The global climate change mitigation strategy REDD: monitoring costs and uncertainties jeopardize economic benefits

REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) has been suggested as a climate change mitigation strategy that is based on the philosophy to reward countries for reducing their deforestation and forest degradation by financial benefits via the generation of carbon credits. While the potential of REDD has been widely discussed, minor attention has been drawn to the implication of uncertainties and costs associated with the estimation of carbon stock changes. To raise awareness of these issues, we conducted a simulation study for a set of countries that show high to low deforestation rates, which demonstrates that the potential to generate benefits from REDD depends highly on the magnitude of the total error while assessment costs and the price of carbon credits play a minor role. For countries with low deforestation rates REDD is obviously not an option for generating benefits as they would need to implement monitoring systems that are able to estimate carbon stock changes with a total error well below 1 %. Total errors feasible under operational monitoring systems are only sufficient to gain revenues from REDD-regimes under high deforestation rates.     

Does the CDM discourage emission reduction targets in advanced developing countries?

Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can voluntarily participate in climate change mitigation through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in which industrialized countries, in order to meet their mitigation commitments, can buy emission reduction credits from projects in developing countries. Before its implementation, developing-country experts opposed the CDM, arguing that it would sell-off their countries’ cheapest emission reduction options and force them to invest in more expensive measures to meet their future reduction targets. This ‘low-hanging fruit’ argument is analysed empirically by comparing marginal abatement cost curves. Emissions abatement costs and potentials for CDM projects are estimated for different technologies in eight countries, using capital budgeting tools and information from project documentation. It is found that the CDM is not yet capturing a large portion of the identified abatement potential in most countries. Although the costs of most emissions reduction opportunities grasped are below the average credit price, there are still plenty of available low-cost opportunities. Mexico and Argentina appear to use the CDM predominantly for harvesting the low-hanging fruit, whereas in the other countries more expensive projects are accessing the CDM. This evidence at first sight challenges the low-hanging fruit claim, but needs to be understood in the light of the barriers for the adoption of low-cost abatement options.     

Lessons from carbon markets for designing an effective REDD architecture

Consideration of incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is now formally part of the post-2012 climate change negotiations. A significant amount of financing will be required to make REDD a success, but the design of the REDD architecture can determine the availability of capital. Therefore, in negotiations this should be considered at the same time and on an equal basis with methodological and political considerations. Detailed consideration is given to the type of commitment, the financing mechanism, the level of incentive allocation, and the fungibility of carbon credits, in the context of experience from existing carbon markets. We conclude that a financially successful REDD mechanism would be based on a strong regulatory framework with mandatory targets, market-based, with some degree of project-level crediting, creating fungible REDD credits, subject to a cap.     

A CER discounting scheme could save climate change regime after 2012

We can generate a net global GHG emission reduction from developing countries (in an UNFCCC term, non-Annex 1 Parties) without imposing targets on them, if we discount CERs generated from CDM projects. The CER discounting scheme means that a part or all of CDM credits, i.e., CERs, made by developing countries through unilateral CDM projects will be retired rather than sold to developed countries to increase their emissions. It is not feasible to impose certain forms of target (whether sectoral or intensity targets) on non-Annex 1 whose emission trend is hard to predict and whose industrial structure is undergoing a rapid change.

Instead of imposing targets (a command and control approach), we should apply market instruments in generating a net global emission reduction from non-Annex 1. Since April 2005 when the first unilateral CDM was approved by the CDM Executive Board, CDM has been functioning as a market mechanism to provide incentives for developing countries to initiate their own emission reduction projects. As CDM is the only market mechanism engaging developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol, we should try to re-design CDM so that it can generate net global emission reductions by introducing the idea of discounting CERs. But in order to produce meaningful GHG emission reductions by discounting CERs, the project scope of CDM has to be expanded by relaxing project additionality criteria while maintaining strict technical additionality criteria. Agreeing on the CERs Discounting Scheme will have a better political chance than agreeing on imposing emission reduction targets on developing countries.     

