Stakeholders’ participation in the fisheries management decision-making process: Fishers’ perceptions of participation

Public participation is a key ingredient of good governance and there are many advantages of involving stakeholders in the decision-making process. The European Commission identified the lack of stakeholder involvement as one of the major weaknesses of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). As such, the 2002 Reform of the CFP aimed to improve its system of governance by increasing the involvement of stakeholders in decision-making. Over the last decade, Scottish inshore waters have seen an increase in management measures focused on involving fishers, delegating responsibilities and decentralizing management. The present document investigates commercial inshore fishers’ perceptions of participation in the decision-making process and attitudes towards a new management regime – the Inshore Fisheries Groups (IFGs) – which aims to increase participation in and decentralization of inshore fisheries management. A survey was conducted, through face-to-face interviews, and ordered logistic and multiple regression models created to identify which characteristics influence fishers’ perceptions and attitudes. The present analysis concluded that, 5 years subsequent to the reform of the CFP, the majority of inshore fishers perceive themselves not to be consulted or involved in the decision-making process. However, and despite the fact that fishers are not completely certain of the potential of the IFGs to increase their participation in the management process, they have an overall positive attitude towards their implementation.     

Is Europe ready for a results-based approach to fisheries management? The voice of stakeholders

The reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), adopted by the European Union in 2013, aims to achieve sustainable exploitation of marine resources. Beyond the mainstream of stakeholders׳ engagement, the literature increasingly calls for shared accountability in fisheries management. In such scenarios, identifying stakeholders׳ insights becomes critical for a successful design of innovative management approaches. This paper analyses how the stakeholders perceive a results-based management system for four fisheries in different European sea-basins as well as at a pan-European level. The results indicate a need for adaptive and participatory management approaches, building on regional adaptations within transparent and plural frameworks for fisheries. To succeed, the system should explicitly address its associated public and private costs; neither participation nor accountability comes for free.     

Leaning on user-groups: The role of civil society in fisheries governance

Fisheries have long been managed through public–private partnerships based on collaboration between government and user-groups. The alleged benefits of involving the latter—as representatives of civil society—are a management system that is more flexible and legitimate than one based exclusively on top–down command and control. A question that is rarely addressed is whether civil society is up to the task. Are voluntary associations fit—‘technically’ and ‘democratically’—to take on management responsibilities? Assessing the pros and cons of involving civil society in fisheries governance requires a closer look at the role of user-groups in public policy-making. This paper attempts to do that by examining certain aspects of the Norwegian system of fisheries management, focusing—in particular—on the role of its most prominent civil society player: the Norwegian Fishers’ Association. The association has long been a privileged partner, virtually monopolizing the attention and goodwill of government. How has this been justified, and does it still serve its original purpose? As the fishery has changed, so—we contend—has the association: from something akin to a public interest group into what is essentially a ‘trade union’ pursuing the economic interests of its most powerful members. How and why did this change—in goals and priorities—come about, and is it tenable that this particular partnership continues? What lessons, if any, can be drawn from the Norwegian case about the pros and cons of user involvement, interactive governance and the role of civil society in fisheries management?     

A complicated relationship: Stakeholder participation and the ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management

The relationship between stakeholder participation (SP) and the ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management (EBAFM) is often taken for granted, but is actually very complicated. The literature reveals five possible interpretations of this relationship: that they are (1) logically linked; (2) ethically linked; (3) instrumentally linked; (4) complementarily linked and (5) antagonistically linked. We examine these five formulations in the light of recent research on interactions between fisheries and their environment and conclude that the SP/EBAFM relationship manifests itself as predominantly instrumental in character.     

Trust relationships between fishers and government: New challenges for the co-management arrangements in the Dutch flatfish industry

Until the 1990s fisheries were largely managed by the state. Since then, Dutch government and the sector increasingly recognized that a fishing industry cannot be managed effectively without the cooperation and participation of fishers to formulate policy and to implement and enforce laws and regulations. As a result, in the nineties, the existing neo-corporatist arrangement was replaced by a co-management system in the Dutch flatfish fishery. Co-management is often seen as leading to greater procedural legitimacy and subsequently compliance. However, constructing an effective co-management arrangement is not only a matter of building institutions but also a matter of building trust relations between the government and industry. Institutional arrangements such as co-management can contribute to these trust building processes; however, a too strong reliance on institutional arrangements can lead to distrust when new challenges are being faced and institutional arrangements fail to adapt to these changes.     

