Institutional interaction to address greenhouse gas emissions from international transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol

In response to Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) have begun to consider greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from international aviation and shipping. However, neither ICAO nor IMO have taken any effective action on the issue yet and progress can be characterised as slow. The lack of action has so far not been made up for by measures within the climate change regime or by individual countries. An important motivation for the efforts of ICAO and IMO so far has been the potential regulatory competition with the climate change regime. However, given the lack of political will to act on the issue within the latter, this motivation has not been very forceful. Against this backdrop, I argue that there are in particular three options for furthering progress within ICAO and IMO, namely (1) enhancing the threat of regulation of GHG emissions from international transport under the climate change regime; (2) undertaking unilateral domestic action by various countries (in particular the EU); and (3) furthering a learning process within ICAO and IMO. Furthermore, a closer coordination of efforts under ICAO, IMO and the climate change regime could facilitate and accelerate progress.     

Common but differentiated convergence (CDC): a new conceptual approach to long-term climate policy

Abstract

This article describes a new concept for an international climate regime for differentiation of future commitments: the ‘common but differentiated convergence’ approach (CDC). Under CDC, Annex-I countries' per-capita emission allowances converge within a convergence period to a low level. Individual non-Annex-I countries' allowances converge to the same level also within the same period (‘common convergence’), but starting when their per-capita emissions are a certain percentage above global average (‘differentiated’). Until then they may voluntarily take on ‘positively binding’ targets. This approach eliminates two concerns often voiced in relation to gradually converging per-capita emissions: (i) advanced developing countries have their commitment to reduce emissions delayed and their targets are not the same as Annex-I countries with equal per-capita emissions; (ii) CDC does not provide excess emission allowances to the least developing countries. Under CDC, stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at 550 and 650 ppm CO₂-equivalent can be reached with participation at roughly 0% and 50% above global average and convergence to around 3 and 4.5 tCO₂-eq/cap within 40 years. Even if the CDC approach is not implemented in its entirety, it is possible that the step-by-step decisions on the international climate regime can be guided by the principles provided in the CDC approach.     

Climate change: long-term targets and short-term commitments

International negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change could take several different approaches to advance future mitigation commitments. Options range from trying to reach consensus on specific long-term atmospheric concentration targets (e.g. 550 ppmv) to simply ignoring this contentious issue and focusing instead on what can be done in the nearer term. This paper argues for a strategy that lies between these two extremes. Internationally agreed threshold levels for certain categories of impacts or of risks posed by climate change could be translated into acceptable levels of atmospheric concentrations. This could help to establish a range of upper limits for global emissions in the medium term that could set the ambition level for negotiations on expanded GHG mitigation commitments. The paper thus considers how physical and socio-economic indicators of climate change impacts might be used to guide the setting of such targets. In an effort to explore the feasibility and implications of low levels of stabilisation, it also quantifies an intermediate global emission target for 2020 that keeps open the option to stabilise at 450 ppmv CO₂ If new efforts to reduce emissions are not forthcoming (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol or similar mitigation efforts fail), there is a significant chance that the option of 450 ppmv CO₂ is out of reach as of 2020. Regardless of the preferred approach to shaping new international commitments on climate change, progress will require improved information on the avoided impacts climate change at different levels of mitigation and careful assessment of mitigation costs.     

Designing prediction markets for international negotiations: Lessons learnt from the Climate Summit in Copenhagen

This paper presents results from a field experiment of running a prediction market for international climate negotiations. We draw upon our experience of running the Copenhagen Prediction Market during the Copenhagen Climate Summit in December 2009. The Copenhagen Prediction Market consisted of 17 different markets, where participants could trade in shares predicting, amongst others, reduction targets for various countries, the long-term stabilisation goal or the level of funding from developed countries to developing nations for mitigation and adaptation actions. We show that this novel application of prediction markets to climate negotiations is distinct from more traditional applications and, in many ways, more challenging. We discuss our experiences in designing and setting up the market and interpreting its results. In particular, it is crucial to be able to define the outcome of a climate conference in the face of often ambiguous final communications in order to make the prediction market robust and to find benchmarks to compare prediction market performance against.     

