Does funds-based adaptation finance reach the most vulnerable countries?

The evolving architecture of global climate change adaptation finance is shifting towards fund mechanisms with competitive application and allocation principles. At the same time, prioritization of the most vulnerable countries is a key goal within this emerging architecture. The paper analyses whether the Green Climate Fund (GCF), by far the largest climate change fund, has so far delivered on its promise to prioritize the most vulnerable countries. For our analysis, we consider the USD 2.5 billion GCF funding allocated until the end of the first mobilization phase and disaggregate it project-by-project into its mitigation and adaptation related amounts. We then analyze the adaptation flows in terms of the recipient country’s level of vulnerability and institutional capacity. We further analyze whether funds are being accessed through independent national entities or international intermediaries and whether recipient countries have developing country priority status. The results show that funds-based adaptation finance creates an ambiguous picture: On the one hand, the GCF is on track in allocating its funds largely to country groups which its statutes aim to prioritize, particularly LDCs, African countries and SIDS. At the same time, the proposal process results in the fact that many countries with the highest climate vulnerability but weak government institutions and fragile state-bureaucracies have missed out and not been able to access project funding, mostly LDCs in Africa and conflict-ridden countries. Further, most countries have not yet been able to access project funds independently through their national entities, limiting direct access and country ownership – the strengthening of which is a major goal of the fund. The findings suggest that simplified approval tracks need to be strengthened in the emerging climate finance architecture so that populations in countries with the lowest institutional capacity but highest vulnerability are not being left behind in the long-run.     

Weapons of the vulnerable? A review of popular resistance to climate adaptation

Climate adaptation is not a neutral or apolitical process, but one that ignites social resistance. Government responses to risks of floods, droughts, or hurricanes – even those using a language of participation – might follow historical development pathways, strive to maintain the status quo, and directly or indirectly serve elite interests. Little attention has been paid to how people defy or resist top-down adaptation processes, overtly or covertly, in particular cultural, historical, and legal contexts. Drawing on sociological thought on popular resistance, this paper systematises research on people’s resistance to climate adaptation by scrutinising the sites, repertoires, and consequences of such resistance. We identified overt and covert resistance in 56 scientific adaptation articles, which concentrated on 5 ‘sites’ of resistance: Rural livelihoods, Urban informal settlements, Islands, First Nations, and Institutional landscapes. The findings imply that resistance to adaptation occurs globally, and not least in the context of relocation processes and participatory adaptation. We show how a resistance lens can help understand contemporary political behaviours, shed light on dynamic and compound vulnerability, and’unlock’ more context-sensitive and even transformative adaptation. Meanwhile, resistance and popular movements are not only progressive, and there might be conceptual barriers to moving from resistance to transformation or reconciling resistance with actions by or with the state.     

Global climate policy and local energy politics: is India hiding behind the poor?

Along with the large middle-income countries Brazil, China, and South Africa, India has been put under increasing pressure to shoulder parts of the mitigation burden and commit to national emission reduction targets. India, however, refers to its limited capacity and widespread poverty. Is India hiding behind its poor? While others examine the distribution of emissions within the country to answer this question, we study domestic policy making for energy subsidies and access to clean energy. Empirical evidence suggests that domestic policy making is at least partially consistent with the pro-poor arguments advanced at the international level. Given their large number and the country's democratic system, the poor do have some weight in Indian politics. However, pro-poor policies end where they do not translate into greater vote shares. Moreover, India's international position ignores the existing complementarities between climate-friendly and pro-poor activities.

Policy relevance

Despite India's recent growth spurt, its concern to fight energy poverty at home before engaging in any commitments on climate policy at the international level should be taken seriously within the international negotiations. Policy making in India is driven by democratic incentives, which, in this case, work to the benefit of the poor. Pro-poor policies may not go as far as one would wish from a developmental perspective, but the impact of the masses of the poor on domestic policy making is politically significant and cannot be ignored. This also provides some broader lessons for mitigation and adaptation policies in developing countries: politicians respond to incentives and support will only reach the needy if the appropriate incentives are in place. While we observe some significant commitment and implementation problems even in a democratic country like India, such problems must be expected to be even more serious elsewhere. This should not be overlooked when designing institutions for the allocation of climate finance, such as the Green Climate Fund.     

