Is India pulling its weight? India’s nationally determined contribution and future energy plans in global climate policy

Ahead of the Conference of Parties (COP) 24 where countries will first take stock of climate action post Paris, this paper assesses India’s progress on its nationally determined contribution (NDC) targets and future energy plans. We find that, although India is well on track to meet its NDC pledges, these targets were extremely modest given previous context. Furthermore, there is considerable uncertainty around India’s energy policy post 2030 and if current plans for energy futures materialise, the Paris Agreement’s 2 degrees goal will be almost certainly unachievable. India’s role in international climate politics has shifted from obstructionism to leadership particularly following the announcement of withdrawal by the United States from the Paris Agreement, but analysis reveals that India’s ‘hard’ actions on the domestic front are inconsistent with its ‘soft’ actions in the international climate policy arena. Going forward, India is likely to face increasing calls for stronger mitigation action and we suggest that this gap can be bridged by strengthening the links between India’s foreign policy ambitions, international climate commitments, and domestic energy realities.

Key policy insights

• India’s NDC pledges on carbon intensity and share of non-fossil fuel capacity are relatively modest given domestic context and offer plenty of room to increase ambition of action.

• India’s ‘soft’ leadership in global climate policy can be matched by ‘hard’ commitments by bringing NDC pledges in line with domestic policy realities.

• There is significant uncertainty around future plans for coal power in India which have the potential to exceed the remaining global carbon budget for 2 degrees.

     

Meeting the EU 2°C climate target: global and regional emission implications

Abstract

This article presents a set of multi-gas emission pathways for different CO₂-equivalent concentration stabilization levels, i.e. 400, 450, 500 and 550 ppm CO₂-equivalent, along with an analysis of their global and regional reduction implications and implied probability of achieving the EU climate target of 2°C. For achieving the 2°C target with a probability of more than 60%, greenhouse gas concentrations need to be stabilized at 450 ppm CO₂-equivalent or below, if the 90% uncertainty range for climate sensitivity is believed to be 1.5–4.5°C. A stabilization at 450 ppm CO₂-equivalent or below (400 ppm) requires global emissions to peak around 2015, followed by substantial overall reductions of as much as 25% (45% for 400 ppm) compared to 1990 levels in 2050. In 2020, Annex I emissions need to be approximately 15% (30%) below 1990 levels, and non-Annex I emissions also need to be reduced by 15–20% compared to their baseline emissions. A further delay in peaking of global emissions by 10 years doubles maximum reduction rates to about 5% per year, and very probably leads to high costs. In order to keep the option open of stabilizing at 400 and 450 ppm CO₂-equivalent, the USA and major advanced non-Annex I countries will have to participate in the reductions within the next 10–15 years.     

China’s rising influence on climate governance: Forging a path for the global South

China’s influence on climate governance has been steadily increasing since the adoption of the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2015. Much of this influence, this article argues, has come from China forging a path for climate adaptation and mitigation for the global South. This is having far-reaching consequences, the article further argues, for the politics of global climate governance. China’s discursive and diplomatic power in climate politics is growing as China builds alliances across the global South. China is leveraging this enhanced soft power to elevate the importance of adaptation in multilateral climate negotiations, advance a technocentric approach to climate mitigation, export its development model, and promote industrial-scale afforestation as a nature-based climate solution. China’s strategy is enhancing climate financing, technology transfers, renewable power, and adaptation infrastructure across the global South. To some extent, this is helping with a transition to a low-carbon world economy. Yet China’s leadership is also reinforcing incremental, technocratic, and growth-oriented solutions in global climate governance. These findings advance the understanding of China’s role in global environmental politics, especially its growing influence on climate governance in the global South.     

