Resilience through interlinkage: the green climate fund and climate finance governance

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a significant and potentially innovative addition to UNFCCC frameworks for mobilizing increased finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Yet the GCF faces challenges of operationalization not only as a relatively new international fund but also as a result of US President Trump’s announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Consequently the GCF faces a major reduction in actual funding contributions and also governance challenges at the levels of its Board and the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP), to which it is ultimately accountable. This article analyzes these challenges with reference to the GCF’s internal regulations and its agreements with third parties to demonstrate how exploiting design features of the GCF could strengthen its resilience in the face of such challenges. These features include linkages with UNFCCC constituted bodies, particularly the Technology Mechanism, and enhanced engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially through its Private Sector Facility. The article posits that deepening GCF interlinkages would increase both the coherence of climate finance governance and the GCF’s ability to contribute to ambitious climate action in uncertain times.

Key policy insights

• The Trump Administration’s purported withdrawal from the Paris Agreement creates challenges for the GCF operating model in three key domains: capitalization, governance and guidance.

• Two emerging innovations could prove crucial in GCF resilience to fulfil its role in Paris Agreement implementation: (1) interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, especially the Technology Mechanism; and (2) engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially private sector actors such as large US investors and financiers.

• There is also an emerging soft role for the GCF as interlocutor between policy-makers and non-Party actors to help bridge the communication divide that often plagues cross-sectoral interactions.

• This role could develop through: (a) the GCF tripartite interface between the Private Sector Facility, Accredited Entities and National Designated Authorities; and (b) strengthened collaborations between the UNFCCC Technical and Financial Mechanisms.

     

United States non-cooperation and the Paris agreement

In June 2017, the Trump administration decided to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement, a landmark climate agreement adopted in 2015 by 195 nations. The exit of the US has not just raised concern that the US will miss its domestic emission reduction targets, but also that other parties to the Paris Agreement might backtrack on their initial pledges regarding emission reductions or financial contributions. Here we assess the magnitude of the threat that US non-cooperation poses to the Paris Agreement from an international relations perspective. We argue that US non-cooperation does not fundamentally alter US emissions, which are unlikely to rise even in the absence of new federal climate policies. Nor does it undermine nationally determined contributions under pledge and review, as the Paris Agreement has introduced a new logic of domestically driven climate policies and the cost of low-carbon technologies keeps falling. However, US non-participation in raising climate finance could raise high barriers to global climate cooperation in the future. Political strategies to mitigate these threats include direct engagement by climate leaders such as the European Union with key emerging economies, notably China and India, and domestic climate policies that furnish benefits to traditional opponents of ambitious climate policy.

Key policy insights

• US non-cooperation need not be a major threat to pledge and review under the Paris Agreement.

• US non-cooperation is a serious threat to climate finance.

• Deeper engagement with emerging economies offers new opportunities for global climate policy.

     

Swimming upstream: addressing fossil fuel supply under the UNFCCC

Reducing fossil fuel supply is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement goal to keep warming ‘well below 2°C’, yet the Agreement is silent on the topic of fossil fuels. This article outlines reasons why it is important that Parties to the Agreement find ways to more explicitly address the phasing out of fossil fuel production under the UNFCCC. It describes how countries aiming to keep fossil fuel supply in line with Paris goals could articulate and report their actions within the current architecture of the Agreement. It also outlines specific mechanisms of the Paris Agreement through which issues related to the curtailment of fossil fuel supply can be addressed. Mapping out a transition away from fossil fuels – and facilitating this transition under the auspices of the UNFCCC process – can enhance the ambition and effectiveness of national and international climate mitigation efforts.

Key policy insights

• The international commitment to limit global average temperature increases to ‘well below 2°C’ provides a strong rationale for Parties to the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC to pursue a phase-down in fossil fuel production, not just consumption.

• Several countries have already made commitments to address fossil fuel supply, by agreeing to phase down coal or oil exploration and production.

• Integrating these commitments into the UNFCCC process would link them to global climate goals, and ensure they form part of a broader global effort to transition away from fossil fuels.