Limits of governability: Institutional implications for fisheries and coastal governance

Drawing on some recent developments in so-called “interactive governance theory”, it is argued that fisheries and coastal governance is basically a relationship between two systems, which could be termed a “governing system” and a “system-to-be-governed.” The former system is social: it is made up of institutions and steering mechanisms. The latter system is partly natural, partly social: it consists of an ecosystem and the resources that it harbors, as well as a system of users and stakeholders who form political coalitions and institutions among themselves. Obviously, we need to be concerned with the relationship and interaction between the governing system and the system-to-be-governed, which forms a system in its own right. According to governance theory, these systems share similar structural attributes: they are diverse, complex, dynamic and vulnerable. In order for governance to work they must somehow be compatible, in order to be mutually responsive. This is not a matter of natural mechanism but of institutional design by societal actors such as legislative bodies, planning agencies and civic organizations—alone, or in concert. What conditions, mechanisms and institutions are conducive to creating a better rapport between the governing system and the system-to-be-governed? Before we can start this discussion, we need to rethink our basic assumptions of what governance is, what governors do, and what we can expect from governance. How do we get from where we are now to where we want to be? In order to accomplish this we need something other than an instrumental, rational model. We need “a technology of foolishness” that emphasizes institutional experimentation and learning by doing.     

On the role of visualisation in fisheries management

Environmental change has focused the attention of scientists, policy makers and the wider public on the uncertainty inherent in interactions between people and the environment. Governance in fisheries is required to involve stakeholder participation and to be more inclusive in its remit, which is no longer limited to ensuring a maximum sustainable yield from a single stock but considers species and habitat interactions, as well as social and economic issues. The increase in scope, complexity and awareness of uncertainty in fisheries management has brought methodological and institutional changes throughout the world. Progress towards comprehensive, explicit and participatory risk management in fisheries depends on effective communication. Graphic design and data visualisation have been underused in fisheries for communicating science to a wider range of stakeholders. In this paper, some of the general aspects of designing visualisations of modelling results are discussed and illustrated with examples from the EU funded MYFISH project. These infographics were tested in stakeholder workshops, and improved through feedback from that process. It is desirable to convey not just modelling results but a sense of how reliable various models are. A survey was developed to judge reliability of different components of fisheries modelling: the quality of data, the quality of knowledge, model validation efforts, and robustness to key uncertainties. The results of these surveys were visualized for ten different models, and presented alongside the main case study.     

Review of participatory fisheries management arrangements in the European Union

Promoting and attaining sustainable use of resources through community participation is a central tenet of the European Union's (EU) 2013 Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy. A systematic review approach was used to identify participatory fisheries management arrangements within the EU. Following this, the participatory arrangements were categorized based on the nature of the decision-making arrangement, influence and empowerment of the fishing industry. The study identified 40 management arrangements distributed through 8 member states, with a variety of fisheries and institutional settings for participation in fisheries management in the EU. The majority of the partnerships identified are “Functional participation”, i.e., the participatory arrangement is based in pre-determined goals encouraged by higher decision-making levels in order to increase efficiency of management decisions. Interactive partnership was the highest level of participation identified in the systematic review, and is usually more conducive with local arrangements in coastal and small-scale fisheries targeting low mobility species.     

