Accounting for flexibility against uncertain baselines: lessons from case studies in the eastern European energy sector

The Kyoto Protocol defines two project-based flexibility mechanisms: joint implementation (JI) and the clean development mechanism (CDM). The main methodological problem associated with both these mechanisms is the choice of an appropriate baseline: since the baseline is, by definition, counterfactual, it imposes considerable uncertainty on the accounting framework. Little work to date has been carried out on trying to estimate how large this uncertainty might be for particular project types. This paper aims to fill this gap by proposing an approach to baseline construction which explicitly acknowledges this uncertainty. This approach is illustrated through the examination of pilot JI projects in the energy sector in eastern Europe, and then discussed in terms of its implications for climate policy. The results presented are estimates of the range of counterfactual uncertainty in greenhouse gas emission reductions based on the construction of a number of possible baselines for each project. This range is found to be about ±35% for demand side projects, ±45% for heat supply projects, ±55% for cogeneration projects, and ±60% for electricity supply projects. Estimates of uncertainty in the costs of the pilot projects are also found to be high. The paper discusses the problems arising from such large uncertainty and starts to indicate how this uncertainty may be managed.     

Transaction costs of the Kyoto Mechanisms

Transaction costs will reduce the attractiveness of the Kyoto Mechanisms compared to domestic abatement options. Especially the project-based mechanisms Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) are likely to entail considerable costs of baseline development, verification and certification. The Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) pilot phase and the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) programme give indications about the level of these costs. Under current estimates of world market prices for greenhouse gas emission permits, projects with annual emission reductions of less than 50,000 t CO₂ equivalent are unlikely to be viable; for micro projects transaction costs can reach several hundred € per t CO₂ equivalent. Thus, the Marrakech Accord rule to have special rules for small scale CDM projects makes sense, even if the thresholds chosen advantage certain project types; projects below 1000 t CO₂ equivalent per year should get further exemptions. An alternative solution with no risk for the environmental credibility of the projects would be to subsidise baseline setting and charge lower, subsidised fees for small projects for the different steps of the CDM/second track JI project cycle.     

Spain: words that succeed and climate policies that fail

Abstract

The two project-based Kyoto mechanisms, joint implementation (JI) and the clean development mechanism (CDM), require a determination of the “baseline”, the development of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the absence of the project. This paper examines, whether absolute (given in tCO₂ equivalent) or relative baselines (“benchmarks”, given, e.g. in tCO₂ equivalent/MWh) should be applied for JI/CDM projects in the energy sector. Accuracy of the GHG emission reduction and manageability of GHG emission balances are used as evaluation criteria. The results show that relative baselines are a more accurate instrument for the estimation of emission reductions in JI/CDM projects in the energy sector without posing significant additional risks to the management of GHG emission balances for large entities. In comparison to absolute baselines, relative baselines indicate in a more realistic and conservative manner the amount of emission reductions obtained in the energy system and give more appropriate incentives to project sponsors. The additional risks of relative baselines are likely to be small compared to the normal deviation of the domestic/internal GHG emissions. The findings are in line with the Marrakesh Accords, which set restrictions to application of absolute baselines.     

Application of the Multiple Benchmark System (MBS) to selected case study projects

Abstract

Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have been established under the Kyoto Protocol as project-based instruments to mitigate greenhouse gases of the industrialized countries to the levels imposed by their Kyoto commitments. An unresolved issue associated with the implementation of these two flexibility mechanisms, concerns the choice of the appropriate baseline for calculating the emission reductions in JI or CDM projects. This article describes a computerized tool that constructs and compares different types of standardized baselines and benchmarks. The analysis focuses on the suitability of several different types of benchmarks for assessing the emission reductions of certain types of projects. The analysis is also expanded into a discussion of the extent to which benchmarks reduce the crediting of non-additional projects and limit the risk of missed additional investments. This tool has been applied to actual JI and CDM projects in the Russian Federation and Indonesia.     