• The Paris Agreement provides a number of new opportunities for Parties to address fossil fuel production.

     

Evaluating the US Mid-Century Strategy for Deep Decarbonization amidst early century uncertainty

The recent change in US presidential administrations has introduced significant uncertainty about both domestic and international policy support for continued reductions in GHG emissions. This brief analysis estimates the potential climate ramifications of changing US leadership, contrasting the Mid-Century Strategy for Deep Decarbonization (MCS) released under the Obama Administration, with campaign statements, early executive actions, and prevailing market conditions to estimate potential emission pathways under the Trump Administration. The analysis highlights areas where GHG reductions are less robust to changing policy conditions, and offers brief recommendations for addressing emissions in the interim. It specifically finds that continued reductions in the electricity sector are less vulnerable to changes in federal policy than those in the built environment and land use sectors. Given the long-lived nature of investments in these latter two sectors, however, opportunities for near-term climate action by willing cities, states, private landowners, and non-profit organizations warrant renewed attention in this time of climate uncertainty.

Key policy insights

• The recent US presidential election has already impacted mitigation goals and practices, injecting considerable uncertainty into domestic and international efforts to address climate change.

• A strategic assessment issued in the final days of the Obama Administration for how to reach long-term climate mitigation objectives provides a baseline from which to gauge potential changes under the Trump Administration.

• Though market trends may continue to foster emission declines in the energy sector, emission reductions in the land use sector and the built environment are subject to considerable uncertainty.

• Regardless of actions to scale back climate mitigation efforts, US emissions are likely to be flat in the coming years. Assuming that emissions remain constant under President Trump and that reductions resume afterwards to meet the Obama Administration mid-century targets in 2050, this near-term pause in reductions yields a difference in total emissions equivalent to 0.3–0.6 years of additional global greenhouse gas emissions, depending on the number of terms served by a Trump Administration.

     

The global impacts of US climate policy: a model simulation using GCAM-TU and MAGICC

To assess the potential impacts of the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, this study applied GCAM-TU (an updated version of the Global Change Assessment Model) to simulate global and regional emission pathways of energy-related CO₂, which show that US emissions in 2100 would reduce to ?2.4?Gt, ?0.7?Gt and ?0.2?Gt under scenarios of RCP2.6, RCP3.7 and RCP4.5, respectively. Two unfavourable policy scenarios were designed, assuming a temporary delay and a complete stop for US mitigation actions after 2015. Simulations by the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC) indicate that the temperature increase by 2100 would rise by 0.081°C–0.161°C compared to the three original RCPs (Representative Concentration Pathways) if US emissions were kept at their 2015 levels until 2100. The probability of staying below 2°C would decrease by 6–9% even if the US resumes mitigation efforts for achieving its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) target after 2025. It is estimated by GCAM-TU that, without US participation, increased reduction efforts are required for the rest of the world, including developing countries, in order to achieve the 2°C goal, resulting in 18% higher global cumulative mitigation costs from 2015 to 2100.

Key policy insights

• President Trump’s climate policies, including planned withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, cast a shadow on international climate actions, and would lower the likelihood of achieving the 2°C target.

• To meet the 2°C target without the US means increased reduction efforts and mitigation costs for the rest of the world, and considerable economic burdens for major developing areas.

• Active state-, city- and enterprise-level powers should be supported to keep the emission reduction gap from further widening even with reduced mitigation efforts from the US federal government.

     

CO2 abatement goals for international shipping

The Paris Agreement, which entered into force in 2016, sets the ambitious climate change mitigation goal of limiting the global temperature increase to below 2°C and ideally 1.5°C. This puts a severe constraint on the remaining global GHG emissions budget. While international shipping is also a contributor to anthropogenic GHG emissions, and CO₂ in particular, it is not included in the Paris Agreement. This article discusses how a share of a global CO₂ budget over the twenty-first century could be apportioned to international shipping, and, using a range of future trade scenarios, explores the requisite cuts to the CO₂ intensity of shipping. The results demonstrate that, under a wide range of assumptions, existing short-term levers of efficiency must be urgently exploited to achieve mitigation commensurate with that required from the rest of the economy, with virtually full decarbonization of international shipping required as early as before mid-century.