Development of an integrated fisheries co-management framework for new and emerging commercial fisheries in the Canadian Beaufort Sea

The Canadian Beaufort Sea is one of the last places on Earth that has not experienced large-scale commercial fisheries. The aboriginal people of the western Canadian Arctic, the Inuvialuit, have become increasingly concerned about the potential effects of large-scale commercial operations on key subsistence species of fish and marine mammals and the marine ecosystem upon which they depend. A 1984 comprehensive land settlement agreement (treaty) between Canada and the Inuvialuit established a co-management regime for limited aspects of fish and marine mammal resource management, and gave the Inuvialuit rights to subsistence fisheries and existing commercial fisheries but no preference for new commercial fisheries. The Fisheries Joint Management Committee (the fisheries co-management body), the Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation and the Inuvialuit Game Council have developed an integrated fisheries management framework agreement for the review and assessment of any proposed commercial fisheries within the Canadian Beaufort Sea. The agreement provides clarity and transparency for decision making and strengthens the protection of fish stocks. The development of the framework depended upon a history of cooperation between the parties and a bridging initiative by the Fisheries Joint Management Committee and an NGO that brought together the Inuvialuit and the government.     

Punishment and compliance: Exploring scenarios to improve the legitimacy of small-scale fisheries management rules on the Brazilian coast

This study investigated the effects of legal and societal punishment on fishermen's compliance behaviour, according to fishermen's age and level of dependency on fisheries, through the use of interviews and scenarios. Ninety-five fishermen living in a coastal park (Ponta do Tubarão Sustainable Development Reserve) in the Brazilian northeast, where controlled exploitation of natural resources is allowed, took part in this study. The results showed that age alone would not affect compliance, regardless of the level of enforcement. However, it was noticed that the fishermen who claimed to depend on the money provided by fisheries, regardless of their age, were more likely to say that they would not comply, even if enforcement were stricter. The scenario analysis showed that increased monitoring and punishment (including societal pressure) could enhance compliance, especially among younger fishermen, who claimed not to depend solely on fisheries. Therefore, fisheries management should also consider differences in social groups, and not focus solely on the enforcement and punishment mechanisms, assuring that livelihood options that consider different social needs are provided.     

Collaborative fisheries management in the Northeast US: Emerging initiatives and future directions

The nature of participation by fishing organizations in fisheries management in the Northeast US is changing. Evidence of this is the number of groups that are actively seeking opportunities for group governance of marine resources. This article explores emerging collaborative or co-management arrangements in this region (a process whereby decision-making is shared between federal/council level and fishery stakeholder groups) and the shift towards an ecosystem-based approach to the management of marine fisheries.This research suggests that it is an opportune time for the development of a regional policy in the Northeast that provides an enabling environment in support of decentralized governance of federally managed marine fisheries. It also suggests that these initiatives can play a key role in operationalizing ecosystem-based management.     

Institutional and ethical dimensions of resilience in fishing systems: Perspectives from co-managed fisheries in the Pacific Northwest

Resilience defines the ability of a system to retain control of function and structure despite changing conditions. In human-natural systems this is related to the capabilities of social institutions. This paper presents insights into institutional and ethical dimensions of resilience, focusing on case studies in the Pacific Northwest that involve cooperative management of Pacific salmon by tribal, state and federal governments. Several characteristics enhance resilience, including institutional nesting and linkages, responsiveness, flexibility, adaptive capacity, opportunities for cross-cutting cleavages, collaborative problem definition, routinization of conflict, knowledge generation, dissemination and feedback loops, and ethical underpinnings that enlarge the boundaries of community.     

Patterns of fisheries institutional failure and success: Experience from the Southern Gulf of St. Lawrence snow crab fishery,in Nova Scotia,Canada

This paper examines why market and government institutions failed to prevent over fishing in the Southern Gulf snow crab fishery, whereas non-market institutions succeeded. A general conclusion is that the institutional environment in which economic behaviour must be coordinated for successful fisheries management is complex. More specifically, collective action dilemmas arise from the interdependency of human and fish species interactions. However, successful institutions are capable of resolving these dilemmas when they achieve credible commitment. Coordination mechanisms such as co-management contracts, horizontal patterns of communication and win–win negotiations all contribute to building an institutional arrangement in which participants are motivated to comply with conservation objectives.     

