as discussed by Young (1989). International Cooperation. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. The paper begins with an outline of the historical emergence of climate research and climate policy. This is followed by a discussion of the history and development of the Rio Convention, with a look at the latest developments in international climate politics. The next section begins with an examination of the foundations and present strategies of Finnish climate policy, which is used as a case study, and the paper concludes with an assessment of the current state of Finnish climate policy, illustrating the problems of compliance individual countries face when adopting the norms and principles of the regime.     

Long-term climate policy: international legal aspects of sector-based approaches

Abstract

The aim of this article is to discuss the international legal implications of a sector-based approach to long-term climate policy. Sector-based approaches have emerged as a possible way of engaging all the major emitters of greenhouse gases into the system. The article divides sectoral approaches into two main categories based on their legal relevance. Substantive sectoral models focus on ways of defining emission levels for global industry sectors. From the point of view of international law, substantive sectoral models could be integrated into the existing climate change regime if the Parties so agree. Procedural sectoral models focus on actors. Some procedural sectoral models envisage treaty regimes involving non-State actors, such as organizations representing global industry sectors undertaking to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. The main focus of the article is on these models.     

Difficulties in accounting for private finance in international climate policy

It is widely acknowledged that private finance has a key role to play in achieving low-carbon development and resilience to climate change. However, while there have been several studies that have closely examined the data on public climate finance, there have been few such studies of the private climate-related finance data. There is a political dimension to accounting for ‘private finance’ given the commitment of industrialized countries – enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements – to mobilize US$100 billion of public and private finance for developing countries by 2020, on an annual basis. The availability and quality of data for different types of private climate finance flows with climate benefits (investments, carbon market payments, and voluntary funding) are analysed, and these flows are assessed according to various criteria for inclusion in the $100 billion figure. While existing data suggest that private climate finance invested in developing countries and mobilized by industrialized countries might currently be in the range of $27–123 billion per year, this number is a questionable point of reference. Existing data are limited and of very poor quality: definitions of ‘private climate finance’ are missing and data are hardly verified. Therefore, policy makers will first have to clearly define ‘private climate finance’ and develop systems for measuring, reporting, and verifying it, before using private finance numbers in international climate agreements.     

Analysis of climate policy targets under uncertainty

Although policymaking in response to the climate change threat is essentially a challenge of risk management, most studies of the relation of emissions targets to desired climate outcomes are either deterministic or subject to a limited representation of the underlying uncertainties. Monte Carlo simulation, applied to the MIT Integrated Global System Model (an integrated economic and earth system model of intermediate complexity), is used to analyze the uncertain outcomes that flow from a set of century-scale emissions paths developed originally for a study by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program. The resulting uncertainty in temperature change and other impacts under these targets is used to illustrate three insights not obtainable from deterministic analyses: that the reduction of extreme temperature changes under emissions constraints is greater than the reduction in the median reduction; that the incremental gain from tighter constraints is not linear and depends on the target to be avoided; and that comparing median results across models can greatly understate the uncertainty in any single model.     

Integrating national forestry initiatives in India with international climate change policy

Policy initiatives in India, such as the Social Forestry Program and later the Joint Forest Management, were introduced for their co-benefits, including forest protection, employment opportunities, and added income for communities living in and around the forests. The evolution of these forest policies is critically reviewed. It is argued that India is perfectly positioned to benefit from climate change mitigation efforts, due to a rich, albeit chequered, history in forest management. National forestry policies are examined to assess how they can complement international climate change mitigation instruments, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the more recent Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD or REDD+ with conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks) and aid national sustainable development objectives. There is a need to heed the experiences from India's evolving forest policies, particularly those concerning land tenure and resource rights, which lack specificity within international mechanisms. The active engagement of rural communities must be integral to any programmes that make any claim to development and to environmental integrity as a whole.

Policy relevance

India's forestry programmes are examined for their effectiveness in informing international initiatives such as the CDM and REDD+. Forestry policies in India can evolve to complement international climate mitigation tools. By examining current and historical forest legislation, and their subsequent impacts, it is shown how communities can sustain their system of forest management and retain/obtain rights to land and resources under the CDM and REDD+. Looking for such synergies within existing national policies to implement newer international initiatives can greatly facilitate and increase the momentum of global environmental change.     

适应气候变化政策机制的国际经验与启示

中国高度重视适应气候变化工作,实行减缓与适应并重的应对气候变化原则,已出台适应气候变化相关的战略、规划等一系列政策文件。但总体来看,中国适应气候变化政策与行动尚处于起步阶段,面临着法规制度缺位、监测评估不足、组织协调机制不完善等挑战,适应气候变化政策的类型、数量和力度都明显弱于减缓。为完善中国适应气候变化政策与机制的框架设计,文中梳理了相关研究、《联合国气候变化框架公约》下的适应气候变化国际机制及主要国家经验,提出了一套完整闭环的适应气候变化核心决策流程及关键支撑机制,并重点从开展法制建设、制定适应战略（计划）、建立监测评估机制、构建协调机制和完善资金机制等五方面,归纳了主要国家的经验与启示,最终研究提出完善我国适应气候变化政策与机制框架设计的建议,包括加快建立和完善适应气候变化法制建设、加快构建国家适应气候变化的政策体系、加快完善国家适应气候变化的机制设计、加强适应气候变化支撑能力建设、推动适应气候变化的国际合作等。     

Citizens' perceptions of justice in international climate policy: an empirical analysis

Relying on a recent survey of more than 3400 participants from China, Germany, and the US, this article empirically analyses citizens' perceptions of key guiding principles for sharing mitigation costs across countries, justification of climate policy and trust in climate policy. Our findings suggest that the ranking of the main principles for burden-sharing is identical in China, Germany, and the US: accountability followed by capability, egalitarianism, and sovereignty. Thus, on a general level, citizens across these countries seem to have a common (normative) understanding of fairness. We therefore find no evidence that citizens' (stated) fairness preferences are detrimental to future burden-sharing agreements. In all three countries a majority of citizens considers international climate policy to be justified, but citizens' perceptions differ across specific items and countries. Finally, a substantial portion of citizens in all countries exhibit a lack of trust in international climate agreements.