Key policy insights

• Regulatory action is key to ensuring the international shipping sector’s long-term sustainability.

• For the shipping industry to deliver mitigation in line with the Paris Agreement, virtually full decarbonization needs to be achieved.

• In the near term, immediate and rapid exploitation of available mitigation measures is of critical importance.

• Any delay in the transition will increase the risk of stranded assets, or diminish the chances of meeting the Paris Agreement's temperature commitments.

     

The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump

On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced that the US intends to leave the Paris Agreement if no alternative terms acceptable to his administration can be agreed upon. In this article, an agent-based model of bottom-up climate mitigation clubs is used to derive the impact that lack of US participation may have on the membership of such clubs and their emissions coverage. We systematically analyse the prospects for climate mitigation clubs, depending on which of three conceivable roles the US takes on: as a leader (for benchmarking), as a follower (i.e. willing to join climate mitigation clubs initiated by others if this is in its best interest) or as an outsider (i.e. staying outside of any climate mitigation club no matter what). We investigate these prospects for three types of incentives for becoming a member: club goods, conditional commitments and side-payments. Our results show that lack of US leadership significantly constrains climate clubs’ potential. Lack of US willingness to follow others’ lead is an additional, but smaller constraint. Only in a few cases will US withdrawal entail widespread departures by other countries. We conclude that climate mitigation clubs can function without the participation of an important GHG emitter, given that other major emitters show leadership, although these clubs will rarely cover more than 50% of global emissions.

Key policy insights

• The US switching from being a leader to being a follower substantially reduces the emissions coverage of climate mitigation clubs.

• The US switching from being a follower to being an outsider sometimes reduces coverage further, but has a smaller impact than the switch from leader to follower.

• The switch from follower to outsider only occasionally results in widespread departures by other countries; in a few instances it even entices others to join.

• Climate mitigation clubs can function even without the participation of the US, provided that other major emitters show leadership; however, such clubs will typically be unable to cover more than 50% of global emissions.

• Climate mitigation clubs may complement the Paris Agreement and can also serve as an alternative in case Paris fails.

     

What future for the voluntary carbon offset market after Paris? An explorative study based on the Discursive Agency Approach

The Paris Agreement heralds a new era in international climate governance. Yet, the Agreement's implementation rulebook is still under negotiation. During this transition, from the Kyoto Protocol to the new regime under the Paris Agreement, many non-state actors are facing a high level of uncertainty. In particular, actors in the voluntary carbon market are struggling to define their new role. The business model of producing carbon credits in developing countries and selling them elsewhere is threatened. Although its financial significance and achieved emission reductions are limited, the voluntary market's role as an incubator for innovation has made it a prominent representative of non-state mitigation mechanisms. Therefore, we ask: What effects will the regime change to the Paris Agreement have on the voluntary carbon offset market (VCM) and how does it react to these effects?

This study analyses perceptions of, and reactions to, the new regulatory environment within the VCM. We apply the Discursive Agency Approach to scrutinize the institutions, discourses and influential agents involved in the VCM, and the strategic practices they apply to manage the transition towards the Paris regime. We find two dominant coping strategies: to align the voluntary offsetting mechanism with the Paris Agreement, and to re-invent its overall purpose as a tool to deliver sustainable development rather than solely emission reductions. Based on these results, we outline ‘thought spaces’ for a future VCM: (1) voluntary and non-party offsetting beyond nationally determined contributions (NDCs), (2) results-based financing for emission reductions and sustainable development, and (3) private climate action under international oversight.

Key policy insights

• The Paris Agreement threatens the VCM's business model, prompting market agents to frame and legitimize their work in new ways.

• The voluntary market's viability depends on the future accounting rules for emission reductions under Paris Agreement Article 6. Discursive struggles surround the risks of double counting and NDC ambitions.

• Based on an understanding of the past, we can draw lessons from agents’ attempts to re-legitimize their role under the new Paris Agreement; their future visions will shape the debates about this nascent regime.