The Australia clause and REDD: a cautionary tale

If a binding agreement can be reached on a post-2012 international climate regime, it is likely to include the phased introduction of a market-linked mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD). Under such a scheme, countries that reduce net REDD emissions below a pre-set baseline would receive credits that could be sold in carbon markets and used by purchasing nations to meet their international mitigation obligations. This paper draws on the Australian experience with deforestation to identify some of the issues that might obstruct progress on REDD. For the past 20 years, Australia has had the highest rate of deforestation in the developed world; ~416,000 ha of forests were cleared annually between 1990 and 2009, resulting in the emission of almost 80 MtCO₂-e/yr. It is also the only developed country that will rely on reduced deforestation emissions as the primary way of meeting its quantified emissions target under the Kyoto Protocol. Australia’s approach to deforestation issues provides valuable insights into the difficulties an international REDD scheme might encounter.     

Financing climate adaptation with a credit mechanism: initial considerations

Climate mitigation credits have mobilized considerable resources for projects in developing countries, but similar funding to adapt to climate change has yet to emerge. The Copenhagen Accord targets up to US$50 billion per year in adaptation funding, but commitments to date have been trivial compared to what is needed. Although there are some studies and suggestions, it remains unclear where the money will come from and how it will be disbursed. Beyond this, many development experts believe that the main hurdle in climate adaptation is effective implementation. A framework, based on the polluter pays principle, is presented here regarding the mobilization of resources for adaptation in developing countries using market mechanisms. It is assumed that mitigation and adaptation are at least partly fungible in terms of long-term global societal costs and benefits, and that quantifying climate vulnerability reductions is possible at least sometimes. The scheme's benefits include significant, equitable and flexible capital flows, and improved and more efficient resource allocation and verification procedures that incentivize sustained project management. Challenges include overcoming political resistance to historical responsibility-based obligations and scepticism of market instruments, and, critically, quantifying climate impact costs and verifying investments for vulnerability reduction credits.     

Adaptation financing in a global agreement: is the adaptation levy appropriate?

The climate negotiations recognize that adequate and additional funds are needed to assist adaptation in developing countries. This article analyses whether a future 2% or any higher adaptation levy (AL) can achieve this, whether it causes – as it is a tax on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – a significant excess burden, and how it alters the relation between adaptation financing and mitigation. While former studies have focused on single AL levels, this article determines the transfers from the CDM and the AL for a range of emission reduction targets and AL levels with a partial equilibrium model based on marginal abatement cost estimates for 2020. Revenues from a 2% AL are negligible and remain inadequate for ambitious emission reductions and an AL that maximizes transfers (e.g. US$15 billion for 30% reduction target). Revenues are mostly subtracted from CDM transfers, so little additional funds are raised (e.g. less than $2.4 billion for 30% reduction target). Adaptation financing increases disproportionally with more stringent reduction targets for a rising levy, and the share of Annex I country expenditures devoted to transfers increases slightly. Both effects are only small. The excess burden is larger than 85% of the additional funds.

Policy relevance

Financing adaptation in developing countries has become a cornerstone of a global climate agreement. The mechanism for raising additional funds has not yet been determined. This article assesses the potential of upscaling one option that is already in place under the Kyoto Protocol: the 2% AL on the CDM. It is estimated that even a much higher AL does not generate substantial additional funds, mainly redistributes transfers within non-Annex I countries, does so at social costs in the same order of magnitude as additional funds, and increases the share of Annex I country expenditures devoted to transfers. It is unwise to link mitigation and adaptation as CDM and AL jointly do, since this taxes a beneficial activity. Financial instruments with transfers that decrease with or are independent from climate protection would be preferable.     