Past and future carbon sequestration benefits of China’s grain for green program

Carbon sequestration through ecological restoration programs is an increasingly important option to reduce the rise of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration. China’s Grain for Green Program (GGP) is likely the largest centrally organized land-use change program in human history and yet its carbon sequestration benefit has yet to be systematically assessed. Here we used seven empirical/statistical equations of forest biomass carbon sequestration and five soil carbon change models to estimate the total and decadal carbon sequestration potentials of the GGP during 1999–2050, including changes in four carbon pools: aboveground biomass, roots, forest floor and soil organic carbon. The results showed that the total carbon stock in the GGP-affected areas was 682 Tg C in 2010 and the accumulative carbon sink estimates induced by the GGP would be 1697, 2635, 3438 and 4115 Tg C for 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050, respectively. Overall, the carbon sequestration capacity of the GGP can offset about 3%–5% of China’s annual carbon emissions (calculated using 2010 emissions) and about 1% of the global carbon emissions. Afforestation by the GGP contributed about 25% of biomass carbon sinks in global carbon sequestration in 2000–2010. The results suggest that large-scale ecological restoration programs such as afforestation and reforestation could help to enhance global carbon sinks, which may shed new light on the carbon sequestration benefits of such programs in China and also in other regions.     

China’s changing economy and emissions trajectory: following global trends

A key climate policy issue and debate is the future trajectory of emissions of carbon dioxide of countries, their peaking dates, and rates of decline after peaking. This article analyses China’s emissions trajectory in terms of global historical trends distinguishing between industry, infrastructure, and urbanization. Growth of emissions from industrialization and infrastructure development has stabilized in 2014 with saturation levels being reached, while the process of urbanization continues with the shift of the economy to the services sector, with reduced energy use, and this is a global trend. The future trajectory of emissions will be shaped largely by growth of transport and building-related services which directly impact on and are shaped by middle-class levels of well-being. These are areas where convergence with levels of services in other urbanized countries is an important element of national policy. This global trend has not been adequately taken into account in modelling and macroeconomic analysis which ignore social processes. The article concludes that China’s 13th Five Year Plan (2016–2020) seeks to achieve a ‘moderately well-off society’ while putting a cap on total energy demand by modifying the drivers of consumption emissions compared with countries that urbanized earlier. The adoption of a public policy priority of dense mixed-use urban form, public transport, energy efficiency to enable energy system reform, and digital economy could be a model for others.

Policy relevance

The article redefines climate change in terms of social processes as urban form and notions of well-being lock-in increasing levels of future emissions of carbon dioxide. There are implications for research in assessing how best drivers of emissions can be modified without affecting well-being, including renewable and digital technologies and human behaviours that drive patterns of natural resource use as well as the identification of leverage points. There are also broader implications for replacing the development cooperation model of global climate governance to focus on new values recognizing interdependencies for sharing responsibility as well as prosperity.     

Improving China’s water resources management for better adaptation to climate change

Challenged by insufficient water resources and by degraded water quality caused by widespread pollution, China faces an imbalance between the supply and the demand of water for supporting the rapid social and economic development while protecting the natural environment and ecosystems. Climate change is expected to further stress freshwater resources and widen the gap between the demand for and supply of water. As a legacy of the earlier planned economy, water resources management has been primarily supply-driven, which largely fails to account for the economic nature of water resources in relation to their natural characteristics. This paper presents a historical perspective on the water resources management policies and practices in China, and recommends demand management and pollution control as key measures for improving water resources management to adapt to climate change based on the current political, socio-economic and water resources conditions. The past and future impacts of climate change on water resources in China and the general adaptation strategies are also presented. How demand management through increasing water use efficiency, improving water rights and rights trade, and effective regulation enforcement, along with pollution control could improve China’s water resources management are discussed in details. Ultimately, China should develop a sustainable water resources management strategy based on both supply- and demand-side management options to make the limited water supplies meet the demands of economic development, social well-being and the conservation of ecosystems in the context of global climate change.     