     

The death spiral of coal in the U.S.: will changes in U.S. Policy turn the tide?

ABSTRACT

The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has promised to stop the ongoing spiralling down of the U.S. coal industry. We discuss the origins of the decline and assess the effects of policy interventions by the Trump administration. We find that, with fierce competition from natural gas and renewables, a further decrease of coal consumption must be expected by the old and inefficient U.S. coal-fired electricity generation fleet. By contrast, we consider the overly optimistic (for coal producers) view of the U.S. Energy Information Agency, and test whether the tide for the U.S. coal industry could turn as a result of three potential support measures: (i) revoking the Clean Power Plan (CPP); (ii) facilitating access to the booming Asian market; and (iii) enhanced support for Carbon Capture, Transport and Storage (CCTS) technology. We investigate the short-term and long-term effects on U.S. coal production using a comprehensive partial equilibrium model of the world steam coal market, COALMOD-World (Holz, Haftendorn, Mendelevitch, & von Hirschhausen, 2016). We find that revoking the CPP could stop the downward trend of steam coal consumption in the U.S., but even allowing for additional exports, will not lead to a return of U.S. coal production to the levels of the 2000s, that is, over 900?Mt per year. When global steam coal use is aligned with the 2°C climate target, U.S. steam coal production drops to around 100?Mt per year by 2030 and below 50?Mt by 2050, even if CCTS is available and exports via the U.S. West Coast is possible.

Key policy insights

• Declining U.S. coal use is primarily caused by competition from natural gas and renewables not by environmental regulation of the coal sector.

• Without substantial policy support, U.S. coal-fired generation capacity will continue to decline rapidly.

• Revoking the Clean Power Plan will lead to about one eighth higher U.S. coal production in the next years.

• Carbon Capture, Transport and Storage does not prevent the rapid decline of coal use required under stringent climate policy.

• Even in the most extreme pro-coal scenarios with additional export possibilities, U.S. coal production will not return to its pre-2010 levels.

     

Zero carbon energy system pathways for Ireland consistent with the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement is the last hope to keep global temperature rise below 2°C. The consensus agrees to holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim for 1.5°C. Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution (NDC) will represent a progression beyond the party’s then current NDC, and reflect its highest possible ambition. Using Ireland as a test case, we show that increased mitigation ambition is required to meet the Paris Agreement goals in contrast to current EU policy goals of an 80–95% reduction by 2050. For the 1.5°C consistent carbon budgets, the technically feasible scenarios' abatement costs rise to greater than €8,100/tCO₂ by 2050. The greatest economic impact is in the short term. Annual GDP growth rates in the period to 2020 reduce from 4% to 2.2% in the 1.5°C scenario. While aiming for net zero emissions beyond 2050, investment decisions in the next 5–10 years are critical to prevent carbon lock-in.

Key policy insights

• Economic growth can be maintained in Ireland while rapidly decarbonizing the energy system.

• The social cost of carbon needs to be included as standard in valuation of infrastructure investment planning, both by government finance departments and private investors.

• Technological feasibility is not the limiting factor in achieving rapid deep decarbonization.

• Immediate increased decarbonization ambition over the next 3–5 years is critical to achieve the Paris Agreement goals, acknowledging the current 80–95% reduction target is not consistent with temperature goals of ‘well below’ 2°C and pursuing 1.5°C.

• Applying carbon budgets to the energy system results in non-linear CO₂ emissions reductions over time, which contrast with current EU policy targets, and the implied optimal climate policy and mitigation investment strategy.

     

Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation contributions. Environmental integrity is a key principle for using such mechanisms under the Agreement. This paper systematically identifies and categorizes issues and options to achieve environmental integrity, including how it could be defined, what influences it, and what approaches could mitigate environmental integrity risks. Here, environmental integrity is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of carbon market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions. Four factors are identified that influence environmental integrity: the accounting for international transfers; the quality of units generated, i.e. whether the mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of units leads to emission reductions in the transferring country; the ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action, such as possible disincentives for transferring countries to define future mitigation targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in order to sell more units. It is recommended that policy-makers combine several approaches to address the significant risks to environmental integrity.