Pyramids and roses: Alternative images for the governance of fisheries systems

Governors always have some image of what they are governing and why, and of what their role is. These images are often implicit. They are not reflected upon or discussed in the governance process, yet they have real consequences because they are acted upon. Interactive governance theory argues that image formation is an integral part of governance and that images are made as explicit as possible to avoid self-fulfilment. Such a process needs to be interactive and flexible to allow exploration of alternatives to existing governing images for the purpose of enhancing the governability of fisheries systems. In this paper, we contrast the classical image of the governing system (top down decision-making pyramid) and of the human-in-nature system (top down trophic pyramid) with alternative images (roses and inverted pyramid, respectively) and discuss the implication that these different images have on fisheries governance.     

Network approach for understanding small-scale fisheries governance: The case of the Chilean coastal co-management system

Recent studies have focused on the study of social networks among local resource users, but few have attempted to study co-management networks. The objective of the research was to assess the Chilean shellfish co-management system from an organizational network perspective. Starting with one detailed case study, representatives of 38 small-scale fisher associations from two administrative regions were interviewed to investigate: (1) networks of actors in each co-management case, (2) the functions of these actors in co-management, and (3) fisher perceptions about Chile's co-management arrangement. Results indicate that decision-making is highly centralized and power is concentrated in government, with little horizontal exchange and cooperation among fisher associations. However, the network approach indicates the presence of a rich set of players, some seven sets of actors by function. Grassroots management innovations are hampered by the existing co-management structure, suggesting that the system may benefit from a modification of the policy to allow greater learning-by-doing and flexibility.     

Distributing the bigeye conservation burden in the western and central pacific fisheries

The Western and Central Pacific Ocean is home to the world's most productive tuna fisheries, with the majority of tuna catches occurring inside the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the region's developing coastal States. It is important that these fisheries are managed effectively throughout their range, both within and between EEZs and on the high seas. Unrestrained exploitation in a particular EEZ or on the high seas has the potential to significantly impact on catches elsewhere with potentially devastating consequences for developing coastal States, some of which have few alternate resources. The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) was established in 2004 to manage the region's highly migratory tuna fisheries. However, the WCPFC has since repeatedly failed to adopt conservation and management measures that are sufficient to meet the WCPFC's conservation and sustainable use objectives. This paper analyses catch data from the WCPFC and suggests that the weak position of bigeye (in a strategic political context), the unwillingness of members to compromise their interests and the lack of a transparent framework for distributing the burden of conservation are key factors in the WCPFC's failure to adopt sufficiently strong conservation and management measures.     

The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union and fisheries economics

The revision of the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union in 2003 was communicated in a ‘Roadmap’, including the opinion of the EU Commission on how to reform the fisheries policy. This paper reviews the Roadmap and confronts the opinion and initiatives proposed by the Commission with the ‘conventional’ bioeconomic theory. The purpose is to assess to what extent the lessons of the theory could be found in the Roadmap. Having in mind the complexity of the EU fisheries, the Roadmap, in particular, focuses on fleet management policy with the aim of reducing overcapacity on a community level. This applies as a supplementary means to the conventional fish stock conservation measures. In conclusion, the EU Commission is aware of the lessons learned from the bioeconomic theory.     

Co-management from the top? The roles of policy entrepreneurs and distributive conflict in developing co-management arrangements

This research examines attempts to develop co-management arrangements in the Maine lobster and Chesapeake Bay blue crab fisheries. It finds that the attributes of user groups and resources as well as government support are important in facilitating the development of co-management, but are not sufficient. This study highlights that the process of developing institutions for co-management is lengthy and time consuming and that user groups do not necessarily embrace changes to the status quo. I argue that the nature of distributional conflict and the affiliation of policy entrepreneurs account for variation in the development of co-management regimes in these cases.     

Private property and public interest in fisheries management: the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery

In 1998 a management system based on individual transferable quota (ITQ) was introduced in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery. This marked the continuation of a management trend that has favoured economic efficiency at the cost of reduced employment and greater restrictions on access to the fishery. The authors discuss management trends in the fishery in the context of Tasmania's history, and social and political characteristics, which it is argued, have shaped development of Tasmania's resource management culture. Implications for social equality, economic well-being and environmental sustainability are discussed. In conclusion the difficulty of reforming policy that has been shaped by vested interests and which establishes rent-seeking activity is considered.