碳成本传递原理、影响因素及对中国碳市场的启示——以电力部门为例

以欧盟碳市场的实践以及中国碳市场的发展现状为背景,调研分析了碳成本传递原理,重点以电力行业为例分析碳成本传递率的主要影响因素。结果显示影响电力行业碳成本传递率的主要因素包括碳排放权交易的配额分配方式以及电力市场结构。分配方式对传递率的影响主要包括配额是否免费发放、是否实时更新免费配额的发放额度、关闭的发电设备是否获得免费配额和新进入者是否发放免费配额等因素。电力市场结构对传递率的影响主要体现在市场竞争程度、市场需求与供给条件。最后,基于当前国内碳市场试点的碳配额分配方式,给出了循序渐进地改变碳排放额初始分配的方法、减少一次性发放未来相对长时期的免费配额、选择基于发电量发放免费配额而非装机容量发放免费配额等相关政策建议。     

实现国家自主贡献目标背景下我国碳交易机制研究

以实现国家自主贡献目标为背景,运用电力行业细分的递推动态可计算一般均衡（CGE）模型,模拟我国统一碳市场下不同碳交易机制的实施效果及其经济影响。研究表明,全国统一碳市场有助于我国实现国家自主贡献目标,并且可以缓解碳减排对经济增长造成的负面影响;相比基于碳排放量免费分配初始碳配额的“祖父法则”,基于碳强度基准免费分配初始碳配额的“标杆法则”可以降低碳交易价格、增加碳配额交易量并扩大碳市场规模;采取拍卖方式有偿分配初始碳配额时碳市场中各行业面临更大的减排成本,但有利于增加政府收入;对碳市场未覆盖的行业和居民户征收碳税能有效控制其碳排放、增加政府财政收入、降低碳交易价格并促进我国国家自主贡献目标的实现;全国统一碳市场在抑制火电行业发展的同时将不同程度地促进清洁能源发电部门的发展。     

拍卖机制在碳市场配额分配中的应用回顾和比较分析

配额拍卖机制在碳市场中具有重要作用。文中在综述配额拍卖机制研究进展的基础上,重点回顾拍卖机制在欧盟、美国加州和澳大利亚等具有代表性的国际碳市场中的应用情况,结合国内试点碳市场的运行情况,分析不同地区碳市场中拍卖机制的效果。研究认为,国际碳市场拍卖机制设计较为完善,在实际应用中效果良好,起到了增强市场流动性的作用,国内各试点碳市场拍卖机制仍处于探索阶段。文中从拍卖机制的要素设计、平台建设、所得资金管理等方面对全国统一碳市场配额拍卖机制设计提出建议,为全国碳市场中拍卖机制的建设提供参考。     

碳市场、行业竞争力与碳泄漏：以钢铁行业为例

全国碳市场的建设已启动。钢铁行业是被纳入碳市场的主要行业之一,碳市场政策势必对其竞争力带来一定的影响。文中通过构建局部均衡模型,从价格、产量、贸易和碳泄漏等方面定量研究分析碳市场对我国钢铁行业竞争力的影响,并对影响模型结果的关键参数做敏感性分析,包括减排成本曲线、配额分配方式和贸易弹性。研究结果表明,碳市场对于钢铁行业的竞争力影响不太大,但是需要高度关注碳泄漏问题。     

中国碳总量控制新进展：省域碳配额分配研究综述

为加快碳达峰、碳中和进程,中国正探索碳总量控制制度,而省域碳配额分配是落实总量控制目标的重要抓手。从分配准则、分配方法和分配结果3个环节对关于中国省域碳配额分配的研究开展综述。结果表明,兼顾公平和效率原则是各方研究共识,但对于公平原则的解读和测度尚存争议。指标法和优化法在省域碳配额分配中被广泛采用,前者能兼顾多方利益,后者能提升分配效率;混合法因具备多方法优势而具有较大发展潜力;博弈法因缺乏透明度而较为罕见。既有分配结果对各省分配的减排责任与各省实情间尚有差距,并仅关注某一特定年份当期或者某一时间区间内累计的碳配额分配,缺乏对逐年碳配额分配的关注。建议后续研究进一步关注兼顾公平与效率、考虑区域异质性与消费端排放责任、采用多方法组合、兼容个案特殊性的跨期动态分配方法学的构建过程。     