Sector-based approach to the post-2012 climate change policy architecture

A sectoral approach to GHG emissions reductions in developing countries is proposed as a key component of the post-2012 climate change mitigation framework. In this approach, the ten highest-emitting developing countries in the electricity and other major industrial sectors pledge to meet voluntary, ‘no-lose’ GHG emissions targets in these sectors. No penalties are incurred for failing to meet a target, but emissions reductions achieved beyond the target level earn emissions reduction credits (ERCs) that can be sold to industrialized nations. Participating developing countries establish initial ‘no-lose’ emissions targets, based upon their national circumstances, from sector-specific energyintensity benchmarks that have been developed by independent experts. Industrialized nations then offer incentives for the developing countries to adopt more stringent emissions targets through a ‘Technology Finance and Assistance Package’, which helps to overcome financial and other barriers to technology transfer and deployment. These sectorspecific energy-intensity benchmarks could also serve as a means for establishing national economy-wide targets in developed countries in the post-2012 regime. Preliminary modelling of a hybrid scenario, in which Annex I countries adopt economy-wide absolute GHG emissions targets and high-emitting developing countries adopt ‘no-lose’ sectoral targets, indicates that such an approach significantly improves the likelihood that atmospheric concentrations of CO₂ can be stabilized at 450 ppmv by the end of the century.     

发达国家2020年前应对气候变化行动和支持力度盘点

在应对气候变化问题上,发达国家有率先减排和为发展中国家提供气候资金支持的义务。根据《联合国气候变化框架公约》相关成果,发达国家做出了到2020年减排温室气体和每年动员1000亿美元气候资金的承诺,综合相关数据信息盘点了上述承诺的实施进展,结果显示发达国家2020年减排目标力度不足,核算规则不清晰,部分国家缺乏减排进展,气候资金的概念和范围尚有争议,现有气候资金规模与承诺仍有较大差距,《联合国气候变化框架公约》下资金机制作用仍待加强,并且发展中国家需要更大规模的气候资金支持。发达国家2020年承诺兑现不力不利于巩固多边进程各方互信,且有向发展中国家转嫁责任之嫌。为此,建议中国在国际气候谈判进程中,依托谈判联盟,进一步敦促发达国家履行2020年承诺并提高力度。     

Escaping the climate policy uncertainty trap: options contracts for REDD+

Climate policy uncertainty significantly hinders investments in low-carbon technologies, and the global community is behind schedule to curb carbon emissions. Strong actions will be necessary to limit the increase in global temperatures, and continued delays create risks of escalating climate change damages and future policy costs. These risks are system-wide, long-term and large-scale and thus hard to diversify across firms. Because of its unique scale, cost structure and near-term availability, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD+) has significant potential to help manage climate policy risks and facilitate the transition to lower greenhouse gas emissions. ‘Call’ options contracts in the form of the right but not the obligation to buy high-quality emissions reduction credits from jurisdictional REDD+ programmes at a predetermined price per ton of CO₂ could help unlock this potential despite the current lack of carbon markets that accept REDD+ for compliance. This approach could provide a globally important cost-containment mechanism and insurance for firms against higher future carbon prices, while channelling finance to avoid deforestation until policy uncertainties decline and carbon markets scale up.

Key policy insights

• Climate policy uncertainty discourages abatement investments, exposing firms to an escalating systemic risk of future rapid increases in emission control expenditures.

• This situation poses a risk of an abatement ‘short squeeze,’ paralleling the case in financial markets when prices jump sharply as investors rush to square accounts on an investment they have sold ‘short’, one they have bet against and promised to repay later in anticipation of falling prices.

• There is likely to be a willingness to pay for mechanisms that hedge the risks of abruptly rising carbon prices, in particular for ‘call’ options, the right but not the obligation to buy high-quality emissions reduction credits at a predetermined price, due to the significantly lower upfront capital expenditure compared to other hedging alternatives.

• Establishing rules as soon as possible for compliance market acceptance of high-quality emissions reductions credits from REDD+ would facilitate REDD+ transactions, including via options-based contracts, which could help fill the gap of uncertain climate policies in the short and medium term.