A ‘safety deposit’ mechanism for US climate policy

US policy makers are currently evaluating options to reduce domestic carbon dioxide emissions, and several economy-wide cap-and-trade proposals have been put forward in the 111th Congress. Despite mounting enthusiasm for cap-and-trade, advocates of this approach have had to defend such proposals against the criticisms that prices in the resulting carbon market will be unstable and that the implied costs of policy might exceed society's willingness to pay for the expected environmental benefits. Allowance borrowing has been proposed as one solution to both of these concerns, with firm-level borrowing intended to mitigate the impacts of transient cost shocks, and system-level borrowing intended to hedge against the risk of early technology bottlenecks. Each of these mechanisms, as proposed, relies upon prescribed constraints, such as interest payments or quantity limits, to protect against overuse. This article introduces a novel mechanism that offers qualitatively similar protection—a firm-level deposit on borrowed allowances that is refundable upon repayment of the emissions debt. However, the deposit mechanism is shown to be both more economically efficient and more effective in mitigating performance risk, when compared to the existing alternatives.     

Historical and future anthropogenic emission pathways derived from coupled climate�Ccarbon cycle simulations

Using a coupled climate?Ccarbon cycle model, fossil fuel carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions are derived through a reverse approach of prescribing atmospheric CO₂ concentrations according to observations and future projections, respectively. In the second half of the twentieth century, the implied fossil fuel emissions, and also the carbon uptake by land and ocean, are within the range of observational estimates. Larger discrepancies exist in the earlier period (1860?C1960), with small fossil fuel emissions and uncertain emissions from anthropogenic land cover change. In the IPCC SRES A1B scenario, the simulated fossil fuel emissions more than double until 2050 (17 GtC/year) and then decrease to 12 GtC/year by 2100. In addition to A1B, an aggressive mitigation scenario was employed, developed within the European ENSEMBLES project, that peaks at 530 ppm CO₂(equiv) around 2050 and then decreases to approach 450 ppm during the twenty-second century. Consistent with the prescribed pathway of atmospheric CO₂ in E1, the implied fossil fuel emissions increase from currently 8 GtC/year to about 10 by 2015 and decrease thereafter. In the 2050s (2090s) the emissions decrease to 3.4 (0.5) GtC/year, respectively. As in previous studies, our model simulates a positive climate?Ccarbon cycle feedback which tends to reduce the implied emissions by roughly 1 GtC/year per degree global warming. Further, our results suggest that the 450 ppm stabilization scenario may not be sufficient to fulfill the European Union climate policy goal of limiting the global temperature increase to a maximum of 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels.     

Farmers’ climate change beliefs and adaptation strategies for a water scarce future in Australia

Climate change is likely to require irrigators in Australia's Murray-Darling Basin to cope with less water, which will require ongoing farm adjustment. Possible incremental adjustment strategies include expansive and accommodating responses, such as irrigators buying land and water, increasing their irrigated area, changing crop mix and adopting efficient infrastructure. Contractive strategies include selling land and water, and decreasing their irrigated area. Using historical surveys we provide a comparison of irrigators’ planned and actual strategies over the past fifteen years, thereby offering a strong foundation to support analysing future adaptation strategies. We explore influences associated with farm adjustment strategies, and in particular the role that climate change beliefs play. Farmers convinced that climate change is occurring are more likely to plan accommodating, but not expansive, strategies. The relationship between climate change belief and adopting various adaptive strategies was found to be often endogenous, especially for accommodating strategies. Such results suggest the need for irrigation farming policies to be targeted at improving irrigators’ adaptability to manage water variability, and its link with farm future viability.     

