Co-management and “consciousness”: Fishers’ assimilation of management principles in Chile

Chile's new Management Area system delegates management responsibility to organizations of artisanal shell-fishers on the condition that they team with professionally trained marine biologists. A survey of participating fishers in Chile's Fourth and Fifth regions examined four social benefits predicted to result from this type of co-management: (1) improved rapport between fishers and the state, (2) greater awareness among fishers of ecology and the benefits of management, (3) cooperation between fishers and scientists, and (4) unity between fishers. A discussion analyzes the principal benefit encountered—fishers’ newfound “consciousness” of the value of management—within the context of co-management and territorial use rights.     

Network approach for understanding small-scale fisheries governance: The case of the Chilean coastal co-management system

Recent studies have focused on the study of social networks among local resource users, but few have attempted to study co-management networks. The objective of the research was to assess the Chilean shellfish co-management system from an organizational network perspective. Starting with one detailed case study, representatives of 38 small-scale fisher associations from two administrative regions were interviewed to investigate: (1) networks of actors in each co-management case, (2) the functions of these actors in co-management, and (3) fisher perceptions about Chile's co-management arrangement. Results indicate that decision-making is highly centralized and power is concentrated in government, with little horizontal exchange and cooperation among fisher associations. However, the network approach indicates the presence of a rich set of players, some seven sets of actors by function. Grassroots management innovations are hampered by the existing co-management structure, suggesting that the system may benefit from a modification of the policy to allow greater learning-by-doing and flexibility.     

Unfinished business: Taiwan's experience with rights-based coastal fisheries management

This paper examines a case involving a mix of Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries, co-management and the competition for using coastal zones. In the 2000s, Taiwan's government initiated a remodeling of the fishery right system, which is a rights-based approach to fisheries management, as an attempt to address conflicts between fishers and developers regarding the use of coastal space and to put community-based co-management into practice. The paper particularly compares the system before and after 2000 and identifies areas of concern in the implementation of the remodeled system. The results show that the government's support for this system signifies progress in the right direction. However, concerns emerge, mostly involving fishers' low participation, fishermen's association's lack of technical skills and financial resources, and the division of management responsibility. The government is advised to play a more active role in dealing with these concerns. Finally, the paper reveals that the factor of competition for using coastal zones poses a challenge to co-management, and suggests a holistic view with integrated coastal management or marine spatial planning practices, for developing co-management under the fishery right system.     

Trust relationships between fishers and government: New challenges for the co-management arrangements in the Dutch flatfish industry

Until the 1990s fisheries were largely managed by the state. Since then, Dutch government and the sector increasingly recognized that a fishing industry cannot be managed effectively without the cooperation and participation of fishers to formulate policy and to implement and enforce laws and regulations. As a result, in the nineties, the existing neo-corporatist arrangement was replaced by a co-management system in the Dutch flatfish fishery. Co-management is often seen as leading to greater procedural legitimacy and subsequently compliance. However, constructing an effective co-management arrangement is not only a matter of building institutions but also a matter of building trust relations between the government and industry. Institutional arrangements such as co-management can contribute to these trust building processes; however, a too strong reliance on institutional arrangements can lead to distrust when new challenges are being faced and institutional arrangements fail to adapt to these changes.     

Fishers as advocates of marine protected areas: a case study from Galicia (NW Spain)

After years of facing problems such as overfishing, illegal fisheries and the consequences of the Prestige oil spill, the fishermen's association (cofradia) of Lira, a small town in the coast of Galicia (NW Spain), has pioneered a co-management initiative in the region by proposing the creation of a marine reserve. The proposal was designed and developed by the fishers in partnership with biologists and social scientists, environmentalists and members of the autonomous government of Galicia in a highly participatory process. The views of different stakeholders on the implementation process for the marine reserve were assessed through a programme of semi-structured interviews. These findings were also used to analyse issues related to the implementation process employing a governance analysis framework. It was observed that the inclusion of fishers in the decision-making and the use of their traditional ecological knowledge in the design of the reserve promoted a better understanding of its benefits and an improved compliance with the fishing regulations. The effectiveness of the marine reserve was very high during the first years but it has been recently undermined due to the reduction of financial state support for enforcement in the light of the current economic recession. Whilst this marine reserve was driven by the stakeholders, the prospects depend on an adequate state enforcement capacity.     

