The Influence of Path Corrections and a Three-dimensional Global <Emphasis Type="Italic">P</Emphasis>-wave Velocity Model on Seismic Event Location in Kazakhstan

We relocate 81 large nuclear explosions that were detonated at the Balapan and Degelen Mountain subregions of the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan during the years 1978 to 1989. The absolute locations of these explosions are available, as well as very accurate estimates of their origin times. This ground truth information allows us to perform a detailed analysis of location capability. We use a sparse network of stations with highly accurate first arrival picks measured using a waveform cross-correlation method. These high quality data facilitate very accurate location estimates with only a few phases per event. We contrast two different approaches: 1) a calibration-based approach, where we achieve improved locations by using path corrections, and 2) a model-based approach, where we achieve improved locations by relocating in a recently published global 3-D P-velocity model. Both methods result in large improvements in accuracy of the obtained absolute locations, compared to locations obtained in a 1-D reference earth model (ak135). The calibration-based approach gives superior results for this test site, in particular when arrival times from regional stations are included. Estimated locations remain well within a 1000 km² region surrounding the ground truth locations when the path corrections for the Balapan and Degelen Mountain subregions are interchanged, but even for the short separation between these two regions, we find variations in the path corrections that cause systematic mislocations. The model-based approach also results in substantially reduced mislocation distances and has the distinct advantage that it is, in principle, transportable to other source regions around the world.     

Does more mean less in epicentre estimation?

The epicentres of explosions at two test sites – Balapan (Shagan River), Former Soviet Union and Lop Nor, China – are estimated using the onset times of P from only three or four array stations at teleseismic distances. The epicentres of the explosions are known to within about 1 km from studies that make use of information from satellite imagery; these estimates are taken to be the true epicentres. With the true epicentres, differences between the true travel times and the times from travel-time tables are estimated. The differences include a component – path effects – that results in epicentre bias. Comparing our estimates using three or four stations with the true epicentres shows that with correction for path effects most of the epicentres are within 5 km of true and even without correction most estimated epicentres are within 10 km of true. The results confirm the conclusion of Evernden that if reading error in P times has a standard deviation of a few tenths of a second, reliable epicentres can be obtained given readings from only a few stations. This implies, what has been noted by others, that for epicentre estimation, better results can be obtained with a few well read P times from a constant network of the most reliable and sensitive stations, than by using uncritically all the available times. Even without correction for path effects none of the explosions (with times free from possible clock errors) falls outside a circular 1000 km² region; 1000 km² being the search area allowed for an on-site inspection under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The results suggest that rather than try and calibrate the whole of the International Monitoring System, being set up to verify the Test Ban, it would be better initially to concentrate on calibrating the few stations with the longest recording history and lowest detection thresholds.     

Global Event Location with Full and Sparse Data Sets Using Three-dimensional Models of Mantle P-wave Velocity

—?In order to improve on the accuracy of event locations at teleseismic distances it is necessary to adequately correct for lateral variations in structure along the ray paths, either through deterministic model-based corrections, empirical path/station corrections, or a combination of both approaches. In this paper we investigate the ability of current three-dimensional models of mantle P-wave velocity to accurately locate teleseismic events. We test four recently published models; two are parameterized in terms of relatively long-wavelength spherical harmonic functions up to degree 12, and two are parameterized in terms of blocks of constant velocity which have a dimension of a few hundreds of km. These models, together with detailed crustal corrections, are used to locate a set of 112 global test events, consisting of both earthquakes and explosions with P-wave travel-time data compiled by the Internation al Seismological Centre (ISC). The results indicate that the supposedly higher resolution block models do not improve the accuracy of teleseismic event locations over the longer wavelength spherical harmonic models. For some source locations the block models do not predict the range of observed travel-time residuals as well as the longer wavelength models. The accuracy of the locations largely varies randomly with geographic position although events in central Asia are particularly well located. We also tested the effect of reduced data sets on the locations. Multiple location iterations using 30 P-wave travel times indicate that teleseismic events may be located within an area of 1000?km² of the true location 66% of the time with only the model-based corrections, and increasing to 75% if calibration information is available. If as few as 8 phases are available then this is possible only 50% of the time. Further refinement in models and/or procedure, such as the addition of P _n phases, azimuth data, and consideration of P-wave anisotropy may provide further improvement in the teleseismic location of small events.     

On the Use of Calibration Explosions at the Former Semipalatinsk Test Site for Compiling a Travel-time Model of the Crust and Upper Mantle

—?Two chemical calibration explosions, conducted at the former Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in 1998 with charges of 25 tons and 100 tons TNT, have been used for developing travel-time curves and generalized one-dimensional velocity models of the crust and upper mantle of the platform region of Kazakhstan. The explosions were recorded by a number of digital seismic stations, located in Kazakhstan at distances ranging from 0 to 720?km. The travel-time tables developed in this paper cover the phases P, Pn, Pg, S, Sn, Lg in a range of 0–740?km and the velocity models apply to the crust down to 44?km depth and to the mantle down to 120?km. A comparison of the compiled travel-time tables with existing travel-time tables of CSE and IASPEI91 is presented.     