Joint implementation and EU accession countries

The EU accession countries have a high potential for low cost greenhouse gas emission reduction. As they cannot join the “bubble” agreement for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, project-based Joint Implementation (JI) could be a powerful strategy to integrate them into the EU climate policy strategy. An important question is whether the acquis communautaire will be used to define the baseline for the calculation of emission reductions from JI projects. A problem is that the grace periods for several environmental sectors differ considerably among countries. The EU should help accession countries to establish a predictable legal framework for JI preventing in this way the current legal uncertainty regarding JI procedures.     

Searching for baselines constructing joint implementation project emission reductions

Joint implementation of emission reductions by countries is an important component of the Kyoto Protocol. The calculation of emission reductions from projects requires the definition of baselines that describe what would have happened in the absence of the JI projects. Baselines do not occur and are described as counterfactual. This paper applies a sociological perspective to analyse the arguments used to support different baselines by the actors involved in climate change policy. It concludes that environmental arguments should be given prominence in how baselines are defined to ensure that the environmental objectives of the Framework Convention on Climate Change are preserved.     

Implications of early action for JI baselines

Abstract

This article discusses possible implications of early Joint Implementation (JI) action. Some projects which would otherwise be non-additional during the first commitment period, can become additional by implementing them before 2008 through early JI. For example, several environmental investments that will be mandatory under the European Union (EU) Acquis Communautaire as of, e.g. 2008 or 2010 could be carried out earlier than that with early JI action. As such, candidate countries could partly finance the accession process through JI credits and their environmental standards would earlier be in line with the Acquis. The theoretical risk that projects would have to follow a slow track if JI parties are not eligible for the fast track is not large for JI hosts that are candidate for EU membership.     

Implications of early action for JI baselines

This article discusses possible implications of early Joint Implementation (JI) action. Some projects which would otherwise be non-additional during the first commitment period, can become additional by implementing them before 2008 through early JI. For example, several environmental investments that will be mandatory under the European Union (EU) Acquis Communautaire as of, e.g. 2008 or 2010 could be carried out earlier than that with early JI action. As such, candidate countries could partly finance the accession process through JI credits and their environmental standards would earlier be in line with the Acquis. The theoretical risk that projects would have to follow a slow track if JI parties are not eligible for the fast track is not large for JI hosts that are candidate for EU membership.     

The contribution of forest carbon credit projects to addressing the climate change challenge

This article addresses the question of how forestry projects, given the recently improved standards for the accounting of carbon sequestration, can benefit from existing and emerging carbon markets in the world. For a long time, forestry projects have been set up for the purpose of generating carbon credits. They were surrounded by uncertainties about the permanence of carbon sequestration in trees, potential replacement of deforestation due to projects (leakage), and how and what to measure as sequestered carbon. Through experience with Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) forestry projects, albeit limited, and with forestry projects in voluntary carbon markets, considerable improvements have been made with accounting of carbon sequestration in forests, resulting in a more solid basis for carbon credit trading. The scope of selling these credits exists both in compliance markets, although currently with strong limitations, and in voluntary markets for offsetting emissions with carbon credits. Improved carbon accounting methods for forestry investments can also enhance the scope for forestry in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that countries must prepare under the Paris Agreement.

POLICY RELEVANCE

This article identifies how forestry projects can contribute to climate change mitigation. Forestry projects have addressed a number of challenges, like reforestation, afforestation on degraded lands, and long-term sustainable forest management. An interesting new option for forestry carbon projects could be the NDCs under the Paris Agreement in December 2015. Initially, under CDM and JI, the number of forestry projects was far below that for renewable energy projects. With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, both developed and developing countries have agreed on NDCs for country-specific measures on climate change mitigation, and increased the need for investing in new measures. Over the years, considerable experience has been built up with forestry projects that fix CO₂ over a long-term period. Accounting rules are nowadays at a sufficient level for the large potential of forestry projects to deliver a reliable, additional contribution towards reducing or halting emissions from deforestation and forest degradation activities worldwide.     