     

Aligning climate action with the self-interest and short-term dominated priorities of decision-makers

The global and long-term nature of climate change conflicts with the self-interest and short-term dominated priorities of decision-makers. Climate change mitigation makes sense at the global level, but not at the level of the individual decision-maker. This conflict has been and remains the main obstacle to effective global cooperation and mitigation. This paper proposes a framework that aligns climate action with short-term self-interest through results-based payments to governments. Its key components are: determining an emission benchmark for each country as well as a price for carbon saving; paying countries annually for reducing emissions below their respective benchmark; a new international fund to finance these annual payments by borrowing capital from private investors; and repaying borrowings in the long-term through payments made by countries to the fund based on a pre-determined allocation mechanism. This framework would offer important benefits over an approach focused on allocating climate action or a carbon budget among countries. These include the improved prospect of reaching an effective climate agreement and delivering fast and dramatic mitigation thanks to stronger political commitment, the transformation of short-term self-interest from an obstacle into a driver of climate action, and the additional financing created. The paper also proposes a pilot scheme focusing on hydrofluorocarbon emissions with a considerably lower financing requirement. This offers the possibility of an alternative financing mechanism, and thus a faster and more straightforward implementation path. Short-term financial incentives offered to governments could turn policy action from a burden into an opportunity from their perspective unlocking a huge potential for timely mitigation.

Key policy insights

• A new international framework that offers short-term, results-based payments to governments to promote mitigation action could lead to much more effective global mitigation and international cooperation.

• The financing of such an approach could be solved through a novel financing structure, backed by the long-term commitments of participating countries and thus aligning the timeframe of the financial costs of mitigation with its climate benefits.

• The effectiveness of results-based payments and the concept behind this new approach could be proven through a pilot scheme focusing on hydrofluorocarbon emissions.

     

减少发展中国家毁林及森林退化排放(REDD)的各方观点及对策建议

减少发展中国家毁林及森林退化的温室气体排放已成为《联合国气候变化框架公约》谈判的重要议题。从该公约的第十一次缔约方大会(COP11)以来,各缔约国就此议题提出了各自的观点,除在方法学等问题上存在争议外,在激励机制和毁林纳入清洁发展机制(CDM)与否上也存在分歧,巴西、中美洲及非洲的发展中国家希望通过基金的方式获得额外的资金和技术支持,而美国、澳大利亚和欧盟等发达国家却更倾向于CDM市场机制。结合中国森林管理方面的现状,分析了中国在此议题上可能受到的影响并提出了谈判的对策建议。     

Creating incentives for avoiding further deforestation: the nested approach

Since 2005, Parties to the UNFCCC have been negotiating policy options for incentivizing reductions of (greenhouse gas) emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) in a future climate regime. Proposals on how to operationalize REDD range from market-based to pure fund-based approaches. Most of the current proposals suggest accounting for REDD at the national level. Accounting for emission reductions and implementing policy reform for curbing deforestation will take time and imply high levels of technical and institutional capacity. Therefore it is essential that developing countries receive sufficient support to implement national REDD programmes. To save time and ensure prompt action in reducing deforestation, a REDD approach is proposed that integrates project-level and subnational REDD schemes into national-level accounting. This ‘nested approach’ can achieve meaningful reductions in GHG emissions from improved forest governance and management, while allowing for an immediate and broad participation by developing countries, civil society and the private sector.     

全球长期减排目标与碳排放权分配原则

全球长期减排目标将对世界未来的碳排放形成严重制约,减排义务的分担原则涉及各国的发展空间,事关根本利益。部分发达国家倡导人均排放趋同原则,回避发达国家的历史责任,中国等发展中国家提出人均累积排放趋同原则,强调公平性。按人均累积排放量计算,发达国家自工业革命以来的CO₂排放量已远超出其到2050年前应有的限额,其当前和今后相当长时期的高人均排放都将继续挤占发展中国家的排放空间。因此,发达国家在哥本哈根会议的中近期减排承诺中必须深度减排,以实现全球长期减排目标下的排放轨迹,并为发展中国家留有必要的发展空间。同时必须对发展中国家给予充足的资金和技术支持,作为对其过度挤占发展中国家发展空间的补偿,使发展中国家能够在可持续发展框架下,提高应对气候变化的能力。我国在对外坚持公平原则,努力争取合理的排放空间的同时,对内要加强向低碳经济转型,努力实现保护全球气候和国内可持续发展的双赢。     