Ground truth seismic events and location capability at Degelen mountain, Kazakhstan

We utilized nuclear explosions from the Degelen Mountain sub-region of the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS), Kazakhstan, to assess seismic location capability directly. Excellent ground truth information for these events was either known or was estimated from maps of the Degelen Mountain adit complex. Origin times were refined for events for which absolute origin time information was unknown using catalog arrival times, our ground truth location estimates, and a time baseline provided by fixing known origin times during a joint hypocenter determination (JHD). Precise arrival time picks were determined using a waveform cross-correlation process applied to the available digital data. These data were used in a JHD analysis. We found that very accurate locations were possible when high precision, waveform cross-correlation arrival times were combined with JHD. Relocation with our full digital data set resulted in a mean mislocation of 2 km and a mean 95% confidence ellipse (CE) area of 6.6 km² (90% CE: 5.1 km²), however, only 5 of the 18 computed error ellipses actually covered the associated ground truth location estimate. To test a more realistic nuclear test monitoring scenario, we applied our JHD analysis to a set of seven events (one fixed) using data only from seismic stations within 40° epicentral distance. Relocation with these data resulted in a mean mislocation of 7.4 km, with four of the 95% error ellipses covering less than 570 km² (90% CE: 438 km²), and the other two covering 1730 and 8869 km² (90% CE: 1331 and 6822 km²). Location uncertainties calculated using JHD often underestimated the true error, but a circular region with a radius equal to the mislocation covered less than 1000 km² for all events having more than three observations.     

Teleseismic Lg of Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Explosions Recorded by the GRF (Gräfenberg) Array: Comparison with Regional Lg (BRV) and their Potential for Accurate Yield Estimation

—?A comparison of regional and teleseismic log rms (root-mean-square) L g amplitude measurements have been made for 14 underground nuclear explosions from the East Kazakh test site recorded both by the BRV (Borovoye) station in Kazakhstan and the GRF (Gräfenberg) array in Germany. The log rms L g amplitudes observed at the BRV regional station at a distance of 690?km and at the teleseismic GRF array at a distance exceeding 4700?km show very similar relative values (standard deviation 0.048 magnitude units) for underground explosions of different sizes at the Shagan River test site. This result as well as the comparison of BRV rms L g magnitudes (which were calculated from the log rms amplitudes using an appropriate calibration) with magnitude determinations for P waves of global seismic networks (standard deviation 0.054 magnitude units) point to a high precision in estimating the relative source sizes of explosions from L g-based single station data. Similar results were also obtained by other investigators (Patton, 1988; Ringdal et?al., 1992) using L g data from different stations at different distances.¶Additionally, GRF log rms L g and P-coda amplitude measurements were made for a larger data set from Novaya Zemlya and East Kazakh explosions, which were supplemented with m _b (L g) amplitude measurements using a modified version of Nuttli's (1973, 1986a) method. From this test of the relative performance of the three different magnitude scales, it was found that the L g and P-coda based magnitudes performed equally well, whereas the modified Nuttli m _b (L g) magnitudes show greater scatter when compared to the worldwide m _b reference magnitudes. Whether this result indicates that the rms amplitude measurements are superior to the zero-to-peak amplitude measurement of a single cycle used for the modified Nuttli method, however, cannot be finally assessed, since the calculated m _b (L g) magnitudes are only preliminary until appropriate attenuation corrections are available for the specific path to GRF.     

Application of the dynamic calibration method to international monitoring system stations in Central Asia using natural seismicity data

The dynamic calibration method (DCM), using natural seismicity data and initially elaborated in [Kedrov, 2001; Kedrov et al., 2001; Kedrov and Kedrov, 2003], is applied to International Monitoring System (IMS) stations in Central Asia. The algorithm of the method is refined and a program is designed for calibrating diagnostic parameters (discriminants) that characterize a seismic source on the source-station traces. The DCM calibration of stations in relation to the region under study is performed by the choice of attenuation coefficients that adapt the diagnostic parameters to the conditions in a reference region. In this method, the stable Eurasia region is used as the latter. The calibration used numerical data samples taken from the archive of the International Data Centre (IDC) for the IMS stations MKAR, BVAR, EIL, ASF, and CMAR. In this paper, we used discriminants in the spectral and time domains that have the form

