The 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy's system of governance—rhetoric or reality?

The 2002 Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was claimed to be a radical overhaul of a failing system. Several EU fish stocks—particularly North Sea cod—had reached dangerously low levels, and there was widespread dissatisfaction with the way in which the CFP was operating. The European Commission took the opportunity of the legal requirement to review some features of the CFP (principally access provisions) in 2002, to undertake a broader reappraisal of the CFP. One of the features of this reappraisal was an attempt to improve the CFP's system of governance by increasing the amount of stakeholder participation, decentralisation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. In this paper, the conclusion is reached that this attempt to improve the quality of governance in the 2002 CFP reform package has been more rhetorical than real.     

Complementary roles of European and national institutions under the Common Fisheries Policy and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive

Exploited fish and shellfish stocks in European marine waters underlie the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The next round of reform of the CFP is due for completion in 2012. The exploitation at maximum sustainable yield (MSY) may be confirmed as the common environmental objective for good environment status (GES) of exploited fish and shellfish stocks of the reformed CFP and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD). The foreseen time horizon to achieve or maintain GES by 2020 appears inconsistent with the World Summit on Sustainable Development UN agreement in 2002, which stipulates that maintenance or restoring of stocks to produce MSY be realized by 2015. The MSFD requires instead that by 2015 the national programmes of measures be designed in order to become operational the following year (2016).     

Distribution of the burden of fisheries regulations in Europe: The north/south divide

The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is a priority area of the European Union's Better Regulation agenda. Understanding the spatial variation in the application of the policy and the reasons behind these differences would provide insights into policy making in different socioeconomic and cultural settings that will assist in better regulation. The CFP aqcuis (the body of European Union law accumulated thus far) was analysed by creating a database composed of pre-defined elements from each obligation. Distinct differences are apparent in the ‘burden’ imposed by regulations in the Northern and Southern waters. However, a combination of a timeline of fish landings and the accumulation of the CFP regulations shows that despite the increase in the number of regulations this has not led to the anticipated reduction in landings. Historical, biological and geopolitical differences between the two major marine regions of the EU are discussed in terms of the impact they have had on the formation of the different fisheries management models in the different regions. Finally, the elements forming these models are discussed in terms of successes and failures in the context of the 2012 CFP reform.     

From RACs to Advisory Councils: Lessons from North Sea discourse for the 2014 reform of the European Common Fisheries Policy

From RACs to Advisory Councils analyses the discourse of stakeholders engaged in Europe׳s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in a tier of governance known as RACs (Regional Advisory Councils) from 2004 to 2008. The analysis demonstrates a shift towards discursive sharing by participating stakeholders. This fostered inclusion but did not effect a redistribution of the power held by Europe׳s inter-governmental institutions. This more substantive change would require more, and more consistent, discursive consensus from stakeholders. With a reformed CFP for 2014, this paper considers the possibility of a future in which regional stakeholder-based fisheries governance becomes a reality.     

Towards sustainable fisheries subsidies: Entering a new round of reform under the Common Fisheries Policy

On 22 April 2009 the European Commission published its ‘Green Paper on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy’. The Green Paper points out a contradiction in policy, noting on one hand that public financial support to the Community's fisheries sector is substantial, but on the other hand such support is often incompatible with other Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) objectives, particularly the need to reduce overcapacities. Providing an analytical framework to better understand the effects of subsidies as well as an overview of existing funding schemes under the CFP, this article aims at answering some of the questions posed by the European Commission within its Green Paper. Answers are based on two ideas: the exploitation of marine capture resources ultimately depends on the level of available fish stocks and that a large share of subsidies fuels the race to fish by inducing investment incentives for the fisheries sector. Policies that have ignored this tend to encourage inefficient and unsustainable fishing as well as the misallocation of public funds. Although support schemes under the CFP have changed in recent years, some problematic support schemes persist. A future reform will have to continue the course taken towards sustainable and efficient approaches to supporting the fisheries industry.     