A conceptual framework and its application for addressing leakage: the case of avoided deforestation

Abstract

One of the most challenging technical issues associated with project-based mechanisms is that of leakage. A conceptual framework is proposed for the identification and analysis of leakage potentially generated by a project. The categorization of leakage based on the actors responsible for their manifestation is proposed, which divides sources of leakage into primary and secondary types. It is the actors or agents responsible for the baseline activities that cause primary leakage. Secondary leakage occurs when the project's outputs create incentives for third parties to increase emissions elsewhere. This distinction, based on the source of leakage, provides a basis for the analysis outlined in the paper. The extent and type of leakage will vary depending on the project typology and design. Using a decision tree approach, the process of identifying potential sources of leakage is demonstrated for the case study of avoided deforestation projects. If the main elements determining a baseline are properly identified and understood, in particular the ‘baseline agents’, a combination of the decision tree approach and apportioning responsibility, can assist in the quantification and monitoring of primary leakage. An analysis at the project design stage can also assist in minimizing the risk of future leakage. Econometric methods may prove more useful in analyzing secondary leakage.     

Estimating baselines for climate change for less developed countries: the case of the Sahel

Abstract

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol provide mechanisms for assisting less developed countries that are adversely affected by climate change. Such assistance would need a baseline, which ideally would set a precise date for specific impacts of climate change. This article presents the results of statistical tests that we carried out and, for the African region of the Sahel, finds that for precipitation (affecting food supply), impacts due to climate change can be ‘dated’ to the year 1967, when precipitation fell drastically, affecting the local food supply. Such a statistically robust benchmark would be useful to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) of the UNFCCC. The method illustrates how other baselines may be established for the important work of the SBSTA.     

Factors driving international technology transfer: empirical insights from a CDM project survey

This study empirically explores factors driving international technology transfer via Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects by explicitly considering factors that have been identified in the literature on international technology transfer as being relevant for transfer success. These factors include technological characteristics, such as the novelty and complexity of a technology, as well as the use of different transfer channels. Employing data from an original survey of CDM project participants, the econometric analysis also distinguishes between knowledge and equipment transfer. The findings suggest that more complex technologies and the use of export as a transfer channel are both associated with a higher degree of technology transfer. Projects involving two- to five-year-old technologies seem more likely to involve technology transfer than both younger and older technologies. Energy supply and efficiency projects are correlated with a higher degree of technology transfer than non-energy projects. Unlike previous studies, technology transfer was not related to project size, to the length of time a country has hosted CDM projects, or to the host country's absorptive capacity. The findings for knowledge and equipment transfer are similar, but not identical.

Policy relevance

CDM projects are often seen as a vehicle for the transfer of climate technologies from industrialized to developing countries. Technology transfer is an important element of the new and emerging market mechanisms and frameworks under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, such as the Technology Mechanism, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, or Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. Thus, a clearer understanding of the factors driving technology transfer may help policy makers in their design of such mechanisms. For the CDM, this may be achieved by including more stringent technology transfer requirements in countries’ CDM project approval processes. Based on our findings, such policies should focus particularly on energy supply and efficiency technologies. Likewise, it may be beneficial for host countries to condition project approval on the novelty and complexity of technologies and adjust these provisions over time. Since such technological characteristics are not captured systematically by project design documents, using a survey-based evaluation opens up new opportunities for a more holistic and targeted evaluation of technology transfer in CDM projects.     