$D_i = X_i - a_m m_b - b_\Delta \log \Delta $

and are independent of the magnitude m _b and the epicentral distance Δ; these discriminants were elaborated in [Kedrov et al., 1990; Kedrov and Lyuke, 1999] on the basis of a method used for identification of events at regional distances in Eurasia. Prerequisites of the DCM are the assumptions that the coefficient a _m is regionindependent and the coefficient b _Δ depends only on the geotectonic characteristics of the medium and does not depend on the source type. Thus, b _Δ can be evaluated only from a sample of earthquakes in the region studied; it is used for adapting the discriminants D(X _i ) in the region studied to the reference region. The algorithm is constructed in such a way that corrected values of D(X i) are calculated from the found values of the calibration coefficients b _Δ, after which natural events in the region under study are selected by filtering. Empirical estimates of the filtering efficiency as a function of a station vary in a range of 95–100%. The DCM was independently tested using records obtained at the IRIS (Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology) stations BRVK and MAKZ from explosions detonated in India on May 11, 1998, and Pakistan on May 28, 1998; these stations are similar in location and recording instrumentation characteristics to the IMS stations BVAR and MKAR. This test resulted in correct recognition of the source type and thereby directly confirmed the validity of the proposed calibration method of stations with the use of natural seismicity data. It is shown that the calibration coefficients b _Δ for traces similar in the conditions of signal propagation (e.g., the traces from Iran to the stations EIL and ASF) are comparable for nearly all diagnostic parameters. We arrive at the conclusion that the method of dynamic calibration of stations using natural seismicity data in a region where no explosions were detonated can be significant for a rapid and inexpensive calibration of IMS stations. The DCM can also be used for recognition of industrial chemical explosions that are sometimes erroneously classified in regional catalogs as earthquakes.

     

A Study of Small Magnitude Seismic Events During 1961–1989 on and near the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan

—?Official Russian sources in 1996 and 1997 have stated that 340 underground nuclear tests (UNTs) were conducted during 1961–1989 at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS) in Eastern Kazakhstan. Only 271 of these nuclear tests appear to have been described with well-determined origin time, coordinates and magnitudes in the openly available technical literature. Thus, good open documentation has been lacking for 69 UNTs at STS.¶The main goal of our study was to provide detections, estimates of origin time and location, and magnitudes, for as many of these previously undocumented events as possible. We used data from temporary and permanent seismographic stations in the former USSR at distances from 500?km to about 1500?km from STS. As a result, we have been able to assign magnitude for eight previously located UNTs whose magnitude was not previously known. For 31 UNTs, we have estimated origin time an d assigned magnitude — and for 19 of these 31 we have obtained locations based on seismic signals. Of the remaining 30 poorly documented UNTs, 15 had announced yields that were less than one ton, and 13 occurred simultaneously with another test which was detected. There are only two UNTs, for which the announced yield exceeds one ton and we have been unable to find seismic signals.¶Most of the newly detected and located events were sub-kiloton. Their magnitudes range from 2.7 up to 5.1 (a multi-kiloton event on 1965 Feb. 4 that was often obscured at teleseismic stations by signals from an earthquake swarm in the Aleutians).¶For 17 small UNTs at STS, we compare the locations (with their uncertainties) that we had earlier determined in 1994 from analysis of regional seismic waves, with ground-truth information obtained in 1998. The average error of the seismically-determined locations is only about 5?km. The ground-truth location is almost alw ays within the predicted small uncertainty of the seismically-determined location.¶Seismically-determined yield estimates are in good agreement with the announced total annual yield of nuclear tests, for each year from 1964 to 1989 at Semipalatinsk.¶We also report the origin time, location, and seismic magnitude of 29 chemical explosions and a few earthquakes on or near STS during the years 1961–1989.¶Our new documentation of STS explosions is important for evaluating the detection, location, and identification capabilities of teleseismic and regional arrays and stations; and how these capabilities have changed with time.     

Improving Regional Seismic Event Location in China

—?In an effort to improve our ability to locate seismic events in China using only regional data, we have developed empirical propagation path corrections and applied such corrections using traditional location routines. Thus far, we have concentrated on corrections to observed P arrival times for crustal events using travel-time observations available from the USGS Earthquake Data Reports, the International Seismic Centre Bulletin, the preliminary International Data Center Reviewed Event Bulletin, and our own travel-time picks from regional data. Location ground truth for events used in this study ranges from 25?km for well-located teleseimic events, down to 2?km for nuclear explosions located using satellite imagery. We also use eight events for which depth is constrained using several waveform methods. We relocate events using the EvLoc algorithm from a region encompassing much of China (latitude 20°–55°N; longitude 65°–115°E). We observe that travel-time residuals exhibit a distance-dependent bias using IASPEI91 as our base model. To remedy this bias, we have developed a new 1-D model for China, which removes a significant portion of the distance bias. For individual stations having sufficient P-wave residual data, we produce a map of the regional travel-time residuals from all well-located teleseismic events. Residuals are used only if they are smaller than 10?s in absolute value and if the seismic event is located with accuracy better than 25?km. From the residual data, correction surfaces are constructed using modified Bayesian kriging. Modified Bayesian kriging offers us the advantage of providing well-behaved interpolants and their errors, but requires that we have adequate error estimates associated with the travel-time residuals from which they are constructed. For our P-wave residual error estimate, we use the sum of measurement and modeling errors, where measurement error is based on signal-to-noise ratios when available, and on the published catalog estimate otherwise. Our modeling error originates from the variance of travel-time residuals for our 1-D China model. We calculate propagation path correction surfaces for 74 stations in and around China, including six stations from the International Monitoring System. The statistical significance of each correction surface is evaluated using a cross-validation technique. We show relocation results for nuclear tests from the Balapan and Lop Nor test sites, and for earthquakes located using interferometric synthetic aperture radar. These examples show that the use of propagation path correction surfaces in regional relocations eliminates distance bias in the residual curves and significantly improves the accuracy and precision of seismic event locations.     