Why are climate policies of the present decade so crucial for keeping the 2 °C target credible?

Decision-makers have confirmed the long term objective of preventing a temperature increase greater than 2 °C. This paper aims at appraising by means of a cost-benefit analysis whether decision makers’ commitment to meet the 2 °C objective is credible or not. Within the framework of a cost-benefit type integrated assessment model, we consider that the economy faces climate damages with a threshold at 2 °C. We run the model for a broad set of scenarios accounting for the diversity of “worldviews” in the climate debate. For a significant share of scenarios we observe that it is considered optimal to exceed the threshold. Among those “non-compliers” we discriminate ”involuntary non-compliers” who cannot avoid the exceedance due to physical constraint from ”deliberate compliers” for whom the exceedance results from a deliberate costs-benefit analysis. A second result is that the later mitigation efforts begin, the more difficult it becomes to prevent the exceedance. In particular, the number of ”deliberate non-compliers” dramatically increases if mitigation efforts do not start by 2020, and the influx of involuntary non-compliers become overwhelming f efforts are delayed to 2040. In light of these results we argue that the window of opportunity for reaching the 2 °C objective with a credible chance of success is rapidly closing during the present decade. Further delay in finding a climate agreement critically undermines the credibility of the objective.     

Climate mitigation finance across developing countries: what are the major determinants?

This empirical study assesses the relationship between the characteristics of developing countries and the amount of official climate mitigation finance inflow. A two-part model and robustness checks were used to analyse 1998–2010 Rio Marker data on 180 developing countries. The results show that developing countries with higher CO₂ intensity, larger carbon sinks, lower per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and good governance tend to be selected as recipients of climate mitigation finance, and receive more of it. CO₂ emission is not used as a determinant of mitigation finance until the actual financial disbursement. Poverty aid tends to be allocated to countries with low CO₂ emissions, possibly to avoid diverting aid from poorer developing countries. However, such a diversion is unavoidable if the share of mitigation finance in climate finance and in overall official development assistance (ODA) continues to escalate. This study calls for an equitable allocation of total ODA mitigation and adaptation finance in addition to the 0.7% ODA/gross national income target, and for transparent criteria and the verification of reporting on the allocation of mitigation finance.     

Declining impacts of hot spells on mortality in the Czech Republic, 1986–2009: adaptation to climate change?

The study examines temporal changes in mortality associated with spells of large positive temperature anomalies (hot spells) in extended summer season in the population of the Czech Republic (Central Europe) during 1986?C2009. Declining trends in the mortality impacts are found in spite of rising temperature trends. The finding remains unchanged if possible confounding effects of within-season acclimatization to heat and the mortality displacement effect are taken into account. Recent positive socioeconomic development, following the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, and better public awareness of heat-related risks are likely the primary causes of the declining vulnerability. The results suggest that climate change may have relatively little influence on heat-related deaths, since changes in other factors that affect vulnerability of the population are dominant instead of temperature trends. It is essential to better understand the observed nonstationarity of the temperature-mortality relationship and the role of adaptation and its limits, both physiological and technological, and to address associated uncertainties in studies dealing with climate change projections of temperature-related mortality.     

Facilitating adaptation of biodiversity to climate change: a conceptual framework applied to the world’s largest Mediterranean-climate woodland

The importance of ecological management for reducing the vulnerability of biodiversity to climate change is increasingly recognized, yet frameworks to facilitate a structured approach to climate adaptation management are lacking. We developed a conceptual framework that can guide identification of climate change impacts and adaptive management options in a given region or biome. The framework focuses on potential points of early climate change impact, and organizes these along two main axes. First, it recognizes that climate change can act at a range of ecological scales. Secondly, it emphasizes that outcomes are dependent on two potentially interacting and countervailing forces: (1) changes to environmental parameters and ecological processes brought about by climate change, and (2) responses of component systems as determined by attributes of resistance and resilience. Through this structure, the framework draws together a broad range of ecological concepts, with a novel emphasis on attributes of resistance and resilience that can temper the response of species, ecosystems and landscapes to climate change. We applied the framework to the world’s largest remaining Mediterranean-climate woodland, the ‘Great Western Woodlands’ of south-western Australia. In this relatively intact region, maintaining inherent resistance and resilience by preventing anthropogenic degradation is of highest priority and lowest risk. Limited, higher risk options such as fire management, protection of refugia and translocation of adaptive genes may be justifiable under more extreme change, hence our capacity to predict the extent of change strongly impinges on such management decisions. These conclusions may contrast with similar analyses in degraded landscapes, where natural integrity is already compromised, and existing investment in restoration may facilitate experimentation with higher risk?options.     