碳排放配额分配规则对煤电收益的影响研究

依据中国煤电现状及碳电市场发展趋势,在6种碳价及3种传导率组合的碳配额分配规则下,利用经济调度模型对1000 MW、600 MW和300 MW燃煤机组发电收益影响进行模拟研究。结果表明,300 MW机组对配额基准线与拍卖比例的变化较为敏感。在碳价为50.0元/t、79.9元/t及碳价传导率为20%的碳电市场耦合初期阶段下,配额基准线下降至0.74 t CO₂/(MW·h)或拍卖比例升高至50%,300 MW和600 MW机组存在负收益情况。若碳价及其传导率增加,配额基准线与拍卖比例改变对煤电机组造成的负效应更可控;核证减排量比例扩大对提高机组收益影响甚微,可以作为碳市场的一种有益补充并加以监管。因此,在充分考虑煤电承受力和竞争力前提下,制定碳配额分配规则应适应碳电市场发展阶段,积极推动碳电市场耦合传导碳成本,配合抵销机制来加速碳减排。     

全国碳排放权交易市场下电解铝行业基准线法研究

2011年以来,我国碳排放权交易市场建设不断加快,碳排放权交易机制不断健全完善,其中基准线法被确定为全国碳交易初始配额分配的主要方法。电解铝行业是我国能源消耗和碳排放的重点部门,尽早将该行业纳入碳市场对于行业减排、纵深推进全国碳市场交易以及应对国际碳边境调节机制政策均有重要意义。基于2018年电解铝行业直报的碳排放相关数据,确定了我国电解铝行业开展全国碳交易的基准线方案。结果显示,电解铝行业宜选取8.12~8.15 t CO₂/t铝作为基准线取值,不需设置区域差异调整系数。同时为保证电解铝行业碳交易的顺利开展,还需尽快确定行业配额方案,进一步完善企业排放量的监测、报告和核查以提高核查填报数据质量,以及进一步研究电解铝行业碳排放核算的范围。     

全国碳交易下中国钢铁行业的基准线法研究

自2011年来,中国碳排放权交易机制不断健全完善,其中基准线法被确定为全国碳交易初始配额分配的主要方法。钢铁行业作为仅次于电力行业的第二大碳排放部门,加快对其开展基准线法碳交易的测算、设计和评价,对纵深推进全国碳交易市场建设具有重要意义。文中基于2018年钢铁企业直报的温室气体排放数据和单位产品碳强度这一关键指标,确定了中国钢铁行业开展全国碳交易的基准线方案。结果显示,钢铁行业碳交易基准线应包括炼钢及之前的6个工序,基准值宜采用效率较高的前70%至80%范围内的企业碳强度均值,在配额确定时无需考虑行业区域差异,但针对企业间碳强度差异较大的工序应设立从历史法到基准线法的过渡期。     

The economic impacts of introducing CCER trading and offset mechanism into the national carbon market of China北大核心CSCD

基于中国风电及光伏国家核证自愿减排量(CCER)现状及发展趋势,针对CCER供给、抵销和价格形成等关键机制问题,运用电力部门细分的递推动态可计算一般均衡(CGE)模型,模拟了在取消电价补贴的背景下全国碳市场引入风电及光伏CCER交易及抵销机制的经济影响。研究发现:引入CCER交易及抵销机制会降低碳配额交易价格,并缓解取消电价补贴对风电和光伏电力的负面影响,但也会削弱全国碳市场的碳减排效果,且随着CCER供给总量增加这些作用更明显;全国碳市场引入CCER交易及抵销机制后,碳排放强度较高的控排行业将选择购买更多的CCER,其中火电行业是主要的CCER需求方;未来我国如果不放开CCER项目备案审批则风电行业将是主要受益方,而未来适度放开CCER项目备案审批则风电和光伏行业都将从中受益。因此,全国碳市场在引入CCER交易及抵销机制的同时需从紧设置初始碳配额发放量,并可考虑适时重启CCER项目备案审批工作以更好地促进风电和光伏电力的发展,但允许的CCER清缴比例上限应结合碳减排目标合理设定,以避免对全国碳市场产生较大冲击。     

EU ETS试验阶段微观交易大数据分析及其对中国的启示

通过对欧盟独立交易登记系统（CITL）的抓取、识别、清洗与融合构建了全样本的交易大数据集合,完整地重现了欧盟碳排放权交易体系（EU ETS）在试验阶段的市场微观结构。进而从市场内部微观视角出发,对EU ETS的市场微观体系、排放企业的微观交易行为,以及市场供需微观演化等予以分析,结果表明在市场建立初期：排放企业的交易大多是以配额履约为目的;交易行为呈现活跃度低、季节性和同向性的特点;市场上少量的高排放企业凭借其在配额总量、资金和信息上的优势在交易中占据了主导地位。此外,微观行为数据还反映了金融部门在碳配额交易中的作用：配额在前期流向金融部门使得供过于求的状况有所缓解,但当配额流出金融部门时,市场供需失调的情况被迅速放大。在碳市场建立初期,理解EU ETS市场参与者微观行为特点以及潜在的风险,对中国即将启动的全国统一碳排放权交易体系的机制设计有重要的启示意义。     