Discriminating Between Large Mine Collapses and Explosions Using Teleseismic P Waves

—?Some of the most suspicious seismic disturbances under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) are likely to be those associated with mining, as they are shallow, and at least some have an explosion-like m _b :M _s signature. Previous research highlighted the potential of broadband teleseismic P waves as a way of identifying large mine tremors. Broadband teleseismic P from two suspected large mine collapses, one in Germany (1302 UT, 13 March 1989, 5.4?m _b ) and another in Wyoming (1526 UT, 3 February 1995, 5.3?m _b ), show differences in character despite the similarity of the reported ground failure and mine types. We apply a full moment-tensor analysis to the teleseismic P waves and show that the data are inconsistent with either a shallow explosion or an earthquake (double-couple) at depth, but this method is unable to distinguish between a shallow dip-slip source and a closing-crack moment tensor. However, three-component surface-wave seismograms recorded at regional distances fit the shallow closing-crack model, but are inconsistent with a shallow earthquake source, because strong Love waves, expected from a double-couple source, are not observed at a number of stations well distributed in azimuth. Here, we restate the equivalence for shallow sources of the closing-crack model and a gravitational collapse model. We use the latter to model the broadband P waves from these mine tremors and show that, while non-unique, the differences in the observed broadband P waves from the two tremors can be attributed to the area, amount of collapse, depth, and rate of collapse. The collapse model predicts negative first-motion for all P waves in contrast to the positive polarity expected from explosions. Thus, the broadband teleseismic P waves have the potential to discriminate between large collapses and explosions.     

Signal Processing for Indian and Pakistan Nuclear Tests Recorded at IMS Stations Located in Israel

v—vIn compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) the International Monitoring System (IMS) was designed for detection and location of the clandestine Nuclear Tests (NT). Two auxiliary IMS seismic stations MRNI and EIL, deployed recently, were subjected to detectability, travel-time calibration and discrimination analysis. The study is based on the three recent 1998 underground nuclear explosions: one of India and two of Pakistan, which provided a ground-truth test of the existing IMS. These events, attaining magnitudes of 5.2, 4.8 and 4.6 correspondingly, were registered by many IMS and other seismic stations.¶The MRNI and EIL broadband (BB) stations are located in Israel at teleseismic distances (from the explosions) of 3600, 2800 and 2700ukm, respectively, where the signals from the tests are already weak. The Indian and the second Pakistan NT were not detected by the short-period Israel Seismic Network (ISN), using standard STA/LTA triggering. Therefore, for the chosen IMS stations we compare the STA/LTA response to the results of the more sensitive Murdock-Hutt (MH) and the Adaptive Statistically Optimal Detector (OD) that showed triggering for these three events. The second Pakistan NT signal arrived at the ISN and the IMS stations in the coda of a strong Afghanistan earthquake and was further disturbed by a preceding signal from a local earthquake. However, the NT signal was successfully extracted at EIL and MRNI stations using MH and OD procedures. For comparison we provide the signal analysis of the cooperating BB station JER, with considerably worse noise conditions than EIL and MRNI, and show that OD can detect events when the other algorithms fail. Using the most quiet EIL station, the most sensitive OD and different bandpass filters we tried in addition to detect the small Kazakh chemical 100-ton calibration explosion of 1998, with magnitude 3.7 at a distance approaching 4000ukm. The detector response curve showed uprising in the expected signal time interval, but yet was low for a reliable decision.¶After an NT is detected it should be recognized. Spectra were calculated in a 15-sec window including P and P-coda waves. The spectra for the first Pakistan NT showed a pronounced spectral null at 1.7uHz for all three components of the EIL station. The effect was confirmed by observation of the same spectral null at the vertical component of the ISN stations. For this ground-truth explosion with a reported shallow source depth, the phenomenon can be explained in terms of the interference of P and pP phases. However, the spectral null feature, considered separately, cannot serve as a reliable identification characteristic of nuclear explosions, because not all the tests provide the nulls, whereas some earthquakes show this feature. Therefore, the multi-channel spectral discrimination analysis, based on a spectral ratio of low-to-high frequency energy (in the 0.6–1uHz and 1–3uHz bands), and a semblance of spectral curves (in the 0.6–2uHz band), was conducted. Both statistics were calculated for the vertical component of the ISN stations as well for the three components of the EIL station. The statistics provided a reliable discrimination between the recent NT and several nearby earthquakes, and showed compliance with the former analysis of Soviet and Chinese NT, where nuclear tests demonstrated lower values of energy ratio and spectral semblance than earthquakes. ¶Accurate location of NT requires calibration of travel time for IMS stations. Using known source locations, IASPEI91 travel-time tables and NEIC origin times we calculated expected arrival time for the P waves to the EIL and MRNI stations and showed that the measured arrival time has a delay of about 4 sec. Similar results were obtained for the nearby Pakistan earthquakes. The analysis was complimented by the P travel-time measurements for the set of Semipalatinsk NT, which showed delays of about 3.7usec to the short-period MBH station which is a surrogate station for EIL. Similar delays at different stations evidence a path- rather than site-effect. The results can be used for calibration of the IMS stations EIL and MRNI regarding Asian seismic events.     