Key policy insights

• Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The diversity of nationally determined contributions is an important challenge, in particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for international transfers is representative for the mitigation efforts by Parties over time.

• Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring unit quality. Unit quality could be promoted through guidance under Paris Agreement Article 6, and reporting and review under Article 13.

• The ambition and scope of mitigation targets is key for the incentive for transferring countries to ensure unit quality because countries with ambitious and economy-wide targets would have to compensate for any transfer of units that lack quality. Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC targets would therefore facilitate achieving environmental integrity.

• Restricting transfers in instances of high environmental integrity risk – through eligibility criteria or limits – could complement these approaches.

     

Health co-benefits and the development of climate change mitigation policies in the European Union

The 2015 Paris Agreement requires increasingly ambitious emissions reduction efforts from its member countries. Accounting for ancillary positive health outcomes (health co-benefits) that result from implementing climate change mitigation policies can provide Parties to the Paris Agreement with a sound rationale for introducing stronger mitigation strategies. Despite this recognition, a knowledge gap exists on the role of health co-benefits in the development of climate change mitigation policies. To address this gap, the case study presented here investigates the role of health co-benefits in the development of European Union (EU) climate change mitigation policies through analysis and consideration of semi-structured interview data, government documents, journal articles and media releases. We find that while health co-benefits are an explicit consideration in the development of EU climate change mitigation policies, their influence on final policy outcomes has been limited. Our analysis suggests that whilst health co-benefits are a key driver of air pollution mitigation policies, climate mitigation policies are primarily driven by other factors, including economic costs and energy implications.

Key policy insights

• Health co-benefits are quantified and monetized as part of the development of EU climate change mitigation policies but their influence on the final policies agreed upon is limited.

• Barriers, such as the immediate economic costs associated with climate action, inhibit the influence of health co-benefits on the development of mitigation policies.

• Health co-benefits primarily drive the development of EU air pollution mitigation policies.

• The separation of responsibility for GHG and non-GHG emissions across Directorate Generals has decoupled climate change and air pollution mitigation policies, with consequences for the integration of health co-benefits in climate policy.

     

National contributions to climate change mitigation from agriculture: allocating a global target

Globally, agriculture and related land use change contributed about 17% of the world’s anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010 (8.4 GtCO₂e yr^?1), making GHG mitigation in the agriculture sector critical to meeting the Paris Agreement’s 2°C goal. This article proposes a range of country-level targets for mitigation of agricultural emissions by allocating a global target according to five approaches to effort-sharing for climate change mitigation: responsibility, capability, equality, responsibility-capability-need and equal cumulative per capita emissions. Allocating mitigation targets according to responsibility for total historical emissions or capability to mitigate assigned large targets for agricultural emission reductions to North America, Europe and China. Targets based on responsibility for historical agricultural emissions resulted in a relatively even distribution of targets among countries and regions. Meanwhile, targets based on equal future agricultural emissions per capita or equal per capita cumulative emissions assigned very large mitigation targets to countries with large agricultural economies, while allowing some densely populated countries to increase agricultural emissions. There is no single ‘correct’ framework for allocating a global mitigation goal. Instead, using these approaches as a set provides a transparent, scientific basis for countries to inform and help assess the significance of their commitments to reducing emissions from the agriculture sector.

Key policy insights

• Meeting the Paris Agreement 2°C goal will require global mitigation of agricultural non-CO₂ emissions of approximately 1 GtCO₂e yr^?1 by 2030.

• Allocating this 1 GtCO₂e yr^?1 according to various effort-sharing approaches, it is found that countries will need to mitigate agricultural business-as-usual emissions in 2030 by a median of 10%. Targets vary widely with criteria used for allocation.

• The targets calculated here are in line with the ambition of the few countries (primarily in Africa) that included mitigation targets for the agriculture sector in their (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions.

• For agriculture to contribute to meeting the 2°C or 1.5°C targets, countries will need to be ambitious in pursuing emission reductions. Technology development and transfer will be particularly important.