Policy relevance

Disagreement over the distribution of mitigation costs across countries is blocking current negotiations about a new international climate change agreement to be adopted in 2015. At the heart of this disagreement are different perceptions of distributive justice among those involved in climate policy making. Our findings show that there is no difference in the ranking of fairness principles across citizens in China, Germany, and the US, suggesting that the common ground for crafting a future agreement is larger than expected. In particular, the accountability principle should weigh heavily when deciding on the burden-sharing. In addition, our findings suggest that in order to gain support among citizens, international climate policy may need to take measures to improve trust.     

The global impacts of US climate policy: a model simulation using GCAM-TU and MAGICC

To assess the potential impacts of the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, this study applied GCAM-TU (an updated version of the Global Change Assessment Model) to simulate global and regional emission pathways of energy-related CO₂, which show that US emissions in 2100 would reduce to ?2.4?Gt, ?0.7?Gt and ?0.2?Gt under scenarios of RCP2.6, RCP3.7 and RCP4.5, respectively. Two unfavourable policy scenarios were designed, assuming a temporary delay and a complete stop for US mitigation actions after 2015. Simulations by the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC) indicate that the temperature increase by 2100 would rise by 0.081°C–0.161°C compared to the three original RCPs (Representative Concentration Pathways) if US emissions were kept at their 2015 levels until 2100. The probability of staying below 2°C would decrease by 6–9% even if the US resumes mitigation efforts for achieving its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) target after 2025. It is estimated by GCAM-TU that, without US participation, increased reduction efforts are required for the rest of the world, including developing countries, in order to achieve the 2°C goal, resulting in 18% higher global cumulative mitigation costs from 2015 to 2100.

Key policy insights

• President Trump’s climate policies, including planned withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, cast a shadow on international climate actions, and would lower the likelihood of achieving the 2°C target.

• To meet the 2°C target without the US means increased reduction efforts and mitigation costs for the rest of the world, and considerable economic burdens for major developing areas.

• Active state-, city- and enterprise-level powers should be supported to keep the emission reduction gap from further widening even with reduced mitigation efforts from the US federal government.

     

Profitability of fossil-fuel production under different instruments in international climate policies

This article discusses how different climate policy instruments such as CO₂ taxes and renewable energy subsidies affect the profitability of fossil-fuel production, given that a fixed global climate target shall be achieved in the long term. Within an intertemporal framework, the model analyses show that CO₂ taxes reduce the short-term profitability to a greater extent than technology subsidies, since the competition from CO₂-free energy sources does not become particularly noticeable until decades later. Due to, for example, the discounting of future revenues, most fossil-fuel producers prefer subsidies to their competitors rather than CO₂ taxes. However, this conclusion does not apply to all producers. Oil producers outside OPEC lose the most on the subsidizing of CO₂-free energy, while CO₂ taxes only slightly reduce their profits. This is connected to OPEC's role in the oil market, as the cartel chooses to reduce its extraction significantly in the tax scenario. The results seem to be consistent with the observed behaviour of important players in the climate negotiations.     

Rethinking US climate advocacy

The US climate movement has failed to create the political support needed to pass significant climate policy. It is time to reassess climate advocacy. To develop a strategy for philanthropy to strengthen climate engagement, I interviewed over 40 climate advocates,more than a dozen representatives from the foundation community, and a dozen academics. My assessment led me to conclude that climate advocates have focused too narrowly on specific policy goals and insufficiently on influencing the larger political landscape. I suggest four ways to improve climate advocacy: 1) Increase focus on medium and longer-term goals; 2) Start with people and not carbon; 3) Focus more on values and less on science; and 4) Evaluate what works and share what we learn. To accomplish these strategies, social scientists and advocates must work together to build a culture of learning. Meanwhile, philanthropy must empower experimentation and incentivize knowledge sharing.     

The ocean and climate change policy

The ocean plays a major role in regulating Earth's climate system, and is highly vulnerable to climate change, but continues to receive little attention in the ongoing policymaking designed to mitigate and adapt to global climate change. There are numerous ways to consider the ocean more significantly when developing these policies, several of which offer the co-benefits of biodiversity protection and support of marine-dependent human communities. When developing forward-thinking climate change policy, it is important to understand the ways that the ocean contributes to global climate and to fully inventory the services that the ocean provides to humans. Without more inclusive consideration of the ocean in climate policy, at all levels of governance, policy makers risk weaker than necessary mitigation and adaptation strategies.     

Clashing strategic cultures and climate policy

Abstract

Kagan (2002) argues that the different responses of Europeans and Americans to major strategic and international challenges is not simply due to differences in the current administrations, but rather results from (i) a power gap and (ii) differing ideologies. This article applies Kagan's theory to climate policy, employing terrorism policy as a point of comparison. We argue that the power gap between Europe and America is unable to explain the differences in climate policy. In contrast, the ideology gap may indeed have some explanatory value. Furthermore, we argue that one additional feature is critical—the costs and benefits imposed by climate change and terrorism prevention, and the process by which such costs and benefits are evaluated, differ between America and Europe.