Heterogeneous management and conservation perceptions within the gooseneck barnacle co-management system in Asturias (N. Spain)

Stakeholders’ perceptions can influence the success of a fishery. It is important to take these perceptions into account when evaluating the development of a management system and its conservation policies. Structured questionnaires were used to determine fishers’ management and conservation perceptions of the Asturian gooseneck barnacle co-management system. Perceptions were analyzed for the entire fishery and for different socioeconomic factors, these were: location, age, years in the management system, way of access, alternative income sources and income. Fishers’ perceptions varied widely among socioeconomic factors. In fact, a trade-off between management and conservation perceptions was observed for the different categories within each socioeconomic factor, particularly for the years in the management system, location and income factors. Despite the heterogeneity in perceptions, the co-management system has successfully generated a strong conservation ethic in its resource users. Furthermore, as a group, gooseneck barnacle fishers hold positive perceptions on the performance of the management system. When generating management policies, fisheries’ managers must take the heterogeneity of resource users present in the fishery into account. The gooseneck barnacle co-management system demonstrates that even within the same fishery there can be multiple paths to sustainability.     

Fishery control and regulation compliance: a case for co-management in Swedish commercial fisheries

The results from a survey of Swedish commercial fishers on regulation compliance and attitudes to control and restrictions are reported. According to the responding fishers, 90% of all Swedish catches are reported, in spite of limited control efforts. From an economic perspective we would expect substantially lower levels of compliance. The results also show that the majority of Swedish fishers are in favour of co-management on a regional basis. However, on this and other management issues opinions divert significantly between large vessel operators and small vessel operators, which reveals conflicting interests for such and similar changes in Swedish management of fisheries.     

Artisanal fishers' perceptions regarding coastal co-management policies in Chile and their potentials to scale-up marine biodiversity conservation

No-take Marine Protected Areas (Nt-MPAs) constitute an indispensable tool for biodiversity conservation. Nevertheless, there are other instruments such as marine coastal co-management policy frameworks which may be also considered as tools for conservation or as ancillary conservation instruments. Using focus groups, semi-structured interviews and survey questionnaires we analysed small-scale artisanal fishers' perceptions towards a coastal co-management regime in Chile and the potential to generate capacities and a social setting to scale-up marine conservation. Empirical evidence from the study shows artisanal fishers have indeed been empowered through the coastal co-management experience; however, there exist heterogeneity in their willingness to participate in the creation of Nt-MPAs, mainly determined by occupational mobility. Chilean artisanal fishers strongly support a bottom-up process in the conservation of marine biodiversity, though the need for top-down steering and guidance is also stressed, especially regarding enforcement.     

Can formalisation help? The introduction of fisheries co-management in the inshore fisheries of Dingle,Co. Kerry,Ireland

Fisheries co-management is claimed to increase the legitimacy of regulations by allocating management authority to selected users. In this article, experiences from a case study in the inshore fisheries of Ireland involving the establishment of a fisheries co-management system are used to discuss the specific problem of finding an unit to whom regulatory authority may be delegated. Here, the fishers who will benefit from the co-management scheme will also carry the costs, and it is argued that establishment of formal economic liability between those granted management privileges and those excluded can optimise the legitimacy of management authority in fisheries co-management systems.     

Co-management of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) fisheries

The countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have a relatively poor record of fisheries management and the need to reform fisheries governance is urgent. There is now increasing interest in getting fishers and other stakeholders more involved in management through co-management and community-based management approaches. The purpose of this paper is to examine the potentials of co-management as an alternative fisheries management strategy for the countries in the CARICOM region. Co-management is found to have potential but there will need to be capacity-building and institutional strengthening of fisheries departments, fishers and NGOs to participate in co-management. Pilot projects should be initiated to gain practical experience in co-management.     

Participatory methodology used for sea urchin co-management in Barbados

This project aimed to develop co-management of exploited marine fishery resources in Barbados using the sea urchin fishery as a test case. The approach was to work with stakeholders, primarily the fishers, to establish a co-management mechanism that could be operated by the fishers themselves with technical and advisory support from the Fisheries Division. The project used Technology of Participation (ToP) methodology, developed by the Institute of Cultural Affairs (ICA). ToP methods used included Focused Conversation and Participatory Strategic Planning. To our knowledge, this methodology has not previously been applied in small-scale fisheries co-management. Fishers involvement was developed in stages: identification of groups of fishers in communities and a contact person for the group; dialogue with individuals and the small groups; discussion in larger groups to derive approaches to management; and full group participation to reach consensus regarding the most appropriate approach to management. Key persons identified in communities helped organize meetings to discuss the sea urchin fishery. From these community meetings, individuals were selected to take part in the strategic planning. Two vision meetings with separate groups of fishers, produced similar results. These groups were combined at a planning meeting, where fishers examined the blocks to achieving the vision, developed strategies to overcome the blocks, and an action plan to implement the strategies. Fishers and government officials concluded that the methodology had successfully facilitated the input of both parties and produced a workable, consensual approach.     