Application of Network-averaged Teleseismic P-wave Spectra to Seismic Yield Estimation of Underground Nuclear Explosions

—?A set of procedures is described for estimating network-averaged teleseismic P-wave spectra for underground nuclear explosions and for analytically inverting these spectra to obtain estimates of m _b /yield relations and individual yields for explosions at previously uncalibrated test sites. These procedures are then applied to the analyses of explosions at the former Soviet test sites at Shagan River, Degelen Mountain, Novaya Zemlya and Azgir, as well as at the French Sahara, U.S. Amchitka and Chinese Lop Nor test sites. It is demonstrated that the resulting seismic estimates of explosion yield and m _b /yield relations are remarkably consistent with a variety of other available information for a number of these test sites. These results lead us to conclude that the network-averaged teleseismic P-wave spectra provide considerably more diagnostic information regarding the explosion seismic source than do the corresponding narrowband magnitude measures such as m _b , M _s and m _b (L _g ), and, therefore, that they are to be preferred for applications to seismic yield estimation for explosions at previously uncalibrated test sites.     

Source Specific Station Corrections for Regional Phases at Fennoscandian Stations

—?The IASPEI91 global travel-time curves are used as the default for event location at the Prototype International Data Center (PIDC). In order to improve event location, a 1-D Baltic travel-time model was implemented at the PIDC in 1997 for locating events using regional phases from Fennoscandian stations. Where a single model is insufficient for characterizing the regional geology, path-dependent corrections, or Source Specific Station Corrections (SSSCs), are more appropriate for event locations. We have developed SSSCs for regional phases at the Fennoscandian stations by interpolating travel times through different 1-D models. SSSCs for stations NRIS and SPITS are also derived, given the fact that paths from both stations to high latitude events are within the Fennoscandia regionalization as Baltic.¶Validation testing of the SSSCs demonstrates that using SSSCs in event location is superior to not using SSSCs, a nd, in most cases, to using the 1-D model directly when locating events. For a ground-truth data set which includes events in the Baltic Shield with location accuracy better than 2?km, the average improvement in location due to SSSCs is 9?km, and the median coverage ellipse is reduced by 2710?km² (from 3830 to 1120?km²). These results are similar to those obtained using the 1-D Baltic model. For a CEB (Calibration Event Bulletin) data set which includes events along the North Atlantic oceanic ridge and in central/southern Europe, using SSSCs the ridge events move closer to the ridge axis, and the European events move closer to CEB locations than 1-D Baltic locations. For a constrained JHD (Joint Hypocenter Determination) data set of events in the Novaya Zemlya region, when using SSSCs or the 1-D Baltic model, relative to the JHD locations mislocations are less or similar to those without SSSCs. All coverage ellipses are smaller but sti ll contain the JHD solutions.¶Our SSSCs are strongly dependent on the 1-D regional models and regionalization. Future development in 1-D velocity models and travel-time curves should improve such SSSCs, event locations, and uncertainties. It is hoped that the implementation and demonstration of SSSCs in the PIDC software will encourage these further developments. These SSSCs were implemented at the PIDC for Reviewed Event Bulletin (REB) location in April 1999.     

Application of 3-D Crustal and Upper Mantle Velocity Model of North America for Location of Regional Seismic Events

—?Seismic event locations based on regional 1-D velocity-depth sections can have bias errors caused by travel-time variations within different tectonic provinces and due to ray-paths crossing boundaries between tectonic provinces with different crustal and upper mantle velocity structures. Seismic event locations based on 3-D velocity models have the potential to overcome these limitations. This paper summarizes preliminary results for calibration of IMS for North America using 3-D velocity model. A 3-D modeling software was used to compute Source-Station Specific Corrections (SSSCs(3-D)) for Pn travel times utilizing 3-D crustal and upper mantle velocity model for the region. This research was performed within the framework of the United States/Russian Federation Joint Program of Seismic Calibration of the International Monitoring System (IMS) in Northern Eurasia and North America.¶An initial 3-D velocity model for North America was derived by combining and interpolating 1-D velocity-depth sections for different tectonic units. In areas where no information on 1-D velocity-depth sections was available, tectonic regionalization was used to extrapolate or interpolate. A Moho depth map was integrated. This approach combines the information obtained from refraction profiles with information derived from local and regional network data. The initial 3-D velocity model was tested against maps of Pn travel-time residuals for eight calibration explosions; corrections to the 3-D model were made to fit the observed residuals. Our goal was to find a 3-D crustal and upper mantle velocity model capable predicting Pn travel times with an accuracy of 1.0–1.5 seconds (r.m.s.).¶The 3-D velocity model for North America that gave the best fit to the observed travel times, was used to produce maps of SSSCs(3-D) for seismic stations. The computed SSSCs(3-D) vary approximately from +5 seconds to ?5 seconds for the western USA and the Pre-Cambrian platform, respectively. These SSSCs(3-D) along with estimated modeling and measurement errors were used to relocate, using regional data, an independent set of large chemical explosions (with known locations and origin times) detonated within various tectonic provinces of North America. Utilization of the 3-D velocity model through application of the computed SSSCs(3-D) resulted in a substantial improvement in seismic event location accuracy and in a significant decrease of error ellipse area for all events analyzed in comparison both with locations based on the IASPEI91 travel times and locations based on 1-D regional velocity models.     