Review of the experience with monitoring uncertainty requirements in the Clean Development Mechanism

In order to ensure the environmental integrity of carbon offset projects, emission reductions certified under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have to be ‘real, measurable and additional’, which is ensured, inter alia, through the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) process. MRV, however, comes at a cost that ranges from several cents to €1.20 and above per tCO₂e depending on the project type. This article analyses monitoring uncertainty requirements for carbon offset projects with a particular focus on the trade-off between monitoring stringency and cost. To this end, existing literature is reviewed, overarching monitoring guidelines, as well as the ten most-used methodologies are scrutinized, and finally three case studies are analysed. It is shown that there is indeed a trade-off between the stringency and the cost of monitoring, which if not addressed properly may become a major barrier for the implementation of offset projects in some sectors. It is then demonstrated that this trade-off has not been systematically addressed in the overarching CDM guidelines and that there are only limited incentives to reduce monitoring uncertainty. Some methodologies and calculation tools as well as some other offset standards, however, do incorporate provisions for a trade-off between monitoring costs and stringency. These provisions may take the form of discounting emissions reductions based on the level of monitoring uncertainty – or more implicitly through allowing a project developer to choose between monitoring a given parameter and using a conservative default value.

Policy relevance

The CDM Executive Board acknowledged that monitoring uncertainty has not been treated in a consistent manner and the draft standard on uncertainty was subsequently presented in May 2013. This article supports the implementation of this standard for more comprehensive, yet cost-efficient accounting for monitoring uncertainty in carbon offset projects. Moreover, in the light of the ongoing discussions on the New Market Mechanisms as well as the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund and different national mitigation policies, the CDM experience provides valuable insights with regards to the treatment of monitoring uncertainty and constitutes a solid basis for designing uncertainty requirements for new mechanisms to mitigate climate change.     

Future restrictions for sinks in the CDM How about a cap on supply?

Abstract

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects.

This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries.     

Indigenous community benefits from a de-centralized approach to REDD+ in Brazil

Successful efforts of indigenous groups to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+) will likely vary with how the initiatives are designed and implemented. Whether REDD+ initiatives are carried out by national governments or decentralized to sub-national or project-level institutions with a nested approach could be of great consequence. I describe the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Amazonian Brazil, one of the first REDD+ pilot projects implemented with indigenous people in the world. I emphasize (1) how enfranchisement of community members in the policy-planning process, fund management, and carbon baseline establishment increased project reliability and equity, and (2) how the project's quality would have likely been diminished if implemented under a centralized REDD+ scheme.

Policy relevance

This article explores a decentralized REDD+ intervention established in an indigenous land in Brazil. It expands the theoretical discussions on REDD+ governance and highlights how centralized REDD+ programmes are likely to be less effective than project-level interventions assisted by NGOs in terms of social benefits and community engagement. Additionally, the case study described can serve as reference for the design of critical social and technical components of REDD+.     

The investment climate for climate investment: Joint Implementation in transition countries

Transition countries are expected to become important players in the emerging market for greenhouse gas emission reductions, as they can cut emissions at a relatively low cost. However, the attractiveness of the region as a supplier of emission reductions will not only depend on its cost advantage. It will also depend on the business climate offered to carbon investors—factors like a well-functioning legal and regulatory system, economic and political stability and the capacity to process emission reduction projects efficiently. This paper looks at the carbon investment climate in the transition countries eligible for Joint Implementation (JI)—Russia, Ukraine, Croatia and the EU accession countries. It concludes that JI investors will face a clear trade-off between the scope for cheap JI on the one hand, and the quality of the business environment and JI institutions on the other. The countries with the highest potential for cheap emission reductions also tend to be the countries with the most difficult business climate and the least institutional capacity for JI. The most attractive JI locations may be median countries with a reasonable JI potential and an acceptable business climate, such as Bulgaria, Romania and the Slovak Republic.     

Maladaptation and development as usual? Investigating climate change mitigation and adaptation projects in Cambodia

ABSTRACT

Based on research into multiple types of climate change mitigation and adaptation (CCMA) projects and policies in Cambodia, this paper documents intersecting social and environmental conflicts that bear striking resemblance to well-documented issues in the history of development projects. Using data from three case studies, we highlight the ways that industrial development and CCMA initiatives are intertwined in both policy and project creation, and how this confluence is creating potentials for maladaptive outcomes. Each case study involves partnerships between international institutions and the national government, each deploys CCMA as either a primary or supporting legitimation, and each failed to adhere to institutional and/or internationally recognized standards of justice. In Cambodia, mismanaged projects are typically blamed on the kleptocratic and patrimonial governance system. We show how such blame obscures the collusion of international partners, who also sidestep their own safeguards, and ignores the potential for maladaptation at the project level and the adverse social and environmental impacts of the policies themselves.