Characteristics of forest carbon credit transactions in the voluntary carbon market

The voluntary carbon market allows participants to go beyond regulatory carbon offsetting. Recent developments have improved the transparency and credibility of voluntary carbon trading, and forest carbon credit transactions constitute more than half of trade volume. Its workings, however, have not been sufficiently explored in the literature. This study analyses the characteristics of forest carbon credit transactions in the voluntary carbon market using frequency analysis and logistic regression analysis. The results reveal that the co-benefits of forest carbon projects are an important factor influencing carbon credit transactions. From the higher transaction ratio of credits from CCB Standards-labelled projects and projects using co-benefit-oriented standards, it can be inferred that credits with potential for co-benefits (e.g. fostered corporate social responsibility, social cohesion of local communities and voluntary leadership, and positive environmental impacts) are preferred to those focusing exclusively on emission reduction in the voluntary carbon market. The findings of this study suggest that developing co-benefits is important for strengthening the market competitiveness of forest carbon credits in the voluntary carbon market. Additionally, unlike the compliance carbon market, in the voluntary carbon market stringent carbon standards do not always guarantee credit transaction performance.

POLICY RELEVANCE

After UNFCCC COP-21, the global society agreed to acknowledge various forms of international carbon crediting mechanisms, and noted the significance of greenhouse gas emissions reduction for sustainable development and environmental integrity through the Paris Agreement. Moreover, the agreement encouraged both REDD+ activities in developing countries and supports from developed countries. Additionally, co-benefits of forest carbon projects are important for credit transaction in the global voluntary carbon market. Under the new climate regime, co-benefits of forest carbon projects are expected to gain attention in the carbon market. To promote the social, economic, and environmental co-benefits of forest carbon projects, the introduction of an objective co-benefit assessment and certification system should be reviewed at the national level.     

What makes a ‘REDD’ country?

Despite remaining uncertainties, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD) projects are being planned and implemented across the tropics, primarily targeting countries with high forest cover and high deforestation rates. However, there is growing recognition that REDD planning requires a broadened approach; a future REDD mechanism should incentivise emissions reduction in all developing forested countries, and should address critical non-carbon dimensions of REDD implementation—quality of forest governance, conservation priorities, local rights and tenure frameworks, and sub-national project potential. When considering this broader suite of factors, different REDD priorities can emerge, including in countries with low forest cover that would be overlooked by conventional site selection criteria. Using the Philippines as a case study, the paper highlights the importance of an enabling environment to REDD implementation, and presents a more comprehensive and inclusive approach for thinking about what comprises a “REDD country.”     

Rights to carbon and payments for services rendered under REDD+: Options for the case of Mexico

Mexico is relatively advanced in its preparation for international policy on Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) and has many of the pre-conditions needed to support a community approach in the implementation of a national REDD+ programme, particularly as regards tenure of forests and experience with community forest management and PES schemes, although these conditions do not pertain everywhere. One critical issue that is yet to be resolved concerns rights to carbon credits and distribution of the financial benefits flowing from REDD+. We demonstrate that attribution of carbon credits from reduced deforestation and degradation at the community level is virtually impossible from a technical viewpoint, since these credits are counterfactual. Payments based on assessment of performance of each community in terms of such reductions would moreover be inequitable and inefficient. Flat rate payments in return for agreed improvements in management are likely to be more motivating and much easier to administer. However, increases in carbon stock (forest enhancement) can be physically measured on site, and could be more easily attributed to each individual community. We therefore propose a system in which reduced deforestation and degradation are considered environmental services, with credits accruing to national government. The financial value of the credits may be used to finance flat rate payments to communities who agree to implement improved management. On the other hand, credits for forest enhancement, which reflect measurable increases in carbon in the communities’ trees, would be considered environmental goods. These should be considered the direct property of the owners of the forest (in the same sense as wood or poles) and it would be possible for communities to sell these credits themselves. We acknowledge however that many other problems face implementation of REDD+ in Mexico, and provide a number of important examples.     