The use of teleseismic P-wave complexity for seismic event screening – results determined from GRF and GERESS array data

Seismic data recorded at the broad-band teleseismic GRF array and theshort-period regional GERESS array, which is a designated IMS primarystation, are analyzed to determine the effectiveness of teleseismic P-wave complexity for the purpose of seismic event screening within theframework of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification. For theGRF array, seismic waveform data from nearly 200 nuclear explosions havebeen recorded since its installation in the late 1970's, which were studiedalong with several thousand earthquakes from the last few years.Additionally, we investigated teleseismic P wave complexity for a similarnumber of earthquakes recorded at GERESS. However, owing to itsoperation starting in 1991, only a limited number of nuclear explosionseismograms are available for study.For nuclear explosions, complexity does not exceed levels of 0.3 except fora number of events from the Nevada Test Site recorded only at the GRFarray and located at a large distance where PcP may interfere with the initialP wavelet. Since all events with complexity at GRF larger than 0.3 areexclusively located on Pahute Mesa within the Nevada Test Site,near-source geology or topography must play a dominant role for theseincreased complexity values, while PcP may not contribute significantly tothe high-frequency energy measured by the complexity parameter.Although many earthquakes show complexities below this level, for morethan 25% of the earthquakes investigated the complexities determined arelarger than 0.7, thus showing distinctly larger values than nuclearexplosions. Therefore, this percentage may be screened as earthquakes fromall seismic events detected. As currently only about half of the eventsdetected by the global IMS network are screened out based on focal depthand the m _b :M _s criterion, teleseismic P-wavecomplexity may contribute significantly to the task of seismic eventscreening.     

Wave Generation from Explosions in Rock Cavities

—?We have developed a measurement method to monitor P- and S-waves generated from laboratory-scale explosions in meter-sized rock samples at a series of stations, as well as invented a device to drill spherical cavities in rock, with diameters up to 10?centimeters. We applied these to experiments in Bedford limestone in which spherical/cylindrical explosives (0.2 to 1.9?g) were centrally placed in 1.2- to 3-cm diameter cavities. Stress waves generated by the explosions were recorded within a radius of 25?cm. The radial stress wave records and post-explosion studies demonstrate that S-waves are generated from explosions in cavities as a result of both wave mode-conversion from the cavity wall and crack propagation in rocks. The experimental results of wave generation from the explosions in spherical and cylindrical cavities demonstrate the cavity geometrical effect on the resulting wave pattern. The P- and S-waves generated by explosions and crack propagation in rocks are analyzed. A simple analytic model for P-wave generation is proposed to explain the differences of P-wave-induced displacement histories between the observed waveforms and those predicted by a step-pressure source. Generally, the qualitative predictions of this model fit the observations. The present results demonstrate the importance of rock cracking and cavities in P- and S-wave generation.     

Near-realtime source analysis of the 20 March 2012 Ometepec-Pinotepa Nacional,Mexico earthquake

We apply a single-step, finite-fault analysis procedure to derive a coseismic slip model for the large M_W 7.4 Ometepec-Pinotepa Nacional, Mexico earthquake of 20 March 2012, using teleseismic P waveforms recorded by the Global Seismographic Network. The inversion is conducted in near-realtime using source parameters available from the USGS/NEIC and the Global Centroid Moment Tensor (gCMT) project. The fault orientation and slip angle are obtained from the gCMT mechanism assuming that the fault coincides with the shallow-dipping nodal plane. The fault dimensions and maximum rise time are based on the magnitude reported for the event. Teleseismic data from the USGS/NEIC Continuous Waveform Buffer database are used in the inversion with record start times set to the P-wave arrivals used to compute the earthquake hypocenter. The inversion is stabilized by requiring a smooth transition of slip across the fault while minimizing the seismic moment. These constraints are applied using a smoothing weight that is estimated from the inverse problem, allowing the recovery of the least-complicated rupture history in a single step. Inversion of the deconvolved, ground-displacement waveforms reveals a simple, circular rupture similar in extent to the source identified by the USGS/NEIC using body-and surface-wave data, indicating that the teleseismic P waves can provide a first-order source model for the event in near-realtime. Additional inversions conducted using velocity records identify a more-detailed rupture model characterized by an elliptical 2500 km² source region extending updip and downdip from the hypocenter. This elliptical source preserves the orientation and overall dimensions of a dual-source slip model obtained recently by other investigators using local strong motions and global seismic waveforms. The results indicate that velocity waveforms could provide additional details of the earthquake rupture in near-realtime, finite-fault inversions using teleseismic P waves.     

