The hesitant emergence of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) in fisheries policies in Europe

The dismal record of fisheries management worldwide is often blamed on managers' and scientists' bigoted pursuit of the flawed Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) objective. This paper aims at clarifying that MSY has never been a key element in the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), and has not been for several decades the basis of scientific advice provided in support of that policy. The recent emergence of MSY in debates about the CFP might be a rhetoric response to international pressure rather than a willing change in policy. The major danger of assigning the notorious failure of the CFP to a wrong culprit, MSY, is to distract research efforts away from investigating the real causes that likely lay in the institutional set-up. Many objections against the reference points associated with MSY, as targets or limits, are well-founded but controversies among experts, when left unbridled, just provide the opportune climate for politicians to delay actions in the direction of reduced fishing impacts on fish stocks and marine ecosystems.     

Review of participatory fisheries management arrangements in the European Union

Promoting and attaining sustainable use of resources through community participation is a central tenet of the European Union's (EU) 2013 Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy. A systematic review approach was used to identify participatory fisheries management arrangements within the EU. Following this, the participatory arrangements were categorized based on the nature of the decision-making arrangement, influence and empowerment of the fishing industry. The study identified 40 management arrangements distributed through 8 member states, with a variety of fisheries and institutional settings for participation in fisheries management in the EU. The majority of the partnerships identified are “Functional participation”, i.e., the participatory arrangement is based in pre-determined goals encouraged by higher decision-making levels in order to increase efficiency of management decisions. Interactive partnership was the highest level of participation identified in the systematic review, and is usually more conducive with local arrangements in coastal and small-scale fisheries targeting low mobility species.     

Dysfunctions in common fishing regulations

One of the main concerns of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) lies in guaranteeing consistency among the different implemented actions. The main concern is establishing a relationship between the levels of compliance with the Multi-annual Guidance Programme (MAGP), the adoption of total allowable catches (TACs), and the levels of compliance with rules by producers.     

Venue shifts and policy change in EU fisheries policy

Over the past two decades profound changes have taken place in the European Union's (EU) fisheries policy. Partly these changes have occurred within the EU's Common Fisheries Policy itself, but partly policy change has been effected by the application of environmental legislation and policy instruments to fisheries issues. This article argues that the process of policy change in EU fisheries policy can best be understood in terms of the interaction of policy images and policy venues that is at the core of the punctuated equilibrium theory of policy-making. As a result of the rise of a biodiversity perspective on fisheries issues, environmental policy-makers have become active in fisheries issues, which has led to profound changes in both the content of fisheries policies and the institutional organisation around this issue area.     

EU marine policy on the move: The tension between fisheries and maritime policy

In the past decade, the European Commission has developed the Marine Strategy Directive and the Maritime Policy. Both policies aim at governing the marine environment; yet the two policies have a differing signature in policy formulation and implementation. From a fisher's perspective these policies present a change in institutional setting; major policy measures no longer descend from the EU Common Fisheries Policy alone, but increasingly are derived from general environmental policy developments. In this paper, the policy arrangement approach is used to analyse the differences between the two maritime policies, and the way in which they can affect fisheries management.     

Effectiveness of the structural fisheries policy in the European Union

This paper presents an analysis of the effectiveness of the community structural policy in the fisheries sector by comparing the relative level of compliance with objectives (reduction of fleets and economic viability) with the mechanisms that have been implemented (structural funds and allocation of quotas). On the one hand, this analysis shows that there is a positive correlation between the level of structural funds and the attainment of goals. On the other hand, it was found that the greater the relative availability of quotas, the poorer the countries performed in complying with the objective of reducing the fishing capacity, and the higher the expectations of achieving acceptable yields. These correlations, however, were not very strong.     

Designed for failure: A critique of the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union

The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union has neither lived up to its aim of enhancing the sustainability of fish stocks nor that of improving the economic competitiveness of the fishing industry. This paper discusses the failure of the CFP from a biological, economical, legal and political perspective.     

Towards sustainable fisheries subsidies: Entering a new round of reform under the Common Fisheries Policy

On 22 April 2009 the European Commission published its ‘Green Paper on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy’. The Green Paper points out a contradiction in policy, noting on one hand that public financial support to the Community's fisheries sector is substantial, but on the other hand such support is often incompatible with other Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) objectives, particularly the need to reduce overcapacities. Providing an analytical framework to better understand the effects of subsidies as well as an overview of existing funding schemes under the CFP, this article aims at answering some of the questions posed by the European Commission within its Green Paper. Answers are based on two ideas: the exploitation of marine capture resources ultimately depends on the level of available fish stocks and that a large share of subsidies fuels the race to fish by inducing investment incentives for the fisheries sector. Policies that have ignored this tend to encourage inefficient and unsustainable fishing as well as the misallocation of public funds. Although support schemes under the CFP have changed in recent years, some problematic support schemes persist. A future reform will have to continue the course taken towards sustainable and efficient approaches to supporting the fisheries industry.     