The impact of surplus units from the first Kyoto period on achieving the reduction pledges of the Cancún Agreements

Countries with emission levels below their emission allowances have surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) or other emission credits. Under the Kyoto Protocol, these surplus credits may effectively be carried from the first to a following commitment period. In the climate negotiations, various rules for carry-over and sale of surplus allowances have been put forward. This paper analyses the effect of these options on the reduction pledges for 2020, taking into account the estimated credits from the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation projects, and land-use activities for the first commitment period. For current Kyoto Protocol rules of unlimited carry-over of surplus allowances and limited carry-over of other credits, the environmental effectiveness of reduction pledges could be seriously undermined. For the group of countries that showed a willingness to participate in a second commitment period, it could imply that instead of an aggregated 2020 target resulting from the pledges of 18 to 28?% below 1990 levels by 2020, their emissions could return to business-us-usual emission projections. For the EU, a 30?% target by 2020 could imply higher emissions compared to a 20?% target, if surplus allowances would be used for achieving the 30?% but not for the 20?% target. Restricting the use of Kyoto surplus units to domestic use only, would limit the problem, but still seriously undermine the effectiveness of 2020 reduction targets.     

巴黎协定背景下全球减排博弈模拟研究

构建了具有7个国家集团的全球多国家集团气候博弈集成评估模拟系统,针对《巴黎协定》背景下各国至2050年以及2100年的减排目标,分别对减排博弈的纳什均衡、博弈不确定性以及外部政策对减排博弈的影响展开了模拟分析。研究发现：在基准情景下,全球各国将在2030年后均选择不减排策略,全球至2100年升温达到2.62℃;而模型参数的不确定性也未能突破全球零减排的纳什均衡;而仅当在全球范围内对不减排采取惩罚措施时,全球零减排的纳什均衡点被打破。但在当前《巴黎协定》减排承诺下,为达到2℃的温控目标,加大2030—2050年的减排幅度至关重要,否则全球将在2040年左右突破2℃阈值。     

IPCC AR6报告解读:强化技术和管理创新的交通运输部门减碳路径北大核心CSCD

IPCC第六次评估报告第三工作组报告交通运输章评估了该行业温室气体的减缓措施和转型路径。1990年以来,全球交通运输部门温室气体排放量一直增长,2019年已经成为全球第四大排放源,仅次于电力、工业以及农业、林业和其他土地利用(AFOLU)部门,其增长速度超过其他最终用途行业。报告强调了交通减排的重要性,主要的减排措施包括三方面:首先是减少需求,其次是对陆路交通部门进行脱碳,再次是对重型的水运和航空运输等进行脱碳。评估的多种燃料和动力技术处于不同的商业化水平,它们未来应用时间节点和规模各有不同。对于陆路交通来说,需要继续推进电气化;对于水运和航空来说需要进一步应用低碳技术,并优化国际管理机制;从中长期来看,所有部门都需要强调运输服务需求管理和运输效率的提升。情景相关的文献评述分析表明,全球温升目标要求全经济部门采取减排措施,特别是交通电气化的减排潜力在很大程度上取决于电力部门的脱碳。如果不采取减缓措施,交通运输部门排放在2050年可能增长65%(相对2010年);如果成功实施减缓战略,该部门的排放量将减少68%,这也与全球1.5℃温升目标要求相一致。关于这些减缓措施的分析和判断,对我国交通运输部门实现碳中和与碳达峰具有重要的参考意义。