Fish stocks and their management: The changing face of fisheries in South Africa

Transformation of South African marine fisheries over the past 10 years has had to balance economic stability, equity and sustainability. This is being done in three ways. First, access rights have been redistributed, increasing the number of rights holders 20-fold and the participation of historically disadvantaged individuals from 0.75% to 62%. Second, established companies have undergone internal transformation. Third, subsistence fishers have formally been recognised. New focuses include co-management, ecosystem-based management and marine protected areas. Further necessary steps include parity in salaries, attention to artisanal fishers, embracement of co-management, expansion of subsistence management and effective enforcement. Most stocks are healthy or recovering but exceptions, such as abalone, warn how quickly stocks can be decimated if co-operation is not achieved.     

Who benefits from fisheries co-management? A case study in Lake Chiuta,Malawi

The fisheries management policy shift towards resource user participation in Malawi in the early 1990s resulted in mixed benefits among small-scale fishers, with many applauding the changes. This paper considers the impacts of these policy changes on government and within the fishing communities around Lake Chiuta whose fisheries co-management experience is considered successful. Benefits to the communities range from gaining government support in excluding non-local fishers using destructive fishing gear to increased household incomes and improved livelihoods, while benefits to government range from taking credit for establishing a sustainable fishery and co-management arrangements to reduced resource management costs. Community costs include financial resources and time spent by resource user representative organisations in enforcing fishing regulations. These findings enable a more balanced assessment of neoliberal claims about the benefits of delegating management responsibilities and downloading costs of management onto fishing communities and organisations.     

Co-management of sea turtle fisheries: Biogeography versus geopolitics

Co-management between local communities and government agencies is promoted as a strategy to improve fisheries management. This paper considers the potential for co-management of sea turtle fisheries within four UK Overseas Territories (OTs) in the Caribbean, and for co-ordinated management among those territories. We focus on fisher incentives for engaging in co-management and on the potential to scale up co-management to a regional level. This paper presents data from Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands, where 110 turtle fishers participated in a socio-economic survey undertaken as part of the ‘Turtles in the UK Overseas Territories in the Caribbean’ project. Based on three established criteria for co-management (perceived crisis in stock, willingness to participate and community cohesion), results suggest that fisher support for co-management exists within each OT, but the extent of support for and views of specific management interventions varies among OTs. The implications of results for co-management in each territory, and for establishing co-ordinated management regimes in the region, are discussed in the context of current debates about the nature of resources and scalar (mis)matches between resource and management regimes.     

From community-based to centralised national management—A wrong turning for the governance of the marine protected area in Apo Island,Philippines?

Before the mid-1990s, Apo Island, Philippines, was often described as one of the world's best examples of community-based marine management. This paper studies the less-documented transition of the island during the late 1990s from community-based management to centralised national state management. Extensive interviewing of islanders has revealed deep misgivings about the centralised regime—the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB). PAMB's aim of implementing the National Integrated Protected Areas Systems (NIPAS) Act was initially looked upon favourably by islanders, but it has lost that support because of its exclusion of stakeholders from management and its poor institutional performance. The paper's conclusion is that the implementation of the NIPAS Act highlights the limitations of top-down management, and that there is a need to restore an element of local stakeholder participation in the governance of Apo's marine protected area (MPA). A system of co-management between community and national state actors is essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of Apo's marine resources.     

Property relations and the co-management of small-scale fisheries in Costa Rica: Lessons from Marine Areas for Responsible Fishing in the Gulf of Nicoya

Marine fisheries in Costa Rica have become characterized by overexploitation, ineffective centralized management and increased conflict among fishing sectors. Despite high economic and socio-cultural importance of small-scale fisheries, no formal mechanisms existed until recently to facilitate the participation of fishers in management. Marine Areas for Responsible Fishing (Áreas Marinas para la Pesca Responsable, AMPR) were legally recognized in 2009 as a co-management approach, enabling the designation of spatial management areas to be implemented collaboratively by artisanal fishers and government agencies. In this paper, we examine property and access relations shaping this emerging participatory management model using case studies primarily from the Gulf of Nicoya region. The policy demonstrably improves upon some aspects of management, for instance, by allowing artisanal fishers to determine gear restrictions within designated areas. However, the model lacks other attributes of more successful co-management scenarios, particularly exclusive access. The fugitive nature of resources further complicates property relations over these fisheries. The cases explored also illustrate broader institutional and systemic issues that preclude effective participatory management. Lessons from the region are used to propose significant shifts to the management of small-scale fisheries in Costa Rica.     