     

National climate change mitigation legislation,strategy and targets: a global update

Global climate change governance has changed substantially in the last decade, with a shift in focus from negotiating globally agreed greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets to nationally determined contributions, as enshrined in the 2015 Paris Agreement. This paper analyses trends in adoption of national climate legislation and strategies, GHG targets, and renewable and energy efficiency targets in almost all UNFCCC Parties, focusing on the period from 2007 to 2017. The uniqueness and added value of this paper reside in its broad sweep of countries, the more than decade-long coverage and the use of objective metrics rather than normative judgements. Key results show that national climate legislation and strategies witnessed a strong increase in the first half of the assessed decade, likely due to the political lead up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, but have somewhat stagnated in recent years, currently covering 70% of global GHG emissions (almost 50% of countries). In comparison, the coverage of GHG targets increased considerably in the run up to adoption of the Paris Agreement and 89% of global GHG emissions are currently covered by such targets. Renewable energy targets saw a steady spread, with 79% of the global GHG emissions covered in 2017 compared to 45% in 2007, with a steep increase in developing countries.

Key policy insights

• The number of countries that have national legislation and strategies in place increased strongly up to 2012, but the increase has levelled off in recent years, now covering 70% of global emissions by 2017 (48% of countries and 76% of global population).

• Economy-wide GHG reduction targets witnessed a strong increase in the build up to 2015 and are adopted by countries covering 89% of global GHG emissions (76% not counting USA) and 90% of global population (86% not counting USA) in 2017.

• Renewable energy targets saw a steady increase throughout the last decade with coverage of countries in 2017 comparable to that of GHG targets.

• Key shifts in national measures coincide with landmark international events – an increase in legislation and strategy in the build-up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference and an increase in targets around the Paris Agreement – emphasizing the importance of the international process to maintaining national momentum.

     

The impact of the US retreat from the Paris Agreement: Kyoto revisited?

The United States’ decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement (pending possible re-engagement under different terms) may have significant ramifications for international climate policy, but the implications of this decision remain contested. This commentary illustrates how comparative analysis of US participation in multilateral environmental agreements can inform predictions and future assessments of the decision. We compare and contrast US non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, focusing on four key areas that may condition the influence of US treaty decisions on international climate policy: (i) global momentum on climate change mitigation; (ii) the possibility of US non-participation giving rise to alternative forms of international collaboration on climate policy; (iii) the timing and circumstances of the US decision to exit; and (iv) the influence of treaty design on countries’ incentives to participate and comply. We find that differences across the two treaties relating to the first three factors are more likely to reduce the negative ramifications of US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement compared to the Kyoto Protocol. However, the increased urgency of deep decarbonization renders US non-participation a major concern despite its declining share of global emissions. Moreover, key design features of the Paris Agreement suggest that other countries may react to the US decision by scaling back their levels of ambition and compliance, even if they remain in the Agreement.

Key policy insights

• Increasing global momentum on mitigation since 1997 means that US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is potentially less damaging than its non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol

• Despite the declining US share of global emissions, greater urgency of deep decarbonization means that the non-participation of a major player, such as the US, remains problematic for global cooperation and achieving the Paris Agreement’s goals

• Differences in the design of the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement suggest that US non-participation is more likely to prompt reluctant countries to stay within the Paris framework but reduce levels of ambition and compliance, rather than exit the Agreement altogether

     

Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement and the costs of delayed action

Current country-level commitments under the Paris Agreement fall short of putting the world on a required trajectory to stay below a 2°C temperature increase compared to pre-industrial levels by the end of the century. Therefore, the timing of increased ambition is hugely important and as such this paper analyses the impact of both the short and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement on global emissions and economic growth. Using the hybrid TIAM-UCL-MSA model we consider the achievement of a 2°C target against a baseline of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) while also considering the timing of increased ambition of the NDCs by 2030 and the impacts of cost reductions of key low-carbon technologies. We find that the rate of emissions reduction ambition required between 2030 and 2050 is almost double when the NDCs are achieved but not ratcheted up until 2030, and leads to lower levels of economic growth throughout the rest of the century. However, if action is taken immediately and is accompanied by increasingly rapid low-carbon technology cost reductions, then there is almost no difference in GDP compared to the path suggested by the current NDC commitments.