Application of the method of dynamic calibration for IMS stations in regions with lower seismic activity

The Method of Dynamic Calibration (MDC) of stations of the International Monitoring System (IMS) was developed for calibrating regions where no underground nuclear explosions were carried out, with the purpose of providing conditions for implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in nontrivial cases. Initially, the MDC had been presented in [Kedrov, 2001; Kedrov et al., 2001; Kedrov O.K. and Kedrov E.O., 2003] and then considered in detail in [Kedrov et al., 2008]. The core of MDC relates to adapting diagnostic parameters for the identification of underground nuclear explosions (UNE) and earthquakes elaborated for the region of Eurasia, taken as a basic region (BR), for other researched regions that differ from BR in the character of the attenuation of seismic waves. The unique characteristic of this method lies in the fact that calibration of diagnostic parameters with the help of attenuation coefficients b _Δ at varied source-station traces is implemented using only natural seismicity data within the limits of an explored region and does not require special underground chemical explosions. The MDC algorithm is implemented in the research program ”Kalibr”, which was tested by using the experimental data from Eurasia region. It is shown in this work that MDC can be used for calibration of regions where a very low level of natural seismicity is observed. According to the results of the calibration of diagnostic parameters at IMS stations in several regions of North America, Africa, and Asia, the approximate classification of propagation conditions for seismic signals at source-station traces in platform and tectonically active regions is made. The results for the development of two research programs, “Spektr” and “Signal”, are presented; this software is intended for automation of calculation procedures for spectral diagnostic parameters of UNEs’ and earthquakes’ identification by amplitude spectra of P waves and by the maximal amplitudes of P, S, and LR signals. The application of these programs allowed us to accelerate the whole calibration procedure for a particular source-station trace using the ”Kalibr” program.     

