Encouraging clean energy investment in developing countries: what role for aid?

A large portion of foreign assistance for climate change mitigation in developing countries is directed to clean energy facilities. To support international mitigation goals, however, donors must make investments that have effects beyond individual facilities. They must reduce barriers to private-sector investment by generating information for developers, improving relevant infrastructure, or changing policies. We examine whether donor agencies target financing for commercial-scale wind and solar facilities to countries where private investment in clean energy is limited and whether donor investments lead to more private investments. On average, we find no positive evidence for these patterns of targeting and impact. Coupled with model results that show feed-in tariffs increase private investment, we argue that donor agencies should reallocate resources to improve policies that promote private investment in developing countries, rather than finance individual clean energy facilities.

Policy relevance

We suggest that international negotiations could usefully shift the focus of climate change finance towards adaptation in exchange for mitigation-improving policy reforms in developing countries. There is little evidence that mitigation-related financing is having broader effects on energy production, so new financial arrangements should be the focus of future negotiations. Additionally, international donors should focus efforts on reforming policies to attract private investment.     

Adaptation and poverty reduction in Mozambique: an opportunity for developing countries to lead§

Climate change disproportionately impacts the world’s poorest countries. A recent World Bank report highlighted that over 100 million people are at risk of falling into extreme poverty as a result of climate change. There is currently a lack of information about how to simultaneously address climate change and poverty. Climate change challenges provide an opportunity for those impacted most to come up with new and innovative technologies and solutions. This article uses an example from Mozambique where local and international partners are working side-by-side, to show how developing countries can simultaneously address climate change and poverty reduction using an ecosystem-based adaptation approach. Using ecosystem-based adaptation, a technique that uses the natural environment to help societies adapt to climate change, developing countries can lead the way to improve climate adaptation globally. This paradigm shift would help developing countries become leaders in ecosystem-based adaptation and green infrastructure techniques and has implications for climate policy worldwide.

POLICY RELEVANCE

The Paris Agreement resulting from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 21st Conference of Parties (COP 21) in December 2015 was rightly lauded for its global commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions. However, COP 21 was also historic because of its call for non-party stakeholders to address climate change, inclusion of a global goal of ‘enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability’, and the United States’ commitment of $800 million to adaptation funding. The combination of recognizing the need for new stakeholders to commit to climate change adaptation, the large impact climate change will have on the developing world, and providing access to funds for climate change adaptation creates a unique opportunity for developing countries to pave the way in adaptation policies in practices. Currently, developing countries are creating National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) for the UNFCCC. Through including a strong component of ecosystem-based adaptation in NAPs, developing countries can shape their countries’ policies, improve local institutions and governments, and facilitate a new generation of innovative leaders. Lessons learned in places like Mozambique can help lead the way in other regions facing similar climatic risks.     

Bypassing the ‘ratification straitjacket’: reviewing US legal participation in a climate agreement

The issue of US ratification of international environmental treaties is a recurring obstacle for environmental multilateralism, including the climate regime. Despite the perceived importance of the role of the US to the success of any future international climate agreement, there has been little direct coverage in terms of how an effective agreement can specifically address US legal participation. This article explores potential ways of allowing for US legal participation in an effective climate treaty. Possible routes forward include the use of domestic legislation such as section 115 (S115) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the use of sole–executive agreements, instead of Senate ratification. Legal participation from the US through sole–executive agreements is possible if the international architecture is designed to allow for their use. Architectural elements such as varying legality and participation across an agreement (variable geometry) could allow for the use of sole–executive agreements. Two broader models for a 2015 agreement with legal participation through sole–executive agreements are constructed based upon these options: a modified pledge and review system and a form of variable geometry composed of number of opt-out, voting-based protocols on specific issues accompanied by bilateral agreements on mitigation commitments with other major emitters through the use of S115 and sole–executive agreements under the Montreal Protocol and Chicago Convention (‘Critical Mass Governance'). While there is no single solution, Critical Mass Governance appears to provide the optimum combination of tools to effectively allow for US legal participation whilst ensuring an effective treaty.

Policy relevance

This article provides some recommendations on how to create an effective, legally binding treaty that allow for US legal participation without Senate approval. Given the recent election of a Republican majority in the US Senate and Congress, increasing willingness of the President to utilize his executive powers, as well as a strong shift in negotiations to appease US interests, the insights of this research are timely and relevant to delegations and other United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) actors. It will also be of use to domestic US actors involved with climate policy by illustrating how to allow for effective and sustainable US multilateral engagement that bypasses domestic political gridlock.     