Key policy insights

• Delaying the additional action needed to achieve the 2°C target until 2030 is shown to require twice the rate of emissions reductions between 2030 and 2050.

• Total cumulative GDP over the century is lower when additional action is delayed to 2030 and therefore has an overall negative impact on the economy, even without including climate change damages.

• Increased ratcheting of the NDC commitments should therefore be undertaken sooner rather than later, starting in conjunction with the 2023 Global Stocktake.

• Early action combined with cost reductions in key renewable energy technologies can reduce GDP losses to minimal levels (<1%).

• A 2°C future with technological advancements is clearly possible for a similar cost as a 3.3°C world without these advances, but with lower damages and losses from climate change.

     

Social impacts of climate change mitigation policies and their implications for inequality

The Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set ambitious targets for environmental, economic and social progress. Climate change mitigation policies play a central role in this process. To maximize the benefits and minimize the negative effects of climate change mitigation policies, policymakers need to be aware of the indirect and often complex social and inequality impacts that these policies may have and the pathways through which these impacts emerge. Better understanding of the distributional and inequality impacts is important to avoid negative social and distributional outcomes as countries ratchet up their climate policy ambition in the post-Paris context. This paper synthesizes evidence from the existing literature on social co-impacts of climate change mitigation policy and their implications for inequality. The analysis shows that most policies are linked to both co-benefits and adverse side-effects, and can compound or lessen inequalities depending on contextual factors, policy design and policy implementation. The risk of negative outcomes is greater in contexts characterized by high levels of poverty, corruption and economic and social inequalities, and where limited action is taken to identify and mitigate potentially adverse side-effects.

Key policy insights

• The risk of adverse social outcomes associated with climate change mitigation policies, including worsening inequality, increases as countries ratchet up their ambition to meet the Paris Agreement targets. Many policies that have so far only been piloted will need to be up-scaled.

• Negative inequality impacts of climate policies can be mitigated (and possibly even prevented), but this requires conscious effort, careful planning and multi-stakeholder engagement. Best results can be achieved when potential inequality impacts are taken into consideration in all stages of policy making, including policy planning, development and implementation.

• Climate change mitigation policies should take a pro-poor approach that, in best case scenarios, can also lead to a reduction of existing inequalities.

     

Policy goals,partisanship and paradigmatic change in energy policy – analyzing parliamentary discourse in Germany over 30 years

The successful implementation of the Paris Agreement requires substantial energy policy change on the national level. In national energy policy-making, climate change mitigation goals have to be balanced with arguments on other national energy policy goals, namely limiting cost and increasing energy security. Thus far, very little is known about the relative importance of these goals and how they are related to political partisanship. In order to address this gap, we focus on parliamentary discourse around low-carbon energy futures in Germany over the past three decades and analyze the relative importance of, and partisanship around, energy policy goals. We find that the political discourse revolves around four, rather than three, goals as conventionally assumed; improving the competitiveness of the national energy technology industry is not only an additional energy policy goal, it is also highly important in the political discourse. In general, the relative importance of these goals is rather stable over time and partisanship around them is limited. Yet, a sub-analysis of the discourse on renewable energy technologies reveals a high level of partisanship, albeit decreasing over time. Particularly, the energy industry goal’s importance increases while its partisanship vanishes. We discuss how these findings can inform future energy policy research and provide a potential inroad for more ambitious national energy policies.