The special climate change fund: origins and prioritisation assessment

The Special Climate Change (SCC) fund was established by the Marrakesh Accords under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This fund will finance climate change activities in the areas of: adaptation, technology transfer, certain specific sectors, and activities to assist oil-exporting countries diversify their economies. These activities are to be complementary to those funded by the Global Environment Facility and by bilateral and multilateral funding. This paper describes the origins of the SCC fund and proposes a framework for the prioritisation of its activities. The fund has a complicated history that is intrinsically linked to numerous Convention issues, which explains the range of activities included in it. The framework proposed is based on certain principles: sound scientific knowledge, the ultimate objective of the Convention, “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” and the status of the climate negotiations. This appraisal suggests that the fund should prioritise adaptation, followed by mitigation and finally economic diversification.     

Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the UNFCCC: adverse effects and the impacts of response measures

Abstract

Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Article 3.14 of its Kyoto Protocol require parties to take measures to minimise the adverse effects of climate change on developing and least developed countries (LDCs). The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) argue that this should mean assistance for capacity building to help them adapt to a changing climate. Articles 4.8 and 3.14 also require parties to take measures to minimise the impacts of emission reduction measures on energy exporting countries. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries argue that this should mean assistance to compensate for lost oil revenues. This paper explores the dimensions of the adverse effects/impacts issue. It explains how, in arguing that progress on Articles 4.8, 4.9 and 3.14 be equal to progress on the issue of assistance to compensate for lost oil revenues, OPEC countries obstruct progress on assistance to developing and LDCs for adaptation to climate change. This suggests that tacit G77/China support for OPEC's position may ultimately not be in their best interests. The paper discusses the outlook for the adverse effects/impacts of response measures issue.     

The EU as a frontrunner on greenhouse gas emissions trading: how did it happen and will the EU succeed?

The objective of this paper is first to provide empirical evidence of what can be seen as a rather remarkable change in EU’s position on the use of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading (ET) in climate policy, from the role of a sceptic in the run-up to Kyoto towards more of a frontrunner. The paper argues that there is a synergistic and multilevel mix of explanatory factors for this “U-turn”, including developments at the international, EU, Member State, sub-national, and even down to the personal level. Second, the paper explores and discusses the philosophy behind the Commission’s proposal for a directive on GHG ET. Third, the paper examines the prospects for ‘success’ of a scheme for EU-wide ET using a multifaceted set of metrics. In brief, we argue that output success—the chances for having a directive adopted—hinges on the resolution of two key issues. First, whether the preliminary phase is to be mandatory or voluntary, and second, incompatibilities with domestic ET schemes. Outcome success—steering and cost-effectiveness—will in turn depend on factors like the coverage of the scheme and inclusion of project-based credits, while more long-term political implications hinges on the successful adoption and operation of the scheme.

“The Proposal on emissions trading represents a major innovation for environmental policy in Europe. We are de facto creating a big new market, and we are determined to use market forces to achieve our climate objectives in the most cost-conscious way […]. The emissions trading system will be an important cornerstone in our strategy to reduce emissions in the most cost-effective way”.

Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström.     

Convergence or divergence?: Status and prospects for US climate strategy

The objective of this paper is to assess recent developments and prospects for future changes in United States (US) climate strategy. In doing so, the paper explores some of the key factors that have shaped strategies and policies to date, distinguishing between factors related to institutional and governance structures, linkages between science and policy, energy technology and the role of interest groups. Against this background, the paper attempts to explore future development paths for US climate policy. More specifically, the paper assesses opportunities for policy changes compared to the preferences of the current administration, and the prospects for future linkages between US and international climate change strategies. In brief, the paper argues that substantial changes are unlikely to take place in the near to medium term, leaving open, however, the possibility of wide-ranging changes in domestic politics or major incidents that could facilitate a shift in the perceived need for near-term action.     

Thirty years on: Planetary climate planning and the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee

On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, this principal supra-national institution remains paramount to the project of planetary climate planning and governance. Reflections on this anniversary should serve to recall the contestations through which this foundational institution was formed, and the delegate dynamics that continue to be reproduced in its wake. The contentious debates and political dynamics that afflicted the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee tasked with crafting the Framework Convention on Climate Change, as well as dissension in the periphery, remain as relevant today as they were three decades ago. Reprising these dynamics through detailed historical and archival analysis, this article excavates the negotiations of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change by the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, which met in 5 sessions during 1991–1992. The aim is to identify key fault-lines and conflicts in the lead-up to the finalization of the 1992 Convention, in order to demonstrate whose epistemic and normative commitments came to be reflected in the final outcome and to show how the legacy of this process endures to date. I seek to render visible actors and proposals peripheralized in the formation of planetary climate governance to extrapolate normative boundaries and proffer heterodox lessons from the margins.