Non-energy use of fossil fuels and resulting carbon dioxide emissions: bottom–up estimates for the world as a whole and for major developing countries

We present and apply a simple bottom–up model for estimating non-energy use of fossil fuels and resulting CO₂ (carbon dioxide) emissions. We apply this model for the year 2000: (1) to the world as a whole, (2) to the aggregate of Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries, and (3) to the ten non-Annex I countries with the highest consumption of fossil fuels for non-energy purposes. We find that worldwide non-energy use is equivalent to 1,670 ± 120 Mt (megatonnes) CO₂ and leads to 700 ± 90 Mt CO₂ emissions. Around 75% of non-energy use emissions is related to industrial processes. The remainder is attributed to the emission source categories of solvent and other product use, agriculture, and waste. Annex I countries account for 51% (360 ± 50 Mt CO₂) and non-Annex I countries for 49% (340 ± 70 Mt CO₂) of worldwide non-energy use emissions. Among non-Annex I countries, China is by far the largest emitter of non-energy use emissions (122 ± 18 Mt CO₂). Our research deepens the understanding of non-energy use and related CO₂ emissions in countries for which detailed emission inventories do not yet exist. Despite existing model uncertainties, we recommend NEAT-SIMP to inventory experts for preparing correct and complete non-energy use emission estimates for any country in the world.     

‘Green’ on the ground but not in the air: Pro-environmental attitudes are related to household behaviours but not discretionary air travel

The rise in greenhouse gas emissions from air travel could be reduced by individuals voluntarily abstaining from, or reducing, flights for leisure and recreational purposes. In theory, we might expect that people with pro-environmental value orientations and concerns about the risks of climate change, and those who engage in more pro-environmental household behaviours, would also be more likely to abstain from such voluntary air travel, or at least to fly less far. Analysis of two large datasets from the United Kingdom, weighted to be representative of the whole population, tested these associations. Using zero-inflated Poisson regression models, we found that, after accounting for potential confounders, there was no association between individuals’ environmental attitudes, concern over climate change, or their routine pro-environmental household behaviours, and either their propensity to take non-work related flights, or the distances flown by those who do so. These findings contrasted with those for pro-environmental household behaviours, where associations with environmental attitudes and concern were observed. Our results offer little encouragement for policies aiming to reduce discretionary air travel through pro-environmental advocacy, or through ‘spill-over’ from interventions to improve environmental impacts of household routines.     

Revising the ‘host country standard’ principle: a step for China to align its overseas investment with the Paris Agreement

ABSTRACT

China’s overseas investment flows (US$ 183 billion) and stock (US$ 4.7 trillion) reached a record peak in 2016, second only to those of the US. A major cause for concern lies in the environmental sustainability of China’s overseas investment portfolio, which is compounded by the lack of transparency of China’s main development finance arms. We intend in this paper to give an update on the magnitude of green finance in China’s overseas investment and development finance portfolio on the basis of the best available estimates, and to put these figures into a broader perspective of multilateral development banks’ commitments and practices to combat climate change. We derive practical policy recommendations that Chinese development banks could take to further align China’s overseas investment with the 2°C target of the Paris Agreement, with the first step being to revise the ‘host country standard’ principle, to ensure that Chinese development banks use the most stringent of the two environmental standards, abroad or at home.

Key policy insights

• Chinese development banks lend, give or invest between US$ 38 billion and US$ 45 billion every year to developing countries, without either elaborating on, or integrating, the provisions of the Paris Agreement into their investment strategy.

• Regulations and safeguards are much more stringent for China’s domestic investment than for China’s overseas investment, and this stringency gap has been widening over recent years.

• As a step towards aligning Chinese overseas investment with the Paris Agreement, Chinese development banks could revise the ‘host country standard principle’. They could instead choose the highest among the two – recipient country or Chinese domestic – in terms of environmental stringency, consequently harmonizing overseas environmental regulation and safeguards with those that apply domestically.