Key policy insights

• In addition to the three classic goals of energy policy (limiting cost, securing access and reducing the environmental burden) we identify a fourth policy goal: strengthening the national energy technology industry

• Conformity between the three classical energy and the industrial policy goals is a key driver explaining policy change

• For renewable energy technologies, partisanship around this fourth goal is lower than around other goals and decreases over time as innovation allows these technologies to increasingly correspond to policy-makers’ high-level goals

• Extant research underestimates the importance of industry policy goals, but overestimates environmental co-benefits of low-carbon energy options

• Paradigmatic policy change in Germany did not depend on top-down shifts in high-level policy goals but was driven by lower-level technology-specific goals

     

China’s future emission reduction challenge and implications for global climate policy

In December 2015, China joined 190 plus nations at Paris in committing to the goal of limiting the rise in global average temperature to ‘well below’ 2°C. Carbon budget analysis indicates that goal will require not only that the European Union and US reduce their emissions by greater than 80% by 2050, but that China at least comes close to doing so as well, if any budget is to be left over for the rest of the world (RoW). Given that RoW emissions are, and will come from, low-income and emerging nations, China’s emission reduction potential is of no small consequence. In this paper, we use the Kaya identity to back out changes in the drivers of CO₂ emissions, including gross domestic product (GDP), energy intensity (E/GDP) and the carbon content of energy (C/E), the latter two calculated to be consistent with China’s long-term GDP growth rate forecasts and specified 2050 CO₂ emission reduction targets. Our results suggest that even achieving China’s highly optimistic renewable energy targets will be very far from sufficient to reduce China’s CO₂ emissions from 9.1?Gt it emitted in 2015 to much below 3?Gt by 2050. Even reducing its emissions to 5?Gt will be challenging, yet this falls far short of what is needed if the world is to meet its ‘well below’ 2°C commitment.

Key policy insights

• Under the Paris Agreement there is great pressure on China to very substantially reduce its emissions by 2050.

• While China has attached great importance to renewables and nuclear energy development, even achieving the most optimistic targets would not be sufficient to reduce China’s emissions from 9.1?Gt in 2015 to much below 3?Gt by 2050.

• China’s emission reduction potential falls far short of what is needed if the world is to meet its Paris ‘well below’ 2°C commitment, even if the EU and US reduce their emissions to zero by 2050.

• Emission cuts consistent with the Paris Agreement will require that China and the world give much greater weight to advancing research and development of scalable low-, zero- and negative-carbon sources and technologies.

     

Engineering climate debt: temperature overshoot and peak-shaving as risky subprime mortgage lending

Despite the ambitious temperature goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement, the pace of reducing global CO₂ emissions remains sluggish. This creates conditions in which the idea of temperature ‘overshoot and peak-shaving’ is emerging as a possible strategy to meet the Paris goal. An overshoot and peak-shaving scenario rests upon the ‘temporary’ use of speculative solar radiation management (SRM) technologies combined with large-scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR). Whilst some view optimistically the strategic interdependence between SRM and CDR, we argue that this strategy comes with a risk of escalating ‘climate debt’. We explain our position using the logic of debt and the analogy of subprime mortgage lending. In overshoot and peak-shaving scenarios, the role of CDR and SRM is to compensate for delayed mitigation, placing the world in a double debt: ‘emissions debt’ and ‘temperature debt’. Analogously, this can be understood as a combination of ‘subprime mortgage’ (i.e. large-scale CDR) and ‘home-equity-line-of-credit’ (i.e. temporary SRM). With this analogy, we draw some important lessons from the 2007–2009 US subprime mortgage crisis. The analogy signals that the efficacy of temporary SRM cannot be evaluated in isolation of the feasibility of large-scale CDR and that the failure of the overshoot promise will lead to prolonged peak-shaving, masking an ever-rising climate debt. Overshoot and peak-shaving scenarios should not be presented as a secured feasible investment, but rather as a high-risk speculation betting on insecure promises. Obscuring the riskiness of such scenarios is a precipitous step towards escalating a climate debt crisis.

Key policy insights

• The slow progress of mitigation increases the attraction of an ‘overshoot and peak-shaving’ scenario which combines temporary SRM with large-scale CDR

• Following the logic of debt, the role of CDR and SRM in this scenario is to compensate for delayed mitigation, creating a double debt of CO₂ emissions and global temperature

• Using the analogy of subprime lending, this strategy can be seen as offering a combination of subprime mortgage and open-ended ‘line-of-credit’

• Because the ‘success’ of peak-shaving by temporary SRM hinges critically on the overshoot promise of large-scale CDR, SRM and CDR should not be discussed separately