Cap setting and allowance allocation in China's emissions trading pilot programmes: special issues and innovative solutions

Seven emissions trading scheme (ETS) pilots have been established in China. They have introduced some unique methods to set emissions caps and allocate allowances, different from textbook models and their counterparts in the EU, California, and many other regions. This article provides a detailed introduction to the methods for cap setting and allowance allocation adopted by the pilots, and presents detailed comparisons of these methods. In terms of cap setting, the pilots adopt flexible caps that can be adjusted where necessary, which primarily depends on the outcomes of the bottom-up approach, namely aggregating the allowances allocated to participants. As for allowance allocation, the pilots not only adopt such methods as grandfathering and benchmarking, which are also widely applied in other existing schemes, but also some special methods that require ex post adjustment, such as those based on enterprises’ historical emissions intensity (including both physical quantity and added-value intensity) and current production/output. The factors influencing the design are further analysed, including the impacts of theory and experience from foreign systems, concerns about economic development, traditions regarding intensity targets and policy, constraints from data availability and preparation time, tight regulation of the electricity and heat generation sector, and concerns regarding price stability. The practice of pilots presents an improvement opportunity and a challenge for China to further balance the theoretical and practical requirements in ETS design in establishing its national system.

Policy relevance

China is piloting emissions trading in seven regions, as part of efforts to try to rely more on market-based instruments to achieve GHG emissions control targets. All seven pilots have been confronted with special issues in the design process when compared with existing foreign schemes. This article analyses in depth the special issues related to cap setting and allowance allocation and the approaches adopted to address these issues. Flexible cap setting through a bottom-up approach and different types of allocation methods with or without ex post adjustment are adopted in the pilots. The flexible and innovative approaches the pilots have developed could provide useful experience for designing the nationwide ETS in China and promoting emissions trading policy in other parts of the world.     

Effectiveness of pilot carbon emissions trading systems in China

China is in the process of establishing a national emissions trading system (ETS). Evaluating the implementation effectiveness of the seven pilot ETSs in China is critical for designing this national system. This study administered a questionnaire survey to assess the behaviour of enterprises covered by the seven ETS pilots from the perspective of: the strictness of compliance measures; rules for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV); the mitigation pressure felt by enterprises; and actual mitigation and trading activities. The results show that the pilot MRV and compliance rules have not yet been fully implemented. The main factors involved are the lack of compulsory force of the regulations and the lack of policy awareness within the affected enterprises. Most enterprises have a shortage of free allowances and thus believe that the ETSs have increased their production costs. Most enterprises have already established mitigation targets. Some of the covered enterprises are aware of their own internal emission reduction costs and most of these have used this as an important reference in trading. Many enterprises have accounted for carbon prices in their long-term investment. The proportion of enterprises that have participated in trading is fairly high; however, reluctance to sell is quite pervasive in the market, and enterprises are mostly motivated to trade simply in order to achieve compliance. Few enterprises are willing to manage their allowances in a market-oriented manner. Different free allowance allocation methods directly affect the pathways enterprises take to control emissions.

Key policy insights

• In the national ETS, the compulsory force of ETS provisions should be strengthened.

• A reasonable level of free allowance shortage should be ensured to promote emission reduction by enterprises.

• Sufficient information should be provided to guide enterprises in their allowance management to activate the market.

• To promote the implementation of mitigation technologies by enterprises, actual output-based allocation methods should be used.

• The government should use market adjustment mechanisms, such as a price floor and ceiling, to ensure that carbon prices are reasonable and stable, so as to guide long-term low carbon investment.

     

Addressing regional disparities in allowance allocation in China’s national emissions trading scheme

China's national emissions trading scheme (ETS) is expected to be operational in 2017. Effectively addressing regional disparities at the provincial level in allowance allocation will greatly affect the acceptance of the allocation approach and thus deserves careful consideration. This article aims to explore possible approaches for addressing regional disparities, by introducing regional adjustment factors (RAF) in free allowance allocation. Based on the principle of ‘national unified rules?+?stricter adjustment by provincial authorities’, four single factorial and three multi-factorial methods are proposed to calculate the RAFs, through a normalization process. These methods are associated with the most acknowledged factors dealing with regional disparities, including per-capita GDP; per-capita CO₂ emissions; industrial sector contribution to GDP; economy-wide emissions control targets and CO₂ emissions per unit GDP, per unit power and heat output and per unit industrial added value. A comparative analysis is made for the seven methods, in regard to value distribution and level of matching regional political demand.