     

‘This was different’: transferring climate mitigation knowledge practices south to south with the MAPS programme

This article is a case study of the Mitigation Action Plans and Scenarios programme (MAPS) which worked in climate change mitigation and development policy-making spaces in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and South Africa from 2010–2015. The MAPS programme was focused on achieving change in the commitment of southern decision makers to mitigate against climate change through government-mandated, stakeholder processes which generated evidence making a case for a low carbon transition. The article draws on reflective materials generated in the last year of the project. The value of MAPS was found in the well-tested data and evidence-driven scenario building; locally specific and country-driven processes; a culture of knowledge sharing through facilitated communities of practice; the role of professional facilitation in process design and in conducting stakeholder processes; shared experiences of working in the south, and particularly with cultural differences and conflict; and new ways of working south–south with each other, and with donors. These MAPS programme experiences stood in contrast to previous north–south knowledge sharing involvements. Theoretically, the article asks whether MAPS represents southern theory-making (after Connell, 2007). It concludes that through the action-oriented, facilitated co-production way of working on climate change in the south, MAPS represents an understanding of southern theory that challenges the orthodoxy of global knowledge production. MAPS emphasizes the need for theorizing in, and of, the south, and connecting policy and practices.

Key policy insights

• Climate change mitigation work in the south faces poorly resourced, fragmented, under-capacitated governance structures, often in conflicted settings.

• Given conflicted settings, skilled facilitation is an integral part of knowledge-making processes.

• Strong local communities of practice, who undertake learning-by-doing and are connected to ‘stubborn’ development realities, are also key to knowledge-making.

• Intentional co-production of data and evidence enable peer-to-peer learning and the trust-building which is vital to strong communities of practice.

     

Examination of ‘global atmospheric temperature monitoring with satellite microwave measurements’: 2. Analysis of satellite data

Using Microwave Sounding Unit (MSU) channel 2 (Ch. 2, 53.74 GHz) data, Spencer and Christy (1992a) determined that the earth exhibits no temperature trend in the period 1979–90, while other authors find a temperature increase of roughly 0.1 K. Based on a theoretical analysis Prabhakara et al. (1995) showed that the information about the global atmospheric temperature deduced from MSU Ch. 2 observations has a small contamination, T ₂, as a result of the attenuation due to hydrometeors in the atmosphere. A method is developed in this study, that utilizes coincident measurements made by MSU in Ch. 1 (50.3 GHz), to estimate this T ₂ over the global oceans. The magnitude of T ₂ is found to be about 1 K over significant parts of the tropical oceanic rain belts and about 0.25 K over minor portions of the mid-latitude oceanic storm tracks. Due to events such as El Niôo, there is variability from year to year in the rain areas and rain intensity leading to significant change in the patterns of T ₂. The patterns of T ₂ derived for March 82 and March 83 reveal such a change. When averaged over the global oceans, from 50° N to 50° S, T ₂ has a value of 0.25 and 0.29 K for March 1982 and 1983, respectively. Due to these reasons the interannual temperature change derived by Spencer and Christy from MSU Ch. 2 will contain a residual hydrometeor effect. Thus in evaluating decadal trend of the global mean temperature of the order of 0.1 K from MSU Ch. 2 data one has to take into account completely the contamination due to hydrometeors.     

Applying personal carbon trading: a proposed ‘Carbon,Health and Savings System’ for British Columbia,Canada

Addressing climate change requires the synergy of technological, behavioural and market mechanisms. This article proposes a policy framework that integrates the three, deploying personal carbon trading as a key element within a policy portfolio to reduce personal carbon footprints. It draws on policy and human motivation literatures that address the behavioural changes that may be needed in the context of a long-term threat such as climate change. This proposal builds on an analysis of the British Columbia carbon tax, international examples of carbon pricing instruments and strategies for behavioural change such as social networks, loyalty management, mobile apps and gamification. Interviews were conducted with experts in financial services, energy conservation and clean technology, as well as with specialists in climate, health and taxation policy. Their input, together with a review of the theoretical literature and practical case studies, informed the proposed design of a Carbon, Health and Saving System for promoting individual engagement and collective action by linking long-term climate mitigation measures with short-term personal and social goals, including health, recreation and social reinforcement.

Policy Relevance

This article identifies areas for climate policy innovation and recommends policies that can support, promote and enable personal carbon budgeting and collective action. Although this study is focused on British Columbia, both the input provided by key opinion leaders and the proposed framework are applicable to other jurisdictions.

This policy proposal shows how personal carbon trading could work in the context of a Canadian province with an existing climate mitigation policy. It also specifies a minimum viable product approach to establishing the economic, social and technological foundations for personal carbon trading.