The hesitant emergence of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) in fisheries policies in Europe

The dismal record of fisheries management worldwide is often blamed on managers' and scientists' bigoted pursuit of the flawed Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) objective. This paper aims at clarifying that MSY has never been a key element in the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), and has not been for several decades the basis of scientific advice provided in support of that policy. The recent emergence of MSY in debates about the CFP might be a rhetoric response to international pressure rather than a willing change in policy. The major danger of assigning the notorious failure of the CFP to a wrong culprit, MSY, is to distract research efforts away from investigating the real causes that likely lay in the institutional set-up. Many objections against the reference points associated with MSY, as targets or limits, are well-founded but controversies among experts, when left unbridled, just provide the opportune climate for politicians to delay actions in the direction of reduced fishing impacts on fish stocks and marine ecosystems.     

Stakeholders’ participation in the fisheries management decision-making process: Fishers’ perceptions of participation

Public participation is a key ingredient of good governance and there are many advantages of involving stakeholders in the decision-making process. The European Commission identified the lack of stakeholder involvement as one of the major weaknesses of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). As such, the 2002 Reform of the CFP aimed to improve its system of governance by increasing the involvement of stakeholders in decision-making. Over the last decade, Scottish inshore waters have seen an increase in management measures focused on involving fishers, delegating responsibilities and decentralizing management. The present document investigates commercial inshore fishers’ perceptions of participation in the decision-making process and attitudes towards a new management regime – the Inshore Fisheries Groups (IFGs) – which aims to increase participation in and decentralization of inshore fisheries management. A survey was conducted, through face-to-face interviews, and ordered logistic and multiple regression models created to identify which characteristics influence fishers’ perceptions and attitudes. The present analysis concluded that, 5 years subsequent to the reform of the CFP, the majority of inshore fishers perceive themselves not to be consulted or involved in the decision-making process. However, and despite the fact that fishers are not completely certain of the potential of the IFGs to increase their participation in the management process, they have an overall positive attitude towards their implementation.     

Global assessment of the European Union fishing fleet: An update

This paper provides a global analysis of recent trends in the EU fishing fleet. Analysis of the capital productivity, labour rates, and economic benefits of the fleet revealed that considerable replacement of fishermen by better technology and well-equipped vessels occurred between 1990 and 2006. The analysis confirms that the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has been ineffective in reducing fishing capacity. In addition, the changes in capacity that occurred in this time interval differed among the different sectors of the fleet. Some members of the high sea fishing fleet increased their capacity (range 11–57%), and the deep-sea sector, which has greater tonnage and fishing power, increased its fishing capacity by 34–44%. These results confirm the ineffectiveness of the CFP in reducing overcapacity and illustrate the continuing threat of overcapacity to the long-term sustainability of fishery resources.     

Socio-economic quantification of fishing in a European urban area: The case of Vigo

General data would seem to indicate that aquaculture and extractive fishing are primary activities with a greater presence in developing and less industrial economies. Despite the scant importance of fishing in the EU (in terms of GDP and employment), it remains a focal point of EU activity by means of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The CFP establishes measures aimed at supporting fishing, often assuming that it is localized activity in rural, less developed regions. This study looks to quantify the importance and economic and social impact of primary fisheries and aquaculture activities in a European urban region (the area of the Ria of Vigo, in Galicia, Spain) through an exercise based on an input–output approach. The exercise carried out will provide results that imply a total impact that could reach around 7% of the study region's income and employment. From these results it can be concluded that fishing as a primary activity may also be relevant in EU urban areas; therefore, fishery management and support measures within the CFP should bear this differentiated reality in mind.     

The changing environment of fisheries policy in Europe

This paper presents how environmental concerns emanating outside the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) are increasingly setting the stage for EU fisheries management. This is illustrated via what is termed the exogenous entrance of environmental concerns through the implementation of directives in EU policy. More endogenous entrance of environmental concerns occurs via stakeholder participation in Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) as well as market mechanisms, such as ecolabelling and traceability. This study discusses how these latter channels of environmental concern may have become a more potent and efficient way of reaching environmental goals, outside of the primacy of the CFP.     

Good luck or good governance? The recovery of Celtic Sea herring

The herring stock in the Celtic Sea collapsed in 2004. The stock is managed under the European Union's (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), but with a large measure of local stakeholder involvement through the Pelagic Advisory Council and a local Irish stakeholder committee. An iterative process, initiated by the local committee culminated in a formal rebuilding plan, which ran until 2012, by which time, the stock had fully recovered. Subsequent analyses of stock development over this period suggest that the stock was already recovering by the time the final plan was implemented. Did the stock rebuild by good fortune or did the governance measures put in place achieve their aims? This question is answered by way of examination of stock trends over time, analyses of the main elements of the rebuilding measures, including a management strategy evaluation (MSE) along with analyses of the legal and institutional arrangements in Ireland and in the EU CFP, including the development of the Pelagic Advisory Council. Important innovations in the CFP are revealed as having been crucial for the rebuilding process.     