On crafting a fisheries co-management arrangement in the estuary of Patos Lagoon (Brazil): opportunities and challenges faced through implementation

This paper aims to analyze a fisheries co-management regime in Brazil. The Forum of the Patos Lagoon, a collaborative partnership among communities, governmental and non-governmental organizations, was established to move fisheries management toward a negotiation-style decision processes. We find that while many successes are evident including the delegation of decision power, greater protection of artisanal fisheries, and greater legitimacy assigned the Forum as a decision-making body, several problems remain. These include conflicting institutional arrangements; minimal recognition of local fishers’ interests as concerns rules established; and less than optimal participation of fishers in the Forum. The paper closes with multiple suggestions for improvements of this co-management regime.     

Recreational fishing in a time of rapid ocean change

Fishing is an important recreational activity for many Australians, with one in every four people participating every year. There are however many different pressures exerted on Australian fish stocks, including climate-related changes that drive changes in local fish abundances. It is inevitable that recreational fishers will need to adapt to these changes. When resource abundance alters substantially, user adaptation to the new situation is required and policies and incentives may need to be developed to encourage behaviour change. It is important to correctly anticipate fisher's response to these policies and incentives as much as possible. Improved understanding of recreational fisher's likely adaptation decisions and the nature and timing of these decisions can help avoid unintended consequences of management decisions. Based on a survey of recreational fishers in the south-east Australian climate hotspot, we identify 4 relevant dimensions to recreational fisher's behavioural adaptation. There are differences in adaptation timing (early, late, and non-adaptors). Non-adaptors are characterised by greater cultural attachment to fishing and stronger perceptions of the factors that influence abundance change. The fisher's preferred adaptation responses and the timing of the behavioural response differs between decreasing versus increasing fish abundance. Insight into perspectives and expectations on how recreational fishers might adapt to changes is useful to develop a set of behavioural incentives that appeal to different groups but remain efficient and effective in their implementation. Such knowledge can create new pathways to achieve meaningful and targeted adaptation responses for different types of recreational fishers.     

Navigating customary law and state fishing legislation to create effective fisheries governance in India

When customary legal systems exist alongside state regulations, individuals can choose between these different frameworks to support their claims to resources. Research suggests that such framework switching to maximize self-interest weakens and challenges resource management. Multiple legal systems are at work in India's fisheries and this study examines how they work to govern conflict over purse-seine fishing in the Sindhudurg district of Maharashtra State. Through participant observations, interviews and state fishing law reviews, this study finds evidence of strong customary legal systems, operating through local cultural practices, to protect common property rights, equitable access, ethical and ecological concerns. In contrast, state legislation appears weak because it addresses issues of local concern, such as equitable access, at a slow pace and over such a large scale as to be absent. Consequently, multiple legal systems in these fisheries do not create a management challenge that follows a predictable path towards resource degradation. Instead informal, customary rules applied alongside formal state legislation interact in complex ways that create opportunities for effective co-management.     

Why comply? Attitudes towards harvest regulations among Swedish fishers

Why do fishers break rules? And why do they follow them? The answers to these pertinent questions could contribute to reducing overfishing, stock decimation, environmental degradation, economic losses and community failures. This explorative paper presents findings from a nationwide survey among Swedish fishers, who were asked what, in their opinion, would justify non-compliance, why fisheries management regulations are not being respected, and what might help improve the situation. The survey was conducted to test four inducements often suggested in the literature: Fishers’ compliance/non-compliance is based on (a) their own benefit, (b) whether they feel morally compelled to do one way or another, (c) whether compliance is believed to create a negative impression among peers and (d) whether they accept the justification given for introducing the rules. Among other things, the study finds that the moral motives of law-abidingness and peer group solidarity rank the highest among the reasons for compliance, that large-scale fishers are more concerned about deterrence than small- and medium-scale fishers and also that co-management experience makes fishers less inclined to accept non-compliance by fishers who seek to boost their income.