Forensic seismology revisited

The first technical discussions, held in 1958, on methods of verifying compliance with a treaty banning nuclear explosions, concluded that a monitoring system could be set up to detect and identify such explosions anywhere except underground: the difficulty with underground explosions was that there would be some earthquakes that could not be distinguished from an explosion. The development of adequate ways of discriminating between earthquakes and underground explosions proved to be difficult so that only in 1996 was a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) finally negotiated. Some of the important improvements in the detection and identification of underground tests—that is in forensic seismology—have been made by the UK through a research group at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). The paper describes some of the advances made in identification since 1958, particularly by the AWE Group, and the main features of the International Monitoring System (IMS), being set up to verify the Test Ban. Once the Treaty enters into force, then should a suspicious disturbance be detected the State under suspicion of testing will have to demonstrate that the disturbance was not a test. If this cannot be done satisfactorily the Treaty has provisions for on-site inspections (OSIs): for a suspicious seismic disturbance for example, an international team of inspectors will search the area around the estimated epicentre of the disturbance for evidence that a nuclear test really took place. Early observations made at epicentral distances out to 2,000 km from the Nevada Test Site showed that there is little to distinguish explosion seismograms from those of nearby earthquakes: for both source types the short-period (SP: ∼1 Hz) seismograms are complex showing multiple arrivals. At long range, say 3,000–10,000 km, loosely called teleseismic distances, the AWE Group noted that SP P waves—the most widely and well-recorded waves from underground explosions—were in contrast simple, comprising one or two cycles of large amplitude followed by a low-amplitude coda. Earthquake signals on the other hand were often complex with numerous arrivals of similar amplitude spread over 35 s or more. It therefore appeared that earthquakes could be recognised on complexity. Later however, complex explosion signals were observed which reduced the apparent effectiveness of complexity as a criterion for identifying earthquakes. Nevertheless, the AWE Group concluded that for many paths to teleseismic distances, Earth is transparent for P signals and this provides a window through which source differences will be most clearly seen. Much of the research by the Group has focused on understanding the influence of source type on P seismograms recorded at teleseismic distances. Consequently the paper concentrates on teleseismic methods of distinguishing between explosions and earthquakes. One of the most robust criteria for discriminating between earthquakes and explosions is the m _b : M _s criterion which compares the amplitudes of the SP P waves as measured by the body-wave magnitude m _b, and the long-period (LP: ∼0.05 Hz) Rayleigh-wave amplitude as measured by the surface-wave magnitude M _s; the P and Rayleigh waves being the main wave types used in forensic seismology. For a given M _s, the m _b for explosions is larger than for most earthquakes. The criterion is difficult to apply however, at low magnitude (say m _b < 4.5) and there are exceptions—earthquakes that look like explosions. A difficulty with identification criteria developed in the early days of forensic seismology was that they were in the main empirical—it was not known why they appeared to work and if there were test sites or earthquakes where they would fail. Consequently the AWE Group in cooperation with the University of Cambridge used seismogram modelling to try and understand what controls complexity of SP P seismograms, and to put the m _b : M _s criterion on a theoretical basis. The results of this work show that the m _b : M _s criterion is robust because several factors contribute to the separation of earthquakes and explosions. The principal reason for the separation however, is that for many orientations of the earthquake source there is at least one P nodal plane in the teleseismic window and this biases m _b low. Only for earthquakes with near 45° dip-slip mechanisms where the antinode of P is in the source window is the m _b:M _s criterion predicted to fail. The results from modelling are consistent with observation—in particular there are earthquakes, “anomalous events”, which look explosion-like on the m _b:M _s criterion, that turn out to have mechanisms close to 45° dip-slip. Fortunately the P seismograms from such earthquakes usually show pP and sP, the reflections from the free surface of P and S waves radiated upwards. From the pP–P and sP–P times the focal depth can be estimated. So far the estimated depth of the anomalous events have turned out to be ∼20 km, too deep to be explosions. Studies show that the observation that P seismograms are more complex than predicted by simple models can be explained on the weak-signal hypothesis: the standard phases, direct P and the surface reflections, are weak because of amongst other things, the effects of the radiation pattern or obstacles on the source-to-receiver path; other non-standard arrivals then appear relatively large on the seismograms. What has come out of the modelling of P seismograms is a criterion for recognising suspicious disturbances based on simplicity rather than complexity. Simple P seismograms for earthquakes at depths of more than a few kilometres are likely to be radiated only to stations that lie in a confined range of azimuths and distances. If then, simple seismograms are recorded over a wide range of distances and particularly azimuths, it is unlikely the source is an earthquake at depth. It is possible to test this using the relative amplitudes of direct P and later arrivals that might be surface reflections. The procedure is to use only the simple P seismograms on the assumption that whereas the propagation through Earth may make a signal more complex it is unlikely to make it simpler. From the amplitude of the coda of these seismograms, bounds can be placed on the size of possible pP and sP. The relative-amplitude method is then used to search for orientations of the earthquake source that are compatible with the observations. If no such orientations are found the source must be shallow so that any surface reflections merge with direct P, and hence could be an explosion. The IMS when completed will be a global network of 321 monitoring stations, including 170 seismological stations principally to detect the seismic waves from earthquakes and underground explosions. The IMS will also have stations with hydrophones, microbarographs and radionuclide detectors to detect explosions in the oceans and the atmosphere and any isotopes in the air characteristic of a nuclear test. The Global Communications Infrastructure provides communications between the IMS stations and the International Data Centre (IDC), Vienna, where the recordings from the monitoring stations is collected, collated, and analysed. The IDC issues bulletins listing geophysical disturbances, to States Signatories to the CTBT. The assessment of the disturbances to decide whether any are possible explosions, is a task for State Signatories. For each Signatory to do a detailed analysis of all disturbances would be expensive and time consuming. Fortunately many disturbances can be readily identified as earthquakes and removed from consideration—a process referred to as “event screening”. For example, many earthquakes with epicentres over the oceans can be distinguished from underwater explosions, because an explosion signal is of much higher frequency than that of earthquakes that occur below the ocean bed. Further, many earthquakes could clearly be identified at the IDC on the m _b : M _s criterion, but there is a difficulty—how to set the decision line. The possibility has to be very small that an explosion will be classed by mistake, as an earthquake. The decision line has therefore to be set conservatively, consequently with routine application of current screening criteria, only about 50% of earthquakes can be positively identified as such. Various methods have been proposed whereby a “determined violator” could avoid the provisions of a CTBT and carry out a test that would be either undetected or detected but not identified as an explosion. The increase in complexity and cost of such a test should discourage any State from attempting it. In addition, there is always the possibility of some stations detecting the test, the test being identified as suspicious, and so subject to an OSI. With time as the IMS becomes more efficient and effective it will act increasingly to deter anyone contemplating a clandestine test, from going ahead. What has emerged is several robust criteria. The criteria include: location, which when combined with hydro-acoustic data can identify earthquakes under the sea; m _b : M _s; and depth of focus. More detailed study is required of any remaining seismic disturbance that is regarded as suspicious: for example, is close to a site where nuclear tests have been carried out in the past. Any disturbance that is shown to be explosion-like, may be the subject of an OSI. One surprise is how little plate tectonics has contributed to resolving problems in forensic seismology. Much of the evidence for plate tectonics comes from seismological studies so it would be expected that the implications for Earth structure arising from forensic seismology would be consistent with plate-tectonic models. So far the AWE Group have found little synergy between plate tectonics and forensic seismology. It is to be hoped that the large volume of seismological data of high quality now being collected by the IMS and the increasing number of digital stations, will result in a revised Earth model that is consistent with the findings of forensic seismology, so that a future review of progress will show that the forensic seismologist can draw on this model in attempting to interpret apparently anomalous seismograms.

---

Observation and Modeling of the January 2009 West Papua, Indonesia Tsunami

We modeled a tsunami from the West Papua, Indonesia earthquakes on January 3, 2009 (M _w?=?7.7). After the first earthquake, tsunami alerts were issued in Indonesia and Japan. The tsunami was recorded at many stations located in and around the Pacific Ocean. In particular, at Kushimoto on Kii Peninsula, the maximum amplitude was 43?cm, larger than that at Manokwari on New Guinea Island, near the epicenter. The tsunami was recorded on near-shore wave gauges, offshore GPS sensors and deep-sea bottom pressure sensors. We have collected more than 150 records and used 72 stations?? data with clear tsunami signals for the tsunami source modeling. We assumed two fault models (single fault and five subfaults) which are located to cover the aftershock area. The estimated average slip on the single fault model (80?×?40?km) is 0.64?m, which yields a seismic moment of 1.02?×?10²⁰?Nm (M _w?=?7.3). The observed tsunami waveforms at most stations are well explained by this model.