Key policy insights

• Initiatives to mitigate or adapt to climate change look very much like the development projects that caused climate change: Extreme caution must be exercised to ensure policies and projects do not exacerbate the conditions driving climate change.

• Safeguards ‘on paper’ are insufficient to avoid negative impacts and strict accountability mechanisms must be put in place.

• Academic researchers can be part of that accountability mechanism through case study reports, policy briefs, technical facilitation to help ensure community needs are met and safeguards are executed as written.

• Impacts beyond the project scale must be assessed to avoid negative consequences for social and ecological systems at the landscape level.

     

A spatial approach to baseline and leakage in CDM forest carbon sinks projects

Abstract

Forestry projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) face specific challenges with regard to determination of a baseline for carbon sequestration. We propose a semi-standardized approach called PARAPIA for calculation of a baseline that is built on the concept of a reference area around the project area whose land-use characteristics determine the baseline scenario. The land-use shares in the reference area are checked at each verification. Baseline carbon stocks are then derived ex post using the average carbon content of each land-use type. The reference area is between five and ten times larger than the project area. To determine indirect effects (the so-called ‘leakage’), a political influence area such as province or state is assessed with regards to migration flows due to the project and related emissions.     

Rethinking barriers to adaptation: Mechanism-based explanation of impasses in the governance of an innovative adaptation measure

Many of the possible barriers in the governance of climate change adaptation have already been identified and catalogued in the academic literature. Thus far it has proven to be difficult to provide meaningful recommendations on how to deal with these barriers. In this paper we propose a different perspective, with different epistemological assumptions about cause and effect than most existing barrier studies, to analyze why adaptation is often challenging. Using the mechanismic framework, we study how the idea for an innovative “Water Plaza” was realized in the city of Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Mechanisms are understood as patterns of interaction between actors that bring about change in the governance process that lead to policy impasses. Our analysis reveals three mechanisms that explain the impasses in the first Water Plaza pilot project: the risk-innovation mechanism, the frame polarization mechanism, and the conflict infection mechanism. Only after several substantive changes in the project design, location choice, and process architecture was the project of Water Plaza's revitalized. We discuss how the short-sighted ideas about cause–effect relationships, reflected in the superficial identification of barriers, may prove to be counterproductive; if there is high uncertainty about the risks of an innovation, the solution of offering more certainty is not very helpful and could, as it happened in the case study, trigger other mechanisms, creating an even tighter deadlock. Our study also suggests that when adaptation is considered as something innovative, the chances will increase that the risk-innovation mechanism will occur. We conclude that unearthing mechanisms offers new opportunities and different types of strategic interventions in practice than most existing studies have offered.     

The impact of private investor’s transaction costs on the cost effectiveness of project-based Kyoto mechanisms

From a private investor’s point of view transaction costs of project-based Kyoto mechanisms relate mainly to project management and interaction with government representatives. However, when analysing the cost effectiveness of project-based Kyoto mechanisms these transaction costs are often underestimated or completely ignored¹ due to limited data availability. This paper presents an analysis of transaction costs of project-based Kyoto mechanisms by applying cost estimates from comparable activities, for example, activities implemented jointly (AIJ). The findings show that transaction costs of AIJ projects range between 7% and more than 100% of production costs with 80% of projects lying between 14 and 89%. Furthermore the data clearly illustrate that “bigger” projects have lower specific project costs indicating the existence of economies of scale. Due to the fact that high transaction costs will push many promising projects out of the market, efforts should be undertaken to reduce transaction costs by improving procedures and business environments, for example, by standardisation.