Participatory practices in fisheries across Europe: Making stakeholders more responsible

Drawing on an EU-funded project titled “Sharing responsibilities in fisheries management” this paper assesses the institutional landscape of fisheries management in a number of European countries, with a particular emphasis on stakeholder involvement in regulatory decision-making. What are their roles and responsibilities in the chain of governance? What are the specific characteristics of each country, and what is similar and what is different as compared with other sectors? Although there is a move towards devolvement and decentralisation in some European countries, there is quite an ambivalence regarding such reforms in other countries. These differences in stakeholder involvement are partly a result of institutional traditions within each country, but also a reflection of how management authorities struggle with the dilemmas pertaining to such reforms of participatory practices. Thus, we argue that even within a reformed fisheries management system that allows greater participation of stakeholder groups, there can hardly be one European model that fits all.     

The challenges of the landing obligation in EU fisheries

A feasibility study was conducted on the impacts of the new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) rules requiring catches in regulated fisheries to be landed and counted against quotas of each Member State - the landing obligation (LO), and that catch of species subject to the LO below a minimum conservation reference size (MCRS) be restricted to purposes other than direct human consumption. The aim was to estimate the level of discarded fish likely to be covered by the new rules, the impact of the rules on EU fisheries and the regulatory challenges and responses to them. Data from EU's Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee on Fisheries (STECF) database were analysed to estimate the volume of unwanted catches produced by EU fisheries. Views were sought from policy officials and fisheries scientists through a questionnaire on the implications of the LO and the control of fisheries across Member States, and the potential adjustments that might be needed. Findings show that 11% (44,000 t) of the total catches of EU countries from which data were available are of fish under MCRS. The species with the highest volume of undersized discards associated with the lowest quota, which would potentially restrict the fishing opportunities for other quota species (i.e. choke species), are plaice and haddock with 18,000 and 14,000 t of undersized fish respectively, followed by whiting and cod with 5000 and 6000 t of undersized fish respectively. Discards data shows that the Netherlands, United Kingdom, France and Belgium will be most affected by landings for non-human markets. Findings also show that existing infrastructure at landing ports in all Member States is limited because there are currently limited facilities in place to handle animal by-products produced by the catching sector. Policy officials maintained that while they could support the fishing industry through funding programmes, it is the responsibility of fishers to ensure they have the right infrastructure to handle unwanted catches. The expectation is that the LO combined with the restriction to non-human consumption purposes will encourage fishers to internalise the costs of catching unwanted fish and motivate them to avoid unwanted catch. This will be realised if sufficient flexibility is given to fishers to find their own solutions to reducing unwanted catches. It is concluded that gear technology measures exist to enable the regulated fisheries to increase gear selectivity.     

The EU restrictive trade measures against IUU fishing

The opportunities for operators to increase their revenue when illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing catches are converted to currency through the market encourage the persistence and growth of this activity. It is often the same market that is targeted for the legal trade of fish. Thus, paradoxically, the market demand creates and incites it, at least from an economic point of view. To deter IUU fishing activities, some fish and fishery products importing countries have started to enact or implement additional regulatory measures, the goal of which is to tackle the problem from a new trade-related perspective. This contribution provides an analysis of various aspects of the market state competence. Within the framework of the European Union (rights and markets) the study analyses the emergence of regional trade-related measures and explore how they are linked to the international trade law regime especially the World Trade Organization rules. Finally, the paper draws implications for the market state measures and considers their limits and potential in combatting IUU fishing.     

Solving complex fisheries management problems: What the EU can learn from the Nordic experiences of reduction of discards

A crucial issue for the new EU common fisheries policy is how to solve the discard problem. Through a study of the institutional set up and the arrangements for solving the discard problem in Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Norway, the article identifies the discard problem as related to both natural, other material and to cultural conditions. Hence, solving the discard problem requires not only technical and regulatory instruments, but also arenas and structures that allow and facilitate processes of cultural change.     

TAC management in North Sea flatfish fisheries

The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union adopted in 1983 is primarily focused on a science-based TAC management system with fixed national quota shares. The quality of the assessments of plaice and sole, the consistency of the scientific advice, the congruency of the management decisions, and the enforcement of the regulations are reviewed over a 15-year period. The conclusion is that there have been problems at each level, with the ultimate effect that the policy has not been able to restrict fishing mortality and that the level of overexploitation has only increased. It is argued that the present TAC system has created more problems than it has resolved. Attention is drawn to the autonomic economic developments within the fishery and to the potential for managing the fishery more effectively from the cost side rather than the profit side.     