Distributive justice in global climate finance – Recipients’ climate vulnerability and the allocation of climate funds

The ‘climate justice’ lens is increasingly being used in framing discussions and debates on global climate finance. A variant of such justice – distributive justice – emphasises recipient countries’ vulnerability to be an important consideration in funding allocation. The extent to which this principle is pursued in practice has been of widespread and ongoing concerns. Empirical evidence in this regard however remains inadequate and methodologically weak. This research examined the effect of recipients’ climate vulnerability on the allocation of climate funds by controlling for other commonly-identified determinants. A dynamic panel regression method based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) was used on a longitudinal dataset, containing approved funds for more than 100,000 projects covering three areas of climate action (mitigation, adaptation, and overlap) in 133 countries over two decades (2000–2018). Findings indicated a non-significant effect of recipients’ vulnerability on mitigation funding, but significant positive effects on adaptation and overlap fundings. ‘Most vulnerable’ countries were likely to receive higher amounts of these two types of funding than the ‘least vulnerable’ countries. All these provided evidence of distributive justice. However, the relationship between vulnerability and funding was parabolic, suggesting ‘moderately vulnerable’ countries likely to receive more funding than the ‘most vulnerable’ countries. Whilst, for mitigation funding, this observation was not a reason for concern, for adaptation and overlap fundings this was not in complete harmony with distributive justice. Paradoxically, countries with better investment readiness were likely to receive more adaptation and overlap funds. In discordance with distributive justice, countries within the Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia regions, despite their higher climatic vulnerabilities, were likely to receive significantly less adaptation and overlap fundings. Effects of vulnerability were persistent, and past funding had significant effects on current funding. These, coupled with the impact of readiness, suggested a probable Low Funding Trap for the world’s most vulnerable countries. The overarching conclusion is that, although positive changes have occurred since the 2015 Paris Agreement, considerable challenges to distributive justice remain. Significant data and methodological challenges encountered in the research and their implications are also discussed.     

The danger of overvaluing methane’s influence on future climate change

Minimizing the future impacts of climate change requires reducing the greenhouse gas (GHG) load in the atmosphere. Anthropogenic emissions include many types of GHG’s as well as particulates such as black carbon and sulfate aerosols, each of which has a different effect on the atmosphere, and a different atmospheric lifetime. Several recent studies have advocated for the importance of short timescales when comparing the climate impact of different climate pollutants, placing a high relative value on short-lived pollutants, such as methane (CH₄) and black carbon (BC) versus carbon dioxide (CO₂). These studies have generated confusion over how to value changes in temperature that occur over short versus long timescales. We show the temperature changes that result from exchanging CO₂ for CH₄ using a variety of commonly suggested metrics to illustrate the trade-offs involved in potential carbon trading mechanisms that place a high value on CH₄ emissions. Reducing CH₄ emissions today would lead to a climate cooling of approximately ~0.5 °C, but this value will not change greatly if we delay reducing CH₄ emissions by years or decades. This is not true for CO₂, for which the climate is influenced by cumulative emissions. Any delay in reducing CO₂ emissions is likely to lead to higher cumulative emissions, and more warming. The exact warming resulting from this delay depends on the trajectory of future CO₂ emissions but using one business-as usual-projection we estimate an increase of 3/4 °C for every 15-year delay in CO₂ mitigation. Overvaluing the influence of CH₄ emissions on climate could easily result in our “locking” the earth into a warmer temperature trajectory, one that is temporarily masked by the short-term cooling effects of the CH₄ reductions, but then persists for many generations.     

Implications of Japan’s long term climate mitigation target and the relevance of uncertain nuclear policy