How are healthy,working populations affected by increasing temperatures in the tropics? Implications for climate change adaptation policies

Climate change and land use change are increasing average and extreme temperatures. Hotter temperatures can detrimentally affect workers’ health and their economic productivity and livelihoods, especially in rural areas in industrializing countries that may be more vulnerable and less resilient. A growing literature has examined these factors at large spatial scales, yet few studies have done so at finer scales. Micro-level data from developing regions is needed to understand the extent of heat exposure, as well as current and future adaptation strategies of working, healthy, and rural populations. We fill this gap using objective environmental measurements from 3M^TM Questemp^TM 46 Heat Stress Monitors, as well as survey data from working, healthy, and rural communities in East Kalimantan, Indonesia. Our data contain two groups: those who work in only open areas, and those who work in both forests and open areas. We document workers’ livelihood strategies, work schedules, perceptions of how temperatures impact their work, and future adaptation strategies for even hotter days. Ambient temperatures are 2.6–8.3 °C cooler in forests compared to open areas, indicating the temperature effects of deforestation can be immediate and significant. Those working only in open areas face up to 6.5 h of exposure to temperatures above the accepted Threshold Limit Value for worker well-being. Workers adapt to hotter temperatures by altering the timing of their work shifts and breaks, indicating our sample is already adapting to increasing temperatures from climate and land use change. We also find differential adaptation strategies between those working only in open areas compared to those working in both forests and open areas, suggesting current acclimatization may be a factor in how people adapt. Our results suggest the need for adaptation and mitigation policies tailored to the unique constraints of rural workers that specifically incorporate extant adaptation strategies.     

Dealing with displacement: Can “social protection” facilitate long-term adaptation to climate change?

This article explores the possibilities of using social protection to manage and reduce the risks of forced displacement resulting from climate change. It reviews the relevant literature on migration, disasters and climate change, and constructs a model through which international policies may be used to encourage resettlement options that support the capabilities and entitlements of poor and vulnerable populations. By distinguishing between rapid-onset disasters and long-term environmental change, it explores the ways in which cash transfers, asset transfers and conditional cash transfers may be used to break the cycle of vulnerability, destitution and distress migration that can occur during times of severe environmental stress. An important distinction is made between “economic migration,” which implies that households have at their disposal an opportunity to engage in forward-looking analysis about the ways in which they will invest household resources and “distress migration,” which implies that household decisions about investment and migration are largely ad hoc responses to external environmental processes and events. The article reviews recent discussions about the prospects of revising the international refugee regime, and identifies the opportunities and challenges of using social protection to support household decisions that can facilitate economic migration over the long-term.     

The climate change research that makes the front page: Is it fit to engage societal action?

By growing awareness for and interest in climate change, media coverage enlarges the window of opportunity by which research can engage individuals and collectives in climate actions. However, we question whether the climate change research that gets mediatized is fit for this challenge. From a survey of the 51,230 scientific articles published in 2020 on climate change, we show that the news media preferentially publicizes research outputs found in multidisciplinary journals and journals perceived as top-tier. An in-depth analysis of the content of the top-100 mediatized papers, in comparison to a random subset, reveals that news media showcases a narrow and limited facet of climate change knowledge (i.e., natural science and health). News media selectivity reduces climate change research to the role of a sentinel and whistleblower for the large-scale, observed, or end-of-century consequences of climate change for natural Earth system components. The social, economic, technological, and energy aspects of climate change are curtailed through mediatization, as well as local and short-term scales of processes and solutions. Reviewing the social psychological mechanisms that underlie behavioral change, we challenge the current criteria used to judge newsworthiness and argue that the consequent mediatization of climate change research fails to breed real society engagement in actions. A transformative agenda for the mediatization of climate change research implies aligning newsworthiness with news effectiveness, i.e., addressing the extent to which communication is effective in presenting research that is likely to produce behavioral change.     