Estimating the effects of technological efficiency on the European fishing fleet

By comparing the real reductions in fishing capacity of the European Union (EU) and the effects of technological efficiency, this paper presents the first comprehensive analysis since the creation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Using a standard methodology and a conservative value of ±4.4% for annual technological progress, the results obtained for tonnage indicated that the EU-13 fleet's fishing capacity was reduced by >4% for only three years (1991, 2004, and 2006) in the 1987–2006 period.     

Liberal Intergovernmentalism,Historical Institutionalism,and British and German perceptions of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy

The aim of this paper is to determine whether British and German sea fisheries policies have been shaped by domestic factors or by European Union (EU) institutions. To achieve this aim, British and German perceptions of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) were compared using two alternative theories of EU integration: Moravscik's Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Pierson's Historical Institutionalism. The perceptions of three sets of respondents—fisheries scientists, fishers, and politicians—were investigated in each country to determine whether they saw the CFP as a means of attaining their own nation's domestic fisheries agenda (as Liberal Intergovernmentalism would argue), or as an institutional champion of European fisheries as a whole (as might be predicted by Historical Institutionalism). The article concludes that although there were elements of both theories evident in each country's perceptions, British perceptions were more strongly indicative of Historical Institutionalism than Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and German perceptions were more strongly indicative of Liberal Intergovernmentalism than Historical Institutionalism. This difference is exemplified in Britain's euroscepticism (which sees EU institutions as obstacles to British fisheries’ interests), and Germany's environmentalism (which sees EU institutions as synchronising with Germany's national priorities).     

Swedish coastal herring fisheries in the wake of an ITQ system

The European common fisheries policy (CFP) advocates measures to sustain small-scale fisheries; hence, in the European Commission's proposal for a reformed CFP, these are exempted from a mandatory system with tradable fishing concessions. This opens up for management actions designed for small-scale fisheries, but also implies new management issues. This article provides insights into the topic based on a Swedish small-scale herring fishery in the western Baltic Sea that was exempted from an ITQ-system. The fishery has been profitable since the system was introduced, and the increasing effort of both incumbent fishermen and new entrants implies a situation where fishermen compete for a limited quota. The migratory pattern of the herring implies high densities in the southern parts of the fishing areas during spring and in the northern parts during autumn. This forms the basis for two different fisheries in the area, as well as for the current management proposal to divide the quota into a spring and an autumn part. This and other management proposals are discussed in the paper. The main conclusion from the case study is that, when exempting a fishery from tradable fishing concessions, it is important to build other institutions dealing with the fundamental problem of access to the quota. Failure to do so might result in an over-capacity issue and threaten the long-run development of an otherwise successful small-scale fishery.     

Incentives,social–ecological feedbacks and European fisheries

The European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has failed to deliver on social, economic and ecological goals. This failure is in part the result of a number of social–ecological feedback mechanisms. The policy is currently undergoing reform, with unknown practical outcomes. Here, relatively successful fisheries policies outside the European Union are reviewed. Through interviews and workshops with scientists, managers and other stakeholders, complemented with literature reviews, practices that can create incentives for long-term sustainability are investigated. The focus is on how the provision of clear and trusted scientific evidence can stimulate defensible decisions, in turn creating incentives for compliance, leading to positive social–ecological outcomes. Despite differences between Europe and the investigated case studies, the prospects of an increased regionalization within the European CFP provides the best starting point for implementing best practice identified in this study.     