Achieving long-term climate mitigation goals in Japan faces several challenges, starting with the uncertain nuclear power policy after the 2011 earthquake, the uncertain availability and progress of energy technologies, as well as energy security concerns in light of a high dependency on fuel imports. The combined weight of these challenges needs to be clarified in terms of the energy system and macroeconomic impacts. We applied a general equilibrium energy economic model to assess these impacts on an 80% emission reduction target by 2050 considering several alternative scenarios for nuclear power deployment, technology availability, end use energy efficiency, and the price of fossil fuels. We found that achieving the mitigation target was feasible for all scenarios, with considerable reductions in total energy consumption (39%–50%), higher shares of low-carbon sources (43%–72% compared to 15%), and larger shares of electricity in the final energy supply (51%–58% compared to 42%). The economic impacts of limiting nuclear power by 2050 (3.5% GDP loss) were small compared to the lack of carbon capture and storage (CCS) (6.4% GDP loss). Mitigation scenarios led to an improvement in energy security indicators (trade dependency and diversity of primary energy sources) even in the absence of nuclear power. Moreover, preliminary analysis indicates that expanding the range of renewable energy resources can lower the macroeconomic impacts of the long term target considerably, and thus further in depth analysis is needed on this aspect.

Key policy insights

• For Japan, an emissions reduction target of 80% by 2050 is feasible without nuclear power or CCS.

• The macroeconomic impact of such a 2050 target was largest without CCS, and smallest without nuclear power.

• Energy security indicators improved in mitigation scenarios compared to the baseline.

     

AMO’s structure and climate footprint in observations and IPCC AR5 climate simulations

This study aims to characterize the spatiotemporal features of the low frequency Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO), its oceanic and atmospheric footprint and its associated hydroclimate impact. To accomplish this, we compare and evaluate the representation of AMO-related features both in observations and in historical simulations of the twentieth century climate from models participating in the IPCC’s CMIP5 project. Climate models from international leading research institutions are chosen: CCSM4, GFDL-CM3, UKMO-HadCM3 and ECHAM6/MPI-ESM-LR. Each model employed includes at least three and as many as nine ensemble members. Our analysis suggests that the four models underestimate the characteristic period of the AMO, as well as its temporal variability; this is associated with an underestimation/overestimation of spectral peaks in the 70–80 year/10–20 year range. The four models manifest the mid-latitude focus of the AMO-related SST anomalies, as well as certain features of its subsurface heat content signal. However, they are limited when it comes to simulating some of the key oceanic and atmospheric footprints of the phenomenon, such as its signature on subsurface salinity, oceanic heat content and geopotential height anomalies. Thus, it is not surprising that the models are unable to capture the majority of the associated hydroclimate impact on the neighboring continents, including underestimation of the surface warming that is linked to the positive phase of the AMO and is critical for the models to be trusted on projections of future climate and decadal predictions.     

China’s national carbon emissions trading scheme: lessons from the pilot emission trading schemes,academic literature,and known policy details

Upon completion, China’s national emissions trading scheme (C-ETS) will be the largest carbon market in the world. Recent research has evaluated China’s seven pilot ETSs launched from 2013 on, and academic literature on design aspects of the C-ETS abounds. Yet little is known about the specific details of the upcoming C-ETS. This article combines currently understood details of China’s national carbon market with lessons learned in the pilot schemes as well as from the academic literature. Our review follows the taxonomy of Emissions Trading in Practice: A Handbook on Design and Implementation (Partnership for Market Readiness & International Carbon Action Partnership. (2016). Retrieved from www.worldbank.org): The 10 categories are: scope, cap, distribution of allowances, use of offsets, temporal flexibility, price predictability, compliance and oversight, stakeholder engagement and capacity building, linking, implementation and improvements.

Key policy insights

• Accurate emissions data is paramount for both design and implementation, and its availability dictates the scope of the C-ETS.

• The stakeholder consultative process is critical for effective design, and China is able to build on its extensive experience through the pilot ETSs.

• Current policies and positions on intensity targets and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits constrain the market design of the C-ETS.

• Most critical is the nature of the cap. The currently discussed rate-based cap with ex post adjustment is risky. Instead, an absolute, mass-based emissions cap coupled with the conditional use of permits would allow China to maintain flexibility in the carbon market while ensuring a limit on CO₂ emissions.