Climate change response in Europe: what’s the reality? Analysis of adaptation and mitigation plans from 200 urban areas in 11 countries

Urban areas are pivotal to global adaptation and mitigation efforts. But how do cities actually perform in terms of climate change response? This study sheds light on the state of urban climate change adaptation and mitigation planning across Europe. Europe is an excellent test case given its advanced environmental policies and high urbanization. We performed a detailed analysis of 200 large and medium-sized cities across 11 European countries and analysed the cities’ climate change adaptation and mitigation plans. We investigate the regional distribution of plans, adaptation and mitigation foci and the extent to which planned greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions contribute to national and international climate objectives. To our knowledge, it is the first study of its kind as it does not rely on self-assessment (questionnaires or social surveys). Our results show that 35 % of European cities studied have no dedicated mitigation plan and 72 % have no adaptation plan. No city has an adaptation plan without a mitigation plan. One quarter of the cities have both an adaptation and a mitigation plan and set quantitative GHG reduction targets, but those vary extensively in scope and ambition. Furthermore, we show that if the planned actions within cities are nationally representative the 11 countries investigated would achieve a 37 % reduction in GHG emissions by 2050, translating into a 27 % reduction in GHG emissions for the EU as a whole. However, the actions would often be insufficient to reach national targets and fall short of the 80 % reduction in GHG emissions recommended to avoid global mean temperature rising by 2 °C above pre-industrial levels.     

Adaptation action and research in glaciated mountain systems: Are they enough to meet the challenge of climate change?

The challenge of climate change in glaciated mountain systems is significant and cannot be met without adaptation actions and research that addresses the interwoven scientific, human, and socio-ecological dimensions of climate change. However, our understanding of the effectiveness of existing efforts in meeting this challenge is lacking, a shortcoming compounded by a lack of consistent and comparable information about adaptation action and research in glaciated mountain systems. This study develops a typology of the challenge of climate change in glaciated mountain systems and uses formal systematic review methods to critically evaluate existing adaptation actions and research in light of this framework. Our results––based on an evaluation of 170 English-language peer-reviewed and grey literature documents––indicate that socially-relevant climate-related changes are already manifesting in glaciated mountain systems, with the most commonly documented stimuli for adaptation being hydrological changes related to the degradation of the high mountain cryosphere. Some degree of adaptation action has occurred in 78% of countries with glaciated mountain ranges, but most adaptations are reactions to experienced climatic stimuli and carried out without guidance from a formal adaptation plan. The study also identified the emergence of explicitly mountain-focused adaptation research, yet studies framed in this way are still relatively scarce and have only been carried out in about half of the countries with glaciated mountain ranges. Although we document several laudable adaptation action and research efforts, few initiatives are adequately addressing the difficulties outlined in our evaluation framework for the challenge of climate change. The study discusses the consequences of observed shortcomings and identifies recommendations for more fully meeting the challenge of climate change in glaciated mountain systems.     

What (science for) adaptation to climate change in Colombian agriculture? A commentary on “A way forward on adaptation to climate change in Colombian agriculture: perspectives towards 2050” by J. Ramirez-Villegas, M. Salazar, A. Jarvis, C. E. Navarro-Valcines

Climate change is putting Colombian agriculture under significant stress and, if no adaptation is made, the latter will be severely impacted during the next decades. Ramirez-Villegas et al. (2012) set out a government-led, top-down, techno-scientific proposal for a way forward by which Colombian agriculture could adapt to climate change. However, this proposal largely overlooks the root causes of vulnerability of Colombian agriculture, and of smallholders in particular. I discuss some of the hidden assumptions underpinning this proposal and of the arguments employed by Ramirez-Villegas et al., based on existing literature on Colombian agriculture and the wider scientific debate on adaptation to climate change. While technical measures may play an important role in the adaptation of Colombian agriculture to climate change, I question whether these actions alone truly represent priority issues, especially for smallholders. I suggest that by i) looking at vulnerability before adaptation, ii) contextualising climate change as one of multiple exposures, and iii) truly putting smallholders at the centre of adaptation, i.e. to learn about and with them, different and perhaps more urgent priorities for action can be identified. Ultimately, I argue that what is at stake is not only a list of adaptation measures but, more importantly, the scientific approach from which priorities for action are identified. In this respect, I propose that transformative rather than technical fix adaptation represents a better approach for Colombian agriculture and smallholders in particular, in the face of climate change.