The Carbon, Health and Saving System identifies the technologies and stakeholders needed to implement personal carbon trading, and offers the possibility of motivating a widespread conscious human response in the event that carbon taxation proves insufficient to generate economic adaptation in a changing climate.     

Assessing the ‘usability’ of climate change research for decision-making: A case study of the Canadian International Polar Year

The creation of ‘usable science’ is widely promoted by many environmental change focused research programs. Few studies however, have examined the relationship between research conducted as part of such programs and the decision-making outcomes that the work is supposed to advance, and is constrained by limited methodological development on how to empirically assess the ‘usability’ of science. Herein, this paper develops a conceptual model and assessment rubric to quantitatively and systematically evaluate the usability of climate change research for informing decision-making. We focus on the process through which data is collected, analyzed and reported and examine the extent to which key principles of usable science are integrated into project design, using grant proposals as our data source. The approach is applied to analyze climate change research conducted as part of the International Polar Year in Canada, with 23 projects identified as having explicit goals to inform decision-making.While the creation of usable science was promoted by funded projects in the International Polar Year, this was not generally reflected in research design: fewer than half determined objectives with input of decision makers, decision context was not widely considered, and knowledge users were not widely reported to be engaged in assessing the quality of data or in resolving conflict in evidence. The importance of science communication was widely emphasized, although only 8/23 projects discussed tailoring specific results for end user needs. Thus while International Polar Year research has made significant advances in understanding the human dimensions of Arctic climate change, key attributes necessary for determining success in linking science to decision-making (pertinence, quality, timeliness) were not captured by many projects. Integrating these attributes into research design from the outset is essential for creating usable science, and needs to be at the forefront of future research programs which aim to advance societal outcomes. The framework for assessing usability here, while developed and tested in an Arctic climate change context, has broader applicability in the general environmental change field.     

Virtual water ‘flows’ of the Nile Basin, 1998–2004: A first approximation and implications for water security

This paper interprets an initial approximation of the ‘trade’ in virtual water of Nile Basin states in terms of national water security. The virtual water content (on the basis of weight) of select recorded crop and livestock trade between 1998 and 2004 is provided, and analysed for each state separately, for the Southern Nile and Eastern Nile states as groups, and for the basin states as a whole. To the extent that the datasets allow, the distinction between rainfed and irrigated production is maintained. During the period under study, Nile Basin states ‘exported’ about 14,000 Mm³ of primarily rainfed-derived virtual water outside of the basin annually and ‘imported’ roughly 41,000 Mm³/y. The ‘imports’ are considered to have played a key role in filling the freshwater deficits of Egypt and Sudan, and represent a third of the flow of the Nile River itself. Analysis of food trade within the basin shows that the equivalent of small rivers of water used to raise coffee and tea ‘flow’ from the highlands around Lake Victoria to Egypt and Sudan. Because the bulk of these ‘flows’ derive from rainfed agriculture, the virtual water ‘traded’ annually between the Nile Basin states is not considered to represent a significant demand on the water resources of the basin, nor to significantly remedy the freshwater deficits of the arid basin states. The importance of soil water and rainfed farming is in improving water security is highlighted. The limitations and merits of the inter-state basin-wide approach are also discussed. By highlighting the magnitude of water leaving and entering states in its virtual form, the approach obliges policy-makers to think beyond the basin and reconsider the concept of water security within broader political, environmental, social and economic forces.     

Differentiating Future Commitments on the Basis of Countries’ Relative Historical Responsibility for Climate Change: Uncertainties in the ‘Brazilian Proposal’ in the Context of a Policy Implementation

During the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, Brazil proposed allocating the greenhouse gas emission reductions of Annex I Parties according to the relative effect of a country’s historical emissions on global temperature increase. This paper analyses the impact of scientific uncertainties and of different options in policy implementation (policy choices) on the contribution of countries’ historical emissions to indicators of historical responsibility for climate change. The influence of policy choices was found to be at least as large as the impact of the scientific uncertainties analysed here. Building on this, the paper then proceeds to explore the implications of applying the Brazilian Proposal as a climate regime for differentiation of future commitments on the global scale combined with an income threshold for participation of the non-Annex I regions. Under stringent climate targets, such a regime leads to high emission reductions for Annex I regions by 2050, in particular for Europe and Japan. The income threshold assumptions strongly affect the Annex I reductions, even more than the impact of another burden-sharing key. A variant of the Brazilian Proposal, allocating emission reductions on the basis of cumulative emissions since 1990, would lead to a more balanced distribution of emission reductions.