Who gets what? Developing a more equitable framework for EU fishing agreements

The reform of the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is focusing attention on EU distant water fishing activities, including the agreements signed with developing coastal states. Here, the EU’s fishing agreement with Madagascar, among the poorest countries to hold such an agreement, is examined. Incomes received by Madagascar since the first agreement with the EU in 1986 are documented, in both nominal and real terms, and discussed in the context of other conditions tied to the agreement, in particular support provided by the EU to improve Madagascar’s fisheries management capacity. Results indicate that since 1986, EU quotas increased by 30% while the fees paid by the EU decreased by 20%. Yet, Madagascar’s treasury income from these agreements decreased by 90%. This shows that the EU agreements with Madagascar are in direct contradiction to the goals set forth by the CFP, which states that benefits of agreements should be directed towards developing countries, and not towards private EU entities. This raises profound ethical questions that the CFP reform must address. A new framework is proposed, prioritizing fisheries sustainability and equitable benefit sharing, in which reasonable quotas are set, fees are indexed to the landed value of catches, and all costs of agreements are borne directly by the benefiting industries. EU development assistance should be decoupled from these agreements, and should focus on enhancing the host countries’ monitoring and enforcement capacities. This new framework would increase the benefits to Madagascar while reducing costs to EU taxpayers.     

Stakeholder participation in the management of North East Atlantic pelagic fish stocks: The future role of the Pelagic Regional Advisory Council in a reformed CFP

When the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) were created during the last reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 2002, it was recognised that in addition to the five geographically orientated stakeholder lead advisory bodies, a separate RAC dedicated exclusively to pelagic fisheries was needed because of it being so distinctly different from other fisheries. Pelagic fishing is different mostly due to the fact that the targeted fish species behave in a unique manner by grouping in schools in mid-water unlike other commercially targeted fishes, which typically reside on or near the ocean floor. For this reason, as well as the fact that they are usually widely distributed, researching and managing this dynamic group of fishes across the borders of many countries requires a unique approach. Fortunately, despite these complexities, policy makers have succeeded to establish a reasonably well functioning management framework, which has lead to the situation that most pelagic fish stocks are harvested biologically sustainable. While a majority of Europe's fish stocks still need rebuilding, and the main aim accordingly is to reduce fishing mortality, the current focus for pelagic fish stocks is to improve the performance of already implemented Long Term Management plans in terms of their biological as well as social and economical objectives. This paper reflects upon experiences of the Pelagic Regional Advisory Council (PRAC) in its role as advisor to the EU institutions. Subsequently, in the context of ideas presented in the European Commission's Green paper, the authors discuss the future of the PRAC and conclude that its main development potential lies not with the current EU's CFP reform, but rather should be sought in a wider international context.     

Sustainable use of flatfish resources: Addressing the credibility crisis in mixed fisheries management

Many flatfish species are caught in mixed demersal trawl fisheries and managed by Total Allowable Catch (TAC). Despite decades of fisheries management, several major stocks are severely depleted. Using the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) as an example, the failure of mixed-fisheries management is analysed by focussing on: the management system; the role of science; the role of managers and politicians; the response of fisheries to management. Failure of the CFP management could be ascribed to: incorrect management advice owing to bias in stock assessments; the tendency of politicians to set the TAC well above the recommended level; and non-compliance of the fisheries with the management regulations. We conclude that TAC management, although apparently successful in some single-species fisheries, inevitably leads to unsustainable exploitation of stocks caught in mixed demersal fisheries as it promotes discarding of over-quota catch and misreporting of catches, thereby corrupting the basis of the scientific advice and increasing the risk of stock collapse. This failure in mixed demersal fisheries has resulted in the loss of credibility of both scientists and managers, and has undermined the support of fishermen for management regulations. An approach is developed to convert the TAC system into a system that controls the total allowable effort (TAE). The approach takes account of the differences in catch efficiency between fleets as well as seasonal changes in the distribution of the target species and can also be applied in the recovery plans for rebuilding specific components of the demersal fish community, such as plaice, cod and hake.     

Fisheries science and sustainability in international policy: a study of failure in the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy

Within the European Union, scientific fisheries research and advice is passed down a chain of central European institutions before being incorporated into policy. However, advice is often poorly or only partially implemented and the system has largely failed to achieve sustainable fisheries management.This paper aims to explain why, by examining the use of fisheries science within the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The problem is examined with respect to both the political system and fisheries science, to show that the factors in both the supply, and the subsequent use, of scientific data inhibit effective fisheries management.     

Dysfunctions in common fishing regulations

One of the main concerns of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) lies in guaranteeing consistency among the different implemented actions. The main concern is establishing a relationship between the levels of compliance with the Multi-annual Guidance Programme (MAGP), the adoption of total allowable catches (TACs), and the levels of compliance with rules by producers.