Objectives of fisheries management: case studies from the UK, France, Spain and Denmark

The main objectives of fisheries management are generally similar throughout the world. These are often stated in policy documents such as the Common Fisheries Policy and the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. However, at the local level often the key objectives of management are more detailed, characterised by both the overriding management structure and the status and type of fishery concerned. In this paper, we consider case study fisheries from the UK, France, Spain and Denmark to compare some of the various types of fisheries and fisheries management systems that exist in the European Union. From this, we define the key objectives for each management system.     

Distributing the bigeye conservation burden in the western and central pacific fisheries

The Western and Central Pacific Ocean is home to the world's most productive tuna fisheries, with the majority of tuna catches occurring inside the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the region's developing coastal States. It is important that these fisheries are managed effectively throughout their range, both within and between EEZs and on the high seas. Unrestrained exploitation in a particular EEZ or on the high seas has the potential to significantly impact on catches elsewhere with potentially devastating consequences for developing coastal States, some of which have few alternate resources. The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) was established in 2004 to manage the region's highly migratory tuna fisheries. However, the WCPFC has since repeatedly failed to adopt conservation and management measures that are sufficient to meet the WCPFC's conservation and sustainable use objectives. This paper analyses catch data from the WCPFC and suggests that the weak position of bigeye (in a strategic political context), the unwillingness of members to compromise their interests and the lack of a transparent framework for distributing the burden of conservation are key factors in the WCPFC's failure to adopt sufficiently strong conservation and management measures.     

Flexible management of fishing rights and a sustainable fisheries industry in Europe

Although overexploitation of commercial fish stocks in European waters has been in the public debate now for more than 20 years, the European Union has so far failed to implement sustainable fisheries management. Millions in subsidies paid to the fishing industry have led to significant excess capacity in the fishing fleet. Various feeble attempts to stop overexploitation of marine resources have failed. The cause is that fishing policy is highly dominated by short-term socioeconomic interests. There is an urgent need for a new fisheries management system in Europe that supports reductions in the fishing fleet, increases responsibility among fishers and guarantees long-term conservation of natural marine resources.Transferable rights to fish have proved a reliable and effective means of creating incentives to conserve marine resources. By strengthening individual fishing rights under flexible quota management systems, the EU Member States could, within the Common Fisheries Policy, make a significant contribution to conserving fish stocks, to reducing excess capacity and to raising the profitability of the fisheries industry. A closer look at existing reservations against a flexible management system shows most of the objections to be overstated or capable of resolution.     

Minimising unsustainable yield: Ten failing European fisheries

Ten European fish stocks recognised by the European Union as “outside safe biological limits” are considered in light of widespread reforms to fisheries legislation in 2013, particularly the legal responsibility to exploit these resources sustainably. Given that some of these stocks are – as of 2013 – fished at over 150% the recommended intensity and many have been outside of these limits for the entirety of their assessment history, the utilisation of traditional fisheries management measures of sustainability are questioned and tougher approaches such as “zero-catch” and long-term, expansive spatial closure scenarios are considered. Finally, the pervasive issue of data-deficiency (the status of 54% of European stocks) is briefly considered, with specific reference to the understudied West of Scotland and North Sea stock of European seabass (Dicentrarchus labrax).     

A cautious fisheries management policy in South Africa: the fisheries for rock lobster

In South Africa, political emancipation has resulted in a new fisheries policy which is embodied in the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998. The pillars of the new policy are sustainability, equity and stability within the industry. We look particularly at a suite of mainly accessible species, the rock lobsters (truly spiny lobsters), at their management, at control measures, at realities of resource status and harvesting, at naturally occurring ecosystem stimuli, and investigate whether the policy can achieve what it aims to do, to provide more for more South Africans at levels at least equal to what they do today. Put simply, are the political aims and the sustainability aims of the new policy mutually achievable?     

Vessel buybacks in fisheries: The role of auction and financing structures

Vessel buyback programs intended to address overcapacity and excess capitalization in fisheries can lead to dramatically different levels of decapitalization depending on program structure and availability of vessel-specific information. This paper develops a simple theoretical model of self-financing vessel buybacks to examine equilibrium outcomes using sequential versus take-it-or-leave-it auctions, and financing schemes which allocate costs either homogeneously or according to rents captured through the buyback. This model demonstrates that programs which spread costs evenly among remaining vessels limit the possible extent of buybacks, as do programs which buy vessels one at a time in sequence rather than all at once. In addition to the theoretical modeling, a stylized case study inspired by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Fishery is also provided. This analysis suggests that a wide range of auction structures could roughly half the size of the existing fleet, and starkly demonstrates how information poor settings can entirely derail a buyback.