     

California’s local health agencies and the state’s climate adaptation strategy

A changing climate will exacerbate many of the problems currently faced by California’s public health institutions. The public health impacts of climate change include: an increase in extreme heat events and associated increases in heat-related morbidity and mortality, increases in the frequency and severity of air pollution episodes, shifts in the range and incidence of vector-borne diseases, increases in the severity of wildfire, increased risks of drought and flooding, and other extreme events. This article assesses the readiness of California’s public health institutions to cope with the changes that will accompany a changing climate and how they relate to strategies laid out in the state’s Climate Adaptation Strategy. County-level health offices are the front line actors to preserve public health in the face of numerous threats, including climate change. Survey results show that local health officers in California believe that climate change is a serious threat to public health, but feel that they lack the funding and resources to reduce this risk. Local health agencies also have a number of tools in place that will be helpful for preparing for a changing climate.     

Options for differentiation of future commitments in climate policy: how to realise timely participation to meet stringent climate goals?

This paper aims at exploring options for differentiation of future commitments in global greenhouse gas emissions control, linked to climate targets. This is done on the basis of the EU target of a maximum global temperature increase of 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. The Framework to Assess International Regimes for the differentiation of commitments (FAIR) is used to explore the implications of two possible climate regimes: (1) increasing participation (i.e. a gradual increase in the number of parties involved and their level of commitment according to participation and differentiation rules) and (2) ‘contraction and convergence’ (C&C) with universal participation and a convergence of per capita emission permits. It is found that in a regime of increasing participation, stabilising the CO₂ concentration at 450 ppmv by 2100 requires participation of major developing countries before 2050 in global emission control, irrespective of the participation and differentiation rules chosen. In the case of stringent climate targets, a convergence regime seems to provide more incentives for a timely participation of developing countries, and opportunities for an effective and efficient regime for controlling global emissions than increasing participation.     

Options for differentiation of future commitments in climate policy: how to realise timely participation to meet stringent climate goals?

Abstract

This paper aims at exploring options for differentiation of future commitments in global greenhouse gas emissions control, linked to climate targets. This is done on the basis of theEUtarget of a maximum global temperature increase of 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. The Framework to Assess International Regimes for the differentiation of commitments (FAIR) is used to explore the implications of two possible climate regimes: (1) increasing participation (i.e. a gradual increase in the number of parties involved and their level of commitment according to participation and differentiation rules) and (2) ‘contraction and convergence’ (C&C) with universal participation and a convergence of per capita emission permits. It is found that in a regime of increasing participation, stabilising the CO₂ concentration at 450 ppmv by 2100 requires participation of major developing countries before 2050 in global emission control, irrespective of the participation and differentiation rules chosen. In the case of stringent climate targets, a convergence regime seems to provide more incentives for a timely participation of developing countries, and opportunities for an effective and efficient regime for controlling global emissions than increasing participation.     

Unravelling the United Kingdom’s climate policy consensus: The power of ideas,discourse and institutions

As climate change policies and governance initiatives struggle to produce the transformational social changes required, the search for stand out case studies continues. Many have pointed to the period between 2005 and 2008 in the United Kingdom as a promising example of national level innovation. With strong cross-party consensus and a first-of-its-kind legislation the UK established itself as a climate policy leader. However, early warning signs suggest that this institutionalised position is far from secure. Through a novel application of discursive institutionalism this article presents a detailed analysis of the role of ideas in unravelling this ambition under the Conservative-Liberal coalition administration (2010–2015). Discursive interactions among policymakers and other political actors were dominated by ideas about governmental responsibility and economic austerity, establishing an atmosphere of climate policy scepticism and restraint. By situating this conspicuous and influential process of bricolage within its institutional context the importance of how policymakers think and communicate about climate change is made apparent. The power of ideas to influence policy is further demonstrated through their cognitive and normative persuasiveness, by imposing over and excluding alternatives and in their institutional positioning. It can be concluded that despite innovative legislation, institution building and strategic coordination of different types of governance actors the ideational foundations of ambitious climate change politics in the UK have been undermined.