Key policy insights

• ‘Allowing stricter regional adjustment’ represents a dominant feature for China's national ETS, which aims to address regional disparities and government demands.

• How the adjustment plan is designed will have a major influence on the operation of the national ETS and regional business competitiveness. Provincial governments need to consider the trade-off between auction revenue and local business competitiveness.

• Applying the different methods leads to more scattered results for some regions, for whom the choice of adjustment approach will therefore have a greater impact.

• Based on the analysis, four adjustment methods that generate similar results – the per-capita GDP-based method, the intensity reduction target-based method, the 12th FYP target-based method and intensity-based grandfathering – are recommended for most provincial-level regions, with some exceptions.

     

碳市场顶层设计路线图

中国正面临着低碳减排和保持经济增速的双重挑战。为利用碳排放权交易机制以最低的社会成本实现减排目标,我国自2013年起开始建设碳排放权交易试点,并于2017年12月起宣布正式启动全国碳市场。然而碳市场的顶层设计不可一蹴而就,需要在我国宏观经济改革的大背景下分阶段逐步推进。短期（2020年前）碳市场建设重在强化产权制度建设,完善市场交易基础。中期（2021—2030年）碳市场建设要形成活跃的市场氛围,充分降低我国的温室气体达峰成本。长期（2031—2050年）碳市场建设要形成稳定上升的碳价趋势,为我国的低碳转型提供长期动力。     

EU ETS对欧洲电力行业的影响及对我国的建议

简要介绍欧盟排放交易体系（EU ETS）的发展情况,调研EU ETS对欧洲电力行业影响的研究现状,认为EU ETS将增加发电企业的生产成本,迅速提高电力市场价格,大幅增加发电企业利润,刺激能源技术投资和创新。同时简要评述EU ETS引发的争议问题,包括当前EU ETS对发电企业和电力市场的实际影响、发电企业巨额利润问题的产生原因等。在此基础上,对比中国和欧盟之间的差异,初步分析建设国内碳交易市场将对我国电力行业产生的影响,最后对我国建设碳交易市场提出建议。     

Benchmark-based allocations in EU ETS Phase 3: an early assessment

Phase 3 of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS; 2013–2020) sees the introduction of new rules governing the free allocations of emissions allowances given to energy-intensive industries. In contrast to Phases 1 and 2, allocations will be based on historical production multiplied by best available emissions technology benchmarks. This article exploits an original database to provide a first analysis of the distributional and economic efficiency implications of the new rules. It is shown empirically that the new allocation rules reduce the scope for windfall gains by EU ETS firms while also effectively mitigating carbon leakage risks, even assuming optimistic forecasts of Phase 3 carbon prices. The example of the cement sector is used to show that benchmarking significantly improves the harmonization of the levels of free allocations to competing firms throughout the EU compared to Phase 2. However, it is also found that the use of ex ante output levels to determine allocations still leaves considerable scope for windfall gains and possible distortions of the internal market.     

Free allocation rules in the EU emissions trading system: what does the empirical literature show?

This paper analyses the rules for free allocation in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The analysis draws on the empirical evidence emerging from two literature strands. One group of studies sheds light on the following questions: how efficient are free allocation rules in minimizing the risk of carbon leakage? Have they become more efficient over the trading periods? What are the technical limits to making them more efficient? Further: is firm behaviour affected by allowance allocation? Did specific provisions induce strategic behaviour with unintended effects? Studies from the second group estimate sectoral pass-through rates for the costs imposed by the EU ETS. Taking cost pass-through into account is necessary for properly targeting free allocation. The difficulty of accurately quantifying sectoral differences in cost pass-through ability, especially in manufacturing sectors (due to limited data availability and market heterogeneity), is the main hindrance to achieving further efficiency in allowance allocation. The new rules defined in the reform for Phase IV (2021–2030) nevertheless make some progress in this direction.

Key policy insights

• The difficulty of accurately quantifying sectoral differences in cost pass-through ability is the main hindrance to efficient free allocation in minimizing carbon leakage risk.

• In Phase IV (2021–2030), carbon leakage risk will be assessed more accurately thanks to: a) carbon intensity and trade intensity considered together through a combined indicator; b) possible use of more disaggregated data, and c) possible consideration of complementary qualitative assessments of abatement potential, market characteristics and profit margins.

• It is expected that benchmarked allocation introduced in Phase III (2013–2020) has induced additional emission abatement, but there is